INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SENATE REWIilTlnN 91
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
VOLUME 2
HUSTON PLAN
SEPTEMBER 23, 24, AND 25, 1975
Printed for the use of the Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-6M O WASHINGTON : 1976
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $4.00
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUD* ^OVEKNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTTVIJ.I&B
PBANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman
JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman
PHTTTP A HART Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee
SrVmS Minnesota ^^f^^^^Z Havana
IS MO r N 0L L S rCa^r y SS5E rCHW^KER, PennsWanU
GARY HART, Colorado
William G. Miller, Staff Director
Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel
Curtis R Smothers, Counsel to the Minority
Audrey Hatry, Clerk of the Committee
<n)
CONTENTS
HEARING DAYS
Page
Tuesday, September 23, 1975 3
Wednesday, September 24, 1975 51
Thursday, September 25, 1975 95
LIST OF WITNESSES
Tuesday, September 23, 1975
Huston, Tom Charles, former Associate Counsel and Staff Assistant to
President Richard M. Nixon 3
Wednesday, Septembeb 24, 1975
Angleton, James, former Central Intelligence Agency official, accompanied
by John T. Brown, Counsel 52
Thursday, Septembeb 25, 1975
Brennan, Charles, former Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, Domestic Intelligence Division 96
HEARINGS EXHIBITS 1
No. 1 — Special Report, Interagency Committee on Intelligence (ad hoc),
Chairman J. Edgar Hoover, June, 1970, the "Huston Plan" 141
No. 2 — July 1970 memorandum to H. R. Haldeman from Tom Charles
Huston; Subject: Domestic Intelligence Review 189
No. 3 — July 14, 1970 memorandum to Tom Charles Huston from H. R.
Haldeman; Subject: Domestic Intelligence Review 198
No. 4 — July 23, 1970 memorandum to Richard Helms from Tom Charles
Huston ; Subject : Domestic Intelligence 199
No. 5 — June 20, 1969 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William
C. Sullivan ; Subject : Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the
President 203
No. 6 — June 20, 1969 memorandum to the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation from Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the
President 204
No. 7— June 30, 1969 memorandum to William C. Sullivan from Charles
D. Brennan ; Subject : Foreign Support for Revolutionary Protest
Movements in the United States 205
No. 8 — June 5, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William
C. Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Es-
tablished by the President, June 5, 1970) 207
No. 9 — June 5, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William C.
Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Estab-
lished by the President, June 5, 1970).
June 6, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William C.
Sullivan; Subject: Interagency Intelligence Committee (Estab-
lished by the President, June 5, 1970) 209
..u 1 U? dcr criteria determined by the Committee. In consultation with the White House,
the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, certain materials have been deleted from those
documents, some of which were previously classified, to maintain the internal operating
procedures of the agencies involved, and to protect Intelligence sources and methods.
* urther delitions were made with respect to protecting the privacy of certain Individuals
and groups. These deletions do not change the material content of these exhibits.
<m)
IV
No. 10— June 8, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William C. **&
Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Estab-
lished by the President, June 5, 1970), Meeting in the Director's
Office, 11 a.m.. June 8, 1970. ' „.
June 8, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William C.
Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Estab-
lished by the President, June 5, 1970).
June 9, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William C.
Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Estab-
lished by the President, June 5, 1970) 213
No. 11 — June 10, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William C.
Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Estab-
lished by the President, June 5, 1970), Meeting of the Working
Subcommittee June 9, 1970 218
No. 12— Report on USIB (U.S. Inteligence Board) Subcommittee on Do-
mestic Intelligence 224
No. 13 — June 15, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William
C. Sullivan ; Subject: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Es-
tablished by the President June 5, 1970), Meeting of the Working
Subcommittee June 12, 1970 22 '
No. 14— June 19, 1970 agenda of the Working Subcommittee of the Inter-
agency Committee on Intelligence. June 19, 1970 minutes of the
Working Subcommittee of the Interagency Committee on Intelli-
gence :
No. 15-^June 19, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William
C. Sullivan; Subject: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Es-
tablished by the President June 5, 1970), Meeting of the Working
Subcommittee June 18, 1970 235
No. 16-^June 20, 1970 memorandum to Clyde A. Tolson from William C.
Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Estab-
lished by the President, June 5, 1970) 2 s7
No. 17-^June 19, 1970 agenda of the Working Subcommittee of the Inter-
agency Committee on Intelligence. June 24, 1970 memorandum to
Clyde A. Tolson from William C. Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency
Committee on Intelligence (ad hoc), (Established by the Presi-
dent, June 5, 1970) — -- 240
No. 18-^June 26, 1970 memorandum to Clyde A. Tolson from William C.
Sullivan; Subject: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (ad
hoc), (Established by the President, June 5, 1970). June 25, 1970
letter to the President 24 *>
No 19-^July 9, 1970 memorandum to Richard Helms from Tom Charles
Huston; Subject: Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security
Affairs 246
No. 20 — July 28," 1970 memorandum for the Record from Richard Helms ;
Subject : Discussion with Attorney General Mitchell on Domestic
Intelligence vr~r~ _ .r
No 21 — July 28, 1970 memorandum to George. McManis from Richard
Helms 248
No. 22— August 5, 1970 memorandum to H. R. Haldeman from Tom Charles
Huston ; Subject : Domestic Intelligence 249
No. 23— August 7, 1970 memorandum to H. R. Haldeman from Tom Charles
Huston; Subject: Domestic Intelligence Review 254
No. 24— September 18, 1970 memorandum to the Attorney General from
John Dean — - — 255
No 25 — December 4, 1970 memorandum to the Attorney General from
Robert C. Mardian ; Subject : Intelligence Evaluation Committee
Status Report 258
No. 26— February 3, 1970 memorandum to Assistant Attorney General,
Internal Security Division from Director, FBI ; Subject : Intelli-
gence Evaluation Committee, Internal Security— Miscellaneous.
February 10, 1971 memorandum to George C. Moore, Benson Buff-
ham, Thomas J. Kellfy, Col. John W. Downey, and Richard Ober
from Robert C. Mardian ; Subject : Intelligence Evaluation Com-
mittee 261
No. 27 — February 12, 1971 memorandum to the Attorney General from Page
Robert 0, Mardian ; Subject : Intelligence Evaluation Committee 265
No. 28 — June 11, 1973 memorandum to Col. Werner E. Micherirom Henry *"~
E - Petersen; Subject: Intelligence Evaluation Committee 266
No. 29— January 19, 1971 unsigned memorandum to John Mitchell, John
Ehrlichman, and H. B. Haldeman 267
No. 30— March 25, 1971 memorandum to Charles D. Brennan from" W.
Baymond Wannall; Subject: Director's Meeting March 31, 1971
•with the Attorney General, Mr. Bichard Helms and Adm. Noel
Gayler. March 29, 1971, memorandum to Charles D. Brennan from
•W. Baymond Wannall; Subject: Director's Meeting March 31,
•1971, with Attorney General, Bichard Helms and Adm. Noel
Gayler 268
No. 31 — April 12, 1971 memorandum for the files from J. Edgar Hoover__ 272
No. 32 — July 19, 1966 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William
C. Sullivan ; Subject : "Black Bag" Jobs 273
No. 33— January 6, 1967 memorandum to Clyde A. Tolson and Cartha D.
DeLoach from J. Edgar Hoover 276
No. 34— September 24, 1975 letter to Senator Frank Church from Michael
E. Shaheen, Jr., with September 23, 1975 attachment entitled:
Surreptitious Entries — Domestic Targets— _ 277
No. 35— May 9, 1975 letter to Hugh K. Kline from John C. Keeney ; Sub-
ject: United States v. Ehrlichman 281
No. 36— February 26, 1970 letter to J. Edgar Hoover from Bichard Helms" 283
No. 37— February 26, 1970 letter to Egil Krogh with attached memo-
randum _ 287
No. 38 — March 12, 1970 memorandum to William C. Sullivan fromCharles
D. Brennan ; Subject : New Left Movement— Finances— IS— Mis-
cellaneous 309
No. 39— March 16, 1970 memorandum to Special Agent in Charge, Albany
from the Director, FBI; Subject: New Left Movement— Fi-
nances — IS — Miscellaneous 311
No. 40— July 27, 1970 memorandum to the Attorney General" from" the
tvt a- 5 irector- FBI ; Subject: Interagency Committee on Intelligence— 313
No. 41— October 29, 1970 memorandum to Clyde Tolson; Subject: Execu-
tives Conference — October 29, 1970 317
No. 42— November 3, 1970 memorandum to Charles D. Brennan from
George C. Moore; Subject: Black Student Groups on College Cam-
puses, Bacial Matters; with attached November 4, 1970 memo-
randum to Special Agent in Charge, Albany from the Director,
FBI ; Subject : Black Student Groups on College Campuses, Bacial
Matters 390
No. 43— November 3, 1970 memorandum to"~Charles~D. Brennan" "from
Bobert L. Shackleford ; Subject : Security Investigations of Indi-
viduals who are Members of the Students for a Democratic So-
ciety and Militant New Left Campus Organizations ; with attached
November 4, 1970 memorandum to Special Agent in Charge Al-
bany from the Director, FBI ; Subject : Security Investigations of
Individuals who are Members of the Students for a Democratic
Society and Militant New Left Campus Organizations— 325
No. 44— September 2, 1970 memorandum to Clyde Tolson from W. Mark
Felt ; Subject : Security Informants, Bacial Informants
September 15, 1970 SAC (Special Agent in Charge) letter from
J. Edgar Hoover 32g
No. 45— November 2, 1970 memorandum to Charles d" Brennan from
George C. Moore ; Subject : Racial Conference, October 22-23 1970
Becommendation to Modify Instructions Concerning Becordings of
Black and New Left Public Appearances ; with attached Novem-
ber 5, 1970 memorandum to Special Agent in Charge, Albany from
the Director, FBI ; Subject : Use of Concealed Becording Devices
in Covering Public Appearances by Black and New Left Extrem-
lSCS __ QQA'
No. 46— December 22, 1970 memorandum t"o"Cn"a"r"les"D.""Brennan""from
George C. Moore; Subject: Key Black Extremist Program, Bacial
Matters; with attached December 23, 1970 memorandum to Spe-
cial Agent in Charge, Albany from the Director, FBI ; Subject •
Key Black Extremist Program, Bacial Matters— _ 338
VI
Page
No. 47— February 26, 1970 letter to J. Edgar Hoover from Richard Helms— 342
No. 48 — March 6, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William
O. Sullivan; Subject: Relationships with Central Intelligence
Agency (Positive Intelligence) 346
No. 49 — March 7, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. LeLoach from William
C. Sullivan; Subject: Relationships with CIA, The President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and John McCone 348
No. 50— March 20, 1970 letter to J. Edgar Hoover from Richard Helms— 349
No. 51 — March 31, 1970 letter to Richard Helms from J. Edgar Hoover— 354
No. 52 — April 14, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. LeLoach from William
C. Sullivan ; Subject : Relations with Central Intelligence Agency- 357
No. 53 — November 21, 1965 memorandum to Chief of Operations from
James Angleton; Subject: Project HTLINGUAL 359
No. 54 — March 10, 1972 memorandum to James Angleton from J. Edgar
Hoover; Subject: Hunter Project 362
No. 55 — April 8, 1969 CIA Memorandum for the record ; Subject :
HTLINGUAL 363
No. 56 — May 19, 1971 memorandum for the record ; Subject : DCI's Meet-
ing Concerning HTLINGUAL 365
No. 57 — June 3, 1971 Memorandum for the record; Subject: Meeting at
DCI's Office Concerning HTLINGUAL 368
No. 58 — July 22, 1971 Memorandum for the record from Deputy Director
of Security (IOS) ; Subject: Project SRPOINTER 370
No. 59 — February 15, 1973 Memorandum for the record from William E.
Colby; Subject: Mail Intercept Program; with attached Febru-
ary 14, 1973 talking paper ; Subject : Mail Intercept Program 372
No. 60— Title 18 of the United States Code: Crimes and Criminal Proce-
dure, pp. 4322-23 387
No. 61 — May 18, 1973 memorandum from James Angleton ; Subject : Inter-
agency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), Chairman J. Edgar
Hoover, June 1970. July 9, 1970 memorandum to Richard Helms
from Tom Charles Huston; Subject: Domestic Intelligence and
Internal Security Affairs 389
No. 62— September 21, 1970 memorandum to H. R. Haldeman from Tom
Charles Huston; Subject: IRS and Ideological Organizations 395
No. 63 — Presidential Talking Paper for meeting with J. Edgar Hoover,
Richard Helms, Lt. Gen. Donald Bennett and Adm. Noel Gayler— 396
No 64— April 8, 1970 memorandum for file from D. O. Virdin ; Subject :
Students for a Democratic Society— List of Contributors 400
No 65— February 18, 1969 memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger from
Richard Helms; Subject: Student Unrest. September 4, 1968
memorandum for The President 401
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES— HUSTON PLAN
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1975
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee To Study Governmental, Operations
With Kesfect to Intelligence Activities,
Washington, B.C.
The committee met pursuant to notice at 10 :05 a.m., in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Hart
(Colorado), Baker, Goldwater, Mathias, and Schweiker.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O.
Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the
minority.
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.
The end of our involvement in Vietnam brought to a close a tragic
and turbulent chapter in American history. In Southeast Asia, well
over 50,000 American soldiers lost their lives.
Here at home, massive antiwar demonstrations filled the streets. At
Kent State and Jackson State, college students were shot down as they
protested the policies of their Government.
Just as the country was obsessed by Vietnam, so too the White House
became transfixed by the wave of domestic protest that swept the
country. On June 5, 1970, President Nixon called in J. Edgar Hoover
of the FBI, Richard Helms of the CIA, and others from the military
intelligence agencies. He charged them with getting better informa-
tion on domestic dissenters, and directed them to determine whether
they were subject to foreign influence.
After a series of meetings throughout June 1970, a special report
was prepared for the President. It set forth several options which
ranged from the innocuous to the extreme, from doing nothing to
violating the civil liberties of American citizens. In a memorandum,
White House aide Tom Charles Huston recommended the extreme op-
tions to the President. These recommendations have become known
as the Huston plan. The President approved the plan, and it was sent
to the FBI, the CIA, and the military intelligence agencies for
implementation.
Some provisions of the plan were clearly unconstitutional; others
violated Federal statutes. As the distinguished American journalist
Theodore White has observed, the Huston plan would have permitted
Federal authorities to reach "all the way to every mailbox, every col-
lege camous, every teleohone. every home."
Five days after the President approved the plan, he revoked it at
the insistence of the FBI Director and the Attorney General — to the
(1)
dismay of those CIA, NSA, and FBI representatives -who had helped
Huston develop it.
All this is apart of the public record, thanks to Senator Sam ErvhVs
hearings on Watergate. Yet, the matter does not rest here. Our investi-
gations have revealed that the Huston plan itself was only an episode
in the lawlessness which preceded and followed its brief existence.
First, we have discovered that unlawful mail openings were being
conducted long before the President was asked to authorize them in
June 1970. The President and Mr. Huston, it appears, were deceived
by the intelligence officials.
Second even though the President revoked his approval of the
Huston plan, the intelligence agencies paid no heed to the revocation.
Instead, they continued the very practices for which they had sought
presidential authority, expanding some of them and reinstating others
which had been abolished years before. As in the case of the shellfish
toxin, the decision of the President seemed to matter little.
Finally, the Huston plan, as we now know, must be viewed as but
one episode in a continuous effort by the intelligence agencies to secure
the sanction of higher authority for expanded surveillance at home
and abroad.
As these hearings will reveal, the leaders of the CIA and individuals
within the FBI continued to seek official blessing for the very wrongs
envisaged in the Huston plan.
We open this public inquiry to reveal these dangers, and to begin the
task of countering the erosion of our freedoms as American citizens.
Senator Tower?
Senator Tower. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I think the hearings that we are about to undertake
raise some of the fundamental issues that exist in an open society
governed by the Constitution which guarantees certain basic rights to
its citizenry.
We get to the point where we have to determine the extent to which
the individual liberties and the rights of individuals must be protected
by Government, rather than infringed on by Government. We also
^explore the question of the extent to which Government is able to
protect-its^citizens from those who would jeopardize their lives, their
safety, or threaten their property.
The question is whether or not our system provides the climate in
which too much surveillance of individual citizens can occur, or
whether, in given situations, perhaps the proscriptions of the law are
an inhibition on effective law enforcement, and the restraint of those
who would engage in violence against the peace and security of our
society.
I think this is brought sharply into focus by the fact that there have
been two attempts made on the life of the President of the United
States in the last 17 days. There is no question that Government,
or agencies thereof, in the instances we are going to investigate, has
infringed on the rights of its citizens.
I am wondering, however, that if laws that are set up for the general
governance of the citizenry in terms of the preservation of law and
order might not, from time to time, carry some exceptions so that we
can afford reasonable protection to the President of the United States
and others who are set in governance over our people. I think these
hearings could bs vst 17 useful and Productive Thank '"ou Mr. Chair-
man.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Tower.
I might say that with reference to this second attempt on the life
of the President, I have been asked what this committee intends in con-
nection with its mandate to investigate, not only the CIA and the FBI,
but also, the Secret Service, and all other Federal agencies connected
with law enforcement or intelligence activities.
It is my view, as chairman of the committee, that while the com-
mittee itself will have to consider its proper role, it should certainly
look very carefully at the way that the CIA, the FBI, and the Secret
Service coordinates. Any intelligence information that might consti-
tute a possible threat to the President, or any other high official of the
Government, should be passed between them, and procedures then
should be followed to carry out tjhe responsibility to protect the Presi-
dent. This is a matter that clearly falls within the mandate of this
committee, and I would hope that the committee would want to look
very carefully into that aspect of the general question of protecting
the President.
Now, our first witness this morning is Mr. Huston. I wonder if you
will stand and take the oath. Do you solemnly swear that all of the
testimony you give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Huston. I do.
The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning.
TESTIMONY OF TOM CHARLES HUSTON, FORMER ASSOCIATE
COUNSEL AND STAFF ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT RICHARD M.
NIXON
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Huston, were you employed in the White House
as of 1970?
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
Mr. Schwarz. Prior to that time, had you been employed in the
White House and had you worked on intelligence matters?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. Prior to June 1970, had you had numerous conversa-
tions with Mr. William Sullivan of the FBI ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. In the course of those conversations had you dis-
cussed inhibitions upon intelligence collections?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And did he take the position that the FBI was being
unduly inhibited in its efforts to collect intelligence on domestic radi-
cals and other groups in this country ?
Mr. Huston. I think it was his opinion that the Bureau was operat-
ing under restraints ; yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And by operating under restraints, what do you
mean ?
Mr. Huston. That they did not have available for use the tools that
they felt were necessary to do the job.
Mr Schwarz. Did President Nixon call a meeting in his office on
June 5, 1970, to discuss with the heads of the. intelligence agencies the
subject of restraints upon intelligence collection A
Mr Huston. The President did not really touch on -jure. detail on
restrains He was more concerned with making sure that the mtelb,
gence community was aware of the seriousness with which he viewed
the escalating level of revolutionary violence. nmm „ n \^, tn do
Mr. Schwarz. And what did he ask the intelligence community to do
ab Mr. Huston e He directed that each of the agencies should join under
a committee, and a committee to be chaired by Mr Hoover, which
would prepare a report for him which would cover three areas. *irst,
it should have a threat assessment; second, it should specify the vari-
ous restraints under which the agencies thought they were operating
that hindered them; and, third, it should contain a series of options ot
how to deal with these various restraints which would enable him to
make a decision.
Mr. Schwarz. Who was present at that meeting l - ,
Mr. Huston. Mr. Hoover, Mr. Helms, Admiral Gayler, general
Bennett, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Erlichman, Mr. Finch, and myselt.
Mr Schwarz. Mr. Hoover was head of the FBI; Mr. Helms was
head of the CIA. What position did Admiral Gayler hold?
Mr. Huston. Director of the National Security Agency.
Mr. Schwarz. And what position did General Bennett hold*
Mr. Huston. Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Mr. Schwarz. All right. Following the meeting in the President s
office, did you and the agencies proceed to hold a number of meetings
on the subjects which the President had directed you to discuss?
Mr. Huston. Yes. .
Mr. Schwarz. Did you meet with the heads of the agencies, or with
second-level people in the agencies?
Mr. Huston. There were two meetings among the heads of the agen-
cies in addition to the meeting with the President. But the bulk of the
activity was undertaken by a working group consisting of second-level
people.
Mr. Schwarz. All right. The first meeting that took place with the
heads of the agencies was in Mr. Hoover's office?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And did Mr. Hoover, in the first instance, ask the
other agency heads to do what the President had asked them to do,
or did he seek to go down another course?
Mr. Huston. It was my opinion that he was heading down a course
different from that that the President had outlined.
Mr. Schwarz. And how did Mr. Hoover's first proposal differ from
that which the President had asked the representatives to do?
Mr. Huston. Mr. Hoover indicated that he was under the impres-
sion that what the President wanted was a historical overview of the
problem of revolutionary violence.
Mr. Schwarz. And instead, what did the President want?
Mr. Huston. Well, as I said to Mr. Hoover, it was my understand-
ing the President was less interested in the past than in the future,
and that he was concerned about the problems that may come up, and
what could be done to deal with them.
Mr. Schwaez. And he was also concerned in knowing what re-
straints were being applied to the power of the agencies to collect
information on Americans, is that right ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. Did the working group proceed to investigate that
question of what restraints were being placed upon the intelligence
community in their efforts to collect information on American citizens?
Mr. Huston. That was my impression, yes.
Mr. Schwarz. Who chaired the working group ?
Mr. Huston. Mr. Sullivan.
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Sullivan of the FBI ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. There were representatives, also, from the CIA?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And those persons were Mr. Angleton and Mr. Ober,
is that correct ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And then there were representatives from the NSA?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And the DIA?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence
community, is that right?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And in addition to Mr. Sullivan from the FBI,
there were other FBI personnel such as Mr. Brennan, is that right?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. How many meetings did the working group have?
Mr. Huston. I am unclear. It seems to me there were three, maybe
four.
Mr. Schwarz. Stemming from those three or four meetings, did you
come up with a report?
Mr. Huston. Yes. A draft report was prepared by the committee.
Mr. Schwarz. Was it prepared by the committee and approved by
the entire working group ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. What happened then? Was it submitted to the Di-
rectors for their signatures?
Mr. Huston. Well, it was submitted to three of the four Directors
for their approval.
Mr. Schwarz. To which three was it submitted in the first instance?
Mr. Huston. To Admiral Gayler, General Bennett, and Mr. Helms.
Mr. Schwarz. Now, you picked those three out and not Mr. Hoover.
"Why was it submitted to the three Directors, other than Mr. Hoover,
before being submitted to Mr. Hoover ?
Mr. Huston. Because the Bureau personnel on the committee felt
that if they took the report back to Mr. Hoover, that he would go
completely— he would refuse to go along with it, and they felt that,
tactically, if they went to him and said, the report has already been
approved by the other three Directors, that perhaps he would then
acquiesce.
6
Mr. Schwarz. Now, in saying Bureau personnel on the committee,
do you mean Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Brennan ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. What was your understanding of why they believed
Mr. Hoover might resist the proposals?
Mr. Huston. I think they were concerned that Mr. Hoover would
not appreciate anyone outside the Bureau commenting upon the way
in which the Bureau conducted its domestic intelligence operations.
Mr. Schwarz. So your understanding was that Mr. Hoover's sub-
ordinates themselves felt that the restraints which were being placed
upon the intelligence agencies were excessive on the one hand, but felt
that Mr. Hoover, for bureaucratic or personal pride reasons, would not
agree with any proposals to change or eliminate those restraints. Is
that right? . T A , . , -.
Mr. Huston. Well, I think it went beyond restraints. I think it
went to the entire purpose of the report, particularly to the recom-
mendation for a continuing, permanent, interagency committee.
Mr. Schwarz. Did you have a view as to what they thought Mr.
Hoover's attitude would be toward that part of the report dealing
with restraints ?
Mr. Huston. Well, I think their attitude was that he would be
opposed to any change whatsoever in the way in which the Bureau was
operating. . , . ,
Mr. Schwarz. Whereas they favored changing the restraints which
they thought were inhibiting the Bureau's ability to collect intelligence
on American citizens ?
Mr. Huston. That was certainly my impression ; yes.
Mr. Schwarz. That was clearly your impression?
Mr. Huston. Yes ; it was. ,.,... . x^i j ua ■ -\
Mr. Schwarz. The document which is exhibit 1 * is entitled Special
Keport, Interagency Committee on Intelligence, (Ad Hoc) , Chairman,
J. Edgar Hoover, June 1970." Was this document signed by the four
intelligence community directors ? . .
Mr. Huston. I do not have exhibit 1, but I will assume that it is.
The Chairman. Well, let us get you the exhibit.
Mr. Schwarz. In any event, are you aware that certain footnotes
were affixed reflecting Mr. Hoover's disagreement with certain
language in the reports?
Mr. Huston. Yes. _ ,
Mr. Schwarz. When were Mr. Hoover's footnotes affixed? Were they
affixed before the three other Directors approved, or were they affixed
after the three other Directors approved ?
Mr. Huston. After. ..
Mr. Schwarz. So Admiral Gavler, Director Helms and (general
Bennett approved the report prior to any footnotes that Mr. Hoover
inserted ; is that correct ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. All right. Now, have you seen exhibit 1 (
Mr. Huston. Yes. ,, ,, ,
Mr. Schwarz. Is that the document which was approved by the four
Directors?
Mr. Huston. Yes, with the deletions that are
i See p. 141.
Mr. Schwarz. The deletions^ which are for
Mr. Huston [continuing]. For security reasons.
Mr. Schwarz [continuing]. For security reasons which are
disclosed ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. What was the attitude of Messrs. Helms, Gayler,
and Bennett when they discovered that Director Hoover was affixing
footnotes to the report which the entire intelligence community had,
prior to then, agreed to ?
Mr. Huston. I do not recall Mr. Helms having any comment.
Admiral Gayler called me and was very upset. General Bennett called
me and was very upset. They wanted to either have another meeting
among the Directors and demand that the footnotes be withdrawn, or
else they wanted to insert their own footnotes saying that they favored
certain things.
I was very much interested in not creating any difficulties with Mr.
Hoover that could at all be avoided, and I told both General Bennett
and Admiral Gayler that I thought it was unnecessary for them to
take such action ; that in my cover memorandum to the President, I
would set forth their views as they had expressed them to me, and that
I would appreciate it if they would not raise this question with the
Director.
Mr. Schwarz. So their position, in summary, was that either the
Hoover footnotes should be eliminated, or they would like to insert
footnotes indicating that they approved the changes which Mr.
Hoover was indicating he disapproved. Is that correct ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. After the signing of the document which we have
identified as exhibit 1, did you submit to the President certain recom-
mendations with respect to the restraints on intelligence collection?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And have you got in front of you the document which
is exhibit 2 *?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And is that the document which you did submit to the
President?
Mr. Huston. Which I submitted to Mr. Haldeman for transmittal
to the President.
Mr. Schwarz. You submitted it to Mr. Haldeman for transmission
to the President ? Is that right ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And now, in that document, you make certain recom-
mendations with respect to changing restraints which you felt had
been placed upon intelligence collection; is that right?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. In making those recommendations, did you believe
you were representing the consensus of the entire working group that
had worked on the study for yourself and for the President?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. So that whatever recommendations you made with
respect to illegal opening of the mail, or burglary, or surreptitious
entry, were ones which you believe represented the views of the entire
» See p. 189.
8
intelligence community with the exception of the footnotes of Mr.
Hoover himself ; is that right ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. Now you did recommend, did you not, that the
United States should commence — in your view, commence — as you
understood it, commence or recommence, the illegal opening of mail.
Is that correct?
Mr. Huston. Yes. My understanding, from my contacts with the
Bureau and through the working committee, was that in the past, this
had been a technique that had been employed, particularly on matters
relating to espionage, and that the professional intelligence community
indicated that they thought it was a necessary technique to be under-
taken under extreme circumstances, and that they felt that they
should be authorized to do so.
Mr. Schwarz. Basing your views on the recommendations of the
entire intelligence community, except for Mr. Hoover's footnotes, you
also advocated that the United States should commence, or recom-
mence, to commit burglaries, to acquire valuable intelligence informa-
tion. Is that right ?
Mr. Huston. Yes. I was told that the Bureau had undertaken "black
bag" jobs for a number of years — up until 1966. That it had been suc-
cessful and valuable, again, particularly in matters involving
espionage. And that they felt this, again, was something that, given
the revolutionary climate, they thought they needed to have the
authority to do. ...
Mr. Schwarz. And in both cases, your position and their position
was, in effect, that the end justifies the means? ...
Mr. Huston. No. I'm not going to speak for what their position is,
but I do not think that fairly summarizes what my position was.
Mr. Schwarz. Well, I'm sure some of the other persons here are
going to question you on that issue.
Did President Nixon, through Mr. Haldeman, approve the recom-
mendations for change which you had made on behalf of the entire
intelligence community ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. What happened after that ?
Mr. Huston. The question then arose as to how the decisions were
to be implemented. I had recommended to Mr. Haldeman that I felt
that the President ought to call the Directors back into his office and
inform them personally of his decisions. It seemed to me that that was
a proper course to take, particularly in view of the sensitivity of the
decisions relative to Mr. Hoover.
However, the President and Mr. Haldeman did not think that that
was necessary, so then the question became how should a decision
memorandum go out. Mr. Haldeman seemed to think that it was not
necessary for either he or the President to do that, so I was nominated.
Mr. Schwarz. And you sent it out ?
Mr. Huston. Yes, I did. Over my signature.
Mr. Schwarz. You sent a memorandum indicating that the Presi-
dent had approved, and that the restraints that the intelligence com-
munity wished to have removed could now be removed, and they should
proceed with their business. Is that right ? N
9
TVTr TTrrcnrw "Well tooIItt +*U rt 4- 4-Xy^-^ ^U^-.1A «,»*« — J ±-~ ~~ i 1_
— •—■• -•"•.^•^j. *-*.•*• it wiij J.VUIUJI tai*i uxaoj oiaOculU. plUOCCU 1-1/ CUilltJ UHCii.
for a subsequent meeting of what would then become a permanent
interagency committee. And at that point, the methods of implementa-
tion would be discussed.
Mr. Schwakz. At that point, the methods of implementation would
be implemented ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. Now I just have two more questions, Mr. Huston,
having to do with the attitudes of the intelligence community in the
meetings that you attended with them.
First, I would like to read to you from exhibit 9 *, a document pre-
pared for Mr. Sullivan, for Mr. Hoover's first address to the Directors
after the President's meeting on June 5. And Mr. Sullivan proposed
this language :
Individually, those of us in the intelligence community are relatively small
and limited. Unified, our own combined potential is magnified and limitless. It
is through unity of action that we can tremendously increase our intelligence-
gathering potential, and, I am certain, obtain the answers the President wants.
Was that, in substance, the view of the intelligence community
with which you met?
Mr. Huston. Well, I do not know quite how to answer that. It
seemed to me the people at the working-group level felt that it was
important that there be a greater degree of community coordination
than there had been in the past, particularly, as you know, at that
time, the CIA and the FBI liaison had been terminated. So I think
there was a high degree of sensitivity at working-group level with
respect to interagency coordination.
Mr. Schwarz. In connection with your answer that that liaison had
been terminated, at the June 5 meeting, was the President told that,
or was he told something inconsistent with that?
Mr. Huston. Well, I think he was told — well, the trouble with deal-
ing with these people is that what they say is not often so untrue as
it is misleading.
But, the President — I had told the President the problem that
existed as a result of Mr. Hoover terminating the liaison. When the
President asked Mr. Hoover and Mr. Helms, "Are you people getting
along, working well together?", and they both said, "Well yes, we're
doing very well", and I think both of them probably thought that was
an honest answer, because I think both of"them felt that they didn't
need to have any formal method of liaison.
Mr. Schwarz. One final question, Mr. Huston. Throughout the
meetings you had on this subject, did any person, other than
Mr. Hoover in the footnotes, suggest or argue that the activities being
proposed ought not to be done because they were either unconstitu-
tional or illegal ?
Mr. Huston. No.
Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further.
The Chairman. Mr. Smothers, do you have any questions?
Mr. Smothers. Yes, Mr. Chairman, just as a matter of brief inquiry.
Mr. Huston, I think we have so far the impression of your functioning
as the vehicle for transmission of the intelligence community's views
1 See p. 209.
10
to the President. I think it might be useful to inquire whether your
functions indeed went beyond that point.
Mr. Huston, during the time of this effort on the development of
the Huston plan, for whom did you work? Who was your immediate
superior ?
Mr. Huston. Until August of 1970, it would have been Jim Keogh.
I was assigned to the speech writing staff.
Mr. Smothers. Did you also work for Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Huston. Well, anyone who was on the White House staff
worked for Mr. Haldeman.
Mr. Smothers. Did you, from time to time, receive guidance from
Mr. Haldeman regarding the intelligence or investigative capabilities
desired by the President ?
Mr. Huston. No, not really. I don't think I received any guidance
from Mr. Haldeman on that until we got into this period on April or
June of 1970.
Mr. Smothers. Until you got into the period April and June 1970?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Mr. Smothers. What kind of guidance did you receive during the
April-June 1970 period?
Mr. Huston. We had discussions on the staff with Mr. Haldeman
as to who should have staff responsibility for coordination of intelli-
gence matters, which Mr. Haldeman regarded simply as a housekeep-
ing detail.
Mr. Smothers. Did you also receive from Mr. Haldeman a commu-
nication regarding the desires of the President on the nature and
extent of surveillance that ought to be accomplished ?
Mr. Huston. No.
Mr. Smothers. Did you undertake, at Mr. Haldeman's direction,
an effort to use the Internal Revenue Service as a surveillance
mechanism?
Mr. Huston. No.
Mr. Smothers. Let me read to you from a memorandum which
you sent to Mr. Haldeman on September 21, 1970 [exhibit 62 1 ]. You
do not have a copy of this memorandum. It is short, though, and I
believe you will be able to follow it.
Memorandum for Mr. Haldeman, from you. First paragraph be-
gins, "I am attaching a copy of a report from the IES on the activities
of its 'Special Service group' which is supposed to monitor the activi-
ties of ideological organizations (for example, Jerry Rubin Fund,
Black Panthers, et cetera) and take appropriate action when violations
of DJS regulations turn up. You will note that the report is long on
words and short on substance."
Second paragraph, "Nearly 18 months ago, the President indicated
a desire for IRS to move against leftist organizations taking advan-
tage of tax shelters. I have been pressing IRS since that time to
no avail." .
Did this pressing of IRS, Mr. Huston, represent Presidential guid-
ance communicated to you ?
Mr. Huston. The extent of the pressing — we talked before to the
fact that a meeting was held with the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, Dr. Burns, and I in June of 1969, at which meeting Dr. Burns
expressed to the Commissioner the President's concern that as a result
1 See p. 395.
11
of testimony that had come out, both before the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Government Operations Committee,
that it appeared that there were organizations, ideological organiza-
tions, that were in violation of the tax laws. And we were talking in
that context about 501 (c) (3) organizations.
Subsequent to that, I had sent a memorandum to Mr. Barth who
was the Assistant to the Commissioner, asking him specifically a ques-
tion with regard to why the Sierra Club had had its exemption re-
voked when two REMC's (Eural Electrification Membership Corpo-
rations) had been brought to my attention who seemed to be similarly
involved in advocating environmental legislation had not. I received
a memorandum back indicating to me the reason was the two groups
fell into different tax classifications.
I also, in July 1969, received from the IRS copies of the minutes
of two meetings that were held by what then I think was called the
Activist Organizations Committee, or something like that; all of
which I received in July 1969. From July 1969 to August 1970, to the
best of my recollection, there was no further written communication.
And if there were any telephonic communication, I do not recall it
and Mr. Barth does not have any recollection of it. So in August 1970
I sent the memorandum to the IRS, having read the story in the news-
paper that Mr. Rubin was now channeling all of his lecture fees to a
tax-exempt foundation, and asked what was going on and what had
happened to this committee that had been established a year prior.
At that point I then received from the Commissioner a copy of a
report that indicated what the committee had been doing. I then sent
a copy of that report to Mr. Haldeman with the memorandum you
just read. Neither Mr. Haldeman nor anyone else in the White House
responded to that memorandum and I had no subsequent contact with
the IRS.
Mr. Smothers. Is it not true that since this investigation, which
IRS was ordered to initiate, had been going for some 18 months, and
for some 15 months even at the time your Huston plan was completed,
that you and your supervisors had some very clear ideas regarding the
kinds of surveillance you wanted conducted ?
Mr. Huston. By whom ?
Mr. Smothers. By any governmental agencies.
Mr. Huston. Well, as I say, I never talked with any of my superiors
about the type of surveillance activities they wanted undertaken.
Mr. Smothers. But you were aware, were you not, Mr. Huston, of
the intention of these various surveillance efforts? Is it not clear
from your memorandum that you are intending to identify people who
are in conflict or believed to be in conflict with the administration's
ideas ?
Mr. Huston. I am sorry, in what memorandum ?
Mr. Smothers. Concerning the purpose of your investigative effort
with IRS.
Mr. Huston. I did not have any investigative effort with IRS. That
is the point I am trying to make.
Mr. Smothers. What was the intent of the administration, as you
understood it, in asking IRS to look closely at these leftist organiza-
tions ?
Mr. Huston. As far as I know, if by the administration you mean the
White House, the White House never asked the IRS to look at these
62-685 O - 76 -2
12
leftist organizations. Dr. Bums conveyed to the Commissioner the
President's concern about 501(c) (3) organizations.
Mr. Smothers. Let me ask you then two questions about that memo-
randum. First, the words, "nearly 18 months ago the President indi-
cated a desire for IRS to move against leftist organizations." Those
are your words ; how do you interpret them ?
Mr. Huston. Well, the President frankly did express that concern.
However, Dr. Burns did not express his concern to the Commissioner
in the same way.
Mr. Smothers. Just one other statement then from that same memo-
randum. In the last paragraph you indicate in communicating to Mr.
Haldeman :
What we cannot do in a courtroom via criminal prosecution to curtail the
activities of some of these groups, IRS could do by administrative action. More-
over, valuable intelligence type information could be turned up by IRS as a
result of their field audits.
Is this not a move against these organizations? Is this not an indica-
tion of the philosophy you were asked to communicate to the intelli-
gence groups when you sat down with them ?
Mr. Huston. No. First of all, after the time that that memorandum
was written I never sat down with any intelligence community people.
Second, what that concept denoted at that point in time was essen-
tially the strike force concept that had been successful in organized
crime. Going back to the Johnson administration, the White House
had been concerned about the sources of funding of many of these
groups. And the point that was being made there was that through
the audit process undertaken in. connection with alleged violation of
tax laws, it was entirely likely to uncover the source of funds. However,
that was an opinion that I expressed to Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Haldeman
never responded to it. I never talked to anyone at the IRS about it.
And so far as I know, no one at the White House asked the IRS to do
anything. In fact, I might add, that each of the people in the Special
Service Staff have testified — an affidavit indicated that the White
House had absolutely no influence whatsoever in the creation of the
Special Service Staff. That includes Mr. Thrower, Mr. Barth, Mr.
Green, Mr. Bacon. Each one of these people, by affidavit, have indi-
cated that the Special Service Staff was set up at the initiative of the
IRS personnel and not at the request of the White House and that the
White House had made no effort to influence the work undertaken by
that committee. And I know in my own case, I did not even know about
the committee until after it was established.
Mr. Smothers. I have nothing further at this time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I might say that this committee is looking into
the question of the Special Service Staff and the ways that the In-
ternal Revenue Service has been used to harass citizens and organiza-
tions for purposes other than determining their tax liability. And we
will get to that in the course of our hearings.
Coming back now to the Huston plan, I would like to call your
attention to exhibit l. 1 You have it now, do you not, Mr. Huston?
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
The Chatrman. I would ask you to turn to exhibit 2 2 , and turn to
i See p. 141.
1 See p. 189.
!3
page 2, please, of your recommendations to the President. Now first
of all, as I understand it, this document represented your proposals
to the President for lifting or relaxing certain restraints on the intel-
ligence community with respect to gathering information on what you
call the revolutionary climate. I would suppose that had reference to
the antiwar demonstrations and antiwar protest groups.
Mr. Huston. Senator, I really was peripherally interested in the
antiwar demonstrations. What I was concerned about was the 40,000
bombings that took place in 1 year. What I was concerned about was
the 39 police officers who were killed in sniping incidents.
The Chairman. Yes, and everything connected with that.
Mr. Huston. Well, that is what I am talking about when I am
talking about revolutionary violence as opposed to antiwar demon-
strations.
The Chairman. Well, whatever your purpose, the document you
sent to the President contained your recommendations for lifting or
relaxing certain restraints.
Mr. Huston. Or keeping restraints as in the case of the military.
The Chairman. And in some cases, keeping restraints.
Mr. Huston. Yes.
The Chairman. Now, was it your understanding, when you sub-
mitted that document to the President, that his authority was being
requested for lifting or relaxing restraints if he chose to accept your
recommendation ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
The Chairman. Now, turning to the question of mail coverage, on
page 2 of your recommendations I read, "recommendation: restric-
tions on legal coverage should be removed." And I take it by legal
coverage you had reference to the procedure that enables intelligence
agencies, law enforcement agencies, to look at the envelopes. If the
procedure is followed, there is a legal way for doing that.
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Then you recommended, "also, present restrictions
on covert coverage should be relaxed on selected targets of priority,
foreign intelligence and internal security interests." Now here you
were referring to opening the mail, were you not ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
The Chairman. And that was against the law, was it not ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
The Chairman. So you were making a very serious recommendation
to Mr. Nixon. You were recommending that he authorize mail
openings, even though such openings were in violation of the law.
Mr. Huston. Well, I think what was being recommended was that
they be employed in spite of the fact that there was a Federal law
that prohibited it but, as in relationship both to mail and to
surreptitious entry, and of course electronic surveillance, there
was the whole question as to whether in essence the fourth amendment
applied to the President in the exercise of his internal security power.
And I think that is where — that is why I earlier said, when you asked
me about our thinking, I think this is where the question arose. In
my mind, what we were talking about is something that I had been
told had been done for 25 years. It had been done with the knowledge
14
of the professional intelligence community, the people who had been
here long before we got in town, and would be here long after we
left town.
The question really was a question of whether inherent in the Execu-
tive power, in matters involving internal security or the security of
the state, the President could act contrary to the dictates of a statute.
And I think that was the kind of dilemma that we had ourselves in.
The Chairman. You were recommending that the President, in this
case, authorize mail openings, even though such action was contrary
to the Federal statute.
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And you have suggested that there might be some
inherent right that circumvents the fourth amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States guaranteeing citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures without a warrant, bearing upon the national
security responsibilities of the President.
Mr. Huston. Senator, I think this really goes to the heart of the
matter, as you well know. And I think if you recall in the Safe Streets
Act, there was a proviso clause in there that said to the effect that
nothing in this act is to be deemed to limit whatever power the
President might have with respect to national security matters. I
think it was that kind of approach to this whole area of fourth amend-
ment rights as they evolved, in terms of national security, internal
security, that opened the door to men, who in good conscience thought
they could go ahead and do it.
The Chairman. Now, you yourself have suggested this was a very
serious question.
Mr. Huston. Yes.
The Chairman. And you were asking the President to take action
that violated the Federal statute, upon the theory that he had some
inherent right to do this. Now since that is such a central question,
since it does go to the protection offered American citizens in) the
fourth amendment to the Constitution, did you take the matter up with
the Attorney General of the United States to secure his opinion ?
Mr. Huston. No.
The Chairman. No ?
Mr. Huston. No.
The Chairman. Was the Attorney General of the United States ad-
vised of the recommendations that were being made to the President
or of all of the activity by the CIA, the NSA, the FBI that preceded
your submitting recommendations to the President ?
Mr. Huston. In terms of activity, do you mean in connection with
the preparation of a report, or whatever they had done for the last
25 years?
The Chairman. My question relates to those particular meetings
that you have described.
Mr. Huston. No, the Attorney General was not aware of the ap-
pointment of the committee or the fact that the committee was
being
The Chairman. He did not know of the appointment of the com-
mittee, the purpose of the committee ?
Mr. Huston. No.
The Chairman. The fact that it had met, the fact that recommenda-
tions had been made to you, and that you were making recommenda-
15
tions to the President involving actions that constituted a violation
of Federal statutes. Why was the Attorney General never informed ?
Mr. Huston. Well, I think there are two answers to that; well,
there are really three answers. The first answer is that when the de-
cision was made for the President to hold this meeting, the context
in which the discussion occurred related to intelligence collection
matters. It was viewed as an intelligence matter and not a law enforce-
ment or criminal matter. And in that case, we simply brought in the
people who were the professional intelligence people and they are the
ones who had the responsibility for handling the problem, and as to
whom the President would turn.
Now, the second aspect of it is that after all, theoretically at least,
the FBI is the division of the Justice Department and it would have
seemed to be incumbent upon the Director before he signed the report
to have cleared it with his superior just as Admiral Gayler and Gen-
eral Bennett, before they signed the report, got clearance from the
Deputy Director of the Department of Defense.
The third problem or third answer probably is that I was the one
who was responsible for — or at least initially responsible for — suggest-
ing who would be appropriate to be involved in these proceedings. I,
at that time, did not nave any clear preconception of where the com-
mittee was going to end up, in terms of what it specifically would
recommend. Many of these things, particularly as they related to the
NSA for example, or the CIA, I did not know anything about.
And finally, I frankly did not have a whole lot of confidence in the
Justice Department, and its sensitivity with respect to distinguish-
ing between types of protest activity.
The Chairman. And it never occurred to you, as the President's
representative, in making recommendations to him that violated the
law, that you or the White House should confer with the Attorney
General before making those recommendations.
Mr. Huston. No, it didn't. It should have, but it didn't.
The Chairman. Well, now, you have described this report to the
President, which has become known as the Huston plan, as a report
in which you were requesting the President to authorize certain
actions, some of which were illegal. And one of those illegal actions
had to do with the subject about which I am now inquiring, mail
opening.
Mr. Huston. Yes.
The Chairman. When you testified earlier in executive session, you
were asked the following question : "You were not aware of the fact,
I take it, that at this time, the time you were submitting your recom-
mendations to the President, the CIA was opening mail ?"
You replied, "No. In fact, I think one of the more interesting
things in this whole thing is why I didn't know half the things I
didn't know, when the President of the United States sat across the
table from the Directors of the intelligence agencies, and said, 'I want
a complete report on what is going on.' I did not know about the CIA
mail openings. I didn't know about the COINTEL Program. These
people were conducting all of these things on their own that the Presi-
dent of the United States did not know about."
Do you still stand by that testimony ?
16
Mr. Huston. With the exception, I assume — I guess I can't be
positive that the President didn't know, if he had learned from other
sources, but I can say I certainly didn't know about it, and it was
my responsibility to see that the President knew what was going on.
The Chairman. And to your knowledge, he did not know.
Mr. Huston. No. To my knowledge, he did not know.
The Chairman. And it would have been a very curious exercise for
him, wouldn't it, to look at your recommendations asking for his
authority to open the mail, if he already knew that the practice had
been going on for a long time before his authority was asked ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
The Chairman. Yes. And he never raised that with you ?
Mr. Huston. No.
The Chairman. And 5 days later, upon reconsideration, when he
pulled back this report or this directive, did he do that for the pur-
pose of revoking the authority that he had given ?
Mr. Huston. Yes, because Mr. Hoover and Attorney General
Mitchell had prevailed upon him to change his decision, which he did.
And there was certainly no doubt in my mind, nor do I think there
could have conceivably been any doubt in the minds of any of the
other people who had been involved, that the revocation of the — the
recall of the decision memoranda meant a reversal of the President's
position.
The Chairman. So the President revoked the authority he had
given?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
The Chairman. For such things as mail openings?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
The Chairman. And yet, are you aware that the mail openings
continued for a long time after that revocation?
Mr. Huston. Well, I have read the Eockefeller Commission re-
port, yes, sir. That is all I know about it.
The Chairman. So we have a case where the President is asked
to authorize mail openings, even though they are illegal, and quite
apart from whether he should have done it, and quite apart from
whether or not the advice of the Attorney General should have been
asked, he acceded to that request. He did so thinking that he was au-
thorizing these openings, not knowing that his authority was an idle
gesture, since these practices had been going on for a long time prior
to the request for his authority. And after he revoked that authority,
the practices continued, even though he had revoked it. That is the
state of the record, based on your testimony ?
Mr. Huston. Yes ; I think it is.
The Chairman. Senator Tower.
Senator Tower. A fundamental question is whether the intelligence
community itself provided the inspiration to the Huston plan, or
whether you went to them with either the clear guidance of the White
House or with your own ideas. Can you enlighten us on that ?
Mr. Huston. Well, I had been involved peripherally in the intel-
ligence area since June of 1969, when I was first asked to undertake
the assignment of preparing a report on foreign financing of revolu-
tionary protest activity. And in October and November of 1969, I
17
was responsible for the coordination of intelligence relating to the
antiwar demonstrations in Washington.
During this period I became, I think, close to Mr. Sullivan and
Mr. Brennan. I think I had their confidence, in that I think they
thought I understood a little bit about who the players were and what
was going on in the country in internal security matters. And they cer-
tainly had my confidence. In fact, I do not think there was anyone
in the Government who I respected more than Mr. Sullivan.
So that by the time of April when Mr. Haldeman held a meeting
at which it was decided that the President would call the Directors
together, I had had many discussions with the Bureau about what
their problems were. And by the time the committee met, I had a
clear view of what they thought they needed.
Now, the question- becomes, who was the inspiration. No one,
Mr. Haldeman or the President, ever said to me — who were the only
two who were directly involved — "Here is what we want," except that
Mr. Haldeman did say to me that the President leaned toward the use
of the military in domestic intelligence. As a matter of fact, I was
strongly opposed to that, if for no other reason than being a former
Army intelligence officer, I had seen first hand who was doing that
work, and accordingly, I thought they ought to stay in the military
business. The military services wanted to stay in the military busi-
ness; the FBI wanted them to stay. So that was the only guidance
I ever received from Mr. Haldeman or indirectly through the Pres-
ident as to what might be preconceived. And in that instance, we came
in with a recommendation that was contrary to what their initial
reaction had been.
So, in summary, the impression, Senator, of course, is that I kind
of sat down here and created out of whole cloth an entire array of
new techniques to exploit and infringe upon the civil liberties of the
American people, and that I forced it down Dick Helms' throat, and
I blackjacked Admiral Gayler, and I really used my heavy weight
on all of these poor little professional intelligence people and forced
them into coming up with all of this.
Now, I think the fact of the matter is that the entire intelligence
community, in the summer of 1970, thought we had a serious crisis
in this country. I thought we had a serious crisis in this country. My
attitude was that we have got to do something about it. Who knows
what to do about it ? The professional intelligence community.
The professional intelligence community tells me, this is what —
you give us these tools; we can solve the problem. I recommended
those tools.
The thing that is interesting to me about the fact that I did not
know about the mail openings, I did not know about the COINTEL
Program, is that if we had known that many of these tools that they
were asking for permission to use were already being used and we
still were not getting any results, it conceivably would have changed
our entire attitude toward the confidence we were willing to place
in the hands of the intelligence community in dealing with this
problem.
So, since I have been out in front, as you know, Senator, since the
first time we talked, back in May, in the Armed Services Committee,
18
I have been out front in this thing, that the Huston plan — I never
wrote this report that everyone calls the Huston plan. I did not
write that report.
But all I want to say for the record is, I thought we had a seri-
ous problem. I was not concerned about people who didn't like the
war. I wasn't concerned about people who thought Nixon was a louse.
I was not concerned about who was going to be the Democratic nom-
inee. I am talking about — we were talking about bombers; we were
talking about assassins; we were talking about snipers. And I felt
something had to be done. These people said, here are the tools we
need. I take full responsibility. I recommended it.
Senator Tower. So what you are saying is that the inspiration for
the report, in most of its aspects, in the absence of anything but the
scantiest guidelines by the White House, actually came from the
agencies involved?
Mr. Huston. Yes, Senator. As a matter of fact, I never heard of
NSCTD 6. In fact, I never saw NSCID 6. For all I know, NSCTD 6
says you get a free lunch in the White House mess. And you know, it's
in here as a recommendation.
Senator Tower. You got no guidance from anybody, in addition to
the President, Mr. Haldeman, or any of the Presidential staffers? In
other words, all that was contributed by the White House was what
you attested to here ?
Mr. Huston. Yes. After the meeting with the President, I was then
responsible for giving the committee a guideline as to what the Presi-
dent wanted, which was the three areas we discussed — threat assess-
ment, restraints, and options. The committee then prepared the report,
and it came back to me.
In the meantime, I think I sent Mr. Haldeman a memo some time
in mid- June, saying the committee is coming along fine ; we hope to
have a report by the end of the month. At no time from June 5 until
July 23 or after July 23, when Mr. Haldeman called me to recall the
decision memoranda, did I talk either to him or to the President about
anything relating to this report.
Senator Tower. After completion of the report, who took the initia-
tive in seeking the President's approval of it?
Mr. Huston. Of the recommendations ?
Senator Tower. Yes ; of the recommendations.
Mr. Huston. It was my responsibility, when the committee pre-
pared its report and submitted it to the President, to prepare a sum-
mary of the report and, if deemed appropriate, to prepare recommen-
dations, which I then did. I prepared the cover memorandum, which is
exhibit 2 l and sent it forward to the President, trying to set forth
all of the strongest arguments pro and con in a summarized form,
with respect to the various options.
And in that connection, I made the recommendations which I felt,
in my judgment, represented the consensus of the professional intelli-
gence community as to what we ought to do.
Senator Tower. Are you saying in the report that the recommen-
dations, then, are vours ?
Mr. Huston. Yes: they are my recommendations, because in the
formal report — and I insisted on that with the working group that
1 See p. 189.
19
the President wanted options. He did not want someone to say — the
committee people themselves— to say, "this is what you should do.
However, there was simply never any doubt in my mind as to who
wanted what. .
And, in fact, in my cover memorandum to Mr. Haldeman, 1 tried to
outline who was in favor of what. I pointed out, for example, that
the CIA was not in favor of a permanent interagency committee. They
only wanted an ad hoc committee. I said Mr. Helms cooperated. I
would not have said Mr. Helms cooperated, if he didn't. For all I
knew, the President would pick up the phone and say, "Dick, what did
you think of this committee?" So I had tried to tell the President,
through Mr. Haldeman, what I had felt was the result and the attitude
of the committee.
Senator Tower. What was your attitude toward the President s
reversal of the decision that resulted in revoking the plan?
Mr. Huston. I thought it was a mistake for several reasons. The
first reason I thought it was a mistake, is it put us back to ground
zero, which is not merely back to ground zero in terms of operational
techniques, but back to ground zero in terms of lack of any coordina-
tion among the intelligence agencies.
Second, I felt in my own mind that Mr. Hoover's objections were
not based — I do not want to phrase it — I felt that not all of Mr.
Hoover's objections had been meritoriously submitted to the President
as to what hb was really concerned about.
And third, frankly, I was concerned about what effects this would
have on the intelligence community other than the FBI, if they could
put their back into this project which was supposed to have been a
joint effort, they all reached a consensus and then one person, the
Director of the FBI, could succeed in reversing it.
Senator Tower. While you did not prepare this plan, you were in
fact its advocate.
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
Senator Tower. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Mondale?
Senator Mondale. Mr. Huston, in the preparation of the options
presented to the President, several recommendations were presented
to the President which were described as being illegal.
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
Senator Mondale. And I gather that you were not raising any ques-
tions except that it was understood by all concerned that they were
illegal but they were recommended nonetheless.
Mr. Huston. Well, as I indicated earlier, Senator, I think that in
the case of surreptitious entry, for example, based upon the fact that
this had been occurring for many, many years, that there were ob-
viously in line with numbers of who had been involved, that there had
to be some justification, legal justification. But I think that in the
terms of the use of the word, for example, "burglary," frankly, I think,
I am sure what this committee will find out if it talks to enough intelli-
gence community people, that the final bottom line on that is what
happens to the guy who gets caught. And that is where clearly he is
going to take the heat, under the local or State statute that he violates,
because Mr. Hoover is not going to come and bail him out.
20
Senator Mondale. Let me return to my question. There was no doubt
in your mind that opening people's mail and reading it, tapping con-
versations by U.S. citizens, burglarizing embassies and the rest was
illegal. That is why you said it was illegal in your memo to the Presi-
dent, is that correct ?
Mr. Huston. Two areas— I do not think the tapping falls into that
area.
Senator Mondale. Let us pick one area.
Mr. Huston. Yes, certainly. "We said it was illegal. Mr. Hoover
said it was illegal. I put it in the memorandum to the President. In
fact, I escalated the rhetoric from, I think, breaking and entering
to burglary, so that the President would have no doubt whatsoever
what the worst case was on that question.
Senator Mondale. All right. So it is agreed that recommendations
and actions were presented to the President which called for a response
by which the President would approve illegal acts by the Government.
What legal justification or other justification do you have, as an at-
torney and an officer of the court and as a public officer sworn to up-
hold the Constitution and the laws of the land, to entertain and recom-
mend illegal acts by the Government ?
Mr. Huston. "Well, as I said, Senator, it was my opinion at the time
that simply the fourth amendment did not apply to the President in
the exercise of matters relating to the internal security or national se-
curity. It was an argument that Mr. Justice Douglas, for example, an-
ticipated in the U.S. District Court case that ruled unconstitutional the
domestic wiretaps because up until 1972 every President, and with
the possible exception of Attorney General Clark, every Attorney
General, argued that the President had inherent authority under Ex-
ecutive power to engage in warrantless wiretaps, although the Court in
criminal matters had clearly held that a warrantless wiretap violated
the fourth amendment. Yet, the Justice Department even took the
case to the Supreme Court because they felt there was that inherent
power.
Now you and I both know as lawyers that if there is an exception
to the fourth amendment for electronic surveillance, which is a tres-
pass in common law, then it does not take a lot of imagination to extend
that from the trespass via the telephone to trespass via surreptitious
entry or mail opening. That is frankly the kind of dangerous road we
were hustling down at this point.
Senator Mondale. All right. If that is your justification, why did you
call it illegal then ? What you are arguing, then, is that it is legal for the
President to violate rights, constitutional and legal rights of citizens,
if he is the President and if he invokes national security as a justifica-
tion. But you did not say that in your memo. You said these things are
illegal. Now, which is it?
Mr. Huston. Well, I think that for the purposes that seem to me
to be most relevant at the time — that is, that the operative action — the
operation was going to be the undertaken by an individual, who, if he is
caught, is going to go to jail, it is clearly illegal.
Senator Mondale. Yes. So that it would be fair to say that you
understood and told the President it was illegal, but to justify it now,
you invoke a national security defense which would make it legal.
Mr. Huston. No ; I am not
Senator Mondale. Which position is it?
21
Mr. Huston. Senator, I am not invoking any defense now because
you asked me what my opinion was at the time and not what my opinion
is now. r
Senator Mondale. All right.
Mr. Huston. What I am saying to you is that the consideration
that was given by not only me, but by the other people who signed
this report and discussed these things, was that frankly it was within
the power of the President to do it.
Senator Mondale. All right. Why did you not say in your memo
that this would appear to be illegal, but that in fact it is legal be-
cause, the President has powers not mentioned in the Constitution, but
powers which we feel every President possesses. These powers are such
that the law does not apply to the President and the constitutional
rights of the citizens do not apply where the President decides that the
national security dictates; Why did you not say that? Instead of that,
you said it was illegal.
Mr. Huston. I said that because that is what the report had said.
Senator Mondale. All right. Now, do you recall, at the time you
were discussing these various options to be recommended to the Presi-
dent, what the position was of the principals representing the various
agencies? You had a representative from the NSA, one from the CIA,
one from the DIA, and one from the FBI. During the course of mak-
ing up these options, which of them objected to these recommendations
which involved illegal acts ?
Mr. Huston. At the working-group level, I do not recall any
objection.
Senator Mondale. Do you recall any of them ever saying, "We can-
not do this because it is illegal" ?
Mr. Huston. No.
Senator Mondale. Can you recall any discussion whatsoever con-
cerning the illegality of these recommendations?
Mr. Huston. No.
Senator Mondale. Does it strike you as peculiar that top public
officers in the most high-level and sensitive positions of Government
would discuss recommending to the President actions which are clearly
illegal, and possibly unconstitutional, without ever asking themselves
whether that was a proper thing for them to be doing?
Mr. Huston. Yes ; I think it is, except for the fact that I think that
for many of those people we were talking about something that they
had been aware of, had been undertaking for a long period of time.
Senator Mondale. Is that an adequate justification ?
Mr. Huston. Sir, I am not trying to justify, I am just trying to
tell you what my impression is of what happened at the time.
Senator Mondale. Because if criminals could be excused on the
grounds that someone had done it before, there would not be much of
a population in any of the prisons today, would there?
Mr. Huston. No.
Senator Mondale. Second, I gather it is your testimony that
although these agencies were asked to supply information on what
they were doing, in fact, none of them offered evidence that they were
opening mail or intercepting private communications and performing
other acts which it was requested that the President authorize. Is that
correct ?
22
Mr. Huston. The reports indicated that there were no mail open-
ings, there were no surreptitious entries.
Senator Mondale. And in fact there were ?
Mr. Huston. Well, apparently there were, but that was the informa-
tion I had.
Senator Mondale. Now, not only did they not tell the President
that those acts and actions were underway, but they did not talk about
it with each other. Is that correct? When they met and discussed this,
the CIA did not tell the others that they were already engaging in
illegal mail openings.
Mr. Huston. Yes, I think that was part of the problem of not
telling us.
Senator Mondale. Then after these options were turned down by
the President, they continued and, in fact, increased in scope in some
respects, did they not ?
Mr. Huston. I do not know, Senator, any more than what is in the
Rockefeller Commission report.
Senator Mondale. All right. Now suppose you were a President
who wanted the law obeyed in this field. In the light of this record,
what on earth would you do to gain accountability to the law?
Mr. Huston. The first thing I would do is move the Domestic
Intelligence Division out of the FBI.
Senator Mondale. First of all, what would you do to get the truth?
Mr. Huston. To get the truth?
Senator Mondale. Yes.
Mr. Huston. Well, I think that if— I have to think that if President
Nixon had sat Mr. Helms across his desk, and said, "Are you opening
any mail ?", Mr. Helms would have said yes.
Senator Mondale. Why would it occur to the President to ask that
question ?
Mr. Huston. It would not occur to him and that is the whole
problem.
Senator Mondale. You see, time and time again we come to this
point. The only way the President can control these agencies is
to get them over to the White House for dinner and spend hour after
hour to find out what is going on, and then get on his knees and plead
that they might do as he wished.
Mr. Huston. I do not know how you find out except that I think we
are at a threshold period in which the entire attitude toward the
means of collecting intelligence is dramatically changed. I think that
25 years ago that people would not have been at all surprised, nearly
as surprised, as people are or as people are today. It is interesting to
me, Senator, that in October 1971, on the Sunday edition of the New
York Times, there was a front page article which was obviously
planted to attack J. Edgar Hoover, which criticized Mr. Hoover for
the fact that he had refused to engage in "black bag" jobs that were
necessary in dealing with espionage. Now this was on the front page
of the New York Times. There was not any editorial in that paper
saying what in the world kind of criticism is that of J. Edgar Hoover,
that he is not helping you guys out with black bag jobs. But this is
the attitude that existed at that time and it was nothing that was un-
known to any sophisticated person. I think that
Senator Mondale. Yes, but what I do not understand is that as a
lawyer and one trained to uphold the law, and as an officer of the
23
court and one who is sworn to uphold the law, why on earth you felt
that mood was a justification for violating the law. You know better
than that. That is not the basis for law in this country. The law is a
law and we are to uphold it and if it is not popular, then we should
change it. You do not take the law into your hand and play God and
interfere with the rights of the American people just because there is
something you do not like.
Mr. Huston. Senator, I agree with that.
Senator Mondaije. But that is not what you did.
Mr. Huston. Well, Senator, I understand that is not what I did.
Senator Monda^e. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Baker?
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
_. Mr. Huston, there have been references from time to time in. your
testimony and that of other witnesses to the effect that J. Edgar
Hoover put the kibosh on the Huston plan. Do you know why he did ?
Did he ever tell you why ?
Mr. Huston. No, sir, he never talked to me about it.
Senator Baker. Do you have any information that would indicate
why he disagreed with the recommendation of the plan ?
Mr. Huston. I did not think his objections were principled, Senator,
because in many instances he says, not that this is illegal, it should not
be done, he says, "I do not want to do it, but I do not care if somebody
else does it," which does not strike me as being a principled objection.
Senator Baker. Did he say that ?
Mr. Huston. Yes, I think you will find, particularly with regard
to the National Security Agency, indicated that he did not want to do
it but if NSA wanted to do it themselves they had no objection.
Senator Baker. Are there documents that indicate that Mr. Hoover
said that while he did not want the FBI to do certain things, it was
all right with him if the NSA did it ?
Mr. Huston. It was in the report in the footnote, Senator.
Senator Baker. What techniques was Mr. Hoover referring to at
that time ?
Mr. Huston. Of course he was opposed to everything, from the NSA
requests for surreptitious entry down to allowing the FBI to in-
crease its campus coverage by employing informers who were less than
21 years old. He had established a policy that to qualify as a campus
informant for the FBI you had to be 21 years old. The Bureau opera-
tions people thought that imposed a difficult restraint on them since
the most likely people to cooperate with the FBI were the younger
freshmen and sophomores who had not yet become involved in a lot
of these things. And so they wanted, in essence, to get the age where
you could qualify as an FBI informant reduced to 18.
Mr. Hoover did not want to do that because apparently he felt that
the risk of exposure was too great. So in order simply to get the age
reduced from 21 to 18, we couched — the FBI people couched — this
recommendation in terms that campus informant coverage shall be
expanded because they did not want to zero in on the specific problem^
because it would make Mr. Hoover mad.
Senator Baker. Why were you worried about making Mr. Hoover
mad ? This is the second or third time in your testimony that I have
24
either heard you say or gotten the impression that you were scared
to death of J. Edgar Hoover.
Mr. Huston. Well, Mr. Hoover was a very influential man in the
Government and it seemed to me that it was unlikely that any sort of
successful intelligence — domestic intelligence capability — could be de-
veloped without the cooperation of the Director of the FBI, since the
FBI is the primary agency in this area. And it has always been my
view to try — if you can get a fellow to go along without ruffling his
feathers too much by trying to be — that is why I wanted the President
to invite him in and give him the decision because it seemed to me it
would be easier maybe to get him to accept it. But as it turns out, that
did not work.
And finally, on the 18-year-old thing, after Congress said 18-year-
olds could vote
Senator Baker. You mean it did not work because the President
did not call Mr. Hoover in or because the President did not convince
him?
Mr. Huston. I do not know that even if the President would have
called him in it would have made any difference, but that was the kind
of approach that I would have taken.
Senator Baker. Did you broach the idea to the President ?
Mr. Huston. Yes, I did.
Senator Baker. What did the President say about that ?
Mr. Huston. Well, Mr. Haldeman said — as you know, Senator, there
was not much of a disposition in the West Wing to take up valuable
time with dealing with individuals, in a word, just to convince him.
Senator Baker. Did you receive word through Mr. Haldeman that
the President was not about to ask J. Edgar Hoover to the White
House ?
Mr. Huston. That is right.
Senator Baker. Was the President also apprehensive about J. Edgar
Hoover's approval of this?
Mr. Huston. I do not have any idea. I do not know.
Senator Baker. Did you talk to Attorney General Mitchell about
the plan?
Mr. Huston. No.
Senator Baker. But you received word that he disapproved of it?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Senator Baker. How did you receive that word ?
Mr. Huston. Mr. Sullivan told me that Mr. Hoover had gone to
the Attorney General after the decision memorandum had gone out,
and Haldeman called me and indicated to me that either the Attorney
General had talked to him or to the President, and it was at that point
that the decision memorandum was to be recalled.
Senator Baker. As I recall the testimony of Mitchell in the Water-
gate hearings, he indicated that he was considerably distressed, if not
in fact irate, about these proposals, and as quick as he could he got in
touch with the President to put a stop to it. Is that in accord with
^our recollection?
Mr. Huston. That is my understanding, yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Did he give the reasons for his indignity over the
report, according to your information?
25
Mr. Huston. No. I do not know. I assume his arguments were that
it is not the kind of thing we ought to be doing.
Senator Baker. There is a fine difference here that may or may not
be important depending on how things develop later. But is
it your impression, if you have any impression, that Mr. Mitchell was
putting the kibosh on the plan to support Hoover for the sake of sup-
porting Hoover, or because he was indignant that it proposed certain
illegal activities, or for some other reason ?
I was intrigued with your statement a minute ago, which was, I
believe, that Hoover did not really state his concerns about the plan.
What was your impression of the Mitchell objection?
Mr. Huston. I only got second hand from Haldeman, and Bob did
not spend a lot of time explaining to a junior staff member why he
was doing things. So I did not know what it was. I assumed that prob-
ably the Attorney General did not see any reason for a bunch of people
in the White House to be rocking the boat with the Justice Department
and getting Mr. Hoover all upset. And I also would give the Attorney
General the benefit of the doubt and conclude that he thought this was
something that we should not be doing.
Senator Baker. Mr. Huston, you have indicated that, as far as you
know, the President did not know, and you certainly did not know, that
at the time you made the recommendation for mail cover, for surrepti-
tious entry, for illegal wiretaps, those activities were already being
conducted by those agencies. Is that a correct recollection of your
testimony?
Mr. Huston. Well, Senator, again on this wiretap thing, everybody
has assumed all along that these wiretaps were illegal. Until 1972 it
was the position of every President, every Attorney General and many
Federal District Courts that they were not illegal.
Senator Baker. That is sort of like the young lawyer who was argu-
ing the case before the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice stopped
him and said, "Young man, that is not the law," and he said, "Well,
it was the law until your Honor spoke." So until 1972 the law was
different in that respect?
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. And unwarranted, meaning taps without a search
warrant for national security purposes ?
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Without that fine distinction.
Mr. Huston. On the other two areas, there clearly was no authority.
Senator Baker. You did not know at the time you made the recom-
mendation that these things were ongoing?
Mr. Huston. That is right.
Senator Baker. And the other two.
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Senator Baker. What other things were being done by the intelli-
gence community, as you later discovered, that may or may not have
been recommended in your report that dealt with similar matters?
Mr. Huston. I think there were several things that were critically
important that we should have known about that we did not and could
very easily have influenced our judgment. One, of course, was the CO
INTELPRO — Counterintelligence Program which we did not know
26
about; Operation CHAOS, whatever.it was— that the CIA had its own
private operation going that we did not know about.
Senator Baker. Can you tell us, or is there any reason why the wit-
ness should not tell us, what COINTELPRO and CHAOS were, the
nature of the programs ?
The Chairman. No; there is no reason. The Justice Department has
now made disclosures on COINTELPKO and I think the Rockefeller
report set out Operation CHAOS.
Senator Baker. Briefly, for this record, Mr. Huston, what was
COINTELPRO and what was CHAOS?
Mr. Huston. As I understand, the COINTEL Program was essen-
tially designed to sow discord and I do not know what the correct
technical term for it is, but it was an offensive program against desig-
nated targets by the FBI in terms of
Senator Baker. Well, give us an example.
Mr. Huston. For example, Professor Jones is a member of the So-
cialist Workers Party and he is running for the school board so the
friendly neighborhood FBI agent sends a letter to the newspaper say-
ing, "You may not know this, but this bird that is running for the
school board is a member of the Socialist Workers Party."
Senator Baker. You did not know about the COINTEL Program at
the time of the filing of the Huston report ?
Mr. Huston. No.
Senator Baker. And you later learned of it?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Senator Baker. How did you later learn of it?
Mr. Huston. Well, when the Justice Department released the re-
ports.
Senator Bakeb. Do you know whether or not the President of the
United States knew of the COINTEL Program ?
Mr. Huston. I do not believe so. All of the information that has
been made public indicates that no one outside of the Bureau was to
know about it including anyone in the Justice Department.
Senator Baker. Including the Attorney General and the President ?
Mr. Huston. Yes, including the Attorney General.
Senator Baker. What was the other operation ?
Mr. Huston. The Operation CHAOS and that is that apparently
the CIA had a group set up that was concerned directly with matters
affecting domestic intelligence collection or events that were occurring
within the continental United States. We did not know about that. In
fact, the impression that we had all along was that the CIA had very
little interest in or coverage of areas which we thought were important,
which was what happened abroad when these people, who were under
surveillance by the FBI, left the country. That is where we thought the
CIA effort should be.
Senator Baker. Mr. Huston, let me ask you this. Can you tell me
who authorized either COINTELPRO or CHAOS? Was it a Presi-
dential authorization?
Mr. Huston. I do not think so. I do not think any President knew
about it and I think both of those programs were originated before
this administration. I think COINTELPRO went back into the John-
son administration and Operation CHAOS went back to the Johnson
administration.
27
Senator Baker. I am not trying to establish blame or responsibility.
I am just trying to establish in my own mind's eye whether in these
projects the agencies were self-starters or whether someone up the scale
may have authorized them.
Mr. Huston. I do not know except that they were originated in a
prior administration and my understanding is that President John-
son did not know about it, and I do not believe President Nixon knew
about it.
Senator Baker. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Do you suppose they were just covenants that ran
with the land? They were established in some previous administra-
tion. There was no responsibility to let successive Presidents know.
Mr. Huston. Senator, I do not know.
The Chairman. Well, I might say that with respect to both Opera-
tion CHAOS and COINTELPRO this committee intends to hold pub-
lic hearings and explore all of the ramifications of those programs.
Senator Huddleston.
Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Huston, did
you attach any significance to the fact that after your plan was de-
veloped, and at least for a few days, because the official policy of the
administration, that neither the President nor Mr. Haldeman signed
this plan, that went out over your signature, and subsequently be-
came known as the Huston plan ?
Mr. Huston. Senator, I think that was the intention. I was the
person who was given this responsibility. It was my job, and I think
that it was supposed to be me sitting here rather than Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Huddleston. But, it was a significant change in policy, and
one accepted by an administration that had put great store in its law
and order theme during its campaign, and it would seem to me that
this was something that might, with all deference to you, have a higher
classification of importance in the administration.
Mr. Huston. I would think so, too. I was never under any illusions
about my influence in the administration.
Senator Huddleston. Were you flattered by the fact that this plan
carried your name ?
Mr. Huston. It was an honor at the time I would have been very
happy to do without, particularly since it had been my intention to
leave the administration at the end of the second year anyway.
Senator Huddleston. Could it have been that the administration
was reluctant to put any higher official title on the plan, knowing that
it did include extralegal activity ?
Mr. Huston. Well, I think there was no doubt that in matters of
great sensitivity there is always a conscious policy too, in any agency,
to have a cutoff point, but I think more importantly if you understand
the attitude in the White House at this time, Mr. Haldeman felt that
if he said the President had made a decision and you worked in the
Government, you ought to assume that he made the decision, and that
if he designated someone else on his staff to tell you that the President
made a decision, then you ought to believe that person. So, I think it
probably never occurred to him that there is any reason in the world
why a low-ranking White House aide could not simply send out a
decision, a paper that said the President has made these decisions.
62-685 O - 76 - 3
28
Senator Huddleston. Even though that policy pursued such alsfty
objective, as you pointed out a moment ago, of simply quelling the dis-x
turbances that were going on in this country restoring peace and tran-
quility, eliminating the bombings, eliminating the killing of policemen.
Mr. Huston. I think that if there had been any mileage in putting
out a press release, Senator, I am sure it would not have gone out in
my name.
Senator Huddleston. That is what I am curious about, with such a
lofty objective as you have described previously.
Mr. Huston, are you familiar with the Special Service Staff, or the
Special Service groups, of the IRS?
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
Senator Huddleston. Are you familiar with some of its activities ?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Senator Huddleston. Would you say that it is a proper response
and a logical response to the interest that you, on behalf of the Presi-
dent, showed in this field ?
Mr. Huston. No. Well, I never expressed any interest in this field,
Senator. The interest that I expressed to the IRS predated by a year
my activity in this matter and was related to 501(c) (3) organizations.
Senator Huddleston. Which were ideological organizations on
which you were interested in getting information through the IRS ?
Mr. Huston. No, I never asked for any information on any organi-
zation from the IRS.
Senator Huddleston. How would you expect that your memoran-
dum would be interpreted, first of all, when you, after previously
meeting with representatives of the IRS, and then nearly 13 months
later asking for a progress report on operations of ideological organi-
zations, and going to the pains of putting in that request the fact that
you had made your original request back in July of 1969? This memo
was dated August 14. It seems to me you are very pointedly indicating
to the Director that over a year has passed and you have not received
any evidence or any activity.
What impression do you think the IRS would receive from that
memorandum?
Mr. Huston. Well, I think the impression that they received was
that I would like to have a progress report, and Commissioner Thrower
sent me a progress report.
Senator Huddleston. And that there was at least keen interest on
the part of the White House.
Mr. Huston. I do not know how much importance he attached to my
inquiry for a progress report. He indicates he did not attach any, but,
beyond that, I do not know.
Senator Huddleston. I note, too, that in response to your request
that a report was filed, and the cover memorandum to that report from
Mr. Randolph Thrower of the IRS says, "I would stress that knowl-
edge of the existence and operation of this group should be carefully
limited." From whom did you think the information of this group
should be kept? T
Mr. Huston. Senator, I did not give any thought to that at all. 1
was getting at that time every day piles of documents that had all sorts
of elaborate classifications, restraint, hold-back, don't disclose stuff on
it. Whenever something came across my desk like that, I attached no
importance to that characterization whatsoever.
29
Senator Huddleston. You did not wonder whether or not he even
Ranted the other intelligence-gathering agencies to know about this
activity ?
Mr Huston. I did not know because there was nothing in that re-
port that was of any interest to an intelligence agency.
Senator Huddleston. But, as a matter of fact, you pointed out as
you relayed that report on to Mr. H. R. Haldeman in a subsequent
memorandum the next day, the memorandum that Mr. Smothers re-
ferred to earlier, in which you indicate that the report had very little
substance to it. Is that correct?
Mr. Huston. Yes.
Senator Htjddleston. And you pointed out to Mr. Haldeman that
you had been pressing the IRS for over a year now, to no avail, to get
some action, I presume, in this field. What form did this pressing
Mr. Huston. As I indicated earlier, I told you each instance in which
I had a communication with the IRS, and that was primarily in June-
Juiy, 1969, and thereafter I have no recollection, nor does anyone at
the IRS have any recollection, of any subsequent contact until August
ox j_y i \j,
^Senator Huddleston. What did you mean then to Mr. Haldeman?
You said you had been pressing for
Mr. Huston. Well, I had, in fact, on occasions when the initial re-
quest that something be done has come down. The Counsel to the Presi-
dent and I had met with the Commissioner, and I had subsequently
sent two memoranda to the Commissioner regarding 501(c) (3) or-
ganizations, and, as a result of that, we had never gotten— the thing
that happened was we had asked a very narrow question relating to
the enforcement of the tax laws with respect to tax-exempt organiza-
tions. We never got any answer on that. What we got instead was the
creation of this Special Service Staff that was out rooting around in a
thousand different organizations, and never once did we get any re-
sponse back specifically, except on the inquiry I raised about why the
Sierra Club exemption had been revoked. Never did we get any specific
response to the original message that Dr. Burns had conveyed to the
Commissioner.
Senator Huddleston. But your memo to Mr. Haldeman [exhibit
62 1 ], certainly suggests something more than a narrow interest in
tax exemption because it points out again, in the sentence that Mr.
Smothers read, that "Moreover valuable intelligence-type information
could be turned up by IRS as a result of their field audits." This sug-
gests to me that you are looking beyond the question of whether or not
some tax law might be violated.
Mr. Huston. A year later my interest in the question of financing
these groups had arisen in the context of this report. That was my
view, which I conveyed to Mr. Haldeman. However, I never expressed
that viewl to anyone in the IRS. Mr. Haldeman never indicated to me
whether he agreed or disagreed with that view. As far as I know and
as far as the record shows from the IRS, no one from the White House
ever conveyed that view to them.
Senator Huddleston. How did you expect to get a report from the
IRS in this area if you had not expressed a view to them that this is
what you were looking for ?
Mr. Huston. The request for a report went to the earlier area of con-
cern which was after the committee had been set up. They sent me the
1 See p. 395.
30
minutes of the first two meetings. After a year I sent a memo asking
for a progress report of what had happened in the IRS from July 1969
to August of 1970.
Senator Huddleston. Are you suggesting to this committee that at
the time of the plan neither you nor anyone else in your group had an
interest in intelligence-gathering operations that might be conducted
through the IRS ?
Mr. Huston. Senator, if we had attached any importance to the use
of the IRS as an intelligence-collecting agency, we would have in-
cluded them in the committee that met to discuss this problem. The
Bureau was under standing instructions from the President, just as it
had been from President Johnson, to provide the White House with
information with regard to the sources of financing of many of these
activities. Now, where the Bureau got that information, I do not know,
but I do know that there was information that came from the Bureau
regarding that.
Senator Huddleston. Let me go back then to two statements that
you have made today which seem to me somewhat contradictory.
First, you said it was not necessary in your mind to consult with
the Attorney General about this proposed plan because you conceived
it to be directed chiefly at intelligence gathering, rather than law en-
forcement. Later this morning you said that you were not concerned
about what people thought about who was for or against the war, if
I might paraphrase, you were not concerned about who the next Presi-
dent was going to be, or who the candidates were going to be, but you
were concerned about bombings and the killing of policemen.
Now, these are law enforcement problems, it seems to me. Now, do
you find a basic conflict there in what the objectives were of this?
Mr. Huston. Well, there may be a conflict, but it does not seem to
be a conflict to me, and it goes to the entire difference of approach
to this problem, and that my concern was stopping things before
they happened and not having some sort of derivative satisfaction
of having the perpetrator in jail, and to me the purpose of intelligence
was to collect the information in advance that would allow you to
forestall the creation of overt acts, as, for example, the Bureau had
been successful in doing in Detroit, where sniping incidents had been
planned and was done.
Senator Huddleston. That is intelligence. That is what you were
talking about with the IRS, the kind of intelligence they could gather,
was it not?
Mr. Huston. You mean that was the kind of thing I was talking
about by memo to Mr. Haldeman ? Yes : that was the kind of thing
I was talking about to Mr. Haldeman by memo.
Senator Huddleston. Once the IRS had this capability and had it
in place and being used, could they also not use that same intelligence-
gathering capability against any citizen that they, might want to
audit for any purpose?
Mr. Huston. Well, yes ; I think so. but I think you are leaping one
step over from what I indicated to Haldeman in terms of my view
that the strike force concept against organized crime was a model for
a strike force concept against terrorist activities. You are leaping from
that point which ran into a dead end, to some conclusion that Mr.
31
Smothers tried to make, and perhaps you, that that was translated
into some directive to the IRS, and it was not.
Senator Huddleston. It would be very simple, would it not, to
make even a logical extension of this IRS capability, to extend it to
any other group or any other person that the White House might
want some special intelligence information about?
Mr. Huston. Well, as I indicated, I do not think the White House,
in my knowledge, ever asked for any intelligence raw tax data from
the IRS. Any such data would have gone to the Bureau.
Senator Htjddleston. Do you know of any case where the White
House has ever directed the Internal Revenue Office to conduct
any specific audit?
Mr. Huston. No.
The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?
Senator Goldwater. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to speak first about the IRS, and I am very happy that the
chairman has mentioned this subject. Somebody on this committee has
likened the CIA to a bull elephant running rampant. I liken the IRS
to a rattlesnake sliding along in the grass, probably the greatest
threat to American freedom and Americans of anything we have. And
yet, this morning is the first public indication I have heard that the
IRS is going to De investigated, and I think it is time.
I notice a report, or a letter, written by you on September 21
[exhibit 62 *] in which you said, "Nearly 18 months ago the President
indicated a desire for IRS to move against leftist organizations taking
advantage of tax shelters. I have been pressing IRS since that time
to no avail."
In other words, the IRS will protect any organization in this coun-
try they feel like protecting. I thmk it is high time that this committee,
or some other committee, expose just what we are up against in this
country because the power to tax is the power to destroy.
Mr. Huston, have you ever been a member of the CIA?
Mr. Huston. No, sir.
Senator Goldwater. FBI?
Mr. Huston. No, sir.
Senator Goldwater. DIA?
Mr. Huston. Yes. I was assigned to the DIA when I was an Army
intelligence officer.
Senator Goldwater. Were you hired by the White House as a
speech writer at one time?
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
Senator Goldwater. And it was from that that you went into the
preparation of the so-called Huston plan?
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
Senator Goldwater. Was the Huston plan ever used?
Mr. Huston. No.
Senator Goldwater. Never put into effect?
Mr. Huston. No.
Senator Goldwater. What do you think about the Huston plan
as you sit here today ?
Mr. Huston. Well, Senator, I think that the — I still believe that
there is a threat that may be characterized and defined as an internal
security threat. I think there are people that want to destroy this
1 See p. 395.
32
country; I think there are people who are willing to go to great
lengths to do it. I think the two attempts upon the life of the President
are symptomatic of that. And so I think there is a necessary place in
our society for an effective domestic intelligence-collection effort. And
more importantly than collection, for professional analysis of that
information.
I think that it is perhaps easy to justify the emphasis that we
attached in 1970, but I think it is just as easy to discount it. We were
sitting in the White House getting reports day in and day out of what
was happening in this country in terms of the violence, the numbers
of bombings, the assassination attempts, the sniping incidents — 40,000
bombings, for example, in the month of May in a 2- week period were
averaging six arsons a day against ROTC facilities.
What happened then, I think is — at least from my perspective — is
that we convinced ourselves that this was something that was going to
just continue to get worse until we reached the point where all of the
people who were predicting police-state repression were going to get
what they — it was going to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, because
that was the only way it was going to be handled. As for example, I
suspect it had been true in the Chicago Black Panther raid, and in
the Los Angeles Black Panther shootout. So my view was that we had
to do something to stop it.
Mr. White would say that this authorized the extension into every
person's mailbox. Theoretically, that may be true, although I do not
think that the terms that we used in terms of highly selected targets
or top priority targets were a bit looser than the terms that Attorney
General Clark used when he got authorization from President Roo-
sevelt, and when President Truman authorized electronic surveillance.
But the fact of the matter is that we were motivated, unjustly per-
haps, unreasonably or unconscionably, by a legitimate concern which
related to the lives and property of people that were subject to random
acts of violence. My view was, I had confidence in the professional
intelligence community. These were the professionals, these were the
people who had been authorized to solve these problems.
What I did not realize then was that these kinds of programs, al-
though theoretically and conceptually could be narrowly used in the
best interests of the country by responsible people, can lead to the type
of thing that happened with the Plumbers and with the Watergate.
Now everyone tries to link the Huston plan as a precursor of the
Plumbers and the Watergate, and in my mind it is totally untrue.
But it is obvious to me that this kind of thing lends itself too easily
to the type of corruption that we have seen, and, therefore, I have come
to the conclusion that whereas I would traditionally have taken the
position that I am willing to run some small risk of infringing upon
some small portion of the public's otherwise legitimate rights for the
greater good security of all of the people, I now come to the conclu-
sion that we have no practical alternative but to take a far greater
risk that there are goinor to be these kinds of things that we cannot deal
effectively against until such time as perhaps our recourse is simply to
the ongoing criminal process.
But I do not want to leave the impression that I think there is no
problem because I think that we need to deal with this thing in such a
way as to maximize the respect for the rights of the citizens; at the
33
same time, not destroying the capability of the people acting through
their Government to protect themselves against those who would
destroy this country.
Senator Goldwater. I thank you, Mr. Huston, for that statement. I
agree with that statement 100 percent, and I have no other questions,
so I will just comment that as long as we have Daniel Ellsbergs, some
newspapers, journalists, media people, and organizations intent on
changing the basic philosophy of this country, by the same kind of
subversion that you are. now being at least charged with part way, I
think we have to be forever on our toes. I think you have expressed
your purpose well.
Every time I pick up a morning paper or an evening paper, and I
see the disclosure of secrets that I thought were locked up in my brain,
or my heart, or my safe, I get worried about my country. And I hope
that this committee, through the continued diligence of its chairman
and staff members, will disclose everything wrong with this country.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Goldwater.
Senator Hart?
Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Huston, you expressed unhappiness
that the plan that we are discussing here today has come to be known
as the Huston plan. I suppose there is a degree of logic in that dis-
may on your part. If you had your choice, what do you think this
plan should be called, with the benefit of hindsight ?
Mr. Huston. I think it ought to be called simply what it was : the
Report of the Interagency Committee on intelligence. But let me say
that after 2 years of having that tagged on me by the enterprising
members of the press, I have learned to live with it.
Senator Hart of Colorado. You have indicated that after the fact,
you f ound out that many of the agencies that were on that interagency
task force were already using the tools that they were sitting there dis-
cussing obtaining White House approval. Why do you think they
were going through this charade?
Mr. Huston. I wish I knew. I do not know. I think that part of
the problem was that if the other agencies knew they were doing it
there would have been all sorts of problems, because, for example,
the FBI greatly resented President Johnson ordering the military
intelligence into the domestic collection area in 1967 because that was
their charter. But the President directly ordered it, and they had to
live with it, although they certainly were anxious and happy that
the Ervin committee hearings blew that out of the water and got those
people out of the business.
I think, for example, the FBI — Mr. Hoover would have had an abso-
lute stroke if he had known that the CIA had an Operation CHAOS
going on. So I think the last thing in the world the CIA would have
done was to disclose to the Bureau that they were working on their
turf. So I think interagency jealousies and rivalries had part to do
with it.
I think the second thing is that if you have got a program going and
you are perfectly happy with its results, why take the risks that it
might be turned off if the President of the United States decides he
does not want to do it ; because they had no way of knowing in advance
what decision the President might make. So, why should the CIA —
34
that the President may say, "hell no, I don't want you guys opening
any mail." Then if they had admitted it, they would have had to close
the thing down.
The COINTEL Program— apparently even the Justice Department
did not know about that. If they had told me, it was obvious that the
word would have been out. So it seems to me that many of these agen-
cies just kind of operated in their own world, and had their own pro-
grams going. They did not want anyone else to know it. And the thing
that intrigues me is that I always was under the illusion that the pur-
pose of intelligence was to provide policymakers with information
upon which to make policies. But if the policymaker does not even
know that there are sources of information available, I do not know
what in the world good it does anybody except the people who are
operating it for their own gratification.
Senator Hart of Colorado. You were complaining that there were no
available results. Can you account for the fact that they were using
the tools that they, at the same time, were seeking to obtain, and weren t
achieving better results?
Mr. Huston. I think that is what would have been the key show-
down in my mind, because my idea was that what these people were
saying, "if we had the tools we could get the job done." Well, if they
already had the tools and they weren't getting the job done, then you
have to look at some other reason why we weren't getting information
that we wanted.
Senator Hart of Colorado. What do you think that reason is?
Mr. Huston. Well, I think there needs to be some shakeups myself,
and some changes made in the intelligence community. You know, each
of these agencies has great strengths. I think the FBI is the greatest
law enforcement agency in the world. I think the CIA is perhaps the
best foreign intelligence-collection agency in the world. But they have
weaknesses.
The FBI, for example, does not have any effective analytical capa-
bility. I mean, they are very good at collecting raw intelligence data,
but what needs to be done to make it useful to a policymaker is to put
that data into context and to analyze it. Now this is a strength that the
CIA is very good at in many respects.
So I think that — plus, the intelligence community is always on the
short end of personnel and budget. The FBI's Intelligence Division
is always the last in line for new people, always the last in line for
money. There are shortages of people and personnel, and I am, for ex-
ample, convinced that there are vastly inadequate resources available
in the Bureau to deal with the espionage threat in this country,, simply
because they do not have the manpower for it.
So I am hopeful that that is what this committee is going to do, in
addition to merely exposing things that went on that should not have
gone on. I am hopeful that this committee is going to come up and
propose some specific changes, if you operate on the assumption that
there is a need for some sort of intelligence-collection capability, both
domestically and in foreign areas.
Senator Hart of Colorado. I am not sure the record accurately re-
flects why J. Edgar Hoover objected to this report. We have touched
on that several times this morning. In your judgment, was he afraid
of encroachment by the other agencies, or did he genuinely feel that
some of these activities were illegal ?
35
Mr. Huston. Well, I think that Mr. Hoover, since he cannot defend
himself, ought to be entitled to the benefit of the doubt, and his stated
objection was that he did not feel that these things were permissible,
although, as the record will clearly indicate, at one, time or another, for
a substantial period of time, he had authorized each of those things.
But I assume, giving him the benefit of the doubt, he had a change of
heart and that was the basis on which he objected.
I think, however, that the record will also show that he was very
much concerned about any attempt of any other agency to be involved
in programs of which he was ultimately responsible.
Senator Hakt of Colorado. Would you tell the committee what
President Nixon's and Mr. Haldeman's views were on the use of the
military in domestic intelligence and internal security matters?
Mr. Huston. The President never expressed any opinion to me on
that subject, but it is my recollection that Mr. Haldeman had indicated
to me thai; the President felt that perhaps the problem was one of man-
power, and that we could use the military intelligence services for that
purpose. I did not say anything to Haldeman about that, but it struck
me as being a silly thing to say because at that very time we had ap-
proved, at the White House, the request from the Secretary of the
Army to dismantle the CONUS intelligence operation, and Senator
Ervin was getting ready to start his hearings. The FBI had never
wanted to have the military involved.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Did Mr. Sullivan say that ?
Mr. Huston. Yes ; he told me that.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Did he say this in the interagency group ?
Mr. Huston. I don't recall what he said. I certainly recall Colonel
Downey and the other military people saying that they simply did not
want anything. And I said, look, I can understand that, but let us put
down — you know, this is something that the President wants to con-
sider, we've got to give him an option, so let us put it down. But if
you read those options — I mean, there are absolutely no even re-
motely convincing arguments in the paper for using the military. So
it was quite obvious that the committee did not want to do that, and
I recomended that we not use the military.
Senator Hart of Colorado. What did the military people say in the
committee ?
Mr. Huston. They said they simply did not want to be involved ;
that they had limited manpower, that they had problems with Con-
gress as a result of this, that they had their own problems — service-re-
lated problems — to deal with and that they did not think it was ap-
propriate for the military to be involved in the collection of intel-
ligence relating to civilians.
Senator Hart of Colorado. In your judgment, did the other mem-
bers of that interagency group share what you profess to be your con-
cern about bombings and snipings ? Or were they more interested in
lifting some of the restraints so that they could perhaps use some
other devices? Were they using the bombings and the snipings as a
device to broaden their capabilities?
Mr. Huston. Well, it certainly was my impression, and Mr. Sulli-
van, in many talks that we had, certainly indicated to me that he was
as concerned about this problem as I was. The other agencies really
36
didn't discuss it. And of course, the intelligence community's concern
was a lot broader than my concern.
They were talking about a lot of groups that I had never heard of
before, and didn't interest me at all. But I think their concern was as
great as ours because in 1970— up to that May of 1970, you would have
been hard pressed not to be concerned. I do not think there is any
problem about who was concerned. Everybody was concerned. The only
question was what the results of that concern would be.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Helms has indicated that the struc-
turing of Operation CHAOS was in response to a Presidential request.
I think you have indicated the President didn't know anything about
Operation CHAOS. Do you know which of those statements is
accurate ?
Mr. Huston. Again, all I know about Operation CHAOS is what
I ve read in the Rockefeller Keport, and it was my recollection that the
Rockefeller Keport indicated that operation was set up either in 1967
or 1968. And I have no way of knowing for sure if the President
knew about it. But I cannot think that he knew about it. And he cer-
tainly didn't know about it through me or through that report.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Finally, Mr. Huston, there was a famous
statement made by a military officer during the Vietnam conflict to the
effect that a village had to be destroyed in order to save it. Has it ever
occurred to you that that same danger exists with regard to freedoms
and democracy in this country ?
Mr. Huston. That freedom has to be destroyed to save it? No, that
certainly never occurred to me.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that possibility ever ex-
isted in recent years ?
Mr. Huston. No : I don't.
The Chairman. I might say it will be necessary for the committee
to examine the Nixon papers as they relate to the so-called Huston
plan. The committee has subpenaed those papers, and an arrangement
has been worked out which is intended to yield those papers to the
committee.
When we examine those papers, they may or may not tell us how
much the President may have known at any given time. But I am told
by Counsel that the papers have been turned over to the White House
by Mr. Herbert Miller, Nixon's attorney.
Our understanding is that they are to come to us. Maybe it is just
a stopover at the White House. I do not know. But we are going to try
to determine that, and we hope to have, and expect to have, those
papers very soon.
I think, Senator Mathias, you are next.
Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Huston, when you received this assignment and when you eval-
uated it in the serious way that you described to the committee very
eloquently, did it ever occur to you to consult with Senator Eastland,
the chairman, or Senator Hruska, for example, the ranking minority
member of the Judiciary Committee, on such a serious threat to
the Nation?
Mr. Huston. Senator, because of my position on the White House
staff, I woul d not have been in a position to do that.
Senator Mathias. Did you ever recommend it to anybody else?
37
n ^'^ VBlTas -:^ ano P ? infc ' * had recommended that consultation be
undertaken with the ranking members of the Judiciary Committee of
§LSS£ °* th * J ? te ™l Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary
™- aDd the Inter / 1 ?: 1 Securifc y Committee of the House, How-
ever, nothing ever came of that.
Senator Mathias .The concept of coordination with the Congress,
SSJi Ti V6 t0 £ ^ e ^t^onal plan for dealing with serious
th a n"hat P o r nS mS ' nCTer emerged ™ y° ur consultations, other
Mr. Huston. No, sir.
Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I am driven by that response to a
retrospective comment. Senator Goldwater and I and several other
Members of the Senate went down to the White House one day, to have
what we called m those days a "candor meeting" with President Nixon,
an ii m! ime ' I suggested that the problems that we now generally
call Watergate would not be resolved unless the President was willing
to discuss questions like the Huston plan.
And he said that night, "You will get the answer. You will get the
full disclosure." And I have to think what a tragedy it is that we did
not try to work these problems out in a coordinated way, rather than
come through all of the tragedy that we have been through since that
toda ™ Ut Iiuston P lan in this setting and in this way
I must say that I am perhaps more concerned since Mr. Huston's
testimony this morning than I was before, because of what he has told
us about the origins of the plan, and the way in which it was formu-
lated and adopted. Senior officials of the Government advocated it, and
as he describes it, formulated it. He himself, as the task force director,
advocated it, and the President of the United States approved it.
JNow, through all of these steps— and I would gather from your
testimony that there were a number of steps, and a number of meet-
ings and consultations— was the word Constitution ever used bv anv-
body ? J
Mr. Huston. Senator, I do not recall the details of any conversation,
except within the context that I had earlier described of this inherent
Executive power, a belief that I think permeated the entire intelli-
gence community in these areas.
Senator Mathias. Although, of course, Mr. Hoover, for example,
m referring to implementing mail coverage, did raise the question of
illegality.
Mr. Huston. Yes, he did.
Senator Mathias. He did use the word illegal.
Mr. Huston. Yes ; yes, he did.
Senator Mathias. I think the problem before this committee is a
very real one. And I hope that as we make recommendations to the
Congress on how to deal with the problems that have been presented
to us. we would have in mind the role of Government in the lives of the
people.
The role of Government, it seems to me, is not just the use of force.
It is the use of example, and I call to mind Justice Brandeis' opinion,
Olmstead v. The United States, in which he said that,
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that Government officials shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a
38
Government of laws, existence of the Government will be imperiled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher, for good or for ill. It teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for
law. It, invites every man to become a law unto himself. It invites anarchy.
To declare that in the administration of the criminal law, the end justifies the
means, to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private citizen, would bring terrible retribution. Against that
pernicious doctrine, this Court should resolutely set its face.
It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that that is a philosophy that should
guide our Government in dealing with even the most serious problems.
Now, that opinion was written about 1928.
Mr. Huston, you said you thought there had been a change in at-
titude, perhaps more consciousness of, the rights of privacy today than
25 or 30 years ago. That opinion would not, I think, support that
view. But let me ask you this question. Is it not true that it is not so
much a change in attitude, but the development of techniques that has
made us very conscious of our dependence on the fourth amendment,
that years ago — in fact, when the fourth amendment itself was writ-
ten, the only ways to survey the citizen was through a window, or at
his keyhole, or listening down his chimney? Today, you have taps,
and bugs, and telescopic lenses on cameras. You have all kinds of sens-
ing devices beyond the imagination of the citizens a generation ago.
Do you not feel that the protection of the fourth amendment should
be more resolutely adhered to today than ever before, because of that
very fact?
Mr. Huston. Yes. I think that there are numbers of threats today
that weren't perceived. I think that a large number of those threats
are not in the intelligence community, or even in the enforcement areas
of the Government.
Senator Mathias. Which places, as Justice Brandeis suggested, an
even greater burden on Government to lead.
Mr. Huston. On Government in all respects, Senator, from the use
of the social security numbers as a national identifier, on down to
credit reports, and that sort of thing. And I think that — let me say,
for example, that I have absolutely no disagreement whatsoever
with the opinion of the court in the U.S. district court case which
struck down warrantless wiretaps. I agree with the conclusion
of the court entirely in that case, and I have no hesitation in my mind
of feeling that the Government has to run — that free people have to
run certain risks that are inherent in a society where there are people
who aren't going to play by the same rules.
And when I talked about attitude, Senator, I am not trying to justify
anything. I am simply trying to explain my impression of what the
attitude was that I was exposed to by those people who were my
seniors.
Senator Mathias. I understand that, and I think you have done
this committee a great service in the way you presented it this morn-
ing. We are going to need the benefit of all the advice we can get in
making our recommendations.
Earlier this morning, you said that you thought that domestic intel-
ligence should be removed from the FBI, and you did not follow that
up. I wonder if you would like to amplify that statement?
Mr. Huston. Well, I think that the biggest problem this committee
has to grapple with, if I may presume to suggest to the committee, is
39
the problem that on the one hand, you run the risk that the tools of the
intelligence community, the law enforcement community, the taxing
authority to the extent that it is immediately accountable and subject
to the direction of the President or the White House, is subject to poli-
tical abuse. So that it is important, in my mind, to have these authori-
ties independent enough that they have the strength to withstand or
resist use of the agencies for partisan or political purposes, which
I think most of the agencies, most of the time have been successful at,
but not all of the time. And I'm sure you are aware of many instances
going back way beyond the Mxon administration, and in many re-
spects, m my judgment, much more so in prior administrations where
agencies were used for political purposes. And that is a real risk and
a great threat that needs to be dealt with.
On the other- hand, to the extent that these agencies are so inde : ~
pendent that they feel immunity, that they do not even have to tell the
President of the United States what they are doing, that they do not
feel any accountability to him whatsoever, that they are not directly
accountable to the Congress, they are not directly accountable to the
i? e< u UtlVe ' and accordin g 1 y ) the y ar e accountable to no one. And, of
all the power that is dangerous, unaccountable power is the most dan-
gerous in my judgment, so that the dilemma it seems to me that the
Nation faces today is how do you establish these things that are
necessary to protect liberties with enough independence and integrity
to resist any perversions by the politicians, and yet make them suffi-
ciently accountable to those people who are elected, and responsibile
to the American people that they can be on target with the objectives
that have been established by an elected Government. And I think
that is the crux of the dilemma that is faced by those who want to deal
honestly with the intelligence community today.
Senator Mathias. This really brings us back to Senator Mondale's
question : how can a President, feel that the law is being obeyed, and
that Presidential policy is being adhered to? Does that not bring us in
full circle back to the Constitution, and to the assurance, to the extent
that we can be sure of any human undertaking, that the Constitution
is understood, that loyalty to the Constitution is being given by every
public service?
Mr. Huston. Yes; I think it comes back to an assumption by all of-
ficers of what an agreement among all people in Government, as to
exactly what are the limits and responsibilities and obligations imposed
by the Constitution. But I think that the problem we have had—
and it is not just in this area, Senator. I think it is in many areas
that over the past 30 years, you have had an accretion of little steps
to increase the claim of Executive power, and that pretty soon, after
a 30-year period, all of a sudden, you woke up one morning, and here
was this creature that had been created that no one along the line
had ever really contemplated.
Each of these steps, I think, initially were innocent and honest steps.
I thmk most of these— it is my belief that these people in the intel-
ligence community were honest people, dedicated people, wanting to do
an honest job, for what they thought was best for the country. And I
do not think that they were out to destroy the liberties of the American
people for any perverse political purpose.
40
But what happened, in my judgment, in this area, where I got
sucked in, when I should have known better, and where many other
more intelligent, sophisticated people got sucked in in other areas, is the
whole concept of some inherent Executive power that really extends
beyond anything contemplated by those who made the incremental
claims, as we went through the years. And I think that position has
been reached, and now there are some hard looks at this, and some
knocks, and perhaps we're even swinging, in my judgment, a little bit
too much the other way. But I think that is healthy, and I think we are
on the right track.
Senator Mathias. But you agree if it had not come to a screeching
halt, there would have been a national
Mr. Huston. I think that — what I know, and as you know, Senator,
I left the White House in June 1971. But based on what I know, from
what happened subsequently, and other things that had happened
in prior administrations, there is no doubt in my mind that it was
necessary that this thing come to a screeching halt, and some heads
be knocked down, and some people have their names attached to
things that they would rather not be attached to, and that honest men
look at some tough questions in the search for honest answers. And I
hope that is where, we are headed today, not trying to put the blame
on who was the worst guy in the lot, but what in the world got you
guys into this thing, what was your thinking, how can you avoid it ?
And here are some honest solutions.
Senator Mathias. And where do we go from here ?
Mr. Huston. Well, it looks to me like you are on the right track, and
my only hope is that this committee and the committee on the other
side will start on the assumption that here exists a need, an honest
need, for intelligence-collection capability, and the analysis capability
and the question is, how do we structure it, how do we keep it under
control, how do we make its exercise of its powers compatible with
the constitutionally protected rights.
In a final analysis, it is my view, Senator, whether you are a judge
who sits on the court, whether you are a Senator who has to cast a
vote, whether you are the Director of the FBI, when you have power,
in the final analysis, you have discretion, and that discretion and how
you use it is a matter of the extent of your integrity, so the bottom line,
in many respects, is going to be integrity. But where I think I made
my mistake, the biggest mistake I made was, I assumed that the integ-
rity of the people who would be involved in this intelligence-collection
operation was such that, although conceptually you could argue that
these recommendations were so broad that they could have encom-
passed — you know, we could have been breaking into 250 million homes
in 1970 — my judgment was that those types of extraordinary powers
would be used only under the narrowest, most limited circumstances,
and for that check, I rely upon the integrity of the person who has the
authority.
What I have learned subsequently is what happens when the
person who has that discretion is not Dick Helms, but he is Howard
Hunt, and that seems to me to be the risk. So there has to be some insti-
tutional restraint, in my judgment.
Senator Mathias. Thank you very much, Mr. Huston. You have
been very helpful.
41
The Chairman. The Constitution, when it was written, I think, rec-
ognized this frailty in people who were to be entrusted with power,
and for that very reason, laid down certain prohibitions, certain re-
strictions upon the power of Government. As you know, the first
amendment simply denies to the Government the power to interfere
with free speech and freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and
the fourth amendment undertakes to deny to the Government the power
to conduct unreasonable searches and seizures.
The men who wrote the Constitution did not want to entrust our
civil liberties to the good judgment and discretion of men in govern-
ment who may overreach themselves, and that is why these protections
were written into the supreme law of the land.
Now, I go back to Senator Mathias' question. He asked you that
when the intelligence leaders were dealing with you to eliminate these
restrictions, all of which culminated in your recommendation to the
President that certain illegal actions be taken, he asked you whether
anybody expressed any concern about the Constitution. And it just
nappens, oena^or JYta^nias, vu&v our counsel, i\xr. oc^iWarz, asKeu Laa****
question previously in executive session, the same question that you
put to the witness. Mr. Schwarz asked, "Was there any person who
stated that the activity recommended, which you have previously iden-
tified as being illegal opening of the mail and breaking and entry or
burglary — was there any single person who stated that such activity
should not be done because it was unconstitutional?" And you, Mr.
Huston replied, "No." And then Mr. Schwarz asked, "Was there any
single person who said such activity should not be done because it was
illegal ?" And you replied, "No." Now, I take it that still remains your
testimony ?
Mr. Huston. Yes. But Senator, I might point out that on the con-
stitutional question, that — you know, at the time of the OVmstead case,
in 1927, it is my recollection that the Supreme Court at that time held
that, in that period, held that wiretaps — I think they adopted the ex-
clusionary rule, that didn't apply to the States. And it wasn't until
19 — I think it was in the Warren Court, in 1960 — that the Supreme
Court finally held that a nontrespass electronic surveillance constituted
a violation of the fourth amendment.
It was not until 1972 that the Supreme Court held that warrantless
wiretaps — my only point is that in many of these areas throughout
there have been men of honest differences of opinion who felt that the
Constitution — I'm sure, for example, that Justice Black would have
said from day one that the Constitution clearly prohibited this, but
there were other men of equal intent who said that the Constitution
did not contemplate the prohibition of that.
The Chairman. As far as bugging is concerned, there has been an
evolution in the courts, and this has been a gray area in the law, but I
do not think that, as far as opening the mail was concerned, there was
any such gray area, and you yourself referred to your recommendation
as an illegal act. So, we are talking about the whole plan, and in the
course of its evolution, none of these people, even the directors of these
agencies, with such great power, ever raised the question of the consti-
tutionality of what was being proposed.
Mr. Huston. That's right.
The Chairman. That is correct?'
42
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Schweiker.
Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Huston, one of the areas I am interested in is whether or not the
Huston plan ever died. First you have its proposal, acceptance, and
then its withdrawal. But 2 months later — in fact, less than 2 months
later — John Dean wrote about the Interagency Domestic Intelligence
Unit and said it would be established with operational and evaluational
purposes in mind, and that it would help to determine what the re-
straints were that could be removed.
Then, in April of 1971, following after that, there was another meet-
ing with Mr. Hoover, Mr. Helms, Admiral Gayler, discussing a broad-
ening of the operations to remove restraints, and particularly of
the very confidential type. So the idea keeps emerging, almost like a
phoenix out of the ashes ; and then 3 months after that, the Plumbers
was established. Do you really feel that the concept, the ideas, the pro-
posals really died at that point ?
Mr. Huston. Well, I can only speak, Senator, of my own knowledge.
I was not involved in the creation or operation of the Interagency
Evaluation Committee. I left the White House before the Plumbers
were organized, so I do not have any personal knowledge of what hap-
pened after that.
My knowledge is simply that I was told by Mr. Haldeman that the
ening of the operations to remove restraints and particularly of
the FBI, had decided to withdraw his approval, that I was to get the
memorandum back, and that the matter then might be reconsidered,
if the President could meet with the Attorney General and Mr. Hoover.
I assumed that such a meeting would be held. As far as I know, how-
ever, no such meeting was held.
Now, it is entirely possible that — and perhaps, based upon Mr.
Dean's memorandum, it seems to me likely — that as a result of the
decision of the President to terminate his authorization that he had
given in connection with the report of the Interagency Committee,
that they decided to go forward on a narrower basis, and, therefore,
established the IEC. However, the IEC concept was substantially
different from that concept which was set forth in the report of the
Interagency Committee, in that we contemplated that the continu-
ing group would be comparable to the U.S. Intelligence Board, that
it would operate within the FBI, that the Director of the FBI would
be chairman. It would be staffed by FBI people.
And, as I understand, the IEC was set up within the Justice De-
partment, under the direction or the chairmanship of the Assistant
Attorney General, that it had Justice Department staffing, and that
the Bureau, for all intents and purposes, did not cooperate with it.
But that is all I know personally.
Senator Schweiker. Well, as I understand it, it is true they did not
supply a staff which was taken over by Justice Department, but they
did attend meetings and they were part of the formal group. So
while there was a balking up along the way, somebody was pushing,
pushing, pushing with a concept, and even, eventually, the FBI at-
tended that group meeting, while it did not supply staff.
So I think you can make a pretty good case out of the fact that
an awful lot of concepts survived intact, when you also consider
43
that — and you admitted this under earlier testimony — that Operation
CHAOS was in full blast in the CIA. There were other activities that
even the President did not know about previously that were still
going on, that some of the agencies did not want to talk about, and
did not want to admit to their peers and colleagues that they were
doing. So I think when you see the total picture, it is not quite as
definitive as just the ending of a chapter, the closing of a door.
Mr. Huston, you said in your previous testimony that you spoke
about a classification program, and you said on page 96 of your
May 23 deposition, that :
The whole concept of intelligence operations was obviously a very sensitive
matter. If it wouldn't have been classified in the way that it was in the agency
and hadn't been recognized as such, if this wasn't possible, then we couldn't have
had such a plan. _. . . .
Isn't really one of the hearts of this issue Government classifica-
tion of information? Many of us did not even know about these
matters until much later than it happened, because it was highly
classified.
Is classification not really a way that the executive branch not
only keeps things from the legislative branch but keeps it from
the people, because by your own testimony I think you are obviously
saying that if it had gotten out, it probably would have self-de-
structed ? So isn't Government secrecy and classification "top secret"
really the means and the vehicle that the Executive accumulates this
great power that people do not want them to have?
Mr. Huston. I do not think, in my mind, there was ever any jus-
tification for the existence of the committee, or, had the Interagency
Domestic Operations Board been established, there would have been
any justification for having the mere existence of those operations
classified. Nor do I think that, in many respects, much of what was
discussed or contemplated should have been classified.
The only thing, in my mind, that should be classified would be
that which would reveal, would disclose the identity of sources or
otherwise jeopardize the collection of intelligence information.
Senator Schweeker. I think an interesting footnote to what you
are saying is that many of the documents here today were just de-
classified yesterday. Here we have had the Huston plan kicking
around for a long period of time; it has been fairly general press
knowledge. And yet we would have been restrained from asking certain
questions if we had not gotten certain documents declassified by yester-
day. If it had not come through, we might not have been able to have
the hearing. And I think this is a pretty good picture of the technique
that a Government branch or agency uses to put these things into
motion. This would not ever get off the ground if it were open to
the light of day.
We have had a lot of discussion about the fourth amendment, Mr.
Huston, because I realize, that that is the heart of the issue. I have
a little trouble, though, when I hear your answer. I know what you
told me earlier, that you were concerned about revolutionary vio-
lence and that you were concerned about the disturbances rocking the
country, and that this was the lesser of two evils, and that the Con-
stitution gave the President an inherent security power of some kind.
62-685 O - 76 - 4
44
But in reading the fourth amendment, it is pretty clear what it
says :
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
I do not know that you really need the Supreme Court to say what
that means.
What one part of the Constitution gives the executive branch the
rights that you saw for internal security protection? What part of
the Constitution can you quote ?
Mr. Huston. Well, Senator, first of all, I do not take the posi-
tion — and I am not about to take the position here that Mr. Wilson
took before the Ervin committee, because that is not my belief. I am
simply trying to convey to you what the impression, unreasoned that
it was, that existed in June of 1970.
In my judgment, any thoughtful consideration given to the risks
versus the benefits, the literal reading of the Constitution and the
general concept under which we have to operate in this country sup-
port your position. I would say, though, that the justification that
would have been cited under the fourth amendment would be the
question of whether the search was unreasonable.
Senator Schweiker. Are you saying that there is or is not consti-
tutional power to back up the ultimate right to effect the use of
Mr. Huston. In my judgment, now, there is not.
Senator Schweiker. As I recall from the nice chat that we had
when I took your deposition before, Mr. Huston, I thought you felt at
the time
Mr. Huston. I did, at the time. Yes, I did.
Senator Schweiker. Because I think it is really the heart of the
issue, where that power falls and rests. And I think it is significant,
as one of the other Senators pointed out, that they asked you to sign
that memo. It seems to me that the White House knew they were walk-
ing all over the fourth amendment. And it seems to me this is just
one more thing that we have learned to call plausible denial, whereby
if something happens, why, they can really deny it happened, except
that some bureaucratic person gets the blame.
And it just seems to me that the fact it became the Huston plan
is a prettv prood indication that it was not somebody else's plan, that
they really knew they were walking over the fourth amendment, but
thought they could get away with it. Would you agree with that
or not?
Mr. Huston. No, Senator. My guess would be that they never gave
anv thought to it.
Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Huston, when you were testifying in executive
session before this public hearing, you were asked about your present
view. And I think there are two portions of the deposition that ought
to be read into the record, on which I would like any further comment
you may want to make.
You were asked what the risk was of setting aside the laws, even
45
though the purpose seems a very compelling one as you reflect back
upon it. And this is what you said :
The risk was that you would get people who would be susceptible to political
considerations as opposed to national security considerations, or would construe
political considerations to be national security considerations, to move from the
kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from the kid with the picket
sign to the kid with the bumper sticker of the opposing candidate. And you just
keep going down the line.
Is that not really about as good a statement — certainly, it is one
of the best I have ever seen — of the risks that we assume once we begin
to disregard the laws ?
Mr. Huston. Yes, I think it is a risk. I think people start out with
the best intentions in the world. I don't think there was anyone that
was involved in this operation who was motivated by a desire to
protect the President, to secure his reelection, to embarrass the Demo-
crats, to engage in any partisan political purpose. There was no one
who was going to get any medal put on him that said "hero," or who
was going to be invited as a special guest to the White House Press
Club.
But we went from this kind of sincere intention, honest intention,
to develop a series of justifications and rationalizations based upon
this, what I believe to be the basic issue of this distorted view of in-
herent executive power, and from that, whether it was direct, as
Senator Schweiker seems to think it is, or was indirect or inevitable,
as I tend to think it is, you went down the road to where you ended
up, with these people going into the Watergate.
And so that has convinced me that you have just got to draw the
line at the top of the totem pole, and that we would then have to take
the risk — it is not a risk-free choice, but it is one that, I am afraid,
in my judgment, that we do not have any alternative but to take.
The Chairman. Has that not really been a lesson that has been
learned by the historians and the scholars through the years who have
been interested in the growth and preservation of a free society, that
in the end our reliance must be upon the law?
Mr. Huston. I think that is. But I think to me the interesting thing
is that many of us who should have known better adopted a view of
the Presidency that was comparable to the pre- Vietnam views of
Dr. Schlesinger and others, and then proceeded to exaggerate and
accelerate it.
As I say, I think so much of it was incremental, but we have got,
as you say, correctly, I think, to get back to the elemental considera-
tions. And, as I say, in your consideration I hope you will focus on
this really dangerous question of power without any accountability
whatsoever, at least with respect to the Presidency, that it ultimately
was an accountability to the people through the Congress. But it could
be entirely conceivable that the rest of these things would have been
going on forever, and no one, including the President, no one would
have known about it.
The Chairman. Of course, accountability is at the heart of this
issue. And the thing that has not been known until today about the
Huston nlan is that it was just a 5-day episode where the President
was asked to confer his authority to do these various things. He asked
46
for options. He authorized these things. Five days later, upon recon-
sideration, he revoked it. And the fact of the matter is these things
had been going on long before he was asked, and they continued long
after he revoked his authority.
We have found this to be the endemic problem in the intelligence
service and in the law enforcement service of the Government. And
you have characterized it, you have said, '^These agencies are fiefdoms."
It is not only that they do not want the President to know what is going
on for fear he might say you shouldn't do it, but they do not want one
another to know what is going on. The CIA does not want the FBI
to know what particular things it may be up to and vice versa.
And this compartmentalization is always justified with elaborate
arguments about secrecy, sensitivity, national security. And the end
result of it all is such a chaos that the President himself cannot govern
or control the very agencies that are supposed to be upholding the law
and protecting us against the enemy.
Now, that has to be changed. And accountability, as you have said,
goes to the very heart of our search, and it has got to be an accounta-
bility not only to the President; in the future, it has got to be an
accountability to the Congress as well. And we are going to find it if
we can, and we are going to recommend changes in the law and in the
procedures that we hope will make these agencies accountable in the
future.
Senator Mondale.
Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Earlier, Mr. Huston, you indicated that one of the great needs in
this whole field was to draw the line between what, I guess you would
say, were legitimate functions of these agencies, and a point where they
become involved in the political sense, so that they corrupt and under-
mine and subvert the political process.
Would you not agree that that line has been drawn in terms of the
criminal law now, that that has been the basic thrust of the law from
the beginning of American society, to give the law enforcement officers
enough power to apprehend criminals but not so much power that
these agencies can be turned in on the American people, in terms of
spies and in other ways, and that, thus, the first prerequisite of ac-
countability is an agreement that everybody has to obey the law ?
Mr. Huston. Yes, I agree.
Senator Mondale. All right.
During your testimony today, you seemed to indicate that the pres-
ent criminal law did not arm the Government with adequate tools to
anticipate and prevent riots and violence. I find that somewhat
disturbing, as an old law enforcement officer myself, because it is my
impression that there is a host of laws on the books available to crimi-
nal investigators and prosecutors, law enforcement officers, within the
legitimate framework of the Constitution and the laws, that permit
investigations and arrests for conspiracy to commit crimes, or con-
spiracies to cross State lines for purposes of rioting and the rest.
Is there anything in your background which equipped you to draw
the judgment that the criminal law is inadequate to deal with the
problems of violence with which you were trying to deal?
Mr. Huston. No. I have no claim to any expertise that would qualify
me to say that, other than the general specific impression that I had,
47
the information that I had from those people who were responsible for
handling this problem.
Senator Mondale. Yet most of the people you were talking to were
not in law enforcement at all. They were in counterintelligence work
arid in an area which, as we now know, was violating the law. As it was,
the only law enforcement principal you had there was Hoover, and
he opposed it.
Might it be that the whole basis for this recommendation to the
President to relax restrictions on these police activities in order to meet
these threats was based on a false assumption that the law did not, in
its proper exercise, contain adequate remedies to deal with it ?
Mr. Huston. Well, I think that the intelligence collection or analysis
and collection process is different from the law enforcement process.
And I think that the intelligence community can do its job without the
necessity for extraordinary — the use of extraordinary investigative
techniques.
But I think, for example, if you take the Safe Streets Act that sets
forth the criteria under which "^ou can have court-ordered wiretaps, it
is my recollection that those taps can only run for like 7 days — I'm not
sure ; it's some limited period of time — pursuant to a court order, be-
fore they have to be disclosed to the party who is subject to being over-
heard. And in a continuing intelligence collection process, that would
not be as effective a way to go about it.
But I don't think that — my judgment would be that there's nothing
we can do today that cannot be done generally within the parameters
of existing criminal laws.
Senator Monday. I am glad to hear you say that, because I think
there was an impression left here that the country that lives within the
constitutional law is powerless to deal with violence. Within the law
and the Constitution, good law enforcement officers know perfectly
well how to investigate the suggestions of probable cause or the com-
mission of crimes. There are plenty of laws to stop crime before it is
committed, before conspiracies are developed.
I would like to at least correct what I think is the impression here
that somehow if you are constitutional and legal, you are also defense-
less, that criminal law is a rough tool as practiced constitutionally, and
it can work effectively if people have the patience to work within it.
One final point : earlier today you said that you did not see how your
recommended restrictions on due process in any way contributed to the
Plumbers. I will concede that you did not want the Plumbers created.
But if violations of the law by public officers are acceptable for your
purposes, why are violations of the law for other purposes not equally
justifiable ?
Mr. Huston. My view on the Plumbers is that you had a group of
vigilantes operating outside the framework of established, authorized
law enforcement agencies, who were operating for what appeared to
me to be essentially political purposes, whereas what we were talking
about was the exercise of functions by authorized law enforcement
agencies for internal security purposes, and not political purposes.
Senator Mondale. Which is the more offensive to American society
and principles, official lawlessness by persons who are public employ-
ees, and many of them lawyers, on the one hand, or paid lawlessness
by persons outside of the Government?
Mr. Huston. Well, I am not sure that you can establish any qualita-
tive distinction there, except for the risk, the propensity for such acts
to be undertaken by the vigilantes, as opposed to the professionals.
Senator Mondale. Do you think that those who ordered the Plumb-
ers were not just as convinced of the righteousness of their cause as you
were?
Mr. Huston. I do not have any idea what they were convinced of,
but I am convinced that the intelligence community would never have
undertaken the Plumbers' operation.
Senator Mondale. Well, I have some trouble accepting that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Huddleston.
Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just one more question, Mr. Huston, on the subject of the intelli-
gence-gathering capability of the IRS. You have testified, I believe,
that you did not specifically make a request of the Service to gather
intelligence on any particular group or individual. Is that correct?
Mr. Huston. Yes, sir.
Senator Huddleston. Were you surprised to learn, then, that the
IRS, in fact, through its Activist Organizations Committee, and
through the FBI, had been supplying to the White House, some 5
months prior to the memorandum that we referred to earlier, intelli-
gence information on at least one organization, the Students for a
Democratic Society ?
Mr. Huston. I do not think I ever saw, or I have no recollection of
ever having seen any information that came to the White House from
the IRS, Senator.
Senator Huddleston. We have a memorandum to that effect [exhibit
65 *] about Mr. Paul Wright, who at that time was head of the AOC,
indicating that he was giving his permission to the FBI to relay to the
White House, at the request of the White House, intelligence infor-
mation that had been gathered on the SDS.
Mr. Huston. Well, Senator, as I think I testified earlier, there had
been, I assume — I don't know what that memorandum dealt with, but
if it dealt with financial matters or sources of funding, there had
been a standing request from the President, before I became involved
in this, to the Bureau, to provide the White House with continuing
information with respect to sources of funds that were being used by
organizations who were engaged in violence ; and so what may have
happened is that the Bureau was given that assignment ; they went to
the IRS and said, "do you have any information we can use?" And
IRS said, "Yes, you may use this information." The Bureau then sent
it to the White House.
But as far as I know. I never saw any memorandum from the IRS
directly to the White House, or to anyone else to say that this infor-
mation was derived from information secured by the IRS.
Senator Huddleston. Well, this memorandum would certainly in-
dicate that the IRS was supplying to the White House certain very
sensitive intelligence information.
The point I would like to make is that this episode, and this testi-
mony by you, Mr. Huston, and the subsequent action of the IRS, is
somewhat consistent with other types of information that we have
received, where those in high authority within these agencies expressed
1 See p. 400.
49
to us that it was not their intent that any abuse occur, and it was their
understanding that all down the line understood that no abuse occur.
Yet, as we see in this case, where subsequent to your inquiry of the
agency, they did increase their activity in this regard, creating the
Special Sendee Staff. We saw this in the case of the poisons that were
not destroyed, even though the Director of the Agency was under that
impression, and had the understanding that they were destroyed, and
that everyone understood. There have been other instances in a more
serious area, which we cannot go into at this time, but relating to
possible assassination plots.
We see consistently that the higher authorities indicate that they
had an understanding that these abuses would not occur, but down the
line, the persons who were implementing the action had an under-
standing, according to their testimony, that they were acting in ac-
cordance with expressed authority from higher-ups. And this is the
dilemma in which we find ourselves as we continue to try to pinpoint
the accountability for the kind of actions that are contrary to every-
thing we believe in, a free and open and democratic society.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I think that sums it up, Senator.
Senator Schweiker, do you have any further questions ?
Are there any further questions on the part of the committee? If
not, I want to thank you very much for your testimony today. It has
been extremely important testimony, and the committee will stand
adjourned until 10 tomorrow morning.
[Whereupon, at 12 :15 p.m., the committee adjourned to reconvene
at 10 a.m. Wednesday, September 24.]
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER. 24, 1975
U.S. Sekate,
Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D.O.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :05 a.m., in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan,
Hart (Colorado), Baker, Mathias, and Schweiker.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O.
Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, council to the
minority.
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.
Yesterday the committee commenced its inquiry into the Huston
plan, our witness being Mr. Huston. And it developed in the testimony
that several illegal proposals had been made to the President — in this
case, Mr. Nixon — that he had approved those proposals, and later, had
revoked his approval. But, the very activities for which authority
was sought, had in fact been going on for a long period of time, prior
to the submission of the proposals to the President.
The evidence also showed that once the President had revoked the
proposals, about 5 days after he had first approved them, the activities,
nevertheless, continued, and in some cases, were expanded.
Mr. Huston testified that Mr. Nixon was not aware of these activities,
either before or after his approval and revocation of the Huston plan.
One of the illegal activities was the opening of the mail by the ClA,
and this committee will look into that mail-opening program exten-
sively. It is a very serious matter, and we have hearings scheduled a
few weeks from now, at the end of which we will inquire in detail
about the mail-opening program.
We will want to know, for example, why the mail of such individuals
and organizations in this country as the Ford Foundation, Harvard
University, and the Rockefeller Foundation was regularly opened by
the CIA. or why the mail coming to or from such individuals as Arthur
Burns, Bella Abzug, Jay Rockefeller, Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., Richard Nixon himself, as well as such
Senators as Hubert Humphrey, Edward Kennedy, even the Chairman
of this committee, whose letter to my mother is in the file, should have
been regularly opened and scrutinized by the CIA against the laws of
the country.
And so today, our objective is not to look at this mail program in
great detail, for we will do that later. But it is, rather, to examine the
lack of accountability within the Agency and the failure to keep the
President of the United States properly advised of such activities, a
core issue if we are going to reform the intelligence agencies and law
(51)
52
enforcement agencies of the Federal Government and make them
properly responsible and accountable for their actions to the elected
representatives of the people, chief among whom, of course, is the
President himself.
Now with that brief introduction to the general topic for the day,
I would like to ask our witness, Mr. Angleton — who, I understand, is
represented by counsel — to take the oath. Before I ask you to take
the oath, Mr. Angleton, I wonder if your attorney would identify
himself for the record.
Mr. Brown. Yes, Mr. Chairman, my name is John T. Brown, counsel
for Mr. Angleton in these proceedings.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Brown. Mr. Angleton, would you
please stand to take the oath? Do you solemnly swear that all the
testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so helpjou God?
Mr. Angleton. I do. j
The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz, would you please begin the
questioning ?
TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON, FORMER CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN T. BROWN,
COUNSEL
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Angleton, were you employed by the CIA in
Mr. Angleton. Yes ; I was.
Mr. Schwarz. What was your job at that time?
Mr. Angleton. I was Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff.
Mr. Schwarz. And when did you start working for the CIA?
Mr. Angleton. I began in 1947, having come from OSS (Office of
Strategic Services) .
Mr. Schwarz. You knew, Mr. Angleton, did you not, that the CIA
was opening mail in New York City in 1970, and had been doing so for
approximately 15 or 20 years ?
Mr. Angleton. I did.
Mr. Brown. Mr. Schwarz, pardon me. If I may interrupt for just a
moment. As I indicated to the counsel for the committee, Mr. Angleton
had a very brief opening statement which he wished to make, and I
would like, at this time, to ask for the opportunity to have him make
that statement, if I may.
Mr. Schwarz. Yes ; I'm sorry. You did say that to me, and I'm very
sorry. Would you go ahead ?
Mr. Angleton. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my
name is James Angleton. I am appearing before the committee today,
freely and without subpena. I am mindful of the serious issues facing
the committee, and I know of your concern that they be resolved
prudently and expeditiously. I have served in the intelligence com-
munity of the United States for 31 years, beginning with the OSS
during World War II. In 1954, 1 became Chief of the Counterintelli-
gence Staff of the CIA, a position which I held until 1974. I am now
retired.
My years of service have convinced me that the strength of the
United States lies in its capacity to sustain perpetual yet peaceful
53
revolution. It is the ultimate function of the intelligence community,
as part of our Government, to maintain and enhance the opportunity
for peaceful change.
I believe most strongly that the efforts and motivations of the intel-
ligence community have contributed to the sustaining of a Nation of
diversity and strength.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Angleton.
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Angleton, you just said, did you not, that you
knew in 1970, and had known for a substantial period of time, that the
CIA was opening mail in New York City ?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Mr. Schwarz. And Director Helms knew that, did he not ?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Mr. Schwarz. And J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, knew that,
did he not ?
Mr. Angleton. I would assume so, sir.
Mr. Schwarz. Well, I will read to you what Mr. Helms said in his
deposition of last week. "Mr. Hoover knew all about the mail opera-
tions." Now, you have no reason to doubt that, do you %
Mr. Angleton. I do not.
Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Sullivan of the FBI knew all about the
CIA's mail-opening program, did he not?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Mr. Schwarz. Now Mr. Helms, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Sullivan, and your-
self were all involved in the process which has come to be known as
the Huston plan, is that correct ?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Helms and Mr. Hoover signed the plan, did
they not ?
Mr. Angleton. They did.
Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Sullivan was the primary drafter, but you
and other working persons contributed to the drafting of the report,
did you not ?
Mr. Angleton. Correct.
Mr. Schwarz. All right. Would you turn, Mr. Angleton, to page 29
of the Special Report, Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad
Hoc) , June 1970 [exhibit 1 1 ].
Now that is talking about mail coverage, isn't it ?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Mr. Schwarz. And it distinguishes between routine coverage and
covert coverage, saying routine coverage is legal and covert coverage
is illegal, is that correct ?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Mr. Schwarz. And by covert coverage, they meant opening the mail,
did they not ?
Mr. Angleton. Exactly.
Mr. Schwarz. Would you read into the record the first sentence
under the heading, "Nature of Restrictions," please ?
Mr. Angleton. "Covert coverage has been discontinued while routine
coverage has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth of publicity
arising from disclosure of routine mail coverage during legal pro-
1 See p. 141.
54
ceedings and publicity afforded this matter in congressional hearings
involving accusations of governmental invasion of privacy."
Mr. Schwarz. Now the first five words say "covert coverage has
been discontinued," and, as you just agreed a moment ago, that states
that the opening of mail has been discontinued, isn't that right?
Mr. Angleton. May I seek a little clarification, please ?
I bejieve that if you read the contribution under preliminary dis-
cussion, we are faced with two problems. We are faced with the
problem of domestic mail that goes from one point in the United States
to another point in the United States.
The CIA activity was devoted to mail to the United States from
Communist countries, and to Communist countries from the United
States. So there are two degrees of opening.
In other words, the entire intent and motivation of the program,
as conducted by CIA, involved the question of foreign entanglements,
counterintelligence objectives.
The domestic mail program was a program that had been conducted
at some time or another by the FBI.
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Angleton, would you answer my question?
The words "covert coverage has been discontinued," covert there
means opening mail, isn't that right ?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Mr. Schwarz. I will read to you from the prior paragraph, a refer-
ence which makes perfectly clear that the committee was talking
about both foreign and domestic mail. The sentence which says the
following: "Covert mail coverage, also known as 'sophisticated mail
coverage,' or 'flaps and seals,' entails surreptitious screening and may
include opening and examination of domestic or foreign mail." Now,
the sentence which says "covert coverage has been discontinued,"
is a lie. That is false as far as your knowledge, Mr. Hoover's knowl-
edge, Mr. Helms' knowledge, and Mr. Sullivan's knowledge ; isn't that
correct?
Mr. Angleton. Excuse me, I'm trying to read your preceding para-
graph. It is still my impression, Mr. Schwarz, that this activity that
is referred to as having been discontinued refers to the Bureau's ac-
tivities in this field.
Mr. Schwarz. Well, the words don't say that, first of all. Second,
how would a reader of these words have any idea that that distinction
is being drawn, Mr. Angleton ?
Mr. Angleton. Well, it is certainly my impression that this was the
gap which the Bureau was seeking to cure. In other words, that they
had had such
Mr. Schwarz. Let's make perfectly clear what we're talking about.
You knew, Mr. Helms knew, Mr. Hoover knew, and Mr. Sullivan
knew that the CIA was, in fact, opening the mail, and the sentence
says "covert coverage" — which means mail openings — "has been
discontinued."
Mr. Angleton. But I still say that the FBI, in my view, are the
ones who made the contribution of that statement. It was covering
the problems that thev had had in discontinuing their mail coverage.
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Helms signed the report, didn't he ?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Mr. Schwarz. All right. I just want to have you read into the
55
record from two or more documents which relate to the U.S. Attorney
General's being informed about mail opening, but being informed in
June 1971, or in other words, a year after the Huston plan.
Would you first read into the record from exhibit 56 *, paragraph
4 of that document. And while you were looking for it, I will identify
it for the record that that is a CIA memorandum, for the record, dated
May 19, 1971, subject, "DCI's Meeting Concerning HT/LINGUAL,"
which was a code name for the mail-opening program. And it refers,
Mr. Angleton, to a meeting in Mr. Helms' office which involved a
number of ClA officials, including yourself.
Now, would you read into the record paragraph 4, please ?
Mr. Angleton. Paragraph 4 :
"The DCI," meaning the Director of Central Intelligence, "then asked, who in
the Post Office Department knows the full extent of the operation — beyond cover
surveillance. The Chief of Counterintelligence," meaning myself, "replied that
only Mr. Cotter knows, for he has been witting while with CIA and the Office of
Security. The previous Chief Postal Inspector, Mr. Montague, had never wanted to
know the extent of examination actually done, and was thus able to deny on oath
•^'•"V u vuugibOOll/UU! VV>uii>ll/lCl/ LUlili t,ut,J.l> DUO tii-ij L/(J.i-Ll.£st5x lii^. ilil. VuUci It VUlU
be unable to make such a denial under oath.
In an exchange between the Director for Central Intelligence and the Deputy
Director for Plans, it was observed that while Mr. Cotter's loyalty to CIA could
be assumed, his dilemma is that he owes loyalty now to the Postmaster General.
Mr. Schwarz. All right. In other words, for the first time, someone
was in the Post Office Department, who, for sure, knew that the mail
was being opened. Because of that dilemma, Mr. Helms went to see
the Attorney General, did he not ?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Mr. Schwarz. All right. Now, would you read into the record the
memorandum for the record, June 3, 1971, subject, "Meeting at the
DCI's Office Concerning HT/LINGUAL" [exhibit 57 2 ] the second
paragraph which refers to Mr. Helms' statement that he had briefed
the Attorney General concerning the mail opening program.
Mr. Angleton. Paragraph 2 :
Mr. Helms stated that on Monday he had briefed Attorney General Mitchell
on the operation. (Note. — Mr. Helms may have meant Tuesday, June 1, Monday
having been a holiday.) Mr. Helms indicated that Mr. Mitchell fully concurred
in the value of the operation and had no "hangups" concerning it. When discuss-
ing the advisability of also briefing Postmaster General Blount, Mr. Mitchell
encouraged Mr. Helms to undertake such a briefing.
Mr. Schwarz. All right. Now, that document was dated June 3,
1971, and the mail opening program lasted until January or Febru-
ary 1973, when at the insistence of Mr. Colby, who said it was illegal,
it was dropped. Is that correct ?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct. It was actually — the Director was
Mr. Schlesinger.
Mr. Schwarz. And was it not Mr. Colby who was the moving force
saying it was illegal ?
Mr. Angleton. Precisely.
Mr. Schwarz. All right, no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Angleton — well, first of all, Mr. Smothers, do
you have any questions at this time ?
1 See p. 365.
2 See p. 368.
5&
Mr. Smothers. Yes; I do, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Angleton, there are
two matters I would like to inquire into briefly. First, the process
regarding approval for such actions as mail opening; and second, the
nature of this working group itself. The chief counsel has just raised
the questions regarding the statement in the report of the interagency
group, and you indicated in response to his question that that may
have been put in by the FBI. Is that correct ?
Mr. Angleton. Pardon ?
Mr. Smothers. With respect to the discontinuance of the covert op-
eration, mail opening, as mentioned in that report, you theorized, in
response to Mr. Schwarz's question, that that may have been a state-
ment put in by the FBI. To the best of your knowledge, didn't the
FBI do most of the drafting on this report?
Mr. Angleton. The FBI, as I recall it, collected the opinions after
each meeting of the participating agencies and appeared at the next
meeting with minutes and a draft of the previous session.
Mr. Smothers. All right. With respect to the question then of mail
opening, is it your experience that this kind of operation by the CIA
would have been discussed in interagency working group meetings
among persons who would otherwise have been uninformed of such
operations?
Mr. Angleton. No ; we would not raise such an operation.
Mr. Smothers. In the normal course of things, would there have
been an approval channel other than such interagency groups for se-
curing Presidential advice and consent to such operations ?
Mr. Angleton. I am not aware of any other channel.
Mr. Smothers. Would such channels as the Special Group or the
Intelligence Board have been a proper place for such matters to be
raised ?
Mr. Angleton. I do not believe that an operation of this sensitivity
would have been raised in any body. It would have been — if there was
going to be submission for Presidential approval, it would have been
raised either by the Director of the FBI or the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Mr. Smothers. But in any event, it would not have been raised with
this working group involved with the Huston plan?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct. That is correct.
Mr. Smothers. Mr. Ansrleton, if we could turn for a moment to the
process resulting in the Huston plan itself, I would like to take you
back to your testimony before the staff of this committee on the 12th
of September. At that time, you were asked about the involvement of
Mr. Tom Charles Huston in the development of this plan. I would
like to read to you from page 16 of your transcript and ask you if it
accurately reflects your comments at that time.
Mr. Loch Johnson is doing the questioning, and his question to you is :
Do you think that Tom Charles Huston viewed himself as a potential arbiter
for domestic intelligence disagreements within the community?
Your response :
I think he did because his short letter of instructions to the heads of the
intelligence community said that his role was to be what Dr. Kissinger's was in
foreign policy. It was a very clear-cut edict, so to speak, that he was the ultimate
authority in the Executive for domestic security.
57
Mr. Angleton, is that statement still true ? Does that accurately re-
flect your testimony on September 12 ?
Mr. Angleton. I think it does. I could expand on it, but I think that
is quite accurate.
Mr. Smothers. But that response then is still true ? You still believe
it to be true?
Mr. Angleton. I believe it very much so and that particularly after
listening to Mr. Huston yesterday.
Mr. Smothers. Let me then raise with you another question regard-
ing Mr. Huston's role. If you would, counsel, turn to page 24 of the
same transcript. Mr. Angleton, the question is raised as to whether
Mr. Huston was in fact the White House authority, but in addition
as to whether he was competent to manage such a group as the one that
was involved in the preparation of the Huston plan.
If you would turn to the last Angleton statement on page 24, let me
read into the record your comment at that time and ask if that still
represents your view.
Talking about his experience in the intelligence area, he was very know-
ledgeable. He had obviously gone into this matter at some length prior to the
meeting. He knew prescisely what none of us really knew, that is the depths of
the White House concern. In fact, the most dramatic moment, I think, was at
the beginning of one meeting. At some stage in the meetings after preliminary
draft had been put forward, he found it totally unacceptable, and his comments
were to the effect that the subcommittee was not being responsive to the
President's needs.
Does that accurately reflect your comments?
Mr. Angleton. It does indeed. I think it is almost a direct quotation
as it relates to his insistence, after one of the sessions. He began the
next session with the statement to the effect that the committee was not
responding — the drafting committee was not responding to the
President's requests and was not responsive to it.
Mr. Smothers. During the course of the meetings of this interagency
intelligence group, was there any doubt in your mind that your pur-
pose was to respond to the White House's bidding and that the
message regarding the desires of the White House was being brought
by Tom Charles Huston ?
Mr. Angleton. There was no question in my mind, nor in the minds
of others, that he represented the Commander in Chief in terms of
bringing together this plan, and he certainly never qualified what his
authority was. He made it very clear, and he submitted in writing that
he was to have this role for domestic intelligence comparable to Dr.
Kissinger's role in foreign affairs.
Mr. Smothers. Thank you, Mr. Angleton.
Mr. Chairman, I have nothing further.
The Chairman. Mr. Angleton, you heard Mr. Huston's testimony
yesterday ?
Mr. Angleton. I heard most of it, sir.
The Chairman. You will remember then that he represented to the
committee that in response to the President's desire to extend intel-
ligence coverage within this country, that he asked the various de-
partments of the Government involved, the FBI, the CIA, the NSA,
to come together with a plan and give the President some options, and
that the purpose of the recommendations that were made to the
58
President in the so-called Huston plan, based upon the recommenda-
tions that had come from these departments, was to secure the
President's authorization to eliminate restrictions that he felt were
obstructing this gathering of intelligence.
Now, Mr. Huston told us that he was never informed by the CIA,
the FBI, or any agency that the mail was being opened. He made a
recommendation to the President. The President authorized mail open-
ings, and he testified that to his knowledge the President did not know
that the mail was being opened either.
Now, when we asked Mr. Helms, the Director of the CIA, if to his
knowledge the President had been told of the mail openings, he said,
I do not know whether he knew it or not.
So the state of the record is that to the best of our knowledge the
President had not been told that the mail was being opened. He gets
a recommendation in which it is represented that covert coverage,
which is mail openings, has been discontinued, and he is asked to
authorize the reopening of this program. Now, you have referred to
the President as the Commander in Chief. What possible justification
was there to misrepresent a matter of such importance to the Com-
mander in Chief?
Mr. Angleton. I would say that your question is very well put, Mr.
Chairman. I can only speculate — and I do not have any record of the
discussions between ourselves and the FBI during the drafting stages,
but I know we had several where matters tabled within the drafting
committee, were matters that we never explained to the other members,
and one of them, of course, was the mail intercept. Again, only by way
of speculation, I believe if the President had approved, or even if
there had been some access to the President — because, I think, this is
probably the most difficult task of all, was to have the audience in
which these things could be explained — I have no satisfactory answer
to your question, except that I do not believe that a great deal of the
mail problem centered on the Bureau's lack of coverage, not the
Agency's. -
The Chairman. But the CIA was the agency principally involved in
the mail openings.
Mr. Angleton. That is correct for all foreign mail, not for domestic.
The Chairman. Yes ; and we will explore the whole breadth of that
program in due course. Did not the CIA have an affirmative duty to
inform the President about such a program ?
Mr. Angleton. I believe so, without any question.
The Chairman. But it apparently was not done. You did not inform
the President. Director Helms did not inform the President, so
Mr. Angleton. I would say, sir, not by way of any excuse, but
those were very turbulent periods for the intelligence community and
particularly for the FBI, and I think that all of us had enormous
respect for Mr. Hoover and understood the problems which he had
in sustaining the reputation of the FBI.
The Chairman. But the fact that the times were turbulent, the fact
that illegal operations were being conducted by the very agencies we
entrust to uphold and enforce the law makes it all the more incumbent
that the President be informed of what is going on; does it not? It
is really not an excuse.
Mr. Angleton. I do not think there was ever the forum in which
these matters could be raised at that level. I think that has been one
50
of the troubles in domestic counterintelligence and foreign counter-
intelligence that the issues never do get beyond the parochial circle
of those engaged in that activity.
The Chairman. But you have said that there was an affirmative duty
on the CIA to inform the President ?
Mr. Angleton. I don't dispute that.
The Chairman. And he was not informed, so that was a failure
of duty to the Commander in Chief; is that correct?
Mr. Angleton. Mr. Chairman, I don't think anyone would have
hesitated to inform the President if he had at any moment asked for
a review of intelligence operations.
The Chairman. That is what he did do. That is the very thing he
asked Huston to do. That is the very reason that these agencies got
together to make recommendations to him, and when they made their
recommendations, they misrepresented the facts.
Mr. Angleton. I was referring, sir, to a much more restricted
forum.
The Chairman. I am referring to the mail, and what I have said is
solidly based upon the evidence. The President wanted to be in-
formed. He wanted recommendations. He wanted to decide what
should be done, and he was misinformed.
Not only was he misinformed, but when he reconsidered authorizing
the opening of the mail 5 days later and revoked it, the CIA did not
pay the slightest bit of attention to him, the Commander in Chief, as
you say. Is that so ?
Mr. Angleton. I have no satisfactory answer for that.
The Chairman. You have no satisfactory answer ?
Mr. Angleton. No ; I do not.
The Chairman. I do not think there is a satisfactory answer, because
having revoked the authority, the CIA went ahead with the program.
So that the Commander in Chief is not the Commander in Chief at
all. He is just a problem. You do not want to inform him in the first
place, because he might say no. That is the truth of it. And when he
did say no you disregard it and then you call him the Commander in
Chief.
I have no further questions. Senator Tower ?
Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, the role of certain leaders within
the intelligence community, such as that of Mr. Helms, has been of
concern to this committee. Referring back to your transcript of Sep-
tember 12, at page 17, you were asked about the role of the Director
of your Agency, the role of Mr. Helms. You began by discussing the
first meeting of the interagency committee. You were asked who at-
tended it and your response was as follows, and I read directly from
the transcripts:
Mr. Helms, but he attended only for a few moments. Huston made the opening
remarks as I recall. And since it was being held in our building, Helms made a
brief appearance so to speak, the host, and he took off and I do not think from
that moment he attended any other meetings.
Now Mr. Angleton, the question is this: is this still an accurate
characterization of Mr. Helms' participation in the decisions and
recommendations leading up to a so-called Huston plan ?
Mr.. Angleton. I did not mean my statement to indicate that there
is any neglect of duty. It was simply that the working group was
62-685 O - 76 - 5
60
qualified to adhere to certain guidelines. Mr. Helms' appearance, first
appearance, was to lend weight to the President's request and to sup-
port Mr. Huston.
Senator Tower. Are you saying then that Mr. Helms made no sub-
stantial contribution to the substance of the report?
Mr. Angleton. No; I am speaking about the — that his original
talk was only to outline what the President required from the work-
ing group and naturally I saw him from time to time in -terms of — I
would telephone him to indicate where we stood on the report.
Senator Tower. Now, Mr. Angleton, in these working group ses-
sions, who represented the FBI ?
Mr. Angleton. Mr. Sullivan, sir, who was also the chairman of the
working group.
Senator Tower. In your opinion, did Mr. Sullivan's views accurately
represent those of Mr. Hoover?
Mr. Angleton. No ; I do not think so.
Senator Tower. Could you elaborate on that ?
Mr. Angleton. Mr. Sullivan, as the chief of internal security,
Assistant Director for Internal Security, found himself handicapped
by lack of personnel and funding and in addition many of the aggres-
sive operations conducted by the Bureau in the past have been system-
atically cut out by Mr. Hoover.
Senator Tower. What does that mean? What is the significance?
Mr. Angleton. The significance being that the production of Inter-
nal Security fell down considerably.
Senator Tower. Now, Mr. Angleton, did you come to gain some
insight into the relationship between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Tom
Charles Huston ?
Mr. Angleton. Well, it was my understanding, sir, that they had
known one another for over a year prior to the meetings. And I would
suggest that Mr. Huston was much better educated when he embarked
on these matters than his testimony suggests. I find him extremely
knowledgeable. He was certainly aware of the gaps.
Senator Tower. Would you say that Mr. Huston reflected the views
of Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. Angleton. Very much so, sir.
Senator Tower [presiding]. I have no further questions.
Mr. Mondale ?
Senator Mondale. Thank you, Senator Tower.
Mr. Angleton, you were in charge of the covert mail cover program
from the beginning ; am I correct ?
Mr. Angleton. Not from the beginning, sir, from 1955.
Senator Mondale. All right
Mr. Angleton. I took it on as an ongoing operation which had been
lodged also in the Agency.
Senator Mondale. What is your understanding as to who authorized
the program ?
Mr. Angleton. I would say that the operation that was first initiated
in 1952, at some stage the authorization was from the Chief of Opera-
tions of the Clandestine Services.
Senator Mondale As you conducted this program, under whose
authority was it your understanding that you were operating?
Mr. Angleton. Within the Agency?
61
Senator Mondale. Yes.
Mr. Angleton. Under the Chief of the Clandestine Operations.
Senator Mondale. The Deputy Director for Plans, would that be?
Mr. Angleton. Correct.
Senator Mondale. For your purposes, was that considered adequate
authority or was this such that you felt authority had to flow from
either the President or the National Security Council ?
Mr. Angleton. I believe that I regarded that, plus the authority
from the Director who was knowledgeable of the program, as internal
authority.
Senator Mondale. At your level of operations, that would be the
only authority with which you would concern yourself?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Senator Mondale. All right. What was your understanding of the
legality of the covert mail operation?
Mr. Angleton. That it was illegal.
Senator Mondale. It was illegal. Now, you are an attorney ?
Mr. Angleton. No, I am not, sir.
Senator Mondale. Well, that might be an asset.
Mr. Angleton. That is my cover, Senator.
Senator Mondale. How do you rationalize conducting a program
which you believe to be illegal?
Mr. Angleton. To begin with, I was taking it over as an ongoing
operation and there was probability that the program, through lack
of personnel and funding, would have been scrubbed at some stage.
From the counterintelligence point of view, we believe that it was
extremely important to know everything possible regarding contacts
of American citizens with Communist countries.
And second, that we believed that the security of the operation
was such that the Soviets were unaware of such a program and there-
fore that many of the interests that the Soviets would have in the
United States, subversive and otherwise, would be through the open
mails, when their own adjudication was that the mails could not be
violated.
Senator Mondale. So that a judgment was made, with which you
concurred, that although covert mail opening was illegal, the good
that flowed from it, in terms of the anticipating threats to this coun-
try through the use of this counterintelligence technique, made it
worthwhile nevertheless.
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Senator Mondale. How do you recommend that this committee deal
with this profound crisis between political and legal responsibility
in government, a nation that believes in the laws, and what you regard
to be the counterintelligence imperative of illegal activity ? What do
we do about it?
Mr. Angleton. My own belief has always been that high authority,
whether it be on the Hill, the Congress, or in the Executive, needs
to examine very closely the counterintelligence content available to
this Government regarding its adversaries, and regarding the Soviet
and the Soviet Bloc.
To my knowledge, there has never been such an examination. I
believe very much in a statement made by Director of the FBI,
Mr. Kelley, that it is his firm view, which he expressed in Canada
62
at a bar association convention, that certain individual rights have
to be sacrificed for the national security.
Senator Mondale. Do you believe that national security cannot be
protected except through the sacrifice of these rights?
Mr. Angleton. I believe that all matters dealing with counter-
espionage require very sophisticated handling and require consider-
able latitude.
Senator Mondale. Who do you think should be empowered to deter-
mine which rights should be set aside?
Mr. Angleton. I think that, sir, not being an expert in these
matters, that it should be a combination of the Executive and the
Congress.
Senator Mondale. How would the Congress express itself? Tradi-
tionally, it is through the adoption of laws.
Mr. Angleton. I am afraid I do not
Senator Mondale. As I understand the progression of this dis-
cussion, it is your opinion that this Nation cannot protect itself with-
out setting aside certain personal liberties. Then I asked you, who
would determine what liberties were to be set aside? And you have
said it should be a combination of the Executive and the Congress.
Of course, the Congress acts through laws. Are you saying that we
should take another look at our laws to see whether they fully meet
the needs of national security?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Senator Mondale. Would it not have been better then, when these
laws were violated in the past, to do just that? Come to the Congress
and say, "in our opinion we cannot defend you under the present laws
and, therefore, we make these recommendations for change." That
was not what was done. Surreptitiously and privately and covertly,
legal rights of the American people were violated ; in this case, mail
was opened, without any such approval in the law. Is that correct?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Senator Mondale. Do you think that was a correct way to proceed ?
Mr. Angleton. I think in an ideal world dealing with intelligence,
and I have never seen one yet, that these matters should have been
brought up vigorously. All through the life span of the CIA, I do
not think there was the proper forum here for the airing securely
of these matters.
Senator Mondale. I disagree with you on the question of national
security. I think our Constitution provides plenty of power to protect
this country. In any event, I see no authority for anyone in the
executive or in the Congress or anywhere else for determining, on
his own, that the law is not good enough and therefore taking it into
his own hands. I see no way of conducting a civilized, democratic
society with those kinds of rules.
Now in your system for covert openings, there was prepared a
watch list which set forth certain names of organizations and purposes
and those names were the trigger for opening mail to or from them
which was sent internationally.
Mr. Angleton. To the Soviet Union.
Senator Mondale. To the Soviet Union. The list included Linus
Pauling, John Steinbeck, the author, and Victor Reuther of the Auto
Workers. What counterintelligence objective was it you thought you
63
were achieving in opening the mail of what most of us would assume
to be very patriotic, thoughtful, decent Americans ?
Mr. Angleton. Sir, I would prefer, if possible, to respond to that
question in executive session.
Senator Mondale. Well, I would like the answer. The chairman is
not here so I think we ought to pass that request up until the chairman
is back.
I have several other questions along that line with other names. But,
in any event, let us wait until the chairman returns.
Senator Tower. What was the request of the witness? That it
not be answered except in executive session ?
Senator Mondale. Yes; I asked about three names that were on the
watch list and he asked to answer that in executive session. I think we
should await the chairman.
Mr. Angleton. Sir, may I please modify that?
Mr. Brown. Would the Senator please just indulge us for just a
moment so I can confer with Mr. Angleton ?
Senator Tower. Let us have order, please.
Mr. Angleton, should you answer this question in open session,
would you be disclosing classified information that has not been
previously cleared for disclosure?
Mr. Angleton. I would also need to have the opportunity to review
files in the agency before making any response.
Senator Tower. In other words, you do not know whether it would
be disclosing classified information that has not been cleared ?
Mr. Angleton. I would not depend on my memory, sir, at this time,
because these are cases or matters which apparently were some time
back.
Senator Tower. The Chair will rule that for the time being, you
will not be required to answer the question in open session ; but that
the matter can be reopened, should the committee decide that they
should be disclosed in public session.
Mr. Angleton. Thank you.
Senator Mondale. I have got some other names I would like to sub-
mit to Mr. Angleton which I wish he would use in his review in prepa-
ration for that answer, whether in public or in private.
Senator Tower. Thank you, Senator Mondale. Senator Baker?
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I believe most of the information relevant to the Huston plan docu-
ment have been covered by other members of the committee and by
counsel. But there are two or three things of a more general nature
that I would like to direct Mr. Angleton's attention to, and ask his
reaction or comments on.
Before I do, however, what was your job at the time of your retire-
ment from the CIA?
Mr. Angleton. I was the head of counterintelligence.
Senator Baker. Counterintelligence, in layman's terms, implies
something other than intelligence. I take it that it implies something
to do with keeping up with what the other fellow's intelligence
would be.'
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
64
Senator Baker. Was a major part of your operation concerned with
intelligence operations against the United States by, say, the Soviet
Union or other countries ?
Mr. Angleton. It was a question of all hostile intelligence services
where we have a situation, for example, that in the Soviet bloc alone,
there are over 27 intelligence services who would conduct activity in
the United States and in the territories of allies.
Senator Baker. Well, to put it in lay terms again, counterintelli-
gence was to protect our intelligence resources ?
Mr. Angleton. It was to penetrate and frustrate the espionage and
subversion from outside.
Senator Baker. How, then, was counterintelligence, your area of
concern and expertise, important to that area to be involved with mail
openings ?
Mr. Angleton. Well, since the mail openings were to the Commu-
nist countries, it meant that there was a contact, regular contact, with
Americans and third country nationals who were here. For example,
there are many third country nationals that were here studying, who,
in turn, had relatives who were studying in Soviet institutions.
Senator Baker. I can follow that. But what prompted the question
was, why on earth would you have, for instance, Frank Church or
Richard Nixon on that list?
Mr. Angleton. I would say it was very much an error.
Senator Baker. It was an error to have them on the list ?
Mr. Angleton. That is precisely correct.
Senator Baker. Are there other members of this committee that
were on that list?
Mr. Angleton. I'm not aware of it, sir. I've not gone through the
listings.
Senator Baker. You began this operation in 1954 or thereabouts,
I understand.
Mr. Angleton. It was started in another part of the agency in 1952,
and it was taken over by us — counterintelligence — in 1955.
Senator Baker. I understand from your testimony to Senator Mon-
dale that you think that it is of sufficient value so that it ought to be
continued. . .
Mr. Angleton. It is certainly my opinion, and the opinion of my
former associates.
Senator Baker. It should be continued even if it required the change
of the statute law — and I am not sure that would even do it. Let us
just assume for the moment that you have a congressional debate on
the necessity for doing it, and thus change the nature of the postal
system; that is, people no longer would assume that their mail was
inviolate, that people probably were going to inspect it. That gets us
terribly close to Big Brotherism ; the idea that when you mail a letter,
you have got to assume that somebody may read it, at least a letter
outside the country. Even if you assume that that would be the range
and scale of the debate in Congress, you would favor the passage of
such a bill ?
Mr. Angleton. I didn't quite say that, sir. I believe I would prefer,
if possible, to stick to what I believe to be the "approach to the prob-
lems within the intelligence community; and that is that both the
executive, at a high level, and the Congress examine in depth the nature
of the threat to our national security.
65
Senator Baker. If I may interrupt you for a minute, I think I ought
to explain why I am proceeding in this way. I know, from reading
your briefing papers, and from a general impression of your service
to your country and to the CIA, that you have been an extraordinarily
important figure in the intelligence and counterintelligence scheme of
things for many, many years. I believe, based on your testimony, that
you have a grave concern for the nature and the scope of the foreign
threat, and the importance of the methods and techniques that are
employed or may be employed by the CIA, by the DIA, and by other
intelligence agencies.
That is my general impression. But your impression of us should be
that, while we recognize the importance of that, it gets right sticky
when it would appear, in some cases clearly, that those methods and
techniques violate either the statute law or the Constitution of the
United States. What I am putting to you is whether or not this coun-
try should engage in a debate in the congressional forum — which is
where laws are made and changed — about a matter such as the chang-
ing of the fundamental nature of the postal system — that is to say, to
create a situation where people must assume that their mail is being
read.
Now, are the techniques for intelligence gathering — is the nature of
the foreign threat such that we should go ahead with that debate, or
even pass such a statute?
Mr. Angleton. I think in the present atmosphere, it would be
impossible.
Senator Baker. That is sort of our job, too ; to guess what is possible
and impossible in the Congress, and I am often fooled about what is
possible and impossible. From your standpoint, what I am trying to
drive at is whether or not you believe the scope and the extent of the
threat to this country from abroad is sufficient to launch this Congress
into a debate on whether there should be such a change in the postal
laws or not.
Mr. Angleton. Well, I must accept, sir, the fact that again, that I do
not believe that the atmosphere would even tolerate this subject being
the subject of debate. I think these perceptions of dangers and threats
have changed very greatly in the last 2 years. I think the policies of
detente and, prior to that, peaceful coexistence
Senator Baker. What do you think of the policies of detente ?
Mr. Angleton. Well, I would only speak to the question of detente,
peaceful coexistence, strictly from counterintelligence observation.
Senator Baker. That is why I asked you. You were the head man in
that field. What do you think of it ?
Mr. Angleton. My view is that there is complete illusion to believe
that, on the operative, clandestine side — which is, in a sense, a secret
war that has continued since World War II — that the Soviets or the
Soviet bloc have changed their objectives. And I base this on counter-
intelligence cases.
Senator Baker. I do not mean to embarrass you, Mr. Angleton, but
I want to ask you this question. In that respect, is your disagreement
with detente as a national policy part of the reason why you retired
from the CIA at the time you did ?
Mr. Angleton. I really cannot say. Every day that passes, I discover,
much to my amazement, certain points of view and activity in which I
66
might say, neither myself nor my colleagues were in great favor. I
cannot be specific. I do not have the facts.
Senator Baker. Mr. Angleton, there are many questions I could ask.
Your experience covers a turbulent time in history, and the tempta-
tion to ask you specific details about it is almost irresistible. But
for the moment, in view of the time restraints, I will postpone that.
I would ask only a single thing, and that is whether or not you think
there should be a significant national debate in a congressional forum,
as well, on the question as to whether or not we should legalize some of
the activities that now appear to be illegal in the intelligence-collecting
field. Now, it is my own personal view that if you are going to do
some of these things, the country will not accept them, and should not.
They are intrinsically an intrusion, beyond the scope of the permissible.
But if you are going to do some of the others, that are more closely
held, you ought not to do them without asking. You ought to send
them up to Congress and find out what the likelihood of the law being
changed may be. Would you generally agree, in retrospect, that that
ought to be the way this matter is approached ?
Mr. Angleton. There is no question in my mind.
Senator Baker. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston?
Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Angleton, first I wonder if we might bring some of the intelli-
gence terminology down to lay language, so that the people will have
a complete understanding of what we are talking about here. I think
we have pretty well covered mail coverage, but just to clarify it maybe
somewhat further, we are discussing the actual opening of mail of cer-
tain citizens who appear on a predetermined list. Does some individual
actually read this mail, or is it photographed, or just how is this
handled ?
Mr. Angleton. Well, sir, the process was to collect mail at an inter-
national terminal before it went abroad, and mail coming from abroad
from Communist countries, and having the opportunity to surrepti-
tiously open the envelopes, photograph the contents, and to dispatch
the mail to the addressee. The photographs of the mail were brought
through another part of our organization to us in Counterintelligence,
where we had a group of some six people very fluent in languages, and
also in holograph and flaps, and they were very sophisticated tech-
nicians and analysts. They would make abstracts of the mail where it
was important, together with internal findings and dossiers, and direct
it to certain selected customers.
Senator Huddleston. Customers being specific agencies of the Gov-
ernment, either CIA
Mr. Angleton. For all intents and purposes it was only to the FBI,
although there was some mail that did — there were some special items
that went to military intelligence.
Senator Huddleston. Now, electronic surveillance — what all does
this involve?
Mr. Angt.eton. Pardon, sir ?
Senator Huddleston. Electronic surveillance — what does this in-
volve specifically ?
Mr. Angleton. We were not involved in electronic surveillance.
Senator Huddleston; You know what it is, do you not?
67
Mr. Angle-ton. Yes, sir. It is all forms of eavesdropping.
Senator Htjddleston. Is this tapping telephones ?
Mr. Angleton. Telephones;
Senator Huddleston. That is, a wiretap.
Mr. Angleton. Bugs.
Senator Htjddleston. Bugs in rooms, or in places where people
might assemble?
Mr. Angleton. Precisely.
Senator Htjddleston. Without their knowledge?
Mr. Angleton. Hopefully.
Senator Htjddleston. Surreptitious entry — what is this describing?
Mr. Angleton. That is the ability to penetrate into either a build-
ing or mail
Senator Htjddleston. Break it down into a simple context that we
hear in every police court in the country on Monday morning. It is
breaking and entering to a great degree, is it not? It might be
Mr. Angleton. As long as there is no — I say I agree, sir.
Senator Htjddleston. It would be breaking into someone's home
or into his office or his apartment, and, in effect, taking what you con-
sider to be important to the objective.
Mr. Angleton. It is not so much taking as it is photographing.
Senator Htjddleston. Or photographing.
Mr. Angleton. There is not really much breakage.
Senator Htjddleston. What do you mean by development of campus
sources ?
Mr. Angleton. Is that in the context, sir, of the Huston plan ?
Senator Htjddleston. Yes, that was part of the Huston objective.
Mr. Angleton. It simply meant the eventual recruitment of sources
on the campus.
Senator Htjddleston. Would that be students?
Mr. Angleton. I believe it referred specifically to students and
perhaps some instructors.
Senator Htjddleston. Who would perform as informants or as
Mr. Angleton. They would be spotters in terms of possible recruit-
ment of people, or informants.
Senator Htjddleston. I think it is important that the people under-
stand what we are talking about when we talk in intelligence terms,
Mr. Angleton, and those descriptions I think will be helpful.
Now, prior to the development of the Huston plan, would you say
that one of the reasons that this development occurred was that con-
flicts had grown specifically between the CIA and the FBI ?
Mr. Angleton. Unfortunately, yes.
Senator Htjddleston. Would you describe what some of those con-
flicts were, some of the things that were troubling Mr. Hoover?
Mr. Angleton. Well, to begin with, in all fairness to Mr. Hoover,
after World War II, he was not happy with his activities in certain
parts of the world which he conducted during wartime, being trans-
ferred to another agency. I do not believe that this was jealousy, as
has often been stated. I think that he only had to look at the fact
that during World War II. the OSS had many people who were loyal
to General Donovan, but also had loyalties to the opposition — and I
do not want to characterize it as many. I think it is in many records.
68
And therefore, there was a very grave problem of the security stand-
ards of the Agency coming from World War II.
Senator Huddleston. Did this result in the concern that he had that
there were informants within the FBI that were telling the CIA
things that Mr. Hoover did not think they should be telling?
Mr. Angleton. Sir, I think you are referring directly to the one
straw that broke the camel's back.
Senator Huddleston. Was this a single incident ?
Mr. Angleton. A single incident in which an officer of the CIA re-
ceived information to which he was entitled regarding a foreign na-
tional who disappeared and he received this information from an
unnamed FBI officer. Mr. Hoover demanded the identity of the FBI
officer. The CIA official as a matter of personal integrity refused to
divulge the name of his source and he also offered to the Director,
Mr. Helms, his resignation.
Senator Huddleston. You indicate this was a one-time incident. Are
you suggesting that the CIA did not have other sources of informa-
tion from within the FBI that may not have been known by the
Director, Mr. Hoover?
Mr. Angleton. I would never call them sources. The CIA had many
contacts with the FBI at various levels.
Senator Huddleston. Were there also instances where the CIA re-
quested of the FBI and of Mr. Hoover to undertake certain wiretaps
for domestic surveillance that Mr. Hoover declined to do?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Senator Huddleston. Did this also create friction between the
agencies ?
Mr. Angleton. I do not think that that in itself necessarily created
the friction. I think the friction came from the case I described earlier.
Senator Huddleston. Just that one case ? Was that enough to cause
Mr. Hoover to eliminate the liaison totally and formally between the
two agencies?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Senator Huddleston. And he did that, in fact ?
Mr. Angleton. He did, indeed.
Senator Huddleston. During the early sessions of the group that
was setting up the Huston plan, was this friction evident to you as
a participant of those meetings, that the CIA and the FBI were not
getting along at the top levels as they might ?
Mr. Angleton. Well, I do not think that the relationship at the
top levels was ever satisfactory. I believe — and this may be somewhat
of an exaggeration — but I believe that over a period of some 25 years
I do not think there were probably more than three or four or five
meetings between the Director of FBI and the Director of CIA except
those that might have been casual, where they bumped into one an-
other in a national securitv conference.
Senator Huddleston. Did this adversely affect the efficiency of our
intelligence community ?
Mr. Angleton. It did.
Senator Huddleston. Do you think Mr. Hoover's concern in the
FBI's dealings with the CIA was principally due to the questionable
legality of some of the thinsrs that the CIA was asking him to do?
Or was it a concern for the public relations aspect of his agency ?
69
Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that Mr. Hoover was conscious of all
aspects of situations where the Bureau's interests were aftected,
whether it be professional, whether it be public relations, he was
without question the number one law enforcement officer m the Umtea
States and probably the most respected individual outside the United
States among all foreign intelligence and security services. And 1
believe that Mr. Hoover's real concern was that during the Johnson
administration, where the Congress was delving into matters pertain-
ing to FBI activities, Mr. Hoover looked to the President to give him
support in terms of conducting those operations. And when that sup-
port was lacking, Mr. Hoover had no recourse but to gradually elimi-
nate activities which were unfavorable to the Bureau and which m
turn risked public confidence in the number one law enforcement
agency.
And I think his reasoning was impeccable.
Senator Huddleston. Well, did the CIA, on occasion, ask Mr.
Hoover and his agency to enter into "black bag" jobs?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Senator Htjddleston. And that is surreptitious entry or in layman s
terms, breaking and entering.
Mr. Angleton. It deals basically with handling couriers, the man
who carries the bag.
Senator Htjddleston. During the initial stages of the interagency
committee developing the Huston plan, did it occur to you to inquire
whether or not— since you were aware that you were suggesting or
talking about doing things that were illegal— did it occur to you to
inquire whether or not the Attorney General of the United States had
been advised or questioned about this plan ?
Mr. Angleton. Well, I did not have, as a rule, relations with many
Attorneys General except on very special cases.
Senator Huddleston. I am not suggesting you would have inquired
yourself, but that his approval would have been given or at least he
would have been consulted.
Mr. Angleton. My approach, sir, on that
Senator Huddleston. Did it even bother you to wonder about it?
Mr. Angleton. No. I think I can reconstruct my attitude over many
years on that matter, that I felt it most essential that the Attorney
General be aware of the program in order to read the mail and to read
the production. In other words, I think that an Attorney General
who does not know the minutiae of the threat is a very poor Attorney
General.
Senator Huddleston. Were you surprised then to learn that he had
not been consulted about the Huston plan ?
Mr. Angleton. I was absolutely shocked. I mean it was unbelievable,
because one believed that he had everything relating to Justice
Department.
Senator Huddleston. Is that the reason that you testified you were
not surprised when the President rescinded his approval after Mr.
Hoover went to the Attorney General?
Mr. Angleton. I must repeat that I could well understand how
without even going into any inquiries, that the Huston plan was dead.
Senator Huddleston. You expected that to happen ?
Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.
70
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much. I want to thank
Senator Tower for taking over and presiding for me. I had to be at
a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that is consider-
ing the Sinai agreements and for that reason I had to absent myself.
Let us see, we are now at Senator Schweiker, please.
Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Angleton, did you support the Huston plan in principle? At
the time that this became a function of your decisionmaking process,
your administrative responsibility, did you support the Huston plan?
Mr. Angleton. I did.
Senator Schweiker. After the Huston plan was shot down, I guess
by a combination of John Mitchell and J. Edgar Hoover, there were
some other actions taken. First of all, John Dean was moved in and
somewhat replaced Mr. Huston in his duties and then he wrote a
memo on September 18, 1970 [exhibit 24 *], within 2 months of the
decision to abandon the Huston plan. And he set up a new committee
and I quote now from his memo, "a key to the entire operation will
be the creation of a interagency intelligence unit for both operational
and evaluation purposes." You were a part of that new unit ; was that
correct ?
Mr. Angleton. I was present.
Senator Schweiker. And as I understand it, the very first meeting
of that unit was held in John Dean's office in the White House. Is
that correct?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Senator Schweiker. So in essence, by this move, did you not really
begin to accomplish many of the objectives that Mr. Huston set out,
but you did it in a way that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Hoover did not
strenuously interpose their objection. Is that correct ?
Mr. Angleton. I do not have any evidence of that.
Senator Schweiker. Well, on April 12, do you recall there was a
meeting among Mr. Helms, Mr. Hoover, and Admiral Gayler to dis-
cuss loosening up or broadening, whatever way you want to call it, the
information gathering techniques to the point where some of the
elements of the Huston plan were being reconsidered. Do you recall
such a meeting ?
Mr. Angleton. I know that that was something that was of concern
to the intelligence community prior to and after the Huston plan. The
Huston plan itself had no impact or did not impact on the meeting,
the question of espionage assistance to the National Security Agency.
Senator Schweiker. Of the seven or eight individual elements of
the Huston plan concerning new ways of getting intelligence more
easily, weren't some of these similar to the proposals that were dis-
cussed at the April 12 meeting as well as at the interagency meeting?
Certainly you did discuss them, and did they not come up for consid-
eration in different forms ?
Mr. Angleton. Excuse me, sir.
Senator, I am trying to be responsive to your hypothesis. The Huston
plan, in effect, as far as we were concerned, was dead in 5 days and
therefore all of the other matters of enlarging procurement within
the intelligence community were the same concerns that existed prior
1 See p. 255.
71
to the Huston plan, and subsequent to the Huston plan. The Huston
plan had no impact whatsoever on the priorities within the intelligence
community.
Senator Schweiker. I understand that, Mr. Angleton. But at that
meeting where Mr. Helms and Admiral Gayler and the others met,
was there not a discussion to do some of the very same things that
had been referenced in the Huston plan ?
Mr. Angleton. That part is correct, sir.
Senator Schweiker. That is all I am trying to establish.
Mr. Angleton. But it had a life of its own prior to the Huston plan.
Senator Schweiker. And then did not the Plumber's unit at a later
time perform some of the same illegalities, such as breaking and enter-
ing, that the Huston plan has proposed ?
Mr. Angleton. Pardon ?
Senator Schweiker. I realize you are not directly connected with
the Plumbers, but did the Plumber's unit not do some of the same
things, breaking and entry, illegal burglary, that the Huston plan
proposed ? Is that not a fact ?
Mr. Angleton. Yes.
Senator Schweiker. So in essence, they went around the back door
instead of the front door. Even though the Huston plan was dead I
believe it had nine lives. Now, Mr. Angleton, you were head of the
Counterintelligence Unit of the CIA and under you was a group called
the Special Operations Group, headed by Mr. Richard Ober, who we
will be hearing from tomorrow. But inasmuch as you were involved
as his immediate supervisor, it is correct to say that Operation CHAOS
was under your supervision, although not immediately ?
Mr. Angleton. It was technically under my supervision for "rations
and quarters."
Senator Schweiker. And you supported and went along with Op-
eration CHAOS as an executive of CIA, is that not correct ?
Mr. Angleton. I was not familiar with all of the operations of
CHAOS.
Senator Schweiker. Did you object to it? Did you oppose it? Did
you fight it in any way ?
Mr. Angleton. Those operations I knew about I approved, I mean,
I was approving of.
Senator Schweiker. Were you aware that some of the Operation
CHAOS agents were operating in the United States?
Mr. Angleton. I was not. I would qualify that to say, as I have said
before, before the Rockefeller Commission, that there was a period in
all operations of that nature where the agent had to build cover in
the United States. But I suggested, and I still believe, that those opera-
tions should be examined in terms of what was Mr. Ober's motive.
And I think that one will find, as far as I know, that his motive was
to send these people abroad for intelligence collection.
Senator Schweiker. Well, were you aware of the memos [exhibit
65 *] that CIA sent to Walt Rostow, and then Henry Kessinger, which
said the following, and I quote "you will, of course, be aware of the
peculiar sensitivity which attaches to the fact that CIA has prepared
1 See p. 402.
72
a report on student activities, both here and abroad." Were you aware
of either memo, number one, or number two, that you were following
student activities here ?
Mr. Angleton. Do we have this memorandum ?
Senator Schweiker. I will ask the counsel whether you have it.
This was received from the Kockefeller Commission. You might not
have it immediately before you.
Mr. Angleton. I do not recall it.
Senator Schweiker. Let me ask you this way. Were you aware of
any activities under you, or under people under your direction, that
had to do with preparing a report on the domestic activities of stu-
dents here in the United States of America ?
Mr. Angleton. There were reports that I cannot identify unless
I see them.
Senator Schweiker. That is not my question. My question is were
you aware of any counterintelligence activities directed against the
students of the United States of America here at home? You were in
charge of supervising this whole counterintelligence unit.
Mr. Angleton. I tried to explain, sir, that I was not in charge.
Senator Schweiker. What does being Chief of Counterintelligence
mean? You were Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, were you not?
Mr. Angleton. Yes.
Senator Schweiker. And that did not come under your purview?
Mr. Angleton. I said that Mr. Ober's unit was in the Counter-
intelligence staff for rations and quarters. I did not have access to
many of his disseminations. We were not even on the carbon copies
for dissemination. I did not know the identity of his agents. I did
not have any knowledge or appurtenances of a case officer over these
activities.
Senator Schweiker. Let me ask you something that you did testify
to that we will not have a problem of communication on. On page
109 of your September 12 testimony, in a deposition before this com-
mittee, you were specifically asked about how the CIA might either
ignore, or not follow, or contradict an order relating to the destruction
of shellfish toxins and poisons, about which we held hearings last
week. Now you are quoted in your deposition, "It is inconceivable that
a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all
the overt orders of the government." Is that an accurate quote or not ?
Mr. Angleton. Well, if it is accurate it should not have been said.
The Chairman. That is right, Mr. Angleton.
Senator Schweiker. It looks like we are on plausible denial again
is all I can say here, Mr. Chairman. It is a direct quote and I under-
stand the procedure is to give you an opportunity to review your
testimony each day, in case you want to correct it. Did you not have
that opportunity ?
Mr. Angleton. I did not expect, sir, to be called Friday night late
and told I would be here today. I intended in due course to see my
testimony. I was informed that I would be present in October.
Senator Schweiker. Well, getting back to the issue at hand, Mr.
Angleton, do you believe that statement that you made or do you not
believe it ? What is your belief of whether a secret intelligence agency
has the right to contradict a direct order of a President or whether it
does not apply ?
73
Mr. Angleton. Well, I would say I had been rather imprudent in
making those remarks.
Senator Schweieer. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, it raises the prob-
lem that this committee is really confronted with. And I don't want to
say that — unfortunately you are not the exception in this belief, Mr.
Angleton, because I think our work, our intelligence investigation, has
turned up an awful lot of people in the intelligence community who
really feel this way.
I think that is exactly how the toxin situation got to where it was.
And, while this may not have been the biggest thing that happened, I
think it is indicative of the problem that this committee and the Con-
gress have to deal with. And you feel, or the intelligence community
feels, that they are removed from even a direct order of the President.
And I think that does come to the heart of the issue. I think you were
honest in your statement and I think actually this is the issue before the
committee and the Congress now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well I might observe that Mr. Angleton has not
denied the statement, nor has he changed his position. He said it was
an imprudent thing to say. That was your answer, was it not?
Mr. Angleton. I have not pursued the question of toxins from a pro-
fessional point of view. I did not listen to all of the hearings on it. It is
a matter very much outside of my professional background.
The Chairman. But your statement, Mr. Angleton, is not related to
toxins. It is a very general statement, which I do believe represents
your view.
Mr. Angleton. I am sorry, sir, but it does not necessarily represent
my views.
The Chairman. You said it is inconceivable that a secret intelligence
arm of the Government has to comply with all of the overt orders of
the Government.
Mr. Angleton. To comply with all overt
The Chairman. Do you retract that statement now, or do you merely
regard it as imprudent.
Mr. Angleton. I have not studied the testimony, sir.
The Chairman. May I call your attention to it on page 109 of your
testimony before this committee, September 12, beginning on line 9,
and I read, "It is inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the
Government has to comply with all of the overt orders of the Govern-
ment."
Mr. Angleton. I withdraw that statement.
The Chairman. Do you withdraw that statement?
Mr. Angleton. I do.
The Chairman. Did you not mean it when you said it the first time ?
Mr. Angleton. This was stated before the hearings, before you held
your hearings on this matter ?
The Chairman. Yes, but when you said it to us, did you mean it or
did you not mean it ?
Mr. Angleton. I do not know how to respond to that question.
The Chairman. You do not know how to respond to the question ?
Mr. Angleton. I said that I withdrew the statement.
The Chairman. Very well, but you are unwilling to say whether or
not vou meant it when you said it.
Mr. Angleton. I would say that the entire speculation should not
have been indulged in.
74
The Chairman. I see. Senator Morgan.
Senator Morgan. First of all, with regard to the question that the
chairman asked you, do you know what specific order was being
referred to in that case ?
Mr. Brown. Excuse me. Senator, just a moment please.
Mr. Angleton. No ; I did not know the orders.
Senator Morgan. Then you are not talking about any particular
order, but you were talking about orders in general ?
Mr. Angleton. Sir, I have not reviewed this transcript.
Senator Morgan. I understand that, Mr. Angleton. And that is why
I was looking back at it myself.
If I could pursue for a moment the questions of Senator Mondale
and Senator Baker, first of all, would you again draw the distinction
between counterintelligence and intelligence gathering?
Mr. Angleton. In the ultimate, they are about the same thing.
Counterintelligence is more or less all of the programs of which the
distillate is counterespionage. In other words, the sum total of counter-
intelligence activity includes dossiers, identification of individuals,
travel control and a whole series of other dossier items. It forms the
counterintelligence base. From that can be developed a product which
is counterespionage, the dealing in confrontation with other intelli-
gence services: as a rule, dealing with their aggressive aspects,
whether it be subversion, whether it be espionage, and in certain
instances in the world of double agents, dealing with their counter-
espionage.
Senator Morgan. Now, as Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff,
how much of your work was involved in this country ?
Mr. Angleton. Relatively little.
Senator Morgan. "Was the mail cover part of it?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Senator Morgan. And before the Huston plan, you were intercept-
ing all mail going to Communist countries, photographing it, and
intercepting all mail coming from Communist countries.
Mr. Angleton. That is correct. But there was a limit as to the
amount of mail which we opened and photographed.
Senator Morgan. What limitations were placed on the amount of
mail?
Mr. Angleton. It is where it was of no interest.
Senator Morgan. How did you determine whether or not mail was
of no interest if you
Mr. Angleton. It was, as a matter of procedure, one of the cus-
tomer agencies would indicate that it, having levied a requirement
previously, would state that they no longer desired such coverage.
Senator Morgan. Well, now, was it coverage of those who were
on the watch list, or was it coverage of all mail going to and from
Communist countries?
Mr. Angleton. The basic thrust of the program was a watch list.
Senator Morgan. Mr. Angleton, did you at that time consider the
mail coverage indispensable to your job?
Mr. Angleton. I believed it was one of the few resources, routine
in nature, available to counterintelligence.
Senator Morgan. Well, Senator Mondale asked you about your
rationale behind opening the mail. How do you reconcile it with the
75
rights of the individuals in this country under our Constitution ? How
did you reconcile your action?
Mr. Angleton. Well, Senator, I reconciled it in terms of the knowl-
edge I had, and my colleagues had, regarding the nature of the threat.
Senator Morgan. Well, assuming, Mr. Angleton, that you were
justified in your actions, which I don't think you were, but assum-
ing that, what is to prevent some other individual from deciding on
his own that such activities are justified? And what is to prevent nim
from carrying out such activities?
Mr. Angleton. Senator, I don't want to quibble. But I will have
to say the operation was in being 3 years before I entered
the scene. It was not something of an individual initiative, it was
a group of like-minded men who arrived at similar and the same
conclusions that this was an indispensable means of collecting for-
eign intelligence on the Soviets, who regard this country to be the
main enemy, and, together with the Soviet bloc, coordinates their
activities on their ideological basis. This is very persuasive to some-
one who has given up 31 years of their life with certain very high
ideals for this country. When I left the Army, as many of us did, I
believed that we were in the dawn of a millenium. When I look at the
map today and the weakness of power of this country, that is what
shocks me.
Senator Morgan. Mr. Angleton, the thing that shocks me is that
these actions could be carried on contrary to the constitutional rights
of the citizens of this country. Do you not believe that we can gather
the necessary intelligence that we need for the protection and secu-
rity of this country, and at the same time live within the Constitution ?
Mr. Angleton. I am not a constitutional lawyer and I do not have
at my fingertips those parts of the amendments which appear, on the
surface, to give the President certain rights in wiretapping and elec-
tronic surveillance.
And if I understand it correctly, I do not believe there is too much
of an extension to the next stage, which is the question of American
and Soviet communications, or Soviet bloc communications.
Senator Morgan. I would beg to differ on that, and on the analysis
that you made, and also the one that Mr. Huston made. But for the
purpose of the guidance of this committee, can you give us any sug-
festion as to how the actions of that Central Intelligence Agency can
e monitored in such a way as to protect the fundamental rights of
the American citizens of this country?
Mr. Angleton. You mean how it should be restructured ?
Senator Morgan. Yes; earlier you suggested that maybe the Con-
gress and the President should take some action. But the thing that
bothers me, Mr. Angleton, is how can we act if we don't know the
facts? And, if we do act, the intelligence agencies refuse to obey the
guidelines and ordinances. In other words you were doing all of these
things before the Huston plan was ever devised. You continued to do
them after the President rejected the report. So, what assurancs do
we have that an intelligence agency would follow any mandate of the
Congress or the President ? And how can we prepare some mandates
that would be followed ? That is what this committee is searching for.
Mr. Angleton. I have nothing to contribute to that, sir, beyond
what I have said already.
62-685 O - 76 - 6
76
Senator Morgan. In other words, you just don't think it can be
done. You feel that an intelligence agency has to have unlimited
rights to follow its own instincts in gathering intelligence?
Mr. Angleton. No; I do not.
Senator Morgan. What limitations would you place on it?
Mr. Angleton. I think the mail-intercept program is probably one
of the few exceptions that I could conceive of.
Senator Morgan. But if the Agency will not obey the orders of the
President, do you have any suggestions as to what we can do to assure
obedience in the future?
Mr. Angleton. Sir, I don't regard the submission to the President
as being a black and white matter, because I don't know all of the
facts surrounding that. But my reading of that language had a great
deal to do with the question of gaps in the plan filled by the FBI in
the question of domestically intercepting mail, rather than as we
were doing excepting— directing it entirely to mail between the United
States and Communist countries. And I do draw that distinction. In
other words, our motive had nothing whatsoever to do with infringing,
or I mean in harming, Americans. Our problem was to try to uncover
foreign involvement in this country.
Senator Morgan. Let me conclude by observing that I am concerned,
from the testimony we have heard today, and also from the testimony
we have heard in the past, about the fact that it seems from the testi-
mony that many of these plans are devised and put into practice, and
then at some later date, publicly, or for the record, the plans are re-
jected. But, notwithstanding such rejection either by the President
or some higher authority, all of the plans are carried out anyway.
And it makes me wonder whether or not the rejection of such plans is
for the purpose — as Senator Schweiker pointed out^-of plausible
denial. Are they really rejections of the plans, or are they rejections
for the purpose of the record ? If it is a real rejection, how can we
secure compliance with it by the various agencies?
Thank you, Mr. Angleton.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Morgan.
I think just for purposes of clarifying the matter I ought to say that
we have found the CIA files on mail that has been opened, and we are
now in the process of investigating and preparing ourselves to look
into this whole question of mail opening in a much more detailed way.
At the beginning of this hearing this morning I mentioned such or-
ganizations as the Ford Foundation, Harvard University, the Rocke-
feller Foundation, and such individuals as Arthur Burns, Congress-
woman Bella Abzug, Jay Rockefeller, President Nixon, Martin Luther
King, and Senator Hubert Humphrey, Senator Edward Kennedy, and
myself whose mail had been opened, and I would like to make it clear
that these names were never on the watch list, so far as we can deter-
mine. So that it is obvious that the opening of the mail was not re-
stricted to any particular watch list, but may have gone very far afield,
indeed.
I am going to get that letter I wrote to my mother. I want to see
what is in that letter that was of interest to the CIA. And I say this
because the privacy of the mail has been one of the most honored
practices in this country and it is protected by the statutes. The Su-
preme Court of the United States passed on this very early in our
17
history, back in 1877. I just would like to read a passage of what the
Supreme Court said about the privacy of the mail and the rights of
American citizens. It said :
■ Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the .mail are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if
they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.
The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their
papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus
closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can
only be opened and examined under like warrant * * "
I think one of the real responsibilities of this committee is to make
certain that in the future our intelligence agencies recognize that in the
name of protecting freedom, they had better honor the Constitution
and the laws, because that is what freedom is all about.
Senator Mathias.
Senator Mathias. Mr. Angleton, I suspect that there will be no wit-
nesses coming before this committee who can be of more help to us than
you in understanding the intelligence community as it developed after
World War II, in understanding the kind of work that the intel-
ligence community ought to be doing, and in helping us to see what
needs to be done in the future. But in understanding exactly how you
worked, I think we need to know some of the mundane, mechanical,
things.
For instance, when Mr. Helms was before the committee last week,
we discussed the question of compartmentation, the fact that certain
parts of the Central Intelligence Agency were totally compartmented
from other parts, and I think it is important to understand exactly
what that does to the execution of national policy. For example, if a
project would come to you about which some question of legality is
raised, was compartmentation such that you could not consult the
General Counsel of the CIA for a ruling on its legality ?
Mr. Angleton. I would say that the custom and usage was not to
deal with the General Counsel as a rule until there were some troubles.
He was not a part of the process of project approvals.
Senator Mathias. There was no preventative practice ?
Mr. Angleton. Not necessarily.
Senator Mathias. So that on this question of opening mail, the ques-
tion of whether it was legal or illegal never was discussed with the
legal officials of the Agency ?
Mr. Angleton. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Mathias. What about relationships with law enforcement
agencies outside the Central Intelligence Agency? For instance, in
the Huston plan, Mr. Hoover appended a note to the recommenda-
tions on mail opening in which he objected to it, and noted that it was
illegal, and indicated that he was aware that other agencies might
be doing it. Now, if a project of that sort were undertaken, was there
any preclearance with an agency like the FBI, a law enforcement
agency ?
Mr. Angleton. As it related to this, of course, the Bureau was fully
apprised after they were informed in 1958. The Bureau would be —
we would coordinate any domestic activity, or even with the three
areas with the FBI in advance. By the same token, they would coordi-
nate with us in advance any overseas activity, and in this respect I
78
was always a firm believer that when the Bureau developed certain in-
telligence sources, they should have the operational control over
those sources, regardless of geography, as long as there was coordina-
tion.
Senator Mathias. You are going to lead me to my next question.
But before I get to that, would the coordination with the FBI include
immunity?
Mr. Angleton. It would depend, sir, on the parameters of the op-
eration. If their own interests were impinged upon, there would cer-
tainly be coordinations in the community.
Senator Mathias. Yes, but would your operator, who might be ap-
prehended in the course of the operation, be understood to be immune
from legal prosecution as a result of the coordination with the FBI ?
Mr. Angleton. You mean for an illegal act in the United States?
Senator Mathias. Yes. Was there any agreement that he would not
be prosecuted, as would an ordinary citizen who was apprehended
in the same act ?
Mr. Angleton. Well, I must confess that until it was brought out in
these hearings, I was unaware of the agreement between the Depart-
ment of Justice and ourselves, even though I can well understand why
there was such an agreement. But in the few cases I do know, I never
saw the Agency ever interject itself on anything frivolous. In other
words, it went to the heart of an operation or to the security of an
agent.
Senator Mathias. In other words, you are saying that he took his
lumps if he were apprehended in any legal difficulties?
Mr. Angleton. If he had not been instructed by the agency, and he
strayed, he obviously was, to my recollection — this was a subject mat-
ter for the General Counsel to take up with the Department of Jus-
tice.
Senator Mathias. And when the General Counsel took it up with
the Department of Justice, would it be merely to provide representa-
tion in a court of law, or would it be to make some arrangement by
which immunity would be granted because of the nature of the duties
he had been performing that resulted in the illegal act ?
Mr. Angleton. I would assume that it would be — the purpose of this
would be for our General Counsel to disgorge all relevant facts and
all documents and papers, and present an Agency position, and that
the argumentation for any special treatment would be supported by
the facts.
Senator Mathias. And I have been deducing from what you say
that you made the best deal that you could at the time, under the cir-
cumstances.
Mr. Angleton. Not entirely. I have known of — well, I won't go that
far. But there have been cases which have involved, say, misuse of
funds or whatnot, in which the Agency, as I recall, threw the party
very much to the dogs.
Senator Mathias. Right. But those were the cases where there was
no relief.
Mr. Angleton. Well, they were cases where a superior interest of
the Government was not harmed.
Senator Mathias. I think I understand what you are saying. Now,
getting back to the question that you raised a minute ago, in which
79
you said you thought that a source that you developed belonged to
you, regardless of where it might happen to lodge geographically,
it could be within the United States, could it not?
Mr. Angleton. It could be, and I think that if I might pursue that
somewhat
Senator Mathias. Yes; I wish you would tell us how you distin-
guish between CIA domestic activity that is prohibited by statute, and
counterintelligence that may lead you into some domestic scene.
Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there are many approaches to this.
But I would-begin first with the agent-principal relationship. In other
words, when we are dealing with agents, we are not dealing with pieces
of merchandise. There are very tenuous psychological reaKnements be-
tween a case officer and his agent, and therefore he is threatened even
if you change case officers, let alone the question of jurisdiction.
Now, assuming that an agent of ours comes to the United States, we
are presented with a problem, therefore, of is he to be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the FBI? The moment that the answer is yes, we are
subjecting that individual to risk. Now, in the recruitment of that
man, it is quite possible — and in more cases than one — that he has
been given assurances that his identity is only known to a very limited
number of people. And on occasions, his identity may only be known
to the Director, so that this is a case-by -case matter.
In other words, we are in a sense the contracting agents for the
Government, and we do contract, and we do accept conditions of em-
ployment. And to our way of thinking, we must abide by it. But in
order not to jeopardize the domestic activities of the Bureau, and at
the same time to give them the full benefits of the individual, there
is a coordinating process with them as to this person. And I have
never really known of many cases where there was not agreement.
Senator Mathias. So that there was, in fact, a gray area ?
Mr. Angleton. It is a gray area, but it is a gray area by virtue of
the actuality of a principal-agent relationship, not because of jeal-
ousies or internecine infighting.
Senator Mathias. And there were clearly pragmatic solutions to
the problems that arose in the gray area ?
Mr. Angleton. Correct.
Senator Mathias. One final question, Mr. Angleton. If we are to
construct an intelligence community for the future, I think we have
to understand what the nature of the problem is today. How would
you assess the tensions that exist today between the United States and
potential antagonists or enemies in the world, the kind of tensions
that create the basic intelligence problem with which we have to cope ?
Mr. Angleton. This would open up an extremely complicated chan-
nel of discussion.
Senator Mathias. I think it is important that we try to grapple with
it, no matter how complicated it is.
Mr. Angleton. If I may go off on a tangent for a moment, I have
observed the hearings as printed in the press being conducted by
Congressman Pike; and with the exception of the security leakage
which was highlighted by a press interview and whatnot, I would say
that he is probing the intelligence community in the most productive
avenue of evaluation, and that is the question of estimates, as to
whether the American public are receiving an adequate return for their
80
investment. And I would suggest that if we are unable, in less sophisti-
cated areas of the world, to arrive at accurate evaluation of the out-
break of wars, you can then have some slide rule as to our ability to
cover the Communist bloc, which is composed of 27 different intelli-
gence and security organizations, which deploys hundreds of thousands
of secret police, both by way of troops and where we have the major
challenge in every aspect of the running of an agent : communications,
the possibility of leakages; and I would also note that two agents of
the Agency were most productive for a short time, but were discovered
and executed. I call attention to the inquiry that is going there, because
I have followed it with very, very great interest, because I think it is
hitting the nerve of the problem, namely, are we getting the produc-
tion, and are we having the proper estimates ?
Now, relating this to the Soviet, our inf ormation
Senator Mathias. I would just call your attention, I think, to the
fact that the cost of intelligence, the cost of the product is not only
money. It can be in risk, as was demonstrated by the Gary Powers U-2
incident. It can be in damage to our own constitutional process, which
is one of the elements of cost that I think we are trying to determine
here.
Mr. Angleton. I think that as far as the bloc is concerned, you have
a unified approach to the United States as the main enemy. They are
bound together by ideological ties. There has been a process of de-
Stalinization which was concluded in 1959, which reconciled vast
differences, and which in essence was a return to Leninism. There was
enunciated the policy of the main enemy, and the main enemy was the
United States. And all agents working in bloc countries who priorly
had been working on small members of NATO were redirected against
the main target.
Recently in the newspaper, there was the announcement of the defec-
tion of a Romanian intelligence officer in Oslo, and there has been a
major flap. And one can ask oneself the question that if Romania is so
independent of Moscow and moving away from it, why is it that their
intelligence service, which is most effective of their Central Committee,
is working hand in glove with the Soviets ?
Now, this is not speculation. These are facts. There have been agents
captured playing out these roles who are now in jail, and it has shown
total cohesiveness within the bloc in terms of strategic questionnaires
of no possible use to Romania. Romania, however, has received most-
favored-nation treatment, and it also received the visit recently of the
President, not too far distant from the arrest in Oslo of the intelligence
officer.
So I come back again to the nature of this threat. The nature of the
threat rests within some thousands of pages of interrogation of very-
high-level Soviet and bloc intelligence officers who were, in turn, very
close in their activities to the political guidance of the Central Com-
mittees. And this cohesiveness dates from the period of 1959, when the
intelligence services were changed from being the protectors or the
preservers of the cult of personality of Stalin, and reverted back again
to the days of Duchinsky and the revolution and Lenin, where every
intelligence operation has a political objective.
And it ties together with the entire philosophy — and I do not base
this on reading information available at the corner drugstore; this
81
comes from the interrogation of individuals who were in the system
and had positions of high responsibilty in intelligence— and the
underpinning of those regimes are their intelligence and security
services.
So, in conclusion, I would suggest that some day — and I know that
I have proposed many things here which will never see the light of
day— that the nature of the threat be diagnosed with a view that this
country, having taken stock of those problems, and being faced, as I
think Dr. Schlesinger has eloquently put it, with the possible change
of the balance of military power ; and I hope and I believe that some
of his speeches on these matters were gained by him — the views —
during his short tenure as the Director of Central Intelligence, where
he was an avid reader of the secret information that I refer to.
The Chairman. The committee's concern in this investigation is the
nature of the threat, to be sure. And an efficient intelligence organiza-
tion is needed for this country ; that is not the issue here. What is at
issue here is running it in such a way that we don't slowly become the
kind of police state you have described.
Mr. Angleton. I understand, Mr. Chairman. I was only responding
to Senator Mathias. —
The Chairman. Yes. But I just wanted to emphasize that our con-
cern is that this country should never slide down that slippery slope
that finally ends us up with the kind of police state you have described,
and that is the whole reason that this investigation has been under-
taken. Now, Senator Hart.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Angleton, much of the justification for domestic intelligence
and surveillance during the sixties and early seventies was based upon
foreign contacts. I would like to quote, first of all, a letter from Mr.
Helms to Mr. Hoover, dated March 20, 1970—1 think at the dawn of
the Huston era [exhibit 50 *].
On page 5, paragraph 8, entitled "New Left and Eacial Matters,"
Mr. Helms says, "There is already a substantial exchange of informa-
tion in this field," and then skipping a sentence, he says, "The increas-
ingly close connection between these forces in the United States," pres-
sumably meaning the new left and racial groups, "and hostile ele-
ments abroad has been well established by both of our agencies."
Now, Mr. Angleton, in your deposition before this committee, you
said as follows : "Within the Agency itself, there were those who took
a very staunch stand that there was no foreign involvement." And
then, skipping a line, "And these were fairly senior individuals, main-
ly on the overt side of the business. This attitude was very definitely
that there was nothing to it ; namely, foreign contact."
Are we to believe your deposition before this committee, or Mr.
Helm's letter to Director Hoover in March of 1970, as to the extent of
foreign involvement in domestic groups?
Mr. Angleton. It is not inconceivable — I mean, I cannot reconstruct
this paragraph and put it in the time-frame that you have posed it.
But it is not inconceivable that Mr. Helms did have disagreements
with those senior people on the overt side, or that he had access to the
content of mail intercept which would, of course, not be in their pos-
session. I mean, that is one explanation.
1 See p. 349.
82
Senator Hart of Colorado. His letter leaves almost no avenue open
for question as to the degree of contact. He said, "has been well
established." Mr. Angleton, let me rephrase the question. Was it
or was it not well established in the spring of 1970, that domestic
groups, described as the new left and racial groups, had substantial
foreign contact?
Mr. Angleton, There were a number of people from these groups
who traveledto Moscow and to North Korea, and traveled abroad.
Senator Hart of Colorado. And they had contact with "hostile
elements?"
Mr. Angleton. It is my understanding, not having reviewed the
mail intercepts, that it involved exhortations to violence, that it
involved sending letters from the United States to Soviet institutions,
inviting them to support the group in the United States by destroy-
ing U.S. property in Moscow and in other countries, and keeping them
advised of their own plans and actions. It's also come out in mail in-
tercept that certain groups went to Moscow for political indoctrina-
tion, and they went to North Korea for weaponry.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Then how could senior officials in the
CIA conclude that there was absolutely no foreign involvement ?
Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, there are many who believed that the
foreign involvement matter was immaterial to the
Senator Hart of Colorado. That is not what your deposition said.
Mr. Angleton. Well, I thought my deposition stated that there were
senior officials in the Agency who would not buy it.
Senator Hart of Colorado. They didn't say it was insubstantial;
they said it didn't exist. "There was no foreign involvement." The
attitude is very definitely that there was nothing to it.
Mr. Angleton. I think it could be qualified as stating that the coun-
terintelligence data which they received — and I don't know what they
received — did not strike them as sufficient to go on this investigation
of leftwing groups in this country. In other words, they were opposed
to it.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Angleton, the record before us
strongly suggests that there was not only one Huston plan, but there
may have been several operating almost simultaneously. I refer to your
deposition before the committee in which you say, "What I'm trying
to explain is that people are reading a lot into the Huston plan and,
at the same time, are unaware that on several levels in a community
identical" — I suppose you mean in the community — "identical bilat-
eral discussions were going on." That is, between yourselves and the
FBI. In other words, the Huston plan did not affect one way or the
other the normal flow of business.
I also refer to
Mr. Angleton. I don't think there was any — I'm afraid I don't have
the time sequence here. What is the question, sir ?
Senator Hart of Colorado. Let me complete my question.
In addition to that testimony which you have already given, I refer
to an April 12, 1971 memorandum for the files from Director Hoover
[exhibit 31 x ].
1 See p. 272.
83
He says, and I quote :
This meeting had been requested by Mr. Helms and was for the purpose of
discussing a broadening of operations, particularly of the very confidential type
in covering intelligence, both domestic and foreign. There was some discussion
upon the part of Mr. Helms of further coverage of mail.
Then I also refer to the Helms letter that I quoted in the previous
question that was a March 1970 letter.
What all of this suggests, Mr. Angleton— and I think the committee
would be interested in whether the facts support thatr— that not only
was the so-called Huston group the inter-agency task force operating
on the question of what restraints should be lifted, but, in fact, there
were constant contacts going on, formally and informally, between the
CIA, the FBI, NSA and perhaps other agencies about similar ongoing
domestic intelligence programs. Is it safe for us to conclude that not
only are we dealing with one Huston plan, but in fact, less formally,
with perhaps several ?
Mr. Angleton. Since the creation of the Agency, there has been
constant discussion of operations and improvement of collection, so
there is nothing unusual in this happening at this time, the fact that
this, from 1947 on, was still taking place.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Was it possible Mr. Huston was ]ust
being duped by the Agency into thinking that the White House was
aware of what was going on, when, in fact, the agencies were having
discussions of their own behind the back of the White House officials
as to what should be done about domestic surveillance ?
Mr. Angleton. Well I think that answer could only be had if Mr.
Huston had been asked to explain in great detail, chronologically, his
contacts with the FBI and the subjects of discussion. I do not believe
that he could have met with Mr. Sullivan, and not have been exposed
to all of these matters of operations a year prior to the Huston plan.
I know Mr. Sullivan very well, and he doesn't usually waste his time.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Huston has testified under oath, and
therefore subjected himself to perjury charges, that he didn't
Mr. Angleton. I'm not suggesting that the actual language he used
could not be also interpreted to remove any taint of perjury. I am
simply stating that I have known for a long time that he was very
close to Mr. Sullivan, and I do know what Mr. Sullivan's concerns
were in terms of gaps within the community. And simply because there
was a Huston plan, there were a number of ongoing bilateral discus-
sions every day with other elements within the intelligence community,
which may or may not have duplicated the broad, general plan that
Huston brought about.
Senator Hart of Colorado. One final question.
Mr. Angleton, are you familiar with the name Thomas Riha,
R-i-h-a?
Mr. Angleton. I am, indeed.
Senator Hart of Colorado. And you are aware of the fact that the
so-called Thomas Riha cnse nlayed a key role in the breach of liaison
between the CIA and the FBI ?
Mr. Angleton. I am.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you have any information for this
committee as to what happened to Prof. Thomas Riha?
84
Mr. Angleton. What has happened to the subject ?
Senator Hart of Colorado. He has disappeared.
Mr. Angleton. I haven't heard anything. I have not actually in-
quired, but I have no knowledge. I think I heard speculation at one
time, but it was back, more or less, in the res gestae .of this trouble,
that he was in Czechoslovakia, but I do not know.
Senator Hart of Colorado. In your previous deposition you stated
that the counterintelligence information was only as good as relations
between the FBI and the CIA. That is a paraphrase of what you
said. And since there was a termination of relationships between Mr.
Hoover, the FBI and the CIA in the spring of 1970 over the Riha case,
I think the committee might look into this termination with some de-
gree of intensity. That is all, Mr. Chairman. .
Mr. Angleton. I would like to suggest, Senator, that it was much
deeper than that. It was a cutting off of all liaison within the intelli-
gence community with the exception of the White House.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Over this one case ?
Mr. Angleton. Over this one case.
Gnce having established the principle with us, then it was simply
a matter of a short period of time when the liaison office itself was
done away within the Bureau.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I have a matter of com-
mittee business that I will take up at the appropriate time.
Thank you.
The Chairman. What is the matter you want to bring up ?
Senator Hart of Colorado. It has to do with an additional witness
before this committee on this subject. But if there are further ques-
tions, you may want to go to those first. I don't know.
The Chairman. Very well. If there are further questions let us
take them first. Senator Tower ?
Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, was the mail intercept both for intel-
ligence and counterintelligence purposes ?
Mr. Angleton. Yes, sir.
Senator Tower. Was there a feeling that the Soviets relied on a lack
of authorization from the Government to open mail, and therefore,
widely used the mail system ?
Mr. Angleton. My assumption is that much of the mail and the con-
tent of the mail would not have come to us if they had been aware of the
program.
Senator Tower. Now returning to the comment at page 29 of the
Huston plan [exhibit 1 1 ], the report noted that "covert coverage had
been discontinued due to publicity arising from congressional hear-
ings on privacy." You have testified that you believe this referred
to FBI mail openings. Is that correct?
Mr. Angleton. I say that it is my impression that the thrust of that
related directly to the Bureau's having abandoned the mail-intercept
program domestically.
Senator Tower. Is it your belief that disclosure of the CIA's contin-
uing intercept to a working group, including representatives of other
agencies, might lead the Soviets and others to discontinue use of the
mails, and thus, deprive the United States of an important source of
intelligence ?
1 See p. 141.
85
Mr. Angleton. I'm sorry, I don't quite get the thrust of this
questioning.
Senator Tower. Well, in other words, did you continue to do this
and did not let anyone else know that the Agency was intercepting
mail because you felt that the Soviets might get wind of it and, there-
fore, discontinue the use of the mails, thereby denying us an important
intelligence source?
Mr. Angleton. I would say that does represent my analysis of the
situation because I am quite confident — for example, we had in the
Weathermen case, Cathy Boudin, who, in Greenwich Village, was
a part of the Weathermen group building bombs. The bombs went up,
and she and another person, a woman, fled from the house, and she was
identified as one of the people fleeing from the house. And those were
the facts — the only facts — in possession of the FBI dealing with a
bomb-making house in Greenwich Village.
Now, when we went back and continued — or went back into our mail-
intercept program, we found that she had written from Moscow some
30 to 40 letters to people in the United States, and these were the only
leads that the FBI had that were in any way important. And to this
day she is a fugitive from justice. It would raise in anyone's counter-
intelligence mind as to whether she is in Moscow, but she is an active
fugitive from justice.
Senator Tower. During working group sessions, did anyone, at any
time, ask you whether the CIA was conducting covert mail coverage ?
Mr. Angleton. I don't recall, myself. I mean, I don't recall that and
I don't recall details on how we arranged with the Bureau — or the ver-
biage in that report — in a way that would hide our use of the mails.
Senator Tower. Did you at any time receive instructions, or attempt
on your own initiative, to mislead the President on the issue of covert
mail coverage conducted by the CIA ?
Mr. Angleton. It is very difficult for me to respond to that because
I do not have the facts as to the — as to what we were going to do re-
garding this question of including within the Huston project the fact
that the FBI were recipients of our mail coverage.
I find it, therefore, very difficult to know how to reply to your ques-
tion. I do know — and I think that this was my conviction at all times —
that if there was ever an audience with the President of the United
States to go over internal security in this counterespionage matter,
there would never be anything withheld from him.
Senator Tower. So you were never ordered to, nor did you ever on
your own, attempt to mislead the President in this matter?
Mr. Angleton. I did not.
Senator Tower. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Mondale ?
Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Angleton, would
it be fair to say that starting, say, in 1967, with the rise in antiwar
protests, that the CIA, the FBI and the other intelligence agencies
were placed under tremendous pressure by the White House to investi-
gate and determine the source of these protests ?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Senator Mondale. So that while we ask questions about what you did
in your department, it has to be placed in the context of what you re-
ferred to earlier as the mood and the temper and the fear of the times.
86
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Senator Mondale. I think that has to be understood, because I think
it is quite obvious that the Presidents — starting with Mr. Johnson in
the beginning of the high rise in protests — tended to interpret those
protests as being foreign-inspired. I don't have all of the documents
with me by any means, out here is the memorandum from Mr. Huston
to the President on June 20, 1969 [exhibit 6 *], stating — this is to the
Director of the FBI, but he quotes the President :
The President has directed that a report on foreign Communist support of rev-
olutionary protest movements in this country be prepared for his study. . . .
"Support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign Com-
munists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protests. . . .
And then I have a document here [exhibit 7 2 ] which we have just
obtained from President Nixon's files, entitled "Presidential Talking^
Papers," on June 5, 1970 [exhibit 63 3 ], and this is the description or
what he apparently told Mr. Hoover, Helms, General Bennett and
Admiral Gayler.
He said —
We are now confronted with a new and grave crisis in our country, one which
we know too little about. Certainly hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans,
mostly under 30, are determined to destroy our society. They find in many of the
legitimate grievances of our citizenry opportunities for exploitation which never
escape the attention of demagogues. They are reaching out for the support-
ideological and otherwise — of foreign powers, and they are developing their
own brand of indigenous revolutionary activism which is as dangerous as any-
thing which they could import from Cuba, China or the Soviet Union.
And then, among other things, he says, or his talking papers indi-
cates he planned to say —
Third, our people, perhaps as a reaction to the excesses of the McCarthy era,
are unwilling to admit the possibility that their children could wish to destroy
their country, and this is particularly true of the media and the academic
community.
In other words, this is a reflection of the President's attitude that
there was a possibility that thousands of American youths desired to
destroy this country.
Do you have any doubt that that is the motivation of Presidential
orders and the temper of orders during that time ?
Mr. Angleton. None whatsoever.
Senator Mondale. If that is their view, namely, that the American
people increasingly — including the media and the parents — could not
be trusted to perceive this threat, isn't a series of agencies, uncon-
trolled by the law, reaching out to apprehend a threat which they
perceived to threaten the very survival of democracy, an exceedingly
dangerous tool indeed?
Mr. Angleton. Would you repeat the first part of that question ?
Senator Mondale. If I were a President, and I believed there were
thousands of American youths wishing to destroy American society,
and the parents couldn't see what the kids were up to, and the media
wouldn't understand what they were up to, wouldn't I likely proceed
to use agencies such as the CIA to move in most exaggerated and inten-
sive ways to try and meet this threat ?
1 See p. 204.
3 See p. 205.
» See p. 396.
87
Mr. Angleton. I think that is correct, and that is the reason why
earlier I referred to the strong statement made by Mr. Huston to us
that we were not complying with the President's request.
I do not have a record of those first meetings as to anyone raising
problems or political differences, but I know there was — the question
of political implications was raised and discussed and they were
knocked down by him.
Senator Mondale. Yes. Because I think while we probe, as we should,
in hard and intensive ways, with persons such as yourself who have
worked in these agencies, the truth of it is that this problem began in
the White House with the concern on the part of the President that
these protests came not from legitimate concerns of Americans against
the war, but probably were inspired by foreign support and leader-
ship. Their protests were considered to be compromised and corrupted
expressions, rather than the good faith protests of Americans concerned
about that war. I think that attitude shows how dangerous it is to have
agencies which themselves do not feel that they are bound by the re-
strictions of the law. That attitude, that fear, that distrust of the
American people, coupled with agencies which feel they are not re-
strained by the law, I think is a road map to disaster.
Mr. Angleton. Senator, I would like to make just one comment. I
believe that the depths of the President's feelings were, in part, justified
because of the ignorance, so to speak, in the West regarding these
matters. In other words, the quality of intelligence going to him he
found totally unsatisfactory.
Senator Mondale. That's right. Because it did not square with his
paranoia that the American people were trying to destroy the country,
and in fact, there was never any evidence of any significance that that
paranoia was justified. That is what, I think, has been the traditional
dispute in maintaining a democracy — whether you restrain power lest
it be turned on the people, or whether you restrain power because you
trust the people in the long run as the primary salvation of society.
I think this document, expressing as it does enormous, unrestricted
paranoic fear about the American people, is an excellent expression of
why we have to have laws that restrain the action of the President.
Because, really, you were an agent of the President in all of these
matters.
Mr. Angleton. Mr. Senator, I do believe that it is difficult to judge
the President on the basis of that document. I am certain that anyone
who has his responsibilities, and was receiving in-depth, around the
clock reports from all over the United States, of bombings and civil un-
rest and murders — and I can go all the way down the long, grizzly
list
Senator Mondale. Oh, yes. But-
Mr. Angleton. You can induce that, but it was not, in my view,
paranoia.
Senator Mondale. Do you think the possibility that there were
thousands of American children under 30 determined to destroy our
society is not paranoia ?
Mr. Angleton. I will not take that out of context. The overall pur-
pose of that talking paper was to address it to intelligence collectors,
the heads of agencies. And it was to give them a hot foot of getting
down to business and supplying facts. And those facts were very dim-
88
cult to come by. Outside of the mail-intercept program, there was very
little hard, incontrovertible evidence. There was nothing known re-
garding Cleaver's operations, his stay in Algiers, his dealing with
Soviet bloc countries, his going to North Korea, and other activities of
this sort. And these were hard facts.
Senator Mondale. But as an old law enforcement officer, Mr. Angle-
ton, I can tell you there are ways of going after those people based on
probable suspicions entirely consistent with the laws and the Constitu-
tion, without undertaking efforts of the kind that were recommended
here that were shotgun, unrestrained and unconcerned with the Con-
stitution. We have ways of taking care of people who resort to violence
in this country, and this way is not one of those permitted by the
Constitution.
There is one other problem that bothers me, and that is this : what
was really the problem in 1967, until the end of that war ? Was it that
Americans were bad people and therefore had to be spied on, or was
it that we had a bad war that needed to be stopped ? What I think
this reflects is, instead of Presidents asking themselves, "is there some-
thing wrong with this war that is creating these protests?" Instead of
that, they said, "there is something wrong with the protestors. They
are getting foreign money, foreign directions, foreign spies, and there-
fore what we need is more counterintelligence." That may have delayed
the day when Presidents realized the need to change and end that war.
The Chairman. I might just say, Senator, I think your point is
well taken and we might just remind ourselves of the constitutional
duty of the President. It is not just to perceive threats and then think
up ways to deal with them outside of the law. The constitutional duty
of the President is that he shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. And when he takes his oath of office as President of the
United States, he takes the following oath : "I do solemnly swear that
I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States
and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States." Those are his duties.
Mr. Angleton. Yes ; I understand.
The Chairman. And when Mr. Nixon approved the Huston plan,
he forgot those duties. And when Mr. Mitchell, the Attorney General
of the United States, was informed of the illegal opening of the mail
a year later, as the chief law enforcement officer of the United States,
he forgot those duties, too. Are there further questions ?
Senator Mathias ?
Senator Mathias. Mr. Angleton, I think you raised a very im-
portant and useful question when you pointed to the issue of measur-
ing the value of the intelligence you received against the cost of
producing it, and I have always felt, from the inception of this study,
that that would have to be one of the major elements of our considera-
tion. I would suggest, as I did a few minutes ago, that that cost has to
be measured in more than just dollars. It has to be measured in the
financial cost — what it costs the taxpayers — it has to be measured in
the kind of risks that it exposes the United States to, risks of various
kinds. It may be loss of personnel, loss of equipment, loss of face, loss
of prestige, various kinds of risks ; ultimately, the risk of war. And
finally, of course, it involves the third element which you have just been
discussing with Senator Mondale, the question of the cost in terms of
erosion of the constitutional process.
But for our purposes today I am wondering if you could tell us
how you, in your career, went about assessing the cost of intelligence
that you felt might be procured in terms of risk to the United States.
How would you make that delicate balance between what you wanted
to know and thought would be useful for this Government to know,
against what we might lose in the process of getting it ?
Mr. Angleton. Well, sir, I think those of us who were in the war
had the advantage of having been backstopped by thousands of troops
in the event of error. And I might add that that is a testing ground
that younger people in intelligence have not had. In other words, when
they embark on operations, they are apt to not have the period of trial
and error. I would say that all of the officers I have known in my ex-
perience in the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly in Counter-
intelligence, have a very acute sense of making this judgment factor.
That is, we have handled so many cases that it builds up sort of a
body of expertise in its own right as to how much you will risk to go
after certain targets.
Naturally, the highest quality of intelligence that exists is in the
field of radio signals and related matters. And then it goes in descend-
ing order of documents and to individuals who have had great access,
or access. Now, all of these matters have to be brought to bear on what
the expectancy will be, what one expects from the operation.
When the risks get very great, without exception that is taken to the
Director. And then, if he has to seek outside guidance or consultation,
he does so. And Mr. McCone was a great stickler for being brought in
when anything reached a Cabinet-level decision.
Senator Mathias. Now, when we talk about a risk being very great,
are we talking about the chance of losing an airplane and a pilot, or
are we talking about the chance of involving this country, in a serious
way, with another government ? I'm trying to get some scale of values
that would be considered.
Mr. Angleton. Obviously, anything that sets back the prestige of
this country is almost controlling in terms of the Director's final deci-
sion. I mean, if the risk is one that is going to undermine the prestige
of the United States, I don't know of any Director who would not
take that up with Dr. Kissinger, or with the National Security Coun-
cil, or the Forty Committee, or with the President.
But I think there is great responsibility within the Agency. I mean,
I make no excuses regarding going ahead on the matters of illegal
mail coverage, but that is a very small part of our activity, and I am
not excusing it.
Senator Mathias. Going back into history, to pick up another ex-
ample in which this kind of evaluation of what you might learn as
against what you might risk is involved, do you know how that was
weighed in the Gary Powers U-2 flight ?
Mr. Angleton. It is purely hearsay. It is simply that a decision was
made by the President.
Senator Mathias. We are not bound by the hearsay rules here.
Mr. Angleton. Well, I at least would like to so label it. But it is my
understanding — and I know Mr. Dulles quite well in this regard, be-
cause later on it was my man who handled Gary Powers as to his
debriefing — and what happened, it is my understanding that the ques-
tion of the U-2 flights — and I may be wrong on this — were cleared
with the President in terms of his own activities — in this case, his
90
travels to Paris to meet Khrushchev. And I would say the history of
the Agency is sprinkled with cases which have gone forward and
which have been canceled or changed because of some overriding
political factor.
Senator Mathias. So it is your considered judgment that the ques-
tion of the exposure of an important national interest is consistently
weighed when a project is undertaken?
Mr. Angleton. Yes ; but I would like to draw attention to the recom-
mendation of the Eockefeller Commission, of which I happen to be
much in favor. And that is that there be two Deputy Directors who
would be approved by the Congress, one military and one civilian.
And I would say there is very much need to have accessible a Director
who can take the time to go into the nuts and bolts, because his ab-
sence means that there will be this slippage. And I think there is more
than enough business for two Deputy Directors to be fully occupied.
Senator Mathias. Deputies who can measure this element of cost
before
Mr. Angleton. But who are looking into the Agency. Not being in
the Agency looking out into the community. And there is a very
proper role for the overall DCI. But I think Mr. Colby would be the
first to- admit that the burdens which he has had since he assumed
the directorship — that he has been able to give a very small percentage
of his time to the actual workings of the Agency.
The Chairman. Senator Hart ?
Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, the so-called Huston
plan has been called one of the most dangerous documents in the
history of this Republic. Mr. Huston testified that the President did
not know that questionable surveillance techniques were being used
prior to the development of this plan, that he thought when the order
was given to terminate them, that they were terminated. There is
other testimony and evidence about what the President knew or did
not know. As I think all of us have tried to indicate to the
people of this country, the principal part of our concern is the ques-
tion of command and control. Who is in charge? Who gives what
orders ? Are they carried out ? And if they are not carried out, why
not?
I think it comes down, in this case, to a phrase that one of our dis-
tinguished members used in another context with regard to the same
President. What did he know, and when did he know it? I have felt
since the beginning, as a member of this committee, that we stand in
constant danger of repeating a kind of perennial Government pattern
that when something goes wrong, or when there are governmental
abuses, the politicians and elected officials take it out on the ap-
pointed people, the career people, in yarious departments or agencies.
And I think we, particularly, stand in constant danger of doing that
in this case, and in other cases that we will be looking at.
I frankly don't find it very tasteful, and I don't think the Ameri-
can people will. If all we accomplish is public and private thrashing
of people like Mr. Angleton and Mr. Huston and others, whether they
deserve it or not, that is not our particular function.
I think the question comes down to : Who was giving what orders ?
What people at the highest levels of government, particularly the
elected officials, knew or did not know about this plan and other activi-
91
ties? Were the causes shared equally among, or in part, by elected
officials with appointed officials ?
Consequently, Mr. Chairman, although I do not intend at this point
to seek its immediate consideration, I would move to ask this com-
mittee to consider using all methods within its authority and control to
seek the presence of former President Nixon before this committee.
The Chairman. I think the point is well taken, and I personally con-
cur in the Senator's views. I think that in the Huston plan, Mr. Nixon
was the central figure. We can get and are getting testimony as to what
he appeared to have known, and the representations that were made to
him, and what he appeared to authorize and then revoke. But he is the
best witness as to what his intentions were, and he is the ultimate wit-
ness as to what he was told and what he was not told, and for that
reason I concur fully in the Senator's view.
Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes, Senator Tower.
Senator Tower. I think this is a matter that should be taken up in
a closed business session of the committee so it can be fully discussed
in that context as not to engage in a discussion of it here or a resolu-
tion of the matter here.
The Chairman. Well, the matter has been raised. As I understood
Senator Hart to say he is not going to press for an immediate vote.
Senator, have you made a motion ?
Senator Hart of Colorado. The motion is made, and I do not intend
to press it in this session.
The Chairman. At this time.
Is there any further discussion that members would like to
Senator Mathias. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can only say that I per-
sonally asked Mr. Nixon about the Huston plan, and I hope the com-
mittee has more luck than I have had as an individual in getting any
information on it.
The Chairman. Well, we have also asked for other information, and
we have had to subpena some of it, as the Senator knows. I think that
we will just have to find out if the former President is willing to come
and tell us about this and his part in it, what he knew about it.
Senator Mathias. I do think this, Mr. Chairman, if you would yield.
The Chairman. And ultimately, of course, we have the question of
a subpena in the event that he declines to do so.
Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, I do not think we should discuss that
here and raise publicly the threat of a subpena because I think the
matter can be resolved privately and should be. If we get into the busi-
ness of a subpena, we are looking at a long court battle that could go
on well beyond the life of this committee as authorized by the Congress.
There are ways to do things and ways not to, and I think we ought to
explore every means short of that before we even suggest that we con-
sider a subpena.
The Chairman. Well, I think that the Senator is not going to press
his motion at this time, and I feel we should take it uo more fully
and consider the proper step to take, and that then the committee
should make its decision, and that decision will be announced pub-
licly as soon as it is made. Is that agreeable to the committee?
62-685 O - 76 - 7
92
Senator Mathias I would just make this comment, that this of^
course is not the first time that the question of Mr. Nixon's testimony
has been raised in this committee. We have talked about it on several
occasions, and I think it was Marlowe who said, "But at my back I
always hear Time's winged chariot hovering near." Now, this com-
mittee has got to someday make a report. Time is moving very rapidly,
and I would suggest to the Chair that we schedule the appropriate
amount of time to discuss this subject and then make a decision one
way or the other.
The Chairman. Very well, that will be done, if there is no further
objection. That is the decision of the Chair. As soon as the committee
has reached its decision, an appropriate announcement will be made.
If there are no further questions
Senator Huddleston. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Oh, Senator Huddleston, do you have a further
question?
Senator Huddleston. May I ask one further question that I did
not get to during my allotted time ?
Mr. Angleton, the Huston plan was an operative policy of the
White House for some 5 days.
Mr. Angleton. Yes, 5 days.
Senator Huddleston. During that time were there any internal
instructions or memoranda or direction given within the ClA relat-
ing to implementing that plan ?
Mr. Angleton. None to my knowledge.
Senator Huddleston. None to your knowledge. After the Presi-
dent rescinded his authorization, following that time were there any
internal memoranda involving instructions or directions within the
CIA?
Mr. Angleton. No.
Senator Huddleston. So it is accurate to say that the Huston plan
presumably could have been implemented by the CIA without any
further directions in addition to what they were already doing, and
that there were in fact no directions canceling any effort that might
have been started relative to that plan? It is almost as if the status
quo were maintained from the beginning to the end, before and after
without any actions being taken.
Mr. Angleton. With one exception, Senator, and that is that the
plan marched up the hill and then it marched back again, and this
was one of the few times that any programs involving counterintel-
ligence, interagency counterintelligence, were ever read by a President.
Senator Huddleston. That was the plan itself.
Mr. Angleton. The plan itself, but it had its own
Senator Huddleston. The paper went up the hill and back.
Mr. Angleton. It had certain impact.
Senator Huddleston. The paper went up the hill and back, but the
plan, the activities related in that plan, in fact, did continue.
Mr. Angleton. I do not think all the activity continued. I think
there were a number of activities of the Bureau that fitted within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau that were not rezoned.
Senator Huddleston. But there were mail openings.
Mr. Angleton. The mail openings were within the Agency.
Senator Huddleston. Wiretaps, surreptitious entries.
93
Mr. Angleton. I do not think there were any surreptitious entries,
but I am giving an unqualified answer. But I understand your point,
sir.
Senator Htjddleston. But I think the evidence indicates there were.
But that is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes, it is almost as though from the state of evi-
dence to date that the President were really an irrelevancy.
Tomorrow, we will meet again at 10 o'clock, and our witness tomor-
row is Mr. Charles Brennan of the FBI.
Thank you, Mr. Angleton, for your testimony.
Mr. Angleton. Thank you, Senator.
[Whereupon, at 1 :05 p.m., the select committee was adjourned, to
reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, September 25, 1975.]
THXTBSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1975
U.S. 'Senate,
Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D.O.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :05 a.m., in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan,
Hart (Colorado) , Baker, Gold water, Mathias, and Schweiker.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O.
Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the
minority.
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.
At the close of yesterday's hearing, Senator Hart of Colorado
moved that former President Nixon be called as a witness in connec-
tion with the committee's investigation of the Huston plan. That
motion was considered in executive session of the committee yesterday
afternoon and it was decided by the committee that Mr. Nixon was
indeed a central witness of great importance in the matter of the
Huston plan, but that there were also other subjects that the committee
is now investigating, with respect to which the former President's
testimony would be equally important. And so the committee decided
that we should endeavor to secure Mr. Nixon's testimony with respect
to all of the work of the committee where that testimony would be
critical. And the counsels for the committee, Mr. Schwarz and Mr.
Smothers, were instructed to open negotiations with Mr. Nixon's at-
torney looking toward the arrangement that would enable the com-
mittee to secure this testimony.
Have you anything to add to that, Senator Tower?
•Senator Tower. I think that about sums it up, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. This morning, we continue our examination of the
Huston plan and the events that led up to it and the continuing opera-
tions of the intelligence agencies, following Mr. Nixon's revocation of
the plan itself. And our witness this morning is a representative of
the FBI, Mr. Charles Brennan.
Before I swear the witness, I might say that last summer I made the
remark that there was considerable evidence that the CIA had been
behaving like a rogue elephant on a rampage. That remark was chal-
lenged. But I think that as we close this second week of public hearings,
the evidence certainly bears out the fact that the CIA failed, in the case
of the poisons, which we examined last week, to carry out the orders of
the President. And this week, of course, as. we have examined the
Huston plan, it again becomes clear that the CIA was not responsive to
the President's revocation. Not only the CIA, but the other agencies
involved, including the FBI, failed to tell the President that cer-
(95)
96
tain operations like the mail openings, for which they sought Presi-
dential approval, had in fact been going on for years before that
authorization was sought. And when it was revoked, the mail openings
continued for a long period of time afterwards. We will look this
morning at the FBI's role in this particular plan. And our witness., Mr.
Brennan, is prepared to respond to questions from the committee.
Before we do that, would you please stand and take the oath ? Do you
solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this proceeding
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God ?
Mr. Brennan. I do.
The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz, would you commence questioning
please.
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Brennan, were you employed by the FBI ?
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES BRENNAN, FORMERLY ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (1970-71)
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Schwarz. From when to when?
Mr. Brennan. From April 1948 until July 1974 when I retired.
Mr. Schwarz. And in June 1970 were you the Chief of the Internal
Security Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division of the FBI?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, I was.
Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Sullivan was your immediate superior?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Schwarz. And did you then in July of 1970 succeed him as the
Chief of the Domestic Intelligence Division ?
Mr. Brennan. Specifically August 1970.
Mr. Schwarz. And you left the FBI because of an incident in which
Mr. Hoover and you had had a dispute about the questioning of Daniel
Ellsberg's father. And I think some people will want to get into that
with you, but is that the circumstance under which you left the FBI?
Mr. Brennan. Well, no, sir. That was not the specific circumstance.
By the time I retired from the FBI, Mr. Hoover, of course, had been
deceased several years.
Mr. Schwarz. All right. But there was an incident involving that
matter in which Mr. Hoover placed you on probation. Am I correct
about that?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Schwarz. All right. Now, going back to the Huston plan itself,
you recall, am I correct, that there was advocacy in the plan of in-
creasing electronic surveillance, or bugs and taps, restoring, as the
plan "said, mail opening, increasing the coverage of envelopes and
so" forth, restoring the practice of surreptitious entry, and increasing
the coverage of campus persons who were believed to be subjects of
attention to the intelligence community?
Is that in general what was sought in the Huston plan ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Schwarz. And all of those matters were opposed in the summer
of 1970 by Mr. Hoover, is that right?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, that's right.
97
Mr. Schwarz. And had Mr. Hoover been dpposing those matters
for a few years prior to 1970 ?
Mr. Brennan. .Yes, sir, he had.
Mr. Schwarz. Was there an earlier time when Mr. Hoover had ap-
proved the use of those techniques?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, previously during the earlier years of the
Bureau's history I think most of these techniques had been in existence.
Mr. Schwarz. Now, I am going to ask you a question that may sound
sort of strange, but I believe it is relevant from your conversation with
us 2 days ago.
Mr. Hoover became 70 years old in 1965, is that in accord with your
recollection ? Now, why is it significant that Mr. Hoover became 70 in
1965 ? Specifically, why is that fact significant to your understanding
of his opposition to the use of the techniques which we have been talk-
ing about?
Mr. Brennan. I think when Mr. Hoover reached age 70, of course,
he came within the Government's law which required mandatory re-
tirement at that time. And I believe that was waived by President
Johnson, which virtually then called for the Director to be renewed
as Director of the FBI on an annual basis. And I think that Mr.
Hoover was very conscious of the fact that to a degree this put him
into a somewhat vulnerable position. I think he then also became very
conscious of the fact that any incident, which, within his understand-
ing might prove to be an embarrassment to the Bureau, could reflect
questionably on his leadership of the Bureau. And I think that perhaps
he felt that such an incident could provide certain individuals with
the capacity to not renew his continued role as Director of the FBI.
Mr. Schwarz. In your opinion, how was it that Mr. Hoover was able
to stay on as Director of the Bureau for so long after 1965 ? Indeed, he
stayed on until he died in what was it, 1972 or 1973?
Mr. Brennan. In 1972, 1 believe, he died.
Mr. Schwarz. In your opinion, why was it that the various Presi-
dents kept him in office ?
Mr. Brennan. Well, this very definitely is my opinion, but I think
that the various Presidents possibly, just for political purposes I think,
feared possibly the loss of votes. If they were to remove Mr. Hoover,
I think there might have been some — and again this is purely specula-
tion — there might have been fear on their part that perhaps Mr.
Hoover had some information that might prove embarrassing to them.
Senator Morgan. I feel as a committee member that I must voice
my objection or dissent from this line of questioning. This man is
speculating about the reasons that people who are now dead acted as
they did.
In all fairness to the Presidents who retained Mr. Hoover and to
Mr. Hoover, I just don't think it is proper to let somebody who ad-
mittedly had difficulty with Mr. Hoover speculate on his motives. This
would not be accepted in a court of law and I don't think it should be
accepted in this committee.
The Chairhan. Senator, I think your point is well taken. Let us
move ahead with the questions.
Mr. Schwarz. With respect, Mr. Brennan, to what Mr. Hoover
actually did, let us look at what the written record reveals. And in
98
connection with the point made by Senator Morgan I wish to move
to what he actually did and not to speculation.
Would you examine exhibit 32 1 , please?
And I move, Mr. Chairman, the introduction of this document
which is dated July 19, 1966. It is from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach,
subject: "Black bag" jobs. And it contains Mr. Hoover's handwritten
note on the third page stating, "no more such techniques must be used."
The Chairman. Very well, without objection, the document will be
entered into the record of the proceedings.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 32 for
identification.]
Mr. Schwarz. Now, Mr. Brennan, you have had an opportunity to
see this document during the course of your preparation with us.
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, I have.
Mr. Schwarz. And does it accord with your understanding of the
procedures which previously had been employed in connection with
so-called "black bag" jobs?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, it does.
Mr. Schwarz. All right. Would you read into the record, please, the
second paragraph of the document.
Mr. Brennan. The second paragraph states, "We do not obtain au-
thorization for 'black bag' jobs from outside the Bureau. Such a
technique involves trespass and is clearly illegal. Therefore, it would
be impossible to obtain any legal sanction for it. Despite this, 'black
bag' jobs have been used because they represent an invaluable tech-
nique in combating subversive activities of a clandestine nature and
directly undermining and destroying our Nation."
Mr. Schwarz. All right. Now, the document also refers to a so-called
"do not file" procedure.
The Chairman. I think, Mr. Brennan, it might be helpful if you
would just explain to the committee what a "black bag" job is.
Mr. Brennan. I think in general parlance, in the intelligence com-
munity, Senator, the "black bag" iob refers to an operation which in-
volves a penetration which basically is designed to obtain intelligence
information, which basically constitutes breaking and entering.
The Chairman. You mean what would normally be called a
burglary ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes ; normally, Senator, yes.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Schwarz. Would you turn to exhibit 33, 2 please ?
And, Mr. Chairman, in line with what Senator Morgan indicated,
I move the introduction of exhibit 33, which is Director Hoover's mem-
orandum to Mr. Tolson and Mr. DeLoach, dated January 6, 1967,
again stating his opinion with respect to the propriety of so-called
"black-bag" techniques.
Senator Morgan. Mr. Chairman, before we go on, so that there will
be no misunderstanding about my position, I have no objection whatso-
ever to Mr. Hoover's orders being put in the record. My objections were
to allowing or asking this witness to speculate on why Mr. Hoover did
so and so or why the President extended his term.
The Chairman. I understand the objection and I have sustained it.
* See p. 273.
' See p. 276.
99
Mr. Schwarz. Would you read into the record, Mr. Brennan, exhibit
33, please?
Mr. Brennan. It is a memorandum for Mr. Tolson and Mr. DeLoach
from J. Edgar Hoover, and it states :
I note that requests are still being made by Bureau officials for the use of
"black bag" techniques. I have previously indicated that I do not Intend to ap-
prove any such requests in the future, and consequently, no such recommendations
should be submitted for approval of such matters. This practice, which includes
also surreptitious entrances upon premises of any kind, will not meet with my
approval in the future.
Very truly yours.
Mr. Schwarz. All right, finally, in this line of questioning, would
you turn to exhibit 40 1 which is a memorandum dated July 27, 1970,
from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General, including Mr.
Hoover's comments on the Huston plan itself.
Have you got that, Mr. Brennan ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. All right, Mr. Chairman, I move the introduction into
evidence of that document.
The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 40 for identifi-
cation.]
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question on procedure ?
I notice counsel today is moving introduction of documents. I was
not under the impression that that was necessary in order to make it
a part of the records of this committee. If it is, we have got a problem,
because I assumed, then, at some point, all of the documents that have
been used and prepared by staff would be thought of as the records of
this committee and would be open to public inspection, except as sani-
tization would be required. I don't want to be picayunish, but I don't
want to end up at some future date not having access to some of the
information which was before us at this committee table. Is it the chair-
man's position that we must formally put documents in the record?
My position is that we should consider all of them part of the record.
The Chairman. I think all documents will be considered part of the
record. I believe that the reason counsel is proceeding this way this
morning is because he is undertaking to put these particular documents
in the record. While, normally, we have simply been asking the witness
to refer to passages of documents in the normal interrogation. But,
Senator, all of the documents, in any case, will form the record of this
committee.
Senator Baker. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. My view is the same as yours.
Senator Tower. So, no formal motion is necessary ?
The Chairman. I actually think that is so. And if the committee
would prefer, we will
Senator Baker. No ; I don't object, I just want to make sure that this
questioning which was new today does not imply that at some future
date we are going to exclude documents. I am now reassured. The
chairman, as I understand it, has ruled all of these documents will be
for the record of the committee. That satisfies my request.
» See p. 313.
100
The Chairman. Very well. Now, would you proceed, Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Brennan, is it fair to say that this document
restates the objections to the lifting of the various restraints which
Mr. Hoover had already expressed in the footnotes to the document
submitted to the President on June 25, 1970 ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, it does.
Mr. Schwarz. All right, the only added part that ought to be read
into the record, if you would, would be the final paragraph on the
third page. Would you read that into the record.
Mr. Brennan :
Despite my clear-cut and specific opposition to the lifting of the various in-
vestigative restraints referred to above and to the creation of a permanent
interagency committee on domestic intelligence, the FBI is prepared to implement
the instructions of the White House, at your direction. Of course, we would
continue to seek your specific authorization, where appropriate, to utilize the
various sensitive investigative techniques involved in individual cases.
Mr. Schwarz. Now, is it your understanding that Mr. Mitchell
declined to authorize, or did authorize specific techniques that were re-
ferred to ? Or is it in between in some fashion ?
Mr. Brennan. I don't recall that, sir.
Mr. Schwarz. I just have one more question. After the Huston plan
was turned down, was there a program of intensification of investiga-
tion in the security field which was proposed by your department and
approved eventually by the Director ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Smothers, do you have questions ?
Mr. Smothers. Just a few inquiries, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan,
I think it is a fair inference from your testimony this morning, and
certainly from your previous testimony before the committee, that you
are of the opinion that the FBI was somehow being restricted un-
necessarily in its domestic intelligence effort.
Mr. Brennan. Yes sir, I was.
Mr. Smothers. Is it your opinion that these restrictions were based
upon the FBI's past record of inexactness or ineptness in this area?
Could this at all have been based upon the fact that the work product
coming out was not a good one ?
Mr. Brennan. No, sir, I do not feel that there is a relation there at
all. And perhaps I can clarify it for you. For example, I believe we
have to go back to 1960. Prior to 1960 the FBI was not involved to
any great extent in the investigations of organized crime or to any
great extent in the investigations of civil rights matters. And following
the advent of the Kennedy administration into office I believe particu-
larly because of the Attorney General's interest in organized crime
matters, specifically Robert Kennedy, the FBI quickly responded by
establishing a new division which immediately began to emphasize and
intensify investigations into organized crime. And at about the same
time, I believe that there was an intensification of investigations into
civil rights violations. And I think if you examine the record prior
to 1960 as contrasted to after 1960, you will see there was a marked
increase in the accomplishment of the FBI relative to these types of
investigations.
101
I" relate this because it also relates to the impact within the FBI,
in other words, when you intensify in one area then you have to take
manpower from somewhere in order to produce those intensified in-
vestigations. Basically, that manpower began to drain away from
security and intelligence operations. And as a result, with the reduced
manpower, there was coincidentally a reduction in the various tech-
niques which applied to the security and intelligence field. Subse-
quently, as I indicated, Mr. Hoover then, by 1965, reached age 70 and
I think then he also became very sensitive to the use of investigative
techniques in the security intelligence field which he felt might prove
embarrassing to the Bureau; all of which provided a drain which
materially affected those of us who were involved in security and
intelligence investigations.
Mr. Smothers. Mr. Brennan, the question is raised in part because
of a recent inquiry into this very question conducted by the General
Accounting Office. In commenting on the effectiveness of FBI in-
vestigations, the Comptroller General, Elmer Staats, looked at and
reported on cases that were reviewed, cases of the domestic intelligence
activities here, many of which covered a period of time when you
headed that operation. Turning to page 33 of a report released by
them on yesterday, he notes that only 16 of 676 cases, less than 3 per-
cent of those that you investigated, were referred for prosecution. Of
those 16 referrals, only 7 were prosecuted, obtaining 4 convictions.
Of these same cases, only 12 of them, or less than 2 percent, resulted
in the FBI obtaining any advance knowledge of planned activities on
the parts of subversive or extremist groups. The report sort of con-
cludes that the domestic intelligence effort may be largely an ineffec-
tual one. Do you agree with that conclusion ?
Mr. Brennan. I do not think I would agree with that conclusion.
I think that basically intelligence investigations are designed not
specifically for prosecutive intent, but basically to develop intelligence
information which will be provided to officials of the U.S. Govern-
ment to enable them to possibly consider new types of legislation
which may be affecting the security of the country. And I have not
had an opportunity to review that report so I am not familiar with
those circumstances. And I feel that a response to that could only
come from the FBI relative to its own record of accomplishments, in
regard to security and intelligence investigations.
Mr. Smothers. Let me be sure I understand your last comment, then
I will conclude. Is it your contention that a primary purpose of the
domestic intelligence investigations conducted by the FBI was to
aid in some legislative purpose ?
Mr. Brennan. To a great extent, yes, sir.
Mr. Smothers. To your knowledge, has the FBI made substantial
legislative recommendations based on these intelligence activities?
Mr. Brennan. It is my recollection that it has, yes, sir.
Mr. Smothers. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. First of all, I would like to call your attention, Mr.
Brennan, to exhibit 2, 1 page 3. Now do you have that reference ?
Mr. Brennan. I believe so, Senator.
The Chairman. And if you look to the bottom of the page, to part
E which bears the caption, "Development of Campus Sources." Now
the document I am referring to is generally referred to as the Huston
1 See p. 189.
102
plan. It is the recommendations that Mr. Huston made to President
Nixon to relax restrictions and to authorize certain illegal actions.
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Now, with respect to the development of campus
sources, Mr. Huston recommended to the President that "present
restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded coverage of vio-
lence-prone campus and student-related groups." And then in the
rationale for that recommendation on page 4, 1 read at the top of the
page, the first sentence, "The FBI doe's not, currently recruit any
campus sources among individuals below 21 years of age."
So what Mr. Huston was recommending, backed up by the various
agencies that had put this report together, was that the restriction that
the FBI had imposed upon itself, that it would not use informants
on campuses who were less than 21 years old, should be revoked. Now
the purpose of that was to enable the FBI to recruit student
informants, was it not?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. So that information could be secured from mem-
bers of the student body about activities, protests and demonstration
activities on the campuses ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Now, as we know, the President accepted that
recommendation and then 5 days later revoked his approval of the
entire Huston plan. That was in July of 1970.
Now I call your attention to exhibit 44, 1 please. It is the FBI's plan
following the President's revocation of the Huston plan. It is dated
September 2, 1970, and the purpose at the very top of the page of the
plan is "to recommend consideration be given to returning to previous
standards permitting the field to develop security and racial inform-
ants among students 18 years of age and older with full individual
justification and Bureau approval." So here, within a month or so of the
time the President revoked the Huston plan, this recommendation is
made to Mr. Hoover, that the restriction on 21 years of age should be
removed and student informants should be obtained on the college
campuses. And on the last page of that memorandum, Mr. Hoover's
approval states that you are authorized to develop student security
and racial informants who are 18 years of age or over. This presents
you with a tremendous opportunitv to expand your coverage, correct —
the last paragraph, just above Mr. Hoover's signature ?
Mr. Brennan. The memorandum has attached to it part of what we
call an SAC letter of instruction to the field. That is what you are
referring-fcoJ
The Chairman. Yes. And in that letter of instruction to the field,
Mr. Hoover says in the last paragraph, "as you are aware, you have
been previously instructed not to use campus student informants under
the age of 21. In view of the current circumstances, you are authorized
to develop student security and racial informants who are 18 years of
age or older." This presents you with a tremendous opportunity to
expand vour coverage.
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right. So within a month after the time the
President had revoked the Huston plan, the FBI had reduced the age
1 See p. 323.
103
limit from 21 to 18 and then commenced a tremendous expansion of
surveillance of student groups. Is that not correct ?
Mr. Brennan. It was an expansion, Senator; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Well, let us look at the size of it.
Now let us turn back to exhibit 41, 1 if you please. And on page 2
of the FBI plan, I read to you from the latter part of the third
paragraph :
* * * it is felt that every Black Student Union and similar group, regardless of
their past or present involvement in disorders, should be the subject of a dis-
crete preliminary inquiry through established sources and informants to deter-
mine background, aims and purposes, leaders and key activists. It is estimated
that this would cause the field to open approximately 4,000 cases involving
organizations and the key activists and leaders connected therewith.
That suggests to me a very broad expansion of the student surveil-
lance activities.
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, but I think the foregoing, prior to that,
provides a justification for it. It indicates, for example, in paragraph
2 there, that in 1967 black student unions began forming their own
groups to project their demands, many of which indicated a commit-
ment to black nationalism. And it also is followed by an observation
that campus disorders involving black students increased, I believe
that is either 23 or 28 percent of the 1969-70 school year over the
previous year.
The Chairman. Eight, but if we go back to the order for increasing
the surveillance, the plan states, "It is felt that every Black Student
Union and similar group, regardless of their past or present involve-
ment in disorders" should be put under surveillance. So it really was a
plan to establish general surveillance of these black student groups on
the campuses of the country, regardless of their past or present involve-
ment in disorders ?
Mr. Bkennan. Yes, sir, that is correct.
The Chairman. I think we have established on this testimony that
the President revoked this plan which he first authorized, a plan that
reduced the 21-year age barrier. A month or so later the Bureau comes
along and reduces the age anyway, and establishes a broad new sur-
veillance program on black student groups, regardless of whether or
not they had any previous record of any sort.
Senator Tower?
Senator Tower. Mr. Brennan, regarding the assumption that anti-
war activities were being financed by Communist sources externally,
was this an assumption that was held at the highest level in both the
Johnson and Nixon administrations?
Mr. Brennan. I do not know whether it was an assumption, Sen-
ator, that was held at the highest levels. I believe it was my recollec-
tion that the FBI was continually being pressed by both the Johnson
administration and the Nixon administration as to whether or not
this was true — whether or not there was evidence to indicate that
possibly there might be financing from abroad, underlying the anti-
war protest here. And perhaps it might be that it was based on their
assumption that it could be true.
Senator Tower. In pursuance of this, did the FBI or the CIA
monitor the principals involved in the matter of foreign travel,
i See p. 317.
104
attendance of international conferences, and recipt of propaganda,
individual guidance from external sources and external finances ? Was
there an effort made to follow all of these particular aspects of the
activities in the principals involved ?
Mr. Brennan. To the degree that we were capable, within the
limitations that we had, yes sir, we were seeking to do this and in
some instances succeeded in placing informants in groups who were
traveling abroad or attending Communist conferences abroad, yes
sir.
Senator Tower. Did you get any information or any hard intelli-
gence to the fact that they were getting any individual guidance from
these Communist sources?
Mr. Brennan. Guidance is a difficult question to answer, Senator.
They attended conferences, for example, in Cuba, which were attended,
as I recall, by officials from Communist governments. They attended
conferences in various other countries abroad which were sponsored
by Communists. The peace movement in the United States was gen-
erally discussed and I recall in one instance, for example, where
several of the activists who were involved in the policy committee
of the antiwar activities traveled abroad and attended conferences
where these issues were the subject of discussion with many Com-
munist representatives. And at the time, the general feeling of the
antiwar movement here was that the next step in the stage should be
protest demonstrations around the United States.
It is my recollection that information at the Communist conference
abroad led to the conclusion that there should be instead a concen-
trated demonstration in Washington, D.C. And following the return
of these individuals to this country, I think they served to project
that view and indeed we did have a concentrated demonstration in
Washington, D.C, and it is my recollection that when that demon-
stration took place, there were also concerted demonstrations at
American embassies in many foreign countries on the same day.
Senator Tower. Did you get any evidence that the activities in
this country were indeed being financed by external sources?
Mr. Brennan. We never had any evidence to that effect, Senator.
Senator Tower. You suspected it but you could not get any hard
evidence ?
Mr. Brennan. I personally did not suspect it, Senator. The question
was continually being pushed to us by the White House as to whether
or not there was proof of this. I personallv held the feeling that we
were dealing with what I term "credit card revolutionaries,'' and that
the individuals involved in this type of activity in the United States
had ample resources of their own through which to finance these
activities. I never saw anything to the contrary.
Senator Tower. These international meetings that they attended —
those were under Communist auspices, were they not, financed by Com-
munis 1 " sources?
Mr. Brennan. As I recall, they were, yes, sir.
Senator Tower. So their external participation was indeed under
Communist auspices ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, we had furnished to
the White House in one neriod of time a renort which I recall ran
between roughly 40 and 50 pages at the specific request of the White
105
House, in which we detailed specifically the extent of the links be-
tween Americans who were traveling abroad with the Communist
representatives of these various conferences.
Senator Tower. Turning to another matter, after the withdrawal
of the Huston plan, was there any increase in electronic surveillances
by the FBI?
Mr. Brennan. It is my recollection, Senator, that there was no
significant increase.
Senator Tower. In other words, it continued at about the same
level?
Mr. Brennan. I believe it did, yes, sir.
Senator Tower. What was the general level of electronic surveil-
lances during the 1970 period?
Mr. Brennan. If I recall correctly, Senator, in the security field,
I believe that we had somewhere in the range of 40 to 45.
Senator Tower. Were you aware of a covert mail program in the
FBI prior to June of 1970 ?
Mr. Brennan. Prior to June 1970 the only program of that nature
of which I am aware went way back for years, and which I had no
specific relationshipwith.
Senator Tower, were you aware of the CIA mail program before
June 1970?
Mr. Brennan. No, sir, I was not. .
Senator Tower. Did you become aware of the CIA mail program
during the preparation of the special report that was being prepared
for the President?
Mr. Brennan. No, sir, I did not.
Senator Tower. Did you ever inquire of any CIA personnel on the
Huston plan working group if the CIA had a mail program ? Did
you ever ask any of them ?
Mr. Brennan. No, sir, I did not.
Senator Tower. Did you inquire of Bureau personnel about the
CIA mail program ?
Mr. Brennan. No, sir, I did not
Senator Tower. Were you ever aware that the Bureau was receiv-
ing information obtained from any mail intercepts ?
Mr. Brennan. Not to my knowledge, no, sir. I knew that the Bureau
received information disseminated by the CIA, but as to the nature
of the technique by which information was received, no, I had never
any indication that it came from that type of a technique.
Senator Tower. Now, Mr. Brennan, you were one of the FBI repre-
sentatives in the interagency working group which prepared the
Special Beport on Intelligence Assessment. Now, was it your impres-
sion that Mr. Huston of the White House staff, who testified here the
day before yesterday, and Mr. Sullivan, from the FBI, were in close
communication as the report developed?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, they were.
Senator Tower. Did Mr. Huston limit his role merely to that of
an observer, or was he an active participant ?
Mr. Brennan. I would define his role as an active participant.
Senator Tower. In what way did he participate? Did he by chance,
or by design, guide and direct the preparation of the report?
106
Mr. Brennan. I don't think he guided and directed the preparation
of the report, because it is my recollection that Mr. Huston did not have
that sufficient in-depth background concerning intelligence matters
to be able to give that strong direction and guidance.
Senator Towee. So who would be the principal figure there— -Mr.
Sullivan?
Mr. Brennan. I would say Mr. Sullivan was, yes, sir.
Senator Tower. Thank you, Mr. Brennan. I have no further ques-
tions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Tower.
Senator Mondale.
Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan, I take
it that there was no doubt in your mind that the break-ins or the so-
called black bag jobs were illegal ?
Mr. Brennan. There was no doubt in my mind about that.
Senator Mondale. And that some of the other activities such as un-
warranted taps, some of the efforts under the COINTEL Program that
we are going to be reviewing later, were illegal ?
Mr. Brennan. In regard to wiretapping, Senator, the policy, as it
prevailed within the Bureau, within my understanding, involved a
legal one, which called for the written approval of the Attorney
General of the United States, and which I believe was within the
framework of legality, as the procedures existed at that time.
In regard to the counterintelligence program, I think the policy
called for specific instructions to the field, that they were not to en-
gage in illegal activities.
Senator Mondale. Well, for the purpose of my question, let us just
stay with break-ins, then, because they, we can both agree, were clearly
illegal. How do you justify the law enforcement arm of the government
which itself resorts to illegal taps? You must have thought this
through. You must have wondered about, it. How do you justify it?
Mr. Brennan. The primary ones of which I was aware involved
organizations which were taking their direction and control from for-
eign powers, and that, to me, was sufficient basis for a utilization of
that technique in order to determine the extent of the foreign direction
or control of their activities.
Senator Mondale. So the reason was not, in your mind, that it was
legal, but that even though it was illegal, the purpose sought was
sufficiently important that you felt the law could be violated ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Mondale. In retrospect, when we look at this whole period
of the late sixties and the early seventies, did that foreign threat,
the alleged foreign control and foreign funding, in fact, prove to be
a serious cause of domestic unrest?
Mr. Brennan. No, sir, it did not.
Senator Mondale. And, as a matter of fact, when we were all
through with these techniques you concluded and I quote, "It is my
recollection that we never developed any information to indicate that
Communist sources abroad were financing the antiwar activities of
the United States." Would that be accurate?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, that is true.
Senator Mondale. Further, you said, "I felt that the extremist
groups and the others who were involved in the antiwar activities and
107
the like at the time were of middle- and upper-level income, and we
characterize them generally as credit-card revolutionaries." Is that
correct?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Mondale. So that, when we spent several years trying to
find, under Presidential directive, this evidence that domestic unrest
was directed, financed, and heavily influenced by foreign enemies, in
fact, we found it was pretty much a domestic source of unrest. Is that
correct?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, but we were continually being asked by
the White House as to whether or not there was foreign funding of it,
and in response to that, then, I felt that it was necessary for us to try
to respond to the question.
Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Brennan, because I think that is
exactly the point. And I return to Senator Hart's point yesterday. Our
hearings thus far have necessarily involved questioning people like
yourself, but, in fact, you were carrying out what you thought was
official governmental policy, were you not?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Mondale. And you thought you were doing what the Presi-
dent of the United States wanted you to do ?
Mr. Brennan. Well, yes, to a degree that when the White House
asked a question, I felt that it was necessary for the FBI to respond
through the utilization of the appropriate techniques, to try to ascer-
tain the answer.
Senator Mondale. And you were under tremendous pressure in the
late sixties and the early seventies to find evidence that these protesters
were being financed and directed by foreign sources. Is that not correct ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, no question about that.
Senator Mondale. As a result, you, following these orders, expended
tremendous effort, money and the rest, to try to prove the existence of
such foreign influence ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, we did.
Senator Mondale. And except for these meetings about which you
testified before, you found little or none ?
Mr. Brennan. That is true.
Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that part of the
problem that we have uncovered here is a lack of accountability, and
even some lawlessness on the part of these agencies, but above all, it
seems to me what we have seen is a pattern of Presidential unaccount-
ability to the law. It seems, if we go back to the sixties and the seven-
ties, there was rising domestic concern and bitterness about this war,
and those Presidents, instead of deciding there was something wrong
with the war, decided there was something wrong with the people, and
instead of trying to meet those arguments as though they were honest
protests against the war, they tried to characterize them as being
foreign-dominated-influen'ced, and in effect, the critics would be cor-
rupted by an alien power.
Now, maybe some were, but there is very little evidence of it.
Our task is not only to try to restore some kind of accountability
to these agencies, but a much more difficult one. What do we do to
make certain that Presidents in the future do not use these secret
62-685 O - 76 - 8
108
agencies to carry out their fantasies, to try to shift the blame from
themselves to somebody else, and if possible, to foreigners ? I think it
is asking a lot of human nature to ask people at the second level of
Government to disobey the orders of the President. That means you
lose your job. It means destruction of your career, maybe more, if that
should happen. I think it is hard to expect, nor is it likely, that those
agencies are going to proceed with policies which they think are
really alien to what the President wants. And I think it was interesting
that in 1966, when Ramsey Clark was Attorney General, they did, in
fact, stop "black bag" jobs. Atleast an order went from Hoover to that
effect, 1 think, reflecting this as the official policy at the time.
And our great task is to see how on earth we can address this prob-
lem : The grant of power to the CIA and to these other agencies is,
above all, a grant of power to the President, and a dangerous grant,
because he can operate secretly. And that is what I think makes our
task so very difficult. Thank you.
Mr. Bbennan. If I may inject an observation, Senator, and hopefully
I will not be out of line in doing so, I would suggest that perhaps the
problem is even more complex. In other words, the requests of the
White House were just not simply to answer that one specific question.
I think you have to look at the social, political, and economic com-
plexities that were related, which built tremendous pressures on the
White House, and these, T think, stem from" the thousands of bombings,
the arsons, the disruptions, the disorder. Our^ academic communities
were being totally disrupted, and I think that a vast majority of the
American people were subjecting the Representatives of Congress and
the members of the White House staff and other people in Government
to a great deal of pressure, as to why these things were taking place
and why something wasn't being done about these, and I think in a
broader context, then, the FBI was getting a tremendous amount of
pressure from the White House, in response to the overall problem.
Senator Mondale. The irony was that their conclusion, without any
evidence, was that the unrest was supported by foreign money and
direction, and you could not find any.
Mr. Brbnnan. Well, I would say
Senator Mondaije. But they continued to pursue that theory long
after no one could prove it, and the whole idea behind the Huston plan
was to criticize the FBI for failing to find what the President was sure
existed. And they found a dollar or two here and there, and they found
some meetings, and no doubt there were some Communists involved. I
have no doubt about that. But the mass of the protest was indigenous.
It was domestic. It was prompted not by disloyalty, but by a profound
feeling on the part of millions of Americans that the war was wrong.
Mr. Chairman, I think a very instructive memo on this Presidential
point is dated September 18, 1970, by John Dean [exhibit 24 *]. It
went to the Attorney General. What it says, in effect, is that now that
we have rejected the Huston plan, we should put it, in effect, back into
place, and remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelli-
gence. In other words, they rejected the formal plan, and then they
proceeded surreptitiously, according to this memo, to go ahead and
do it anyway.
The Chairman. I think that is correct. Senator.
Constantly we have this theme raised, Mr. Brennan. You have raised
1 See p. 255.
109
it in complete good faith, I am sure. Other witnesses have raised it,
that this was a time of turbulence. Yes, there were great pressures on
the Agency. The White House was deeply concerned about the extent
of the antiwar protests.
But that is the very time, in times of turbulence and distress, when
an even greater obligation falls not only on the agencies but on the
President himself, to operate within the law. Stress or turbulence does
not really excuse law enforcement agencies of the Government or the
President himself from rising above the law and proceeding in lawless
fashion.
Mr. Brennan. Yes ; I agree with that, Senator.
The Chairman. Well, that certainly is not the record of what hap-
pened during this period. And I can only say that remembering those
protests, it did not take an FBI agent to tell me that the students out in
the campuses were upset with the war because they thought it was a
foolish, futile war, and that is what it was. And I was upset with it, too,
in the U.S. Senate, and I was protesting it. And I did not go to any
Communist meetings in Cuba. It was a foolish policy for the country,
and that was what the students were upset about, and it was an indi-
genous movement, basically, and a lawful one — not the violence, but the
protest was lawful. This is a free society, and students have a right to
protest when they do not think the Government policy is sound, par-
ticularly when they are the ones who are drafted to fight a war
thousands of miles away in the jungles of Southeast Asia. So I just
want to emphasize that our concern here is lawlessness.
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And that is all the more important in times of
stress.
Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, may I be indulged a comment at this
time?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Tower. However indigenous this may have been, I am con-
vinced there was some external influence. In 1967, 1 made a speech from
the steps of Sproul Hall at the University of California at Berkeley.
I was lucky to get away with my life. My speech was punctuated by
such editorial comment consisting of four-letter words that I will not
repeat here in mixed company, and I was called among other things,
a Fascist pig, and I heard all of the rhetoric of the Communist anti-
American propaganda mill. So that influence came from somewhere.
The Chairman. Yes. We all had that experience. I recall being
called a Commie symp, because I opposed the war, so it was a time of
stress. My point is that that is the time when it is more important than
any other that everybody live within the law.
Mr. Brennan. Yes; and I agree with the Senator that certainly there
was evidence of external Communist direction, whether that direct or
not, the point is we were getting to the point of whether or not it was
being funded from abroad, so there is no inconsistency in the two
observations.
Senator Tower. Let me just reinforce what I said by reading from
page 62 of the transcript of the testimony of Mr. Angleton in an execu-
tive session of this committee, on September 12, 1975, "It has also come
out in mail intercept that certain groups went to Moscow for political
indoctrination, and they went to North Korea for weaponry."
110
The Chairman. Senator Baker?
Senator Baker. It is my turn ?
The Chairman. I believe so.
Senator Baker. I want my 10 minutes, plus the time to speak and a
tune for rebuttal, Mr. Chairman.
[General laughter.]
Senator Baker. I will take my time in rebuttal first.
You know, really, it is awfully easy for all of us to be morally
righteous and indignant. But as Senator Jim Pearson from Kansas
told me when I was a young Senator, and excited about something,
You know, if you're in the Senate, you're only entitled to be a moral
giant once a week." I don't propose now that we are excessively indig-
nant about the turbulence of the times in Vietnam, but it is awful
difficult for me to see how that relates to an inquiry into the Huston
plan.
I think that these things ought to be kept in mind in that respect.
Une, those folks are still out there— the people who did, in fact, dis-
rupt this country, who demonstrated in massive numbers here in the
Capital and tried to block the streets that led to the Capital City, to
shut down Washington, as they said. I remember driving down
Virginia Avenue and having oil drums thrown in the path of my car,
and my staff man who was driving that day is a big, burly young
fellow who managed to get us to the Capitol with his nerve and the
assistance of about 300 horsepower.
But those people are still there. There is no doubt that most of the
protest was domestic, and indigenous to the American opportunity to
express disagreement. But there also is no doubt that people who
want to disrupt this country, and who want to change our system,
thrive on the distrust that goes on during national upheavals.
So we can't sit here — as I sometimes get the impression we are do-
ing— and throw the baby out with the bath water. We can't say the
CIA, the FBI, the DIA, and whatever else we have got, were patently
wrong in their efforts to investigate these situations, and they are bad
and they ought to be disbanded. If we do, we will be totally at the
mercy of those folks who are still out there.
The Chairman. Well, nobody is suggesting that, Senator.
Senator Baker. I know that. But I hear the reports from time to
time that 1976 will be the year of the resumption of the revolution.
And I expect we are going to have a pretty good time next summer.
This is the point that bothers me, Mr. Brennan, and I hope you under-
stand that my energetic remarks in this respect have very little to do
with you.
But the great tragedy of Watergate, or the tragedy of the Johnson
-era in its response to civil distress, or of the Nixon times — and God
knows, the country went through a lot, and I went through a lot dur-
ing that time politically — but the great tragedy of that time is not the
resignation of a President, or the fact that another was killed — as bad
as that was — or another terminated his political career under the stress
of the war.
The great tragedy is, under the most tumultuous civil strife we
have ever known except during the time of the Civil War, our institu-
tions failed us. I am terribly unhappy to hear you say, and to hear
others say, that we knew so-and-so was illegal, therefore we thought
Ill
the national good justified our going ahead with it. That is the greatest
disservice that you could render this country, is to say that the con-
stitutional protections and guarantees are not valid and relevant in
times of great national stress. I think they are. And I think we can
guard ourselves against those folks who are out there who would dis-
rupt this city and this country, and burn our campuses, and destroy
our banks and our public institutions. We can do all of those things
and still not trample the rights under the Constitution. Our purpose
here is to try to find out what went wrong and how we can prevent
those events in the future.
I have two or three questions, and then I will stop. I made my speech,
Barry. I took my speech and my rebuttal all at the same time.
The Chairman. You ended up in agreement with the chairman.
Senator Baker. Well, no; the chairman had difficulty understand-
ing why he agreed with me.
[General laughter.]
Senator Baker. It's just that I expressed it in a different way, Mr.
Chairman. I want to make sure that the chairman understands — and
everbody else understands — that it's all well and good to be concerned
about this, but don't throw the baby out with the bath water. Those
folks are out there, you're going to see them again next summer, and
you might as well be prepared for it.
Mr. Brennan, when did the "black bag" jobs start with the FBI?
. Mr. Brennan. That I wouldn't know, Senator.
Senator Baker. Did it start before you came to the FBI?
Mr. Brennan. That would be very difficult for me to say.
Senator Baker. Certainly you're in a better position to say than I
am. Were they going on at the time that you came to the FBI ?
Mr. Brennan. If they were, I had no knowledge of them. I gained
no knowledge of them until the early fifties.
Senator Baker. When did you first have knowledge of the "■black
bag" jobs?
Mr. Brennan. Tn the early fifties.
Senator Baker. What was your understanding of who authorized
them?
Mr. Brennan. It was my understanding that they were authorized
by the Director, Mr. Hoover.
Senator Baker. Is that understanding based on documentary proof,
on conversation with Mr. Hoover, on the statements of other people,
or what?
Mr. Brennan. Well, it was just the general knowledge that I
gained through my investigative experience in the FBI.
Senator Baker. When was a "black bag" job authorized ? When was
it used? Under what circumstance for national security, or in order to
assist a U.S. attorney in prosecuting a lawsuit? Out of curiosity,
when was it authorized ? When did you use the "black bag" job that
you today say is illegal ?
Mr. Brennan. The "black bag" iobs that I knew of— which I guess
you have to say were technically illegal — but, as I know of the tech-
nique, for the most part through the years it involved counterespio-
nage operations, sir.
Senator Baker. Is that all ?
Mr. Brennan. To my knowledge, yes sir.
112
Senator Baker. Domestic espionage or international espionage?
Mr. Brennan. I'm speaking of counterespionage.
Senator Baker. You're speaking of counterespionage in the sense
of a spy of a foreign country operating in this country, and you were
trying to counter him ? Is that the counterespionage you're speaking
of?
Mr. Brennan. Yes sir.
Senator Baker. And that's the only case you knew "black bag" jobs
to be done ?
Mr. Brennan. Subsequently, after I got to Bureau headquarters,
I learned there were some "black bag" jobs which were directed at
what I would have to term domestic subversive groups, and some
domestic extremist organizations, but they were quite limited.
Senator Baker. How many "black bag" jobs were done in the course
of your tenure at the FBI ?
Mr. Brennan. I would have no idea, sir.
Senator Baker. Well, you've got to have some idea. Was it 1, or was
it 1,000?
Mr. Brennan. I do not think I would be capable of commenting. I
do not have that range ; I did not work in that field where it was gen-
erally employed as a technique, Senator.
Senator Baker. How many do you have knowledge of ? Something
in the range of what, 1, 10, 100, 1,000?
Mr. Brennan. I don't think I'm in a position to be able to answer
that, Senator.
Senator Baker. Do you have any knowledge on that subject?
Mr. Brennan. Yes ; in a general range.
Senator Baker. Then I would like to have that general range.
The Chairman. Senator Baker, we have figures. Would you like to
have them ? We have documentary figures.
Senator Baker. I would like that, and I would like the witness'
impression too, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Very well. What was your impression?
Mr. Brennan. Can we get a given time frame?
Senator Baker. No. That you have knowledge of.
Mr. Brennan. The overall impression on my 26 years in the FBI ?
Senator Baker. Yes.
Mr. Brennan. I would have to say — I would put it in a frame,
possibly, of maybe 30, 40.
Senator Baker. Did the FBI ever get caught ?
Mr. Brennan. I don't think we did, Senator.
Senator Baker. As a matter of fact, you didn't.
Mr. Brennan. I never heard of anybody getting caught, sir.
Senator Baker. And the techniques involved — were they with the
cooperation of the local police? How many men did it take? What
techniques did you employ to keep from getting caught ?
Mr. Brennan. I never engaged in one, Senator, so again, I would
have to speculate on that, or speak from hearsay.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, do you have some figures ?
The Chairman. Yes. I was just going to congratulate you, Senator,
because you have managed to get your rebuttal and a good speech and
your questions all within 10 minutes.
Senator Baker. I think I'm being politely told to shut up.
[General laughter.]
113
The Chairman. Now, let me just give these figures. These are fig-
ures that have been supplied to us by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion ; they have, at our request, been declassified. And I would like to
read them into the record.
At least 14 domestic subversive targets were the subject of at least
238 entries from 1942 to April 1968. In addition, at least three domes-
tic subversive targets were the subject of numerous entries from Octo-
ber 1952 to June 1966. Since there exists no precise record of entries,
we are unable to retrieve an accurate accounting of their number, but
that is tlge best figure we have.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This final question, Mr.
Brennan, since my time apparently has expired. Was your division
the one involved in any surveillance of political figures at the Demo-
cratic National Convention in 1968 ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. "We developed all of the intelligence infor-
mation relative to the activities of the dissidents who went out to
Chicago to disrupt the convention. However, I don't recall any time
that any instructions were given to include surveillances of, as you
say, political figures, Senator.
Senator Baker. Yes. I'm talking about the allegations and the
charges that the FBI kept surveillance /on Bobert Kennedy and
Senator Edward Kennedy and Martin Luther King, and a number of
other political figures, and that, in fact, there was a communications
link— I believe a telephone — from FBI; headquarters in that city
to the White House — even to the Oval Office.
Mr. Brennan. I am not familiar with such surveillances. But
basic
Senator Baker. You're familiar with those allegations and charges?
Mr. Brennan. No. As a matter of fact, I'm not.
Senator Baker. You've never heard them before?
Mr. Brennan. No. Not those specific ones.
Senator Baker. Well, generally, maybe I'm not describing it with
exact accuracy. .
Mr. Brennan. I recall that there was an Earth Day affair, which I
believe Senator Muskie made a speech, or something, and I believe an
FBI report dealt somehow with the Senator's appearance on that
occasion. But any information of that type was purely coincidental
to the investigative efforts of the FBI which were basically directed
at the activists who were involved in those types of movements. And
anything related to political figures was actually coincidental.
Senator Baker. I'm told I was wrong. It was not at the 1968 con-
vention ; it was the 1964 convention that I was referring to. Does that
alter your answer at all ?
Mr. Brennan. I had little knowledge of the 1964 convention. That
was not coordinated out of the Domestic Intelligence Division. It is
my recollection that that was basically coordinated by Mr. DeLoach.
Senator Baker. Are you aware, generally, of the situation that I
described in reference to the 1964 Democratic National Convention?
Mr. Brennan. I'm aware in general, because the FBI personnel that
were there at that time were phoning in reports concerning the activi-
ties of individuals and groups over which Domestic Intelligence Divi-
sion had an interest.
114
Senator Baker. Did they phone in reports on Martin Luther King or
on Kobert Kennedy ?
Mr. Brennan. I do not recall that they did that ; no, sir.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Baker. The Foreign
Relations Committee is considering the Sinai agreement, and I have
to stop in there this morning for a few minutes. I am trying to get the
agreements declassified, and I'm going to ask Senator Tower to take
over during the time I have to be away. Senator Huddleston is next.
Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I regret that I had to miss most of the session so far this morning;
I was at another subcommittee looking into another operation in our
system — the matter of our grain inspection program and the corruption
that has been discovered there and all its implications for this country
and for our dealing with countries in the other parts of the world. So
I will be brief, and hopefully not trespass on subjects that have already
been covered by the witness.
Mr. Brennan, were you aware while you were with the FBI that prior
to the development ol the Huston plan there was a growing feeling of
conflict between the FBI and the CIA, particularly at the top levels
involving Mr. Hoover?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. I was.
Senator Huddleston. How do you think this conflict affected the ef-
ficiency of the total intelligence-gathering community ?
Mr. Brennan. Are you speaking now, Senator — you will have to
put me within the correct time frame. Are you speaking of
Senator Huddleston. Leading up to the formation of the Huston
plan, 1969, 1970.
Mr. Brennan. It is my recollection that the Director of the FBI dis-
continued direct liason with the CIA, I believe, in February of 1969
or 1970.
Senator Huddleston. I think that is very close, if not the exact date.
Mr. Brennan. And basically, I do not think that had a great deal of
effect, relative to our participation with the CIA in the Huston plan.
Senator Huddleston. Now, this conflict resulted primarily from a
reluctance on the part of Mr. Hoover to participate in certain sug-
gested intelligence-gathering activities. Is that correct?
Mr. Brennan. The conflict between CIA and FBI ?
Senator Huddleston. Right.
Mr. Brennan. No. sir. That arose out of a dispute which arose from
a set of circumstances which occurred in, I believe, Denver, Colo., in
which an FBI agent gave some information to a CIA agent, which Mr.
Hoover learned about. He objected to — he had Mr. Helms call the CIA
agent back to Washington, and he insisted on knowing the identity of
the FBI agent who had divulged the information.
Senator Huddleston. Right. Mr. Angleton described that incident
yesterday. He described it as the straw that broke the camel's back, I
believe.
Mr. Brennan. Yes.
Senator Huddleston. Which would indicate there were other in-
stances, too, such as a request by the CIA for specific wiretaps, this
type thing — are you aware of any of this ?
115
Mr. Brennan. I'm not too much aware of those, Senator, because I
did not assume the position as Assistant Director of the Domestic Intel-
ligence Division until August of 1970. And I think that the incidents,
or whatever, that may have led up to a relationship of friction between
the two agencies, had gone on before that. And I was really not all that
aware of the details.
Senator Htjddleston. Were you aware that Mr. Hoover resisted the
proposals that were included in the Huston plan?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, I was.
Senator Httddleston. Did Mr. Hoover also resist — at least for some
period of time — the suggestions for the intensification program that
followed the demise of the Huston plan ?
Mr. Brennan. Well, the intensification program was not, let us say,
an intensification program as might be defined within the concept of a
program, sir.
What I am saying is, if you put all of these individual recommenda-
tions together, it resulted in intensification, but it was not a one-pack-
age program.
Senator Htjddleston. Wasn't it a fact that Mr. Hoover had great
reservations and resisted some suggested intelligence-gathering activi-
ties during this period ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, he very definitely did.
Senator Htjddleston. And it was Mr. Hoover going to the Attorney
General, and then perhaps both of them going to the President, that
actually scuttled the Huston plan. Is that correct ?
Mr. Brennan. That is my understanding of what happened, sir;
yes.
Senator Htjddleston. And why, in your judgment, was Mr. Hoover
so reluctant to participate in these suggested intensifications of the
intelligence-gathering activity ?
Mr. Brennan. Well, sir, I think I previously explained that I feel
that these techniques encompass some degree of risk which might
constitute a backlash, which Mr. Hoover was desirous of avoiding.
Senator Htjddleston. The kind of backlash that would reflect on the
agency?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. Embarassing incidents in which agents
might be involved.
Senator Htjddleston. You think this was a greater concern of his
than any abridgment of individual liberties or freedoms that might
occur because of these activities ?
Mr. Brennan. That is my personal feeling. He hadn't demonstrated
a previous concern of this nature in the past.
Senator Htjddleston. But then after some insistence, and after de-
veloping additional activities that might be employed, on October 29,
Mr. Hoover and the top echelons of the FBI did agree to certain types
of activities which would, in fact, double the caseload of the FBI in
intelligence ; is that correct ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, I believe so.
Senator Htjddleston. Upon what basis do you believe this agree-
ment came about, or this change in position, on the part of Mr. Hoover ?
Mr. Brennan. It is difficult for me to recall the time frame, Senator,
but I believe that possibly it might have been motivated by possible
budgetary considerations.
116
Senator Huddleston. Are you saying, then, that Mr. Hoover and
the other top officials of the FBI entered into this kind of a program
which intensified its intelligence-gathering activity — and went be-
yond what might have been legal — for the purpose of increasing the
caseload so that the budget of the FBI could be sustained or increased ?
Mr. Brennan. No. I don't know that — can you clarify for me which
techniques that you are stating the Director approved which would
have been illegal ?
Senator Huddleston. "Well, there were a number of activities in-
cluded. The lifting of a moratorium. on investigations of 7,000 in-
dividuals on the Security Index — what did that mean?
Mr. Brennan. That was involved in a procedure whereby cases
would be opened at periodic intervals to recheck whether or not the
individual might possibly still be employed at the same place^ and so
forth.
Senator Huddleston. Which required agents in the field to intensify
their surveillance of these individuals, whether or not there had been
any indication that these individuals were,- in fact, engaging in any
kind of wrongdoing.
Mr. Brennan. I don't think it constituted surveillance, Senator. I
think it merely involved reopening
Senator Huddleston. Some kind of checking would be required.
Mr. Brennan. A check, yes. A check.
Senator Huddleston. Exhibit 41 * mentions opening cases on ap-
proximately 4,000 black student activists, all members of the Black
Student Unions, and similar groups, regardless of their past or present
involvement in disorders. Does that constitute a check ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Huddleston. Would this not, too, involve further checks,
further investigation and surveillance, against people who had no
record of any kind of participation in any sort of wrongdoing or
disturbance ?
Mr. Brennan. It was designed to try to develop information about
the types of individuals who were activists in such groups who might
further instigate individuals who had propensities for violence.
Senator Huddleston. It involved the opening of cases on approxi-
mately 6,500 New Left student activists, black and white, to determine
whether they had a propensity for violence. Now, how do you investi-
gate a person to find out whether or not he or she has a propensity for
violence ?
Mr. Brennan. You cover his activities in connection with demon-
strations and the like, and attempt to ascertain whether he is exhorting
other individuals to engage in violence. A number of these individuals
publicly professed their determination to destroy or overthrow the
Government of the United States.
A number of them advocated means by which these efforts should be
furthered, and Bureau investigations were broadly encompassing to
make a determination as to whether or not they did, in fact, do cer-
tain of these activities.
Senator Huddleston. We're looking at 6,500 people. You're surely
looking at a number of people who have no experience in violence, and
1 See p. 317.
117
who have no activity that would suggest that they have been involved
in violence.
Mr. Brennan. That is true, Senator, but I think thafc-
Senator Huddleston. It's a dragnet, "shotgun" type of operation.
Mr. Brennan. I think that's true. But by that time I believe that
the leaders of the New Left movement had publicly professed their
determination to act to overthrow the Government of the United
States. And I felt that with them on public record as having this basic
objective, anyone who joined in membership in their cause, possibly
should have their names recorded for future reference in FBI files.
And I was reminded of the circumstances of the thirties, when many
individuals, who at that time were involved and concerned as a result
of the economic depression, became involved with Communist
activities.
A great deal of Communist cells developed, and many of the indi-
viduals who at that time were in colleges, subsequently were em-
ployed in sensitive positions of Government, and the Government had
no record of their previous Communist involvement. I did not want to
see a repetition of that sort of circumstances come about.
So that when individuals did profess themselves to be in adherence
to the concepts which aimed at or called for the overthrow of their
Government, I did feel that the FBI had the responsibility to record
that type of information so if they ever obtained sensitive Government
positions that could be made known, and known to the agency for
which they were going to go to work.
Senator Huddleston. So it is better to go with a blanket approach
rather than possibly miss somebody who might turn up somewhere
down the road.
Mr. Brennan. Well, sir, I feel that the absence of any type of ap-
proach in the thirties indicated to me that history proves that you can
make tragic mistakes. And I felt that this Government should not fall
into that type of a tragic mistake again.
Senator Huddleston. My one point on the investigations of the
7,000 individuals on the Security Index is that it puts a person in the
position of being locked up. So that is a rather serious position for a
person to be in, or a category for him to be in. And this was part of this
effort to increase the caseload, is that correct ?
I think the total of these certainly represents a substantial intensifi-
cation and increase in the activity of the FBI in this field of domestic
intelligence. And I believe during this period — if it hasn't been
pointed out already — you switched almost entirely from a counterin-
telligence operation to a domestic intelligence operation.
Mr. Brennan. No ; I don't think that is true, Senator. I think that
there was a different type of balance.
Senator Huddleston. The emphasis
Mr. Brennan. There was more of an emphasis on the domestic, but
I think that the emphasis stemmed from the activists in this country
who were using explosives and the like to such a disruptive effect,
when, to me, it was a question of putting your priorities in order, and
I personally felt that the domestic situation had a higher priority at
that particular given time.
Senator Huddleston. All right. Yesterday Mr. Angleton indicated
to this committee that the most appropriate subject for investigation
118
into the intelligence-gathering community of this Nation would be to
look at the product of what is being produced, and determine whether
or not that was adequate.
He suggested by that statement, I think, that it is the end, rather
than the means, that is important And maybe the methods used —
whether or not civil liberties might be abridged, or the Constitution
violated — was not as important as what the final product was. Now
Mr. Angleton, I assume, was speaking for himself and not the CIA.
I am wondering what your concept is and whether this is the
attitude that prevails in the FBI and in other intelUgence-gathering
operations.
Mr. Brennan. No; I don't think so, Senator. My particular feeling
on that score — and I feel this is possibly representative of the general
level of feeling inside the FBI — is that the end never justifies the
means. I believe that we are a society of law and order, and I believe
that our intelligence agencies, or any organization acting on behalf of
our Government, should behave within the concept of the laws that
they are trying to uphold. And I feel that the problem that has been
long lacking has been the fact that we have not had the legislation
which has clearly defined for the FBI the role that it must play in
order to enable it to fulfill its responsibilities.
And I believe that this problem arose when the fact that we were
operating basically out of a directive by President Roosevelt in 1939,
which enabled the FBI to cope with problems which dealt with sub-
versive activities, so-called because they were clearly and directly
related to foreign interests. But I believe that once we passed 1960,
when we got into a new era that marked a drastic social, political, and
economic change in our society, and we saw a number of individuals in
our country who professed themselves to be revolutionaries, dedicated
to the overthrow of our Government, this posed new problems which
should have brought about better denned legislation to enable the FBI
to fulfill its responsibilities.
And I hopefully feel that, if nothing else, something may come out
of the hearings of this committee that will give the FBI the applicable
legal framework to enable it to go ahead and do its job.
Senator Huddleston. That is our objective, Mr. Brennan. I think
your concept would conform to those of the members of this com-
mittee. We are trying to find out how to do it, and your testimony
will be helpful in that regard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tower [presiding]. Senator Goldwater?
Senator Goldwater. I have no questions.
Senator Tower. Senator Morgan ?
Senator Morgan. Mr. Brennan, many of the 7,000 individuals who
were on the Security Index were on there simply because they belonged
to a given organization or some other group that you were suspicious
of. Is that not true ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Morgan. In other words, as far back as 1950, you and others
in the Bureau followed the doctrine of guilt by association.
Mr. Brennan. No ; I wouldn't say that's true, Senator.
Senator Morgan. Well, if you put a man's name on a list because he
was a member of an organization that was not illegal, he was put on
there because he was associated with other people who are in that
group that you might have suspected. Jp that not true?
119
Mr. Brennan. Well, that possibly would be an interpretation that
you could put on it.
Senator Morgan. And from that time on, right on through the anti-
war demonstrations, you and the Bureau had followed a policy of hold-
ing anyone else guilty, or holding others guilty by association, if they
associated with groups that you were suspicious of. Is that not true?
Mr. Brennan. No; I don't think that's true. And let me clarify for
you, Senator, something relative to the Security Index. The Security
Index was something which was in existence years before I ever ar-
rived at FBI headquarters. And as the Senator here indicated, it also
involved one aspect of potential emergency detention.
I was opposed to, in general frames, the existence of a Security
Index of that nature, and I think if you review FBI files you will find
that I worked actively to reduce the number of individuals on the
Security Index, and I changed the policies and procedures which
drastically reduced those numbers. And I also changed the priorities
which would determine the basis for which individuals might be con-
sidered for emergency detention.
Senator Morgan. But on through the years, during your association
with the Bureau, you have engaged in illegal activities such as unlaw-
fully breaking and entering, because you felt that the ends justified
the means.
Mr. Brennan. I never did, Senator. No.
Senator Morgan. Well, under your direction did the Bureau not do
that?
Mr. Brennan. I don't recall any specific instances under my
direction, Senator.
Senator Morgan. Well do you not know of such incidents in the
Bureau?
Mr. Brennan. I know of such-instances ; yes.
Senator Morgan. Mr. Brennan, I ask you, as early as the sixties —
and I believe you indicated that is when most of it commenced — if
you didn't, for instance, unlawfully break into the Ku Klux Klan
headquarters in Louisiana, obtain the list of the membership and the
financial records, and then proceed to arrest those members?
Mr. Brennan. In 1960?
Senator Morgan. Somewhere in the sixties. I don't remember the
exact date.
Mr. Brennan. I was shown a document which related to a penetra-
tion of what I would term a domestic extremist group, and I believe
I indicated in there that I had no specific recollection of the specific
penetration which may have been indicated.
Senator Morgan. By penetration, you mean breaking and entering,
and getting into the organizations, right ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes sir.
Senator Morgan. I ask you to look at exhibit 32 * which is a memo-
randum dated July 19, 1966, from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach.
Do you see that memorandum ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes sir, I see that.
Senator Morgan. Look on the bottom of the second page.
1 See p. 273.
120
Mr. Chairman, I am advised that an agreement would be reached
that we would not talk about specific instances of unlawful break-
ing and entering. Is that correct ?
Senator Tower. I will defer that to Counsel.
Mr. Sohwarz. Senator Morgan, they have not declassified the
specific instances, and we are open to talking about the generalities
at this point. We intend, I believe, to pernaps get back to specifics at
another point.
Senator Morgan. Mr. Brennan, it is true that you broke into these
organization's headquarters, obtained membership rosters, financial
information, not only with the white extremists, but, as you have
already testified, you investigated the black extremist groups, regard-
less of whether you had had trouble with them or not.
That is true throughout the decade of the sixties, isn't it?
Mr. Brennan. Yes sir.
Senator Morgan. And you went beyond that. You not only broke in
and obtained this information, but you then proceeded to harrass
these people by having their income tax records checked, did you not?
Mr. Brennan. I assume, Senator, when you say, I, that you did this,
that you are referring to the FBI ?
Senator Morgan. Yes ; speaking with regard to the FBI.
Mr. Brennan. Yes sir.
Senator Morgan. And you, as a member of the FBI and part of the
Justice Department, had access to every income tax return filed in this
country, didn't you, simply by the attorney for the Justice Department
certifying that it was needed in the course of your investigation ?
Mr. Brennan. I don't know that we had access to the tax return of
every individual in this country, sir.
Senator Morgan. Did you ever have any trouble getting the tax re-
turn of anyone you wanted, whose return you wanted because you
were investigating?
Mr. Brennan. I'm not too familiar with the use of that technique,
Senator.
Senator Morgan. I will ask you, sir, if you don't know that the FBI
made it a practice of harrassing, or calling for tax investigations of
those that they thought, in good faith, were dangerous, such as black
extremists, white extremists, war demonstrators, those who wanted to
go to the Democratic and Republican Conventions, in order to keep
them busy, in order to keep them occupied ?
Mr. Brennan. I was never aware that the FBI requested the IRS
to harrass any individual on the basis of his tax return, Senator.
Senator Morgan. Well, did you harrass them in any way through
your investigations in order to keep them occupied, to keep them busy ?
Mr. Brennan. Not that I have specific recollection of — the nature of
that incident.
Senator Morgan. Now the Director issued an order to stop the un-
lawful breaking and entering in 1966.
Mr. Brennan. Yes sir.
Senator Morgan. But it did continue some after that, did it not?
Mr. Brennan. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Morgan. Not to your knowledge. I believe you told Senator
Mondale that you thought that at times, in the main interest of na-
tional security, such break-ins and enterings were justified.
121
Mr. Brennan. I think I told the Senator that I feel there is a need
for legislation which would provide the legal framework for whatever
action is decided the FBI should be engaged in.
Senator Morgan. Did you not say also that you thought that there
were times when such unlawful entry was justified and warranted ?
Mr. Brennan. In the absence of any specific legislation, and if the
FBI had the responsibility to develop information regarding the
efforts of agents of a foreign power who were actively engaged in spy-
ing on intelligence activities in this country, I would say, yes sir, it
would be justified.
Senator Morgan. What do you refer to as domestic counterespion-
age ? What is that ?
Mr. Brennan. Do you have a reference to domestic counter-
espionage ?
Senator Morgan. I believe you referred to it earlier as domestic
counterespionage.
Mr. Brennan. I do not think those two terms are coincidental or re-
lated. I referred to counterespionage as related to the type of activity
which would be designed to block, negate, nullify, or develop informa-
tion for prosecutive purposes concerning the activities of individuals
who have been sent to this country, either under the guise of diplo-
matic cover legally, or as illegal agents, or utilizing Americans in con-
cert with foreign agents, to engage in intelligence operations here. I
would interpret the domestic groups to be basically related to the
Americans who were involved in either, let us say New Left-type
activities, Old Left activities, or extremist type activities.
Senator Morgan: All right. But going back to domestic activities,
and especially to the question that the chairman asked you with regard
to your instructions, or the Bureau's instruction, to investigate every
black student group, regardless of whether or not that group had been
involved in any unlawful activities, was that sort of an effort to intimi-
date the black students from belonging to those groups ? Was it not a
type of espionage f
Mr. Brennan. No sir. I think if you look — as I pointed out to the
chairman, I believe — the basis for that cited the fact that there had
been a significant increase in disruptive activities on the part of some
Black Student Unions, and I think the instructions concerned the ini-
tiation of investigations to determine which ones may have developed
a propensity for violence.
Senator Morgan. I only have a minute left, Mr. Brennan. Let me
use that minute to say to you that I, of course, can understand the ap-
prehensions of the Bureau, and your efforts to apprehend those who
violated the law. But as a former chief law officer of my State, and one
who directed a substantial law enforcement agency, I believe that there
are adequate laws on the books today to enable any competent and
efficient law enforcement agency to enforce the laws of this country
without engaging in unlawful breaking and entering, without engag-
ing in unlawful wiretaps, without using the IKS for the purpose of
harrassing the citizens that we may suspect even though they may be
guilty of nothing, but who, in our judgment, might be dangerous to
society.
I think it may take a little more effort on the part of our law en-
forcement agencies. They may have to be better trained. But I think it
122
can be done, and I don't believe that in this country that we can toler-
ate people in Government violating laws themselves in order to appre-
hend others'that we may suspect of violating the laws. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Toweb. Senator Mathias ?
Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan, I re-
joiced a moment ago when I heard you say that under the pressure
of what appeared to be a domestic threat that the proper solution
should have been to seek legislation to deal with it. I just want to say
to you that I think that was absolutely the right reaction, and that it
is a tragedy that your advice in this matter was not carried out.
The temptation is very great to say, "Well, we are in an emergency
situation, we have to take emergency action." But, I think we ought to
keep in mind some of the thoughtful advice we have had from great
Americans in the past on this.
Chief Justice Hughes, who I look upon as a very great American,
writing in a case in 1934 said that "an emergency does not create
power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or di-
minish restrictions imposed upon the power granted or reserved. The
Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants
and powers to the Federal Government and its limitations to the power
of the States were determined in the light of emergency, and they are
not altered by emergency." And I think this, in essence, is what you
were telling us, and I think as we look to the future we want to try to
insure that institutions, as they carry out their lawful duties, remem-
ber that emergencies alone do not create the power that is necessary
to cope with. But there are within the constitutional framework sources
of power which I think are capable of meeting any emergency, so it
is the process that is important.
Mr. Brennan. I appreciate your observation, Senator. I agree with
you wholeheartedly, and I think the record should show that I am
very proud to be a member of the FBI. I think the FBI did an out-
standing job over the years, and I think the people of the FBI repre-
sented the finest group of individuals that I have ever had the oppor-
tunity to associate with and I think as they stand today, they are ready
and willing to do a further and better job for the country, and I do
feel that there is a specific need for legislation to enable them — all
they want to know is what are the guidelines, what do you want us to
do, and tell us what are the limits that you do not want us to exceed,
and I am very confident that the FBI will agree with that concept.
Senator Mathias. It seems to me it is the work of this committee, for
the first time in a generation, to try to provide those kinds of guidelines
for the FBI, the CIA, the DIA, the NSA and the other intelligence
agencies that are important to the work of Government-
Mr. Brennan. I agree, sir.
Senator Mathias [continuing]. And this is the long overdue dis-
charge of responsibility for the Congress.
I would like to look with you at the July 19, 1966, memorandum [ex-
hibit 32 *] from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Sullivan with reference to "black
bag" jobs, and, without reviewing the terms of that memorandum,
it would appear from it that it confirms your earlier testimony that
1 See p. 273.
123
the '"black bag" jobs had, in fact, been going on for some period of time
prior co ivov, woiuu ic noes
Mr. xjrennan. ies,sir.
ttenator mathias. .aaid it also then confirms Mr. Huston's testimony
of xuesuay, tnat ac least as lar as surreptitious entries are concerneu,
they cua not Degin witn the Huston pian, wouia it not '(
Mr. jdrennan. ino, sir. x mean re wouia connim Mr. Huston's testi-
mony.
Senator Mathias. It would confirm it so that Mr. Huston really does
not deserve creait as Deing an innovator, if you can call it credit; he
was sort 01 a coditier of a practice tnat nad already existed.
Mr. ±Srennan. ies; as a matter of iact, 1 do not know that Mr.
Huston ever beiore, arter, or at any time between, ever nad any con-
nection with any so-caued "black bag" job.
Senator mathias. This gives me, x tnink, greater concern than if he
had tnougnt it ah up. it is very simple to deal with one man. We can
get rid 01 mm. W e, in ehect, nave gotten rid 01 mm. But ueaiing with
institutional practices that have been in eftect for a long time is a much
tougher job.
Tne memorandum does say on page 2 that "Also through the use of
this technique we nave on numerous occasions been able to obtain mate-
rial held hignly secret and closely guarded by subversive groups and
organizations which consisted of membership fists and mailing lists of
these organizations." I wondered what criterion you imposed on your-
self and your organization to decide whether the pursuit of domestic
intelligence had crossed over the tnreshoid. It was no longer tne pursuit
of subversive information, but actually interierence in legitimate
domestic political activity. Did you have any sort of test tnat you
made yourself when some investigation was undertaken as to whether
this was a proper investigation ? How did you approach it i I am inter-
ested in your thought process.
Mr. Brennan. VVeil, it gets to be a little bit of a complicated ques-
tion. You mean the basis on which investigations were initiated?
Senator Mathias. Was there ever any point in which a red light
flashed before you and you said "Well, 1 do not think we ought to get
into this, I think this is getting into a constitutionally protected area" ?
Mr. Brennan. There may have been some instances. I am sure there
probably were some instances, Senator. Eight offhand, I cannot recol-
lect or recall.
Senator Mathias. But you did not even have sort of a mental check-
list?
Mr. Brennan. Well, you had the basic responsibility of the FBI
within the framework of the Presidential directives that may have
existed within the degree of legislation that might have been passed
by Congress, and based on the instructions from the Attorney General.
This provided a broad framework for FBI operations and there was
no — I do not think there was a situation within the FBI where any one
individual, in other words, would have given a green light, so I think
we had relatively a series of checks and balances, that prior to a really
serious investigative matter, you would have to get approval along the
line in the chain of command.
62-685 O • 76 -9
124
Senator Mathias. But these were internal checklists, and what I
interpret as an appeal for you for congressional guidelines would be
applicable in this very kind of situation.
Mr. Brennan. I feel that the possibility here, Senator, might arise
for, let us say, a congressional legislative oversight committee, which
would encompass agents from the FBI and which would also encom-
pass attorneys from the Department of Justice who could, thereby,
git down and analyze the nature of the problems that the FBI is con-
fronted with, have the prosecutive opinions of the attorneys, and get
the overall legislative impressions of the Members of Congress. And I
feel, by working together in this groundwork, perhaps it can all be
brought together so that there can be a concise framework established
for the future operations of the FBI.
Senator Mathias. But there was never any such consultation during
the periods in which the "black bag" practice developed, which was a
long period of time.
Mr. Brennan. Not to my knowledge, Senator.
Senator Mathias. I would like to move on to the memorandum or
the letter written by Mr. Helms to Mr. Hoover which is exhibit 36, 1
dated February 26, 1970, and I would refer to the notation in Mr.
Hoover's handwriting at the bottom of page 3, which says, "This is
not satisfactory. I want our Denver office to have absolutely no contacts
with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated and
any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only." Signed "H."
Were you aware of this directive by Mr. Hoover?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. I was.
Senator Mathias. Did this affect the operations of the FBI?
Mr. Brennan. I very definitely believe it did because I feel the vari-
ous members of the intelligence community must work together in
order to fulfill everybody's basic intelligence responsibilities, and I felt
that the decision by Mr. Hoover to cut off relationship with the CIA
was just totally an atrocious decision and was not consistent with what
the responsibilities of the intelligence community are.
We rely upon and deal with ClA closely, as they do with us. in the
interchange of matters of mutual interest to both of us, and it just did
not square with the abilities of each to be able to carry out the re-
sponsibilities and perform the functions by saying, "discontinue liai-
son wth the CIA."
Senator Mathias. So you think the best interests of our Government
and our people were injured by the rupture between the FBI and the
CIA in 1970.
Mr. Brennan. It certainly did not improve things, Senator. I feel it
certainly did hurt.
Senator Mathias. Now, in considering the recommendations of this
committee to govern the whole intelligence community in the future,
do you think this kind of liaison ought to be mandated by the Congress
so that one official, even an official as important as the Director of the
FBI or the Director of the CIA, would not be able to cause such a total
breach?
Mr. Brennan. Very definitely. There should have been some degree
of objection right then and there which would have brought the mat-
1 See p. 283.
125
ter to a head and which would have resulted in calling Mr. Hoover to
task for an explanation as to why he arbitrarily was able to discontinue
a relationship with the CIA, and unfortunately that did not come
a i? U v.' - fc * . a ? ree tnat tnere should be some means in the future by
which no individual in a position of directorship of a particular Gov-
ernment agency should be able arbitrarily just to say who he is going
to have contact with and who he is not, especially if it comes down to a
point where it is injurious to the functions of the intelligence com-
munity.
Senator Mathias. To your knowledge, was there any objection to
this from any higher authority in Government ?
Mr. Brennan. Not that I know of. In effect, we worked around it
Senator Mathias. And in fact, it may not even have been known to
higher authority in Government, is that not true ?
Mr. Brennan. I believe it must have been known, Senator.
Senator Mathias. So that, really, the only remedy is to provide by
law for the kind of liaison which is absolutely necessary if we are to
have the most effective use of the intelligence agencies ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Brennan.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Hart.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, did the FBI conduct any
surveillance of political figures at the 1972 Democratic Convention?
Mr. Brennan. Not to my recollection, Senator. And if they— polit-
ical figures— in other words, I was not in — which one, 1968 ?
Senator Hart of Colorado. 1972.
Mr. Brennan. 1972. 1 do not believe they did, Senator.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Could you find out and let the committee
know?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I am no longer in the FBI.
Senator Hart of Colorado. All right, we will find out. Thank you.
Mr. Brennan, how do you define the New Left, and whose definition
was used by the FBI ?
Mr. Brennan. The New Left was sort of an amorphous, disjointed
collection of individuals that ranged all the way from those who were
relatively, let us say, to put it in a nice style, were adopting a new style
of life, and some of those who were involved in the drug scene, moving
all the way up the ladder to those who were more legitimately con-
cerned with—and I think this probably constitutes the overwhelming
bulk and majority of it — several millions, clearly, of students who
were clearly and objectively opposed to our involvement in the Viet-
nam situation, and then a relatively small, let us say, a few thousand
individuals who were involved in the extremist sense of feeling that
the only way to resolve the difficulties they saw confronting us was to
take matters into their own hands, to use violence to achieve their
ends.
Senator Hart of Colorado. That is a pretty sweeping definition,
is it not?
Mr. Brennan. I think that constitutes in my framework of refer-
ence, anyway, Senator, what I would term the New Left movement.
Senator Hart of Colorado. A lot of the documents that we have
before us and that are in the record refer to the need to watch and
follow and otherwise survey the New Left. That is quite a bit of this
country, not to mention a whole generation.
126
Mr. Bkennan. I think, Senator, within the context of the reference
to the New Left, as it is contained in FBI communications, I think we
are basically referring more to trying to isolate out of this broad amor-
phous-type grouping, the grouping I described for you, basically the
individuals who advocated violent — who displayed a propensity for
violence, individuals who publicly professed their supposed revolution-
ary drive, and individuals who espoused Marxist-Leninist concepts, at
the same time individuals who denounced the Communist Party as a
moribund defunct party, and who aligned themselves in a greater
sphere with the revolutionary leaders of Communist movements
throughout the world.
Senator Hart of Colorado. I do not find that qualification anywhere
in the documents I have seen. You sent out dragnet kind of instructions
to your special agents in charge of field agents and so forth, concerning
the New Left, not using any of the qualifications that you have just
stated here, which gave the agents a Droad latitude as to whom they
could watch, follow, break in on, and any one of a variety of other
activities.
Mr. Brennan. I do not think, if you are implying that we watched
and followed and broke in on millions of individuals, Senator, I do
not think that is true. I think that you have to give us some credit for
some degree of circumspection in the handling of these matters, and I
think ifyou — in the context of specific instructions that related to the
investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, I think that it emerges
that there is a framework for our investigative responsibilities.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, Mr. Brennan, if that degree of
circumspection that you were relying on had not broken down, I doubt
that this committee would be in existence. Let me refer to a document,
exhibit 44 1 that I think has already been brought up in this hearing,
a memorandum from Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson, dated September 2, 1970.
It is a document relating to whether people of age 18 to 21 should be
recruited as informants.
At the bottom of the first page of that memorandum, it says, "If we
could develop informants among these new members," talking about
the younger people of various groups, "we could guide them to key
positions. By the time they are 21 years of age they are almost ready to
leave college and have been subjected to the corrosive influence and
brainwashing: of ultra-liberal and radical professors." An observa-
tion that follows says that "The important consideration, of course,
is to protect the Bureau from possible embarrassment. Many of our 18-,
19- and 20-year-old men and women are highly intelligent, mature,
and loyal citizens."
That is a nice observation. "This has recently been recognized by
the Congress in lowering the voting age to 18 years. It is felt the same
concept can-logically be applied to the revolutionary conflict at home
and particularly on campuses."
There follows a penciled notation or a pen notation. "I don't hold
this view. [Signed] H," which I understand is the Director of the FBI.
Could you tell this committee why Mr. Hoover did not like young
people ? [General laughter.]
Mr. Brbnnan. I think you have drawn that conclusion from that.
I do not know whether I could agree that that was a conclusion that he
had arrived at. I was reminded before that I should not engage in such
'See p. 328.
127
speculative conclusions as to why somebody else may have felt some-
thing of this nature.
Senator Hart of Colorado. You do not know why he made that
notation ?
Mr. Brennan. I do not know.
Senator Hart of Colorado. There was a lot of merriment around
this town recently when a journalist inspected the Secretary of State's
garbage. Did the FBI ever involve itself in trash or garbage
surveillance?
Mr. Brennan. I believe we had a program some years ago which in-
volved an assessment of trash.
Senator Hart of Colorado. What kind of things were you looking
for in the trash ?
Mr. Brennan. Basically, as I recall, we were looking for notes or
materials related to individuals we suspected to be intelligence agents
of foreign countries or engaged in espionage activities in the United
States, and anything that might give us a clue as to types of individuals
in the United States that they might be in contact with.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, in your many years at the
Bureau, have you ever known a trained agent of a foreign power to
put incriminating documents in his trash or garbage ?
Mr. Brennan. It is conceivable.
Senator Hart of Colorado. I did not ask the question whether it is
conceivable. I said, did you have a specific case where that had hap-
pened ? Colonel Abel or anyone else ?
Mr. Brennan. Specificaily, at the moment, I cannot recall any. Per-
haps the FBI records might provide a better indication of whether
they had achieved through that degree of investigative technique any-
thing that was of a positive nature.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, can you account for the
reasons why the so-called Thomas Riha case caused the seriousness
of the breach between the CIA and the FBI ?
Mr. Brennan. Why it caused the breach?
Senator Hart of Colorado. What having to do with Professor Eiha
accounted for the seriousness of the breach between the CIA and the
FBI?
Mr. Brennan. Well, I think it was a breach which was totally out of
proportion with the nature of the incident. Are you asking me now to
relate back the incidents concerning the Professor?
Senator Hart of Colorado. No. I want your judgment as to what
was so important.
Mr. Brennan. Well, I feel that — again, you are asking me for a sort
of an opinion or speculative observation — but I feel I am safe in say-
ing that over the years through my observations in the FBI, Mr.
Hoover had no close regard for the Central Intelligence Agency, and I
believe that this particular incident constituted just a basis on which
he could demonstrate to them his degree of arbitrary rule relative to
the relationships between the two agencies, and I believe he seized upon
that as an opportunity to be able to do so.
Senator Hart of Colorado. But, to your knowledge, it had nothing
to do with whether Professor Eiha was an agent, double-agent, or was
working for any asrency of our Government or any other Government?
Mr. Brennan. No; and to my recollection, this is the sad part of it.
It just — I mean Mr. Riha just apparently happened to pop into a
128
set of circumstances where the real vital question here was the fact
that an FBI agent disclosed some information to a CIA agent which
disturbed Mr. Hoover.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Without going to great lengths — it is
fairly crucial in the case because the purported FBI agent who spoke
to the CIA agent said, "Calm this thing down. Get out to the press
that Riha is alive and well." Riha, as you know, disappeared and has
never been found.
If an unnamed FBI agent knew something about Professor Riha
that he was not telling anyone else, I think that is fairly important.
You do not have any information on what happened to Professor
Riha?
Mr. Brennan. My recollection is that he left this country volun-
tarily and that there was no indication or evidence to indicate that,
as many alleged from that section of the country, that he had been
spirited off by Communist agents.
As I recollect, he was possibly of Czechoslovakian background. He
was in this country, teaching here, and he suddenly disappeared. The
information which the FBI had available to it at that time indicated
that he had voluntarily left, and there was no substantiation of any
involvement in any intelligence activity or any spying. There was
just no basis for the flap that arose, as I recall the incident, and this
is why I say it would seem then to me to be a relatively ridiculous
situation which blows up to the point where it then leads to a cutoff
in relations between the two agencies.
Senator Hart of Colorado. I am interested in the information you
have given us, because neither the CIA nor the FBI nor the local law
enforcement agencies had that information as to what happened to
him. They still think he is a missing person.
Finally, Mr. Brennan, Senator Mondale had a discussion with you
in which you talked about the pressures on the FBI and other agen-
cies by elected officials. I feel very strongly, as he and other members
of this committee do, that this is certainly a factor in some of the
things that went wrong. Can you account for the fact that when that
pressure occurs, from the White House or from elected officials, or
from the Congress, for the FBI to do something— why professional
agencies such as this cave in under that pressure? Why concoct, if
you will, information to satisfy those inquiries, rather than tell the
President of the United States the truth ? Why dredge up and examine
people's trash, and everything else, to try to make the kind of case
that the President of the United States or some Member of Congress
wants to hear? Why not tell the Director of the FBI totell the Presi-
dent of the United States that there is no case here ?
Mr. Brennan. I don't think the picture you have drawn quite
applies to what prevailed in the FBI. I feel that Mr. Hoover, as
Director of the FBI, was a very strong personality who at no time
really hesitated to tell anybody in town what he felt, including the
President of the United States. And I think that if he, at any time,
had been directed to take upon himself, or on behalf of the FBI,
activities which he personally objected to, for whatever reason, he
would make these objections known.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Angleton testified yesterday, and
I think the records here today indicate that high level senior officials
129
in both the CIA and FBI seriously doubted, in fact never believed,
that there was substantial foreign connection with domestic dissidents.
Y et we have no record whatsoever that that case was ever laid before
the President of the United States or his delegates.
Mr. Brennan. I cannot vouch for what Mr. Angleton had to say.
I think, on the basis of my testimony here earlier today— I think I
made it clear that in one instance we furnished the White House with
a 40- to 50-page report which detailed the extent to which Americans
involved in the antiwar movement were traveling in Communist
countries and attending Communist conferences.
I think the only question was a continuing hammering of the fact
of whether they were being furnished money. Are Communist funds
subsidizing this activity ? But I don't think the theory was held within
the FBI, that there was no foreign involvement on the part of a num-
ber of individuals who were activists in the antiwar movement.
Senator Hart of Colorado. I am past my time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Schweiker.
Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Brennan, I wonder if you would turn to exhibit 32. 1 I would
like to just read a couple of paragraphs from that; then I would like
to ask you a few questions about those paragraphs. This is a July 19,
1966 memo of Mr. DeLoach and Mr. Sullivan, and the unusuaf cap-
tion to the right of it says "Do Not File," in caps, underscored. And
I am reading the third and fourth paragraphs —
The present procedure followed in the use of this technique calls for the Special
Agent in Charge of a field office to make his request for the use of the tech-
nique to the appropriate Assistant Director. The Special Agent in Charge must
completely justify the need for the use of the technique and at the same time
assure that it can be safely used without any danger or embarrassment to the
Bureau. The facts are incorporated in a memorandum which, in accordance
with the Director's instructions, is sent to Mr. Tolson or to the Director for
approval. Subsequently this memorandum is filed in the Assistant Director's
office under a "Do Not Bile" procedure.
In the field, the Special Agent in Charge prepares an informal memorandum
showing that he obtained Bureau authority and this memorandum is filed in
his safe until the next inspection by Bureau Inspectors, at which time it is
destroyed.
Now, I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about this rather un-
usual "Do Not File" procedure. How did this work, Mr. Brennan?
Mr. Brennan. I think the memorandum speaks for itself, Senator.
In other words, what it is saying is that the special agent in charge
of the field office would call the Assistant Director, relay to him the
basis for his feelings that a certain action should be taken relative
to a "black bag" job. The Assistant Director would prepare that
memorandum, send it to Mr. Hoover for approval. The memorandum
was not recorded in the usual recordkeeping functions of the FBI,
but returned to the Assistant Director of the FBI and would be filed
in his office, under a "Do Not File."
Senator Schweiker. Let me ask you another question this way. If
it had been filed in the normal procedure, and then somebody subse-
quently removed it from the normal file and destroyed it, why was it
not done that way !
Mr. Brennan. There would have been a record of it.
1 See p. 273.
130
Senator Schweiker. In other words, each file of the FBI is
serialized, and as new information is put in, a serial number is assigned.
So is it not correct that if it had been filed in the normal procedure
and then removed, there would have been a gap, as far as the number
is concerned. Is that correct?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Schweiker. I gather this is a procedure. How did the agents
in the field know about this procedure? Was this in the manuals or
rules and regulations, manuals" of instructions? Or how did they
know that this procedure was to be followed ? Was it from memoran-
dums like this? How did the field offices know about the "Do Not
File" procedure, and the destruct mechanism?
Mr. Brennan. I frankly cannot answer that, Senator. I don't be-
lieve there was any reference in any manual or the like that referred
to "black bag" jobs. Maybe there was, but I doubt it. And I did not
have that much of a — well, I just didn't have any participation to a
degree that — well, frankly, I don't know how they knew. Apparently,
it was a very highly "need-to-know" type of operation.
Senator Schweiker. All right. They do, or course, call it a proce-
dure. So obviously, it had been invoked and was invoked, and they
had a quote obviously indicating that that was a signal that this proce-
dure was to be followed. I gather that one purpose of it was that if a
"black bag" job went afoul, and somebody got hauled before a court,
the Bureau or someone in the Bureau or an official of the Bureau could
make a statement to the court, or to any other person investigating,
to the effect that we searched our files and records, and there is nothing
to indicate we did such and such. Would that be a fair assumption, on a
"black bag" job?
Mr. Brennan. I think so, Senator.
Senator Schweiker. And I think that it, of course, could apply in a
lot of other areas as well.
As I see it, it looks to me as if the Bureau has had a better perfected
technique of plausible denial than the CIA had, because number one,
the Assistant Director makes a decision to follow the "Do Not File"
procedure. The special agent is informed. He can put a special memo
only in his personal safe. When the FBI investigator comes around,
the Director or his Assistant Director is assured the procedure has been
followed, because the inspector reads it in a safe. He knows his com-
mand and control is there, but he also knows it will be destroyed
immediately after that. To me it is really the perfect coverup, and a
lot more sophisticated and more refined than the plausible denial of
the CIA.
I think that one other point that ties in here, of course, is that it
would permit anybody to swear in an affidavit, in such a way for
example, "He has caused a search to be made of the records of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Department of
Justice, by the employees of the said Federal Bureau of Investigation,
acting under his direction, and that said search discloses," and so on
and so forth.
Now, the point I am making here — and I realize this does not
directly involve you, Mr. Brennan — I want to be fair and make that
very clear — is that anyone who went to court or filed an affidavit,
or made a sworn statement to another Government agency or to a
commission would be technically telling the truth because of the way
131
that wording is constructed. Yet, in fact, it would be nearly total
deception.
And I think we have seen an illustration just recently in Dallas,
where destruction of FBI documents has come to light. And I am
not going to ask you about that, Mr. Brennan, because I understand
there is an ongoing investigation, and it would not be appropriate.
But I do want to say that I commend Director Kelley, because I think
he is doing a good job. I think he is trying to get things straightened
out, and I commend him for his approach in this area.
But I do think it is interesting that here we look at the chief
investigative arm of the Government, and anytime that somebody at
the Director or sub-Director level decides that they do not want any-
body to know about something, there is a formal procedure whereby
the whole apparatus jumps into line and can do it, and can deny in a
court of law that such a thing ever occurred, and supposedly, tech-
nically be telling the truth.
And it just seems to me this is at the heart of our investigation
here, because how can we, in Congress, even though we are investi-
gating, know what is going on ? We found the theory of plausible
denial in our investigation of the CIA on the subject of assassinations.
We find it here as a technique that the FBI used. It certainly makes
it very difficult for bodies like the Warren Commission and Congress
to do their jobs. And I think it is very significant, and I think the record
should very clearly show that this procedure was used at the uppermost
levels, and was used for certain purposes, and I think we just touched
the tip of the iceberg as to what purposes and what motivation and
what the situation was.
Now, Mr. Brennan, I would like to turn my attention to one or two
other subjects for a moment, and that is that in the mail-opening that
was discussed earlier, we now know, of course, that the CIA did not
discuss at the meetings about the Huston plan the mail opening proce-
dure. And I understand from preceding testimony that the Counter-
intelligence Program was not discussed at these same kinds of meetings.
I wonder if you could tell us why the COINTEL Programs, or Coun-
terintelligence Programs, were not discussed at these meetings?
Mr. Brennan. I don't believe they were pertinent to the basic pur-
pose of the meetings. I believe the basic — in other words, as I interpret
what happened relative to the Huston plan, you have to go back to
the original question again being asked consistently by the White
House. Are foreign, Communist elements subsidizing financially the
activists in the antiwar movement ? And part of the apparent inability
to be responsive to that arises from what I perceive to be a degree of
provincialism which existed among the various organizations of the
intelligence community at that time. I think the general feeling being
let us say, among the FBI, DIA, NSA, you know, we do our thing, you
do yours, and let us not get involved in each other's area of operations
here. And I think there was a feeling that possibly we could overcome
what I would term that frame of provincialism if we could analyze
each other's resources, techniques, and possibly broaden the scope of
our own overall respective capacities. Perhaps we would do better
toward being responsive to what the basic question of the White House
was.
132
Senator Schweiker. Did not the basic question also relate to radicals
on campus and radicals domestically ? And I have a hard time drawing
the line between the distinction you just made and what I thought the
White House group and Mr. Huston were focusing on, because Huston
was focusing, when he testified before us, on violent revolutionaries, on
what they were doing to our streets and to our campuses. And certainly,
as I would understand the program you were working on, that would
certainly go to the heart of the same kind of thing, whether you are
talking about using a student, as an FBI informant, or what.
Mr. Brennan. Right. I agree, Senator. But I feel that then, stem-
ming from that, what you have is the question of, are you utilizing
enough wiretaps, and are you utilizing enough bag jobs, are you utiliz-
ing enough of these sophisticated techniques that perhaps you'd used
in the past which have since been cut back, and should there be re-
consideration of an intensification of the use of these techniques?
Senator Schweiker. I see my time has expired. That is all the ques-
tions I have, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Schweiker. Senator Morgan has
asked to be recognized for one additional question.
Senator Morgan. Mr. Brennan, to follow Up on my line of question-
ing earlier, would you turn to exhibit 46, 1 on the second page, a memo-
randum from the Director of the FBI to the agent in charge in
Albany, I believe.
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Morgan. And on the first page, there was a memorandum
to you, requesting that this memorandum be sent to all stations which
I assume you approved ?
Mr. Brennan. Apparently so, yes.
Senator Morgan. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Brennan. Apparently. That looks like my initials up there.
Senator Morgan. All right. Now, Mr. Brennan, that memorandum
included instructions as to how to keep surveillance on individuals
that were designated as "Key Black Extremists," and "Key Black Ex-
tremist Organizations," did it not?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Morgan. And among the things that were listed to be done
was, number nine, that "the Federal income tax returns of all Key
Black Extremists must be checked annually, in accordance with exist-
ing instructions." Do you find that ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes. sir.
Senator Morgan. That was one of the policies, was it not, to use tax
returns for such purposes of surveillance, and whatever other purpose
that you had ?
Mr. Brennan. There was use of some tax returns ; yes, sir.
Senator Morgan. In other words, anyone who was designated by the
Bureau as a person of interest would have his tax return checked an-
nually, in accordance with instructions that were prepared
Mr. Brennan. I don't think that's what that says, Senator. Doesn't
it say that consideration shall be given ?
Senator Morgan. The beginning: paragraph says: "The desirable
coverage must include, but not be limited to, the following investiga-
1 See p. 338.
133
tion." I am reading from the top of page 2 — ."must include, but not be
limited to." And then item number nine was "The Federal income tax
returns of all Key Black Extremists must be checked annually in ac-
cordance with existing instructions."
Mr. Brennan. Yes. Apparently that would apply to checking the
income tax returns of the Key Black Extremists, or individuals desig-
nated as such.
Senator Morgan. Mr. Chairman, I believe we will be following this
up later, but I would like to comment for the record that this concerns
me greatly, because if the Bureau decided that any given person should
be on their list, then he could have his tax returns checked every year.
And you know, even I might — I will put myself in there — I might be-
long to some organization that the Bureau might decide is extremist,
and if so, I could have my tax returns checked every year. I think this
raises an important question.
The Chairman. Well, indeed it does. And I have known you to op-
pose certain policies of the Government. Does that mean that you get
your tax returns examined every year? This business of using the tax
returns for surveillance and law enforcement purposes unrelated to
the question of whether or not the citizen has paid his taxes, using it
as a form of harrassment, you know, is a very serious question, Senator
Morgan.
And maybe this is the appropriate time to say that next week the
committee is going to explore this question of what we regard as im-
proper practices, where the IKS has begun to use surveillance tech-
niques for purposes other than determining whether the citizen con-
cerned has paid his taxes, for purposes of harrassment. We are going
to examine the ways that this is done in liaison with other agencies of
the Government like the FBI.
Senator Tower has asked to be recognized.
Senator Tower. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Brennan, the GAO report that was mentioned earlier today
by Mr. Smothers raises a question which I believe is critical to our
evaluation of the need for new tools and techniques on the domestic
front, as apparently espoused by you today. From a law enforcement
standpoint, a 3-percent rate of referral for prosecution of domestic
intelligence cases is not, terribly impressive. However, the report also
noted — and I quote — "Who is to say that the Bureau's continuous
coverage on such groups and their leaders has not prevented them to
date from achieving their ultimate subversive and extremist goals ?"
I also raise the question of whether, despite the limited number
of criminals identified to date, this Congress should recognize the
need for FBI activity extending beyond the strict parameters associ-
ated with law enforcement functions. Mr. Brennan, I ask your com-
ment on the question of whether this committee should ask the Con-
gress to clearly establish by statute a domestic surveillance role for
the FBI.
Mr. Brennan. Yes. I think the FBI would welcome that type of
clarification.
Senator Tower. I mean, statutorily authorize a surveillance role
that may not now be authorized, or may be proscribed by law as it
now stands — consistent, of course, with the Constitution, and our
theories of law and rights.
134
Mr. Brennan. I am not quite sure I understand what you mean,
Senator.
Senator Tower. We are talking right now about the FBI going
beyond its authority. We are talking about aspects of FBI activity
that might be considered unconstitutional. What I am trying to estab-
lish here is, should we recommend legislation that might perhaps
remove some of the parameters that surround the FBI at the moment,
and give specific authorization for surveillance under certain circum-
stances?
Mr. Brennan. Yes; I definitely feel you should.
Senator Tower. Thank you.
The Chairman. Any other questions from the committee? Senator
Hart?
Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, the last question I asked
you had to do with the degree of foreign involvement, particularly
financing domestic disruptions. And why, if there were senior people
in both CIA and FBI that believed that there was not substantial
foreign involvement, that case was not made to the President? You
said you could not speak for the CIA, but you thought the FBI
consistently took the view that the domestic unrest had substantial
foreign involvement.
The reference that I was referring to was your deposition before
the committee. The question was asked, "Is it your judgment and
was it your judgment at the time that there must have been a great
deal more foreign money coming in?" Mr. Brennan: "Based on my
experience, I personally did not believe that that was true. I felt that
the extremist groups and the others who were involved in antiwar
activities and the like at that time were of the middle- and upper-level
income, and we characterized them generally as credit-card revolu-
tionaries."
My question is why you and people like you in the FBI and the
CIA did not flatly tell the White House that. That case never seemed
to get up there. It was always what the President wanted to hear.
Mr. Brennan. I don't think that is true, Senator. As I indicated
to you, we had ample evidence of the travel of leading activists in the
antiwar movement to foreign countries, where they attended meetings
of Communist groups abroad concerned with the so-called peace
movement in the United States. We submitted a 40- to 45- or 50-page
report dealing with the extent of this activity.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Did that report include a statement
such as I have just read ? That is the question.
Mr. Brennan. We at one time were required to submit a reoort
dealing with the extent of our knowledge of Communist funding.
And I believe it was our observation therein that there was some
evidence, for example, of one subversive group or one extremist group
of individuals who were traveling to Cuba, who were thereby, let us
say, entertained to a degree at the expense of the Cuban Government.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, that is not my question.
My question was, did these lengthy reports ever contain an observa-
tion such as you made to this committee that you did not believe there
was substantial foreign funding?
Mr. Brennan. No. I don't feel that that would be appropriate
for inclusion within an FBI report as to the expression of a belief.
135
The Bureau took the position it was a fact-finding agency, and it
would stick to basically what it knew. But I don't think that, even
if we had been asked, "what is your feeling about it," that the Bureau
would have been able to respond that, "well, we happen to believe
such and such."
Senator Hart of Colorado. I assume your belief was not based on
imagination, but your opinion was based upon facts. If you saw a
set of facts that showed substantial foreign funding and then had a
belief that there was no substantial foreign funding, I would think
that you would be subject to dismissal.
Mr. Brennan. Yes. But if I gave you a report dealing with 15
separate organizations which relatively set forth the degree of infor-
mation concerning whether or not they were receiving funds from
foreign sources, I think that you would be able to draw the conclusion
for yourself as to whether or not there was any extensive foreign
funding.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Not if you did not present the other
side of the case, and I think it is a classic example of an agency's
being given the obligation to tell the facts to the White House, and
instead telling the White House exactly what it wanted to hear.
Mr. Brennan. I think you are asking, then, for interpretations,
and the Bureau did not engage in interpretations.
Senator Hart of Colorado. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Baker?
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, just briefly, for the sake of clarifi-
cation, I understood Senator Hart's question to be that it was your
conclusion that there was no foreign involvement in these demon-
strations. Is it your testimony that there was no foreign funding?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Now, is there a distinction between these two?
Mr. Brennan. I think there is. I do not know whether I have con-
fused the members of the committee. Clearly, what I again state is
that we had developed no evidence to indicate any substantial Com-
munist foreign funding of the antiwar movement in the United States.
But on the other hand, we had extensive evidence of the leading ac-
tivists, many of the leading activists of the antiwar movement, at-
tending Communist conferences abroad where the matter of what
should transpire relative to demonstrations in this country was dis-
cussed. And you may want to regard that as perhaps indirect guidance,
or perhaps even more direct guidance, of what the antiwar movement
should do in this country. Those, I think, are two separate and distinct
things which led you, on the one hand, to say, "yes, there was extensive
contact between American activists and foreign Communist ele-
ments, but no evidence that the foreign Communist elements were
pouring money in in support of what was taking place here."
Senator Baker. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Schweiker has a question.
Senator Schweiker. Thank you^ Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Brennan, as I recall, a few minutes earlier you testified that
you were not aware that any "black bag" jobs were done after the
January 6, 1967, memorandum of Mr. Hoover's. Is that correct?
Mr. Brennan. That is my recollection, Senator.
136
Senator Schweiker. All right. Now, we have, of course, on file with
the committee the fact that such a "black bag" job did occur in April
of 1968, some time after that. Now, I realize you were Chief of the
Internal Security Section at that time, in the 1968 time frame? _
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Schweiker. And your immediate superior would have been
the head of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Is that the correct
chain of command ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Schweiker. And then, the next step would have been Mr.
Hoover himself?
Mr. Brennan. You have an intermediate step of Assistant to the
Director.
Senator Schweiker. Let's assume that basically, to your knowledge,
it was not approved through you. If, in fact, as the FBI report shows,
it did occur, someone in the sequential steps above you, one, two or
three, would pretty well have had to have approved it for a "black
bag" job to have occurred. Is that correct.
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Schweiker. It is really inconceivable to you that it really
would not have occurred if one, two or three ladders above you did
not somewhere give an OK to it? Would that be a fair assumption?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Senator Schweiker. I think again this points out the clear-cut situa-
tion where a memo says one thing, and yet one or two people at the
top are doing something differently, whether it is setting up a "Do Not
File" procedure, or going against a memo they issued. I think it pretty
well gets to the heart of the problem here; and again realize, Mr.
Brennan, I am not tying you into it. But I think it is important to put
it into the record. That is all.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Schweiker.
I have just one other matter I would like to question you about before
we close this morning. Our figures show, based upon the reports of
the FBI, that when the agency decided greatly to increase its campus
surveillance, it estimated that by its surveillance of all SDS members,
6,500 new cases would be opened. And it estimated that in its surveil-
lance of all black groups on our campuses, 4,000 new cases would be
opened.
Now, what does that mean, opening a case ? Does that mean that you
establish a file on the person ? Give me a better understanding of what
opening a case means. There is a human element here. What does it
mean to the person on whom the case is opened ? You have agents going
on these campuses asking questions about certain people who are within
this new 4,000 group of black students, or within this new 6,500 group
of SDS members, and then a case is opened with each one of them.
What does that mean ? What are the mechanics ?
Mr. Brennan. Well, the field office basically would have the respon-
sibility of opening a case file on the organization.
The Chairman. Or on the individual ?
Mr. Brennan. Well, let me try to give it to you in sequence, Senator.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Brennan. And — the field office — through investigative proce-
dures, would attempt to develop sources and informants who could
137
give them information relative to the individuals who were the leaders
of the organization, and through appropriate investigative techniques
and efforts, attempt to determine who the individual members of an
organization were; at which stage, an individual case would be opened
on each individual member.
They now would be investigated with sort of a preliminary back-
ground investigation, to draw together the picture of the individual.
But inherent in all of this, then, would be the need to make a deter-
mination at some point in time, is this merely a rank-and-file type of
individual, or has this individual through his activities demonstrated a
propensity for violence, or does he occupy a strong leadership position
in the organization, and has he or she been responsible for public
exhortations of violence ?
The Chairman. Once a file is opened, and the individual is placed
under surveillance, suppose it develops— as I am sure it did in a great
many of these cases— that the individual is found not to be engaging
in any unlawful activities, but simply expressing his opposition to the
war, his opposition to being drafted to fight the war, or whatever.
Then is the file destroyed ?
Mr. Brennan. It is closed.
The Chairman. It is closed, Well, suppose that individual later
wants to get a job, let us say, with the Government. He is grown up
now, he has left the campus. He wants to get a job with the Govern-
ment, and he applies for a job, and the FBI is asked to nm a name
check on him. Now. would that name check turn up that file, even
though it were closed ?
Mr. Brennan. I am not sure, Senator. I am not too familiar now with
the operation of the name-check function, and the degree to which they
would include types of information pertinent to the inquirer's interest.
The Chairman. Can you testify that such a name check would not
turn up that name because the file had been closed ?
Mr - Brennan. No; I don't think I could, Senator. As I say, I am
not all that certain, and I would hate to really run around in areas
where
The Chairman. Do you see what I am concerned about ?
Mr. Brennan. Yes; I understand.
The Chairman. Here a file is set up. The agency itself decides, after
surveillance, that this young person has not violated any laws. The
file is closed. Later, he tries to get a job with the Government. A name
check is run by the FBI, and the FBI makes a little reference to the
agency, and says, "this man's name appeared on a subversive file."
You see, this is an intensely human thing. These people who get
caught up in this thing can be affected for the rest of their lives.
Well, I think today the testimony has established that the
Huston plan called for a relaxation of restrictions that then applied
to surveillance on the campuses, following its revocation by the Presi-
dent. And within a month or so thereafter, the FBI greatly expanded
that surveillance. The 21-year limitation, which was meant to avoid
student spying on students on the campuses, was eliminated, and in-
formants were obtained on the campuses among the student body. Also,
all SDS members were placed under surveillance, and 6,500 new cases
were opened. Also, all black groups were placed under surveillance,
138
even though there was no previous evidence of violence or a tendency
toward violence ; and that involved the opening of 4,000 new cases.
My final question, Mr. Brennan, is, do you know whether this rather
dramatic expansion of the FBI involvement on the campuses of the
country began within a month or so after the President had revoked
his authorization of the Huston plan, whether all of that was told to
the President?
Mr. Brennan. I don't believe it would have been, Senator. I believe
that the most that would have been done would have — possibly at the
next appropriations testimony, where Mr. Hoover would be called
upon to spell out what the areas of investigative interest the FBI had,
that he, at that time, would have been subject to the congressional
inquiry which would have enabled him to draw out the scope of our
activities.
The Chairman. Tell me this. The record shows that Hoover was
objecting to the Huston plan, and then shortly after the President
revokes it, he is approving a big expansion of surveillance on the cam-
puses, reducing the age from 21 to 18 and all of the other things we
talked about. What accounted for the change of position? Why did he
object to it in the Huston plan and then shortly thereafter turn around
and approve it?
Mr. Brennan. I frankly don't know, Senator. There were incon-
sistencies of that type that went along from year to year, and Mr.
Hoover was not the type that would call you in and explain to you why
he changed his mind.
The Chairman. Then you have no explanation to give ?
Mr. Brennan. No, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Tower has a comment.
Senator Tower. I just want to make one comment, Mr. Chairman,
consistent with Senator Morgan's objection to the chief counsel,
Mr. Schwarz's line of questioning at the beginning of the session
today. I would like simply to say for the record that the response
that Mr. Brennan gave to Senator Huddleston's questions concerning
Mr. Hoover's motivations for recommending rejection of the Huston
plan was Mr. Brennan's opinion, and was speculative entirely.
I would like to further note — this should not be inferred as a criti-
cism of Mr. Brennan, because he has got a perfect right to respond
to questions as to what his opinion is — but I would point out that
Mr. Hoover, is not around to comment on what his motivations might
have been at the moment. I think we should note that the witness'
answer stands as an opinion, as speculative, and not a matter of fact.
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Chairman, there are other FBI witnesses who
have contrarv opinions, of course, and we have spoken to some who
believe that Mr. Hoover did have a genuine interest in the matters
that he was talking about. So there is a difference of opinion among
the people of the FBI.
Senator Baker. I might ask, Mr. Chairman, whether anybody
really knows why everybody was scared of J. Edgar Hoover. If
this witness knows, we ought to let him say. We stopped him a minute
ago before he had a chance to say.
The Chairman. Are you putting a question, Senator Baker?
Senator Baker. Sure. Mr. Brennan. do you know? Did you ever
discuss with Mr. Hoover why the President or anybody else had such
139
a concern or respect, or even fear, of him? I assume you do not,
-but nobody has asked that question.
Mr. Brennan. No, I don't._
Senator Baker. I remember, Mr. Chairman, that this is a legend
that has gone on for some time. But I rather suspect we may never
find the answer.
Mr. Brennan. Well, I think it possibly arises, Senator, from re-
ports of certain observations perhaps made by President Kennedy,
when he was asked whether or not he intended to reappoint Mr.
Hoover or to get rid of him. If I recollect correctly, his observation
wa s— you know, you don't fire God. And I believe that President
Johnson also was posed a further question as to whether or not he
intended to keep Mr. Hoover on. I think he made a response of similar
content. ,
Senator Baker. Thank you.
The Chairman. At the birth of this country, John Adams resolved
that our society must have a government of laws and not of men.
This was necessary, he said, because the law, in all vicissitudes of
Government, fluctuations of the passions or flights of enthusiasm,
will preserve a steady, undeviating course. It will not bend to the
uncertain wishes, imaginations and wanton tempers of man."
What we have heard this week reflects a sad change from this
original conception, so rightly cherished by our Founding Fathers.
Now we discover that even the mail of our citizens has been unlaw-
fully read by secret intelligence agencies. Instead of all being equal
before the law, we find that any number of citizens, from Presidential
candidates on down, have had their letters opened, copied, photo-
graphed and filed in the vast vaults of the Federal agencies. We
learn that other unlawful intelligence operations have also been
concealed from Congress and from the President himself. This can-
not be allowed. For as John Locke wisely knew, whenever law ends,
tyranny begins.
This hearing is adjourned until 10 o'clock next Tuesday morning.
[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the select committee adjourned, to
reconvene at 10 a.m. Thursday, October 2, 1975.]
62-685 O - 76 - 10
141
HEARINGS EXHIBITS '
Exhibit 1
SPECIAL REPORT
INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)
CHAIRMAN J. EDGAR HOOVER
JUNE, 1970
1 Under criteria determined by the Committee, in consultation with the White
House, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, certain mate-
rials have been deleted from those documents, some of which were previously
classified, to maintain the internal operating procedures of the agencies in-
volved, and to protect intelligence sources and methods. Further deletions
were made with respect to protecting the privacy of certain individuals and
groups. These deletions do not change the material content of these exhibits.
142
June 25, 1970
This report, prepared for the President,
is approved by all members of this committee
and their signatures are affixed hereto.
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
\J thairman
)w Aa.«A»-Oi«-JLL»U-'U>a->v.
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
mJS
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
143
PREFACE
The objectives of this report are to: (1) assess the current
internal security threat; (2) evaluate current intelligence collection
procedures; identify restraints under which U. S. intelligence services
operate; and list the advantages and disadvantages of such restraints;
and (?) evaluate current interagency coordination and recommend means
to improve it.
The Committee has attempted to set forth the essence of
the issues and the major policy considerations involved which fall within
the scope of its mandate.
Page
144
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE i
PART ONE
SUMMARY OF INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT
I. MILITANT NEW LEFT GROUPS 1
A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 1
1. Student Protest Groups 1
2. Antiwar Activists 3
3. New Left Terrorist Groups 4
B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection
Procedures 5
1. Scope and Effectiveness of Current Coverage 5
2. Gaps in Current Coverage 6
3. Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence
Collection 7
H. BLACK EXTREMIST MOVEMENT 9
A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 9
1. Black Panther Party 9
2. New Left Support for BPP ,9
3. BPP Propaganda Appearances 9
4. Appeal to Military 10
5. BPP Philosophy and Foreign Support 10
6. Other Black Extremist Groups 10
7. Black Student Extremist Influence 11
8. Foreign Influence in the Black Extremist Movement 11
B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection
Procedures 12
1. Other Black Extremist Organizations 13
145 Page
III. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 14
A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 14
1. Intervention in Domestic Unrest 14
2. Intelligence Operations 15
B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection 17
1. Scope and Effectiveness 17
2. Gaps in Current Coverage 18
IV. OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS 20
A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 20
1. Communist Party 20
2. Socialist Workers Party and Other Trotskyist
Groups 20
3. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups . 21
4. Puerto Rican Nationalist Extremist Groups 21
B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Coverage 21
1. Scope and Effectiveness 21
2. Gaps in Current Coverage 22
3. Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence
Collection - 22
■ / ■
PART TWO
RESTRAINTS ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
I. SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL RESTRAINTS 23
A. Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence 23
B. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations 26 •
C. Mail Coverage 29
D. Surreptitious Entry 32
E. Development of Campus Sources 34
F. Use of Military Undercover Agents 37
II. BUDGET AND MANPOWER RESTRICTIONS 40
PART THR EE
EVALUATION OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
I. CURRENT PROCEDURES TO EFFECT COORDINATION 42
II. SUGGESTED MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE
COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION 42
146
PART ONE
SUMMARY OF INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT
I. MILITANT NEW LEFT GROUPS
A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat
n
The movement of rebellious youth known as the "New Left, "
involving and influencing a substantial number of college students, is hav-
ing a serious im pac 1 on.conte,mjjorary_aoc;.eJy with a poJ^JiaJJ^£-a£tJflys
dojaj^HEIiinSnyThe revolutionary aims of the New Left are apparent
when their identification with Marxism -Leninism is examined^ They
pointedly advertise their objective as the overthrow of our system of
—government by force and violence. Under the guise of freedom of speech,
they seek to coj^j^nt^Jlj^ai^isJ^^^ujjT^jt^ and PXS^SiiSJjLSS^Ii' •
They_jntend tosnT asTTU ie^. S. .educational system, the^exoj.qSii i^/v rycture,
a Jl^ v. [JS 3 - UY !„ ..{ fr ?.r9-Q ^ e - £flffiiffloitjSa 5i ■ New Left' groups do n ot have a large i;
e nough number of rank-apd-filp fnllp v/p rs f nor do they have a unity of
p urpose to carry out massive or oarab^ ins: acts df . insurrfeclkm. TJiey_jdo,
on the Other hand, h ave the v \\) t.p carry on mors militant- efforts in local
situations and an incfination to utilise more extreme means to attain their
o bjecti ves. ■ i- ■ .
1. Student Protest Groups. The Sjnj^nJsJfc^^Democjv^tic
~§2£i§iS«,(§E§) nas > in tne Pa* 5 * y ear i 3PM& ini0 several factions, including
.the ReY.oU UiQnar.y_ Youth , M ovemertjRy_M) . which has contro.l over30'
'-•'Chairs; and the Worker_ Student AllianceJWSAJi, ,-which co nsists of 63
-c hapte rs. The WJSA faTtipn"^
P_rjD grJess lve i Labor_ Party TPLPj^aims to_biii_ld a worker - student^mp vem ent
in keeping with the"PLP's aim oi developing a broad worKer^based ™~ " r- ""
- revolutionary movement in the United States.
There are some 8 5 _ unaffiliated SDS chaptersgcaejajly
svmnathff jc to revolutionary tactics and"goaisT"'TTe trend of increased
radical campus organizations is noticeable at campuses where recognition
of SDS has been refused or rescinded and SDS members have banded
together, with or without sanction, under a new title to attract student
support. In addition, numerous ad hoc groups have been established
on campuses and elsewhere to exploit specific issues.
The National St udent.gtrikejNSSl, also k nown as t he
National Strike Information Cente r, was formedTofiowing the entry
of the United States forces into Cambodia and the deaths of four students
at Kent State University. NSS, which helped to coordinate the nationwide
student strike in May, .1970, has three regional centers and includes
147
among its leadership SDS members and other New Left activists. The
NSS has ffgtabUsheda nat ion wi de comm unic ati on s s ,y s t e m.-Ql-llh aKC^ ?■ 4*°
s l^iig.U^ on^^mpu^^^^ enrourage stud ent dem onstrations and jd ijj£p.n.tiQns .
This communications capability" hTay'have" a significant impact on campus
stability in the coming school year.
The VencerornosJRr jgade.l.VB ), established to send United States
youth to Cuba to aid in the 1970 harvests, has continually received favorable
publicity in Cuban propaganda media. To date, over 900 members of
the VB have visited Cuba and another group of approximately 500 members
are expected to follow suit. While in Cuba, VB members were individually
photographed and questioned in detail about their backgrounds. Because
of their contacts with Cuban officials, these individuals must be considered
as potential recruits for Cuban intellig en ce activities and sabota ge in th e
United States. '
The greatest threat nosed to the security of the country by
S tudent protesT grouns is their potential for fomenting violence and unres t
on college campuse s. Demonstrations have triggered acts of arson by
extremists against war-oriented research and ROTC facilities and have
virtually paralyzed many schools. There has been a growing number of "
noncampus, but student-related, acts of violence .which increase tensions
between "town and gown" and which constitute a marked escalation of the
scope and level of protest activities. Few student protests are current ly
r elated to exclusively campus issue s; v irtually all involve political an d
s ocial issu es. I ncreasin gly, t he battlefield is the community with the
campus serving primarily as a staging area . ■ •
..«e,i (* ■ ■ ■ -v-
The efforts of the New Left aimed at fomenting unrest and
subversion among civil servants, labor unions, and mass media have met
with very limited success, although the V7SA and its parent, the PLP,
have attempted through their "Summer Work-Ins" to. infiltrate and
radicalize labor. The inability of these groups to subvert and control
the mass media has led to the establishment of a large network of under-
ground publications which serve the dual purpose of an internal communi-
cation network and an external propaganda organ.
Leaders of student protest groups have traveled extensively
over the years to communist countries; have openly stated their sympathy
with the international communist revolutionary movements in South Vietnam
and Cuba; and have directed others into activities which support these
movements. These individuals must be considered to hayepotential for
148
Jg£IHUmmt.anfl,pagjjfiiBatiQBjR. foreign- Er ected .intelligence , act ivity.
2. Antiwar Activists. The impetus and continuity for the
antiwar movement is provided by the New Mobil ization C ommitte e to
Endjhe War in Vietnam (NM C) and the St udenyM ob ili zaUo^omlriTttee
t o End the War tnVietnnm (SMC) . iCThe NMC is a coalition oFnumerous
antiwar groups and individuals including communist "old left" elements.
The SMC is under the control of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party
(SWP).)|
The NMC and SMC have announced a policy of "nonexclusion"
which places no limitation on the type of individuals allowed to participate »;
in demonstrations. This policy opens the door for violence-prone
individuals who want to capitalize on the activities of these groups.
Both groups profess to follow a policy of nonviolence; however, the .
very nature of the protests that they sponsor sets the stage for civil
disobedience and police confrontation by irresponsible dissident elements.
Various individuals in NMC and SMC are calling for more milita nt
protest activities, a subject to be discussed at national meetings by
both groups in late June. 1970. " [ '
Although antiwar groups are not known to be collecting weapons,
engaging in paramilitary training, or advocating terrorist tactics, the
pro-Hanoi attitude of their leaders, the unstable nature of many NMC
advocates and their policy of "nonexclusion" underscore the 'iSfe.ofJ^e
a tL^X^^ ei^^ T - a .?i^^flB^llt.fP r i. lf '-toiJ rti TOrtfi,T- This is further
emphasized by the NMC leadership's advocacy of civil disobedience to
achieve desired objectives.
There is no indication that the antiwar movement has made
serious inroads or achieved any more. than a slight degree of influence
among labor unions, the mass media, and civil servants. One group,
however, the Federal Employees for a Democratic Society (FEDS), offers
a means of protest for recent radical graduates employed by the Federal
Government.
149—
The aUi&£y and e*!^^Uss£tf.M!i9ap a £?.*J]&iiEAs ,s
targets of the antiwar movement. . In addition to vandalism, arsons, and
bombings of ROTC facilities, there has been stepped-up activity to
spread antiwar sympathy among American servicemen from within
through sympathetic members in the military and from without through
such programs as "GI Coffeehouses" and the proposed National GI
Alliance. The increasing access by members of the military to the
underground press, the establishment of servicemen's unions, and
organizations which facilitate desertions, have contributed significantly
to the increasing instances of dissent in the military services.
NMC and SMC leaders are constan tly speakjrgJ^xeJSAldent
(Troi ^ and endeavoring to use.student r adicais_to inrJ;Iiej:_the..antiwar
movement . They have called for an end to the ROTC and have demon-
strated, often violently, to force universities to halt war- related research
projects.
(The NMC maintains close contact with the
World Council for Peace and Stockholm Conference on Vietnam] A new
organi zation dominated by NMC leader s, t he Committe e jjf Liaison with
Families of Servicemen Detained in North Viet nam, emerged in January,
1970, after contacts with North Vietnamese representatives. It attempts
to present.a favorable picture of North Vietnamese treatment of American
prisoners of war.
! '^ ___I_NMC leaders have frequently traveled abroad. It is therefore
I necessary to consider these individuals as havin!^j^tR ntial j ,for - ejT£aging
!in foreign- directed intelligence collection.
I m i i M a m ill i ■IIII1IW IM I I'i J I I I H W""— ' i wy i
//Th e Centr al Intelligence Agency (CIA), injts analysis of bloc
intelligence, is of th&viewlhaf tTJe Soviet and bloc intelligence services
are'cbnimitted at the political level to exploit all domestic, dissidents
wKeTreyer jjos.s.iblej " This'attack is being conducted through recruited
agents, agents ofinfluence, and the use of front groups. It is established
bloc policy to deploy its forces against the United States as "the main
enemy" and to direct all bloc intelligence forces toward ultimately
political objectives which disrupt U. S. domestic and foreign policies.
3. New Left Terrorist Groups. The Weathe rman terrorist
group, which emerged from a factional split of SDS duringthe Summer of
1969, is a revolutionary youth movement wh ich actively supports the
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150
revolutionary leadership role of the Negro in the United States. It has
evolved into a number of small commando-type units which plan to
utilize bombings, arsons, and assassinations as political weapons.
There has been evidence of Weatherman involvement in
terrorist tactics, including the accidental explosion of a "Weatherman
bomb factory" in New York City on March 6, 1970; the discovery of two
undetonated bombs in Detroit police facilities on the same date; and the
blast at New York City police installations on June 9, 1970.
While Weather man membership is not clearly defined, it is
estimated that at least 1. 000 i ndividuals arihprp tn Wpathprm an idqolnjTV.
In addition, groups such as the White Panther Party, Running Dog, Mad Dog,
and the Youth International Party (Yippies) are supporters of Weatherman
terrorism but have no clearly definable ideology of their own.
Adherents to Weatherman ideology are also found within
radical elements on campuses, among those living in off-campus communes-,
among New Left movement lawyers arid doctors, and the underground press.
Individuals who adhere to the Weatherman ideology have offered support
and aid to hard-core Weatherman members, including 21 Weatherman
members currently in hiding to avoid apprehension.
They identify themselves politically with North Vietnam,
Cuba, and North Korea and consider pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese. organi-
zations as being aligned with imperialist powers. In adciltion/ some of t'fig'
"Weatherman leaders and adherents have traveled to communist countries
or have met in Western countries with communist representatives.
Weatherman leaders and other members of terrorist groups
are not known at this time to be involved in foreign-directed intelligence
collection activity. The fugitive and underground status of many of these
people, as well as their involvement in activities which would likely bring
them to the attention of American authorities, would be a deterrent to
contacts by foreign intelligence organizations.
B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures
1. Scope and Effectiveness of Current Coverage. Although
New Left groups liave been responsible for widespread damage to ROTC
facilities, for the halting of some weapons-related research, and for the
increasing dissent .within the military services, the major threat to the
internal security of the United States is that directed against the civilian
sector of our society.
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151
Coverage of student groups is handled prima rily through
l ive informants and it is generally effective at. the national level or
at major meetings of these groups where .overall policy, aims, and
objec tives of the groups are determine d.
The antiwar m ove ment's activities are rnvprpH t-hrm -o rh ftiR f pa
by live informants i n all organizations of interest . This is s upported by
i nformation furnished by all members of the intelligence commun it y
a nd otner Federal, state, and loc al agencies. Key leaders and
activists are afforded concentrated and intensified investigative
coverage on a continuing basis and, in situations where there are
positive indications of violence, e lectronic surveillances have be en
i mplemented on a selective b asis . informant and electronic coverag e
do es no t meet present requirement s.
Although several SDS chapters on college campuses which
adhere to Weatherman ideology have been penetrated by live informants, --
there is no live informant coverage at present of underground Weatherman
fugitives. There is electronic coverage on the residence of a Weatherman
contact in New York City and on the residence of an alleged Weatherman
member in San Francisco; however, no information has been developed
concerning the whereabouts of the 21 Weatherman fugitives.
2. Gaps in Current Co verage . Established, long-term
coverage is not available within student protest groups due to the
fact that the student body itself changes yearly, necessitating a constant
turnover in the informants targeted against these groups. His idealism
and immaturity, as well as the sensitive issues of academic freedom
and the right to dissent, all serve to increase the risk that the student
informant will be exposed as such.
Generally, day-to-dav coverage of the planned activities
of student protest groups, which are somewhat autonomous an d
d isjointed, could be strengthen ed. (Advance notice of forpign travel c/fc
by student militants is particularly neededTjl C ampus viole nce is ''' ''
generall y attr ibutable to small, close-kni t""exJxejnist g roups among
raaicai"Btnctenls. Coverage of these latter groups is minimal. . .
152
The antiwar movement is comprised of a great many
organizations and people which represent varied political, moral and
ethnic beliefs. Current manpower commitments preclude optimum
coverage of all antiwar activities on a day-to-day basis.
Existing coverage of New Left extremists, the Weather man
group in pa rti cular, is negligible. Most of the Weatherman group has
gone underground and formed floating, commando-type units. composed of
three to six individuals. The transitory nature of these units hinders the
installation of electronic surveillances and their smallness and distrust
of outsiders make penetration of these units through live informants
extremely difficult.
Financially, the Weatherman group appears to be without
a centralized source of funds. Wealthy parents have furnished funds to
some of these individuals, including those in a fugitive status. Many
members have also been involved in the thefts of credit and identification
cards, as well as checks, and have utilized them for obtaining operating
expenses.
3 . Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection.
To establish effective coverage of shi.iprrf prot est group s would requir e
the exp ansion of live informant coverage of individual campus c h apters. of
t hese organizat ions. This would entail extensive use of student informants
t o obtain maximum utilization of their servic es for the periods of the ir
college attendance. ■ : ■ ~~ ;
Because of the great number of individuals and groups in the
antiwar movement, a n increase in the manpower assigned to these inves -
ti gations would facilitate more intensive coverag e. I n additi on,. there
are several key leaders involved in virtually all antiwar activitie s,
i ncluding international contacts, against whom electronic surveillance s v
an d mail covers would be particularly effectiv e. ' ' *
Improvement of intelligence gathering against New Left
terrorists depends on a combination of live informant coverage among
key leaders and selective electronic surveillances. Because of the nature
of the Weatherman groups, live informant coverage will most likely result
through the defection of a key leader.
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153
Extensive efforts-have been undertaken which should
produce a live informant capable of furnishing information as to the
location of Weatherman fugitives and planned terrorist acts. In the
event a commune is located, prompt installation, of electronic
coverage should produce similar results.: Utilization of additional
resources to expand and intensify this collection would be beneficial.
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154
II. BLACK EXTREMIST MOVEMENT
A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat
1. Black Panther Par ty. The most active and dangerous
black extremist group in the United States is the Black Panther Party
(BPP). Despite its relatively small number of hard-core members--
approximately 800 in 40 chapters nationwide— the BPP is in the forefront
of black extremist activity today. The BPP has publicly advertised its goals
of organizing revolution, insurrection, assassination and other terrorist-
type activities. Moreover, a recent poll indicates that approximately
25 per cent of the black population has a great respect for the BPP,
including 43 per cent of blacks under 21 years of age.
The Panther newspaper has a current circulation of
approximately 150, 000 copies weekly. Its pages are filled with messages
of racial hatred and call for terrorist guerrilla activity in an attempt _
to overthrow the Government. The BPP has been involved in a substantial"
number of planned attacks against law enforcement officers^ and its
leadership is composed in large part of criminally inclined, violence-
prone individuals.
Weapons are regularly stockpiled by the Party. During 1968
and 1969, quantities of machine guns, shotguns, rifles, hand grenades,
homemade bombs, and ammunition were uncovered in Panther offices.
2. New Left Support for BPP. The BPP has received
increasing support from radical New Left elements. During 1970, the
BPP formed a working relationship with radical student dissenters by
injecting the issue of Government "repression" of Panthers into the
antiwar cause. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) supported
the BPP in a 1969 "united front against fascism." The probability that
black extremists, including the BPP, will work closely with New Left
white radical's in the future increases the threat of escalating terrorist
activities. It would be safe to project that racial strife and student
turmoil fomented by black extremists will definitely increase.
3. BPP Propaganda Appearances. Despite its small member-
ship, the BPP has scored major successes in the propaganda arena. In
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155
1969, BPP representatives spoke at 189 colleges throughout the Nation,
while in 1967 there were only 11 such appearances. Although no direct
information has been received to date indicating that the BPP has initiated
any large-scale racial disorders, the year 19.70 has seen an escalation of
racial disorders across the Nation compared to 1969. This fact, coupled
with an increasing amount of violent Panther activity, presents a great
potential for racial and civil unrest for the future.
4. Ap peal to Military. The BPP has made pointed appeals
to black serviceTiien with racist propaganda. High priority has been
placed on the recruitment of veterans with weapons and explosives training.
The BPP has also called for infiltration of the Government. These
activities, should they achieve even minimum success, present a grave
threat.
5. BPP Ph ilosophy a nd Foreign Sup port. The BPP relies
heavily on foreign communist ideology to shape its goals. Quotations from-
Mao Tse-tung were the initial ideological bible of the BPP. Currently,
the writings of North Korean Premier Kim II -sung are followed and
extensive use of North Korgan propaganda material is made in BPP
publications and training. /The Marxist-oriented philosophy of ihe BPP
presents a favorable environment for support of the Panthers from other
communist countries."":
BPP leaders have traveled extensively abroad including visits
to Cuba, Russia, North Korea, and Algeria. International operations of
the BPP are directed by Eldridge Cleaver, a fugitive from United States
courts. Cleaver has established an international staff in Algeria, from
where communist propaganda is constantly relayed to the BPP headquarters
in Berkeley, California. I Jfe has also established close ties with Al Fatah,
an Arab guerrilla organization, whose leaders have reportedly extended
nvitations to EPP members to take guerrilla training during 1970. Cleaver,
n a recent conversation, indicated that North Koreans are conducting
similar training for BPP members"/ Radical white students in Western
Europe and the Scandinavian countries have organized solidarity committees
in support of the BPP. These committees are the sources of financial
contributions to the Party and provide outlets for the BPP newspaper.
6. Other Black Extr emi st Grou ps. The Nation of Islam (NOI)
is the largest single black extremist organization in the United States with
an estimated membership of 6,000 in approximately 100 Mosques. The NOI
10
62-685 O - 76 - LI
156
preaches hatred of the white race and advocates separatism of the races.
The NOJ as a group has, to date, not instigated any civil disorders;
however, the followers of this semi-religious cult are extremely
dedicated individuals who could be expected to perform acts of violence
if so ordered bv the NOI head, Elijah Muhammed. When Muhammed,
who is over 70 years of age, is replaced, a new leader could completely
alter current nonviolent tactics of the organization. For example, '
Muhammed's son-in-law, Raymond Sharrieff, now among the top
hierarchy of NOI, could rise to a leadership position. Sharrieff is
vicious, domineering, and unpredictable.
There are numerous other black extremist organizations,
small in numbers, located across the country. There is also a large
number of unaffiliated black extremists who advocate violence and
guerrilla warfare. One particular group, the Republic of New Africa
(RNA), headquartered in Detroit, Michigan, calls for the establishment
of a separate black nation in the South to be protected by armed forces. *"
These groups, although small, are dedicated to the destruction of our
form of government and consequently present a definite potential for
instigating civil disorder or guerrilla warfare activity.
7. Black Student Extremist Influence. Black student extremist
activities at colleges and secondary schools have increased alarmingly.
Although currently there is no dominant leadership, coordination or
specific direction between these individuals, they are in frequent contact
with each other. Consequently, should any type of organization or
cohesiveness develop, it would present a grave potential for future
violent activities at United States schools. Increased informant coverage
would be particularly productive in this area. Black student extremists
have frequently engaged in violence and disruptive activity on campuses.
Major universities which made concessions to nonnegotiable black
student demands have not succeeded in calming extremist activities.
During the school year 1969-70, there were 227 college disturbances
having racial overtones. There were 530-such disturbances in secondary
schools compared with only 320 during the previous school year.
8. Foreign Influence in the Black Extremist Movement .
Although there is no hard evidence indicating that the black extremist
movement is substantially controlled or directed by foreign elements,
there is a marked potential for foreign-directed intelligence or subversive
activity among black extremist leaders and organizations. These groups
are highly susceptible to exploitation by hostile foreign intelligence
services.
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Currently the most important foreign aspect cf the black
extremist movement is the availability of foreign asylum, especially
with regard to black extremists subject to criminal prosecution in the
United States. Some foreign countries, such as Cuba, provide a temporary
safe haven for these individuals. Qnformation has been received that ,
passports and funds for travel have also been furnished by countries
such as Cuba, North Korea, and " ' Communist intelligence
services do not, at present, play a major role in the black extremist
movement; however, all such services have established contact with
individual black militants. Thus, the penetration and manipulation cf
black extremist groups by these intelligence services remain distinct
possibilities . V Communist intelligence services are capaole of using tiieir
personnel, facilities, and agent assets to work in the black extremist
field. The Soviet and Cuban services have major capabilities available. J
B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures
There are some definite gaps in the current overall ^„
intelligence penetration of the black extremist movement. For example,
although there appears to be sufficient live informant coverage of the BPP
_ _ _ additional penetration ^_ _ _
'is needed.
High echelon informant coverage could conceivably pre^snt violence,
sabotage, or insurrection if such activity was planned by BPP leadership.
Insufficient coverage of _ '_ ' BPP is offset
to some extent by technical coverage '
Penetration of. leadership levels has been hindered' in part
by current BPP policies which prevent rank-and-file members from
advancing to leadership roles.
Improvement in coverage of BPP financial activities could
be made, particularly with regard to sources of funds and records.
Information received to date indicates that financial support for the BPP
has been furnished by both foreign individuals and domestic sources. Thus,
a deeper penetration and correlation of foreign and domestic information
received is essential to a full determination of BPP finances. Coverage of
BPP finances has been hampered by fact that BPP leaders handle financial
matters personally.
In view of the increased amount of foreign travel and contacts
by BPP leaders abroad, there is a clear-cut need for more complete _,
Coverage of foreign involvement in BPP activities.
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158
1. Other Black Extremist Org anizations.' Informant
coverage of the KOI is substantial, enabling its activities to be followed
on a current basis. Coverage of militant black student groups and
individuals is very limited because of the .sensitive areas involved. An
effective source of such coveragewould be reliable, former members
of the Armed Forces presently attending college. Live informant
coverage, particularly with respMfc&to tlfe activities and plans of
■unaffiliated black militants, nseds to be increased. More sources both
in the United States and abroad in a position to determine the amount of
foreign involvement in black extremist activities need to be developed.
Maximum use of communication interceptions would materially
increase the current capabilities of the intelligence community to develop
highly important data regarding black extremist activities.
13
159
HI. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat
The threat posed by the communist intelligence services
must be assessed in two areas: (1) direct intervention in fomenting
and/or influencing domestic unrest; (2) extensive espionage activities.
Taken in complete context, these services constitute a grave
threat to the internal security of the United States because of their size,
capabilities, widespread spheres of influence, and targeting of the
United States as "enemy number one. " -The largest and most skilled
of these services is the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB)
which has roughly 300,000 personnel of whom some 10,000 are engaged
. in foreign operations/"/
1. Intervention in Domestic Unrest . There have been no
substantial indications that the communist intelligence services have
actively fomented domestic unrest. Their capability cannot, hcwover,
be minimized and the likelihood of their initiating direct intervention
would be in direct relationship to the deterioration of the political
climate and/or imminence of hostilities. The ingredients for a first-,
rate capability are present, including both, the personnel and the
ingrained philosophy and know-how for using such tactics.
Communist intelligence has shown a real capability to
foment disorder in a number of trouble spots. The dissidence and
violence in the United States today present adversary intelligence
services with opportunities unparalleled for forty years. While
fostering disorder ani rebellion through communist parties and
fronts is a potent weapon in the communist arsenal, their past
success has been evident in clandestine recruitment efforts on
campuses during times of unrest. H. A. R. (Kim) Philby, Guy Burgess,
and Donald Maclean were all students at Cambridge during the depression
period of the 1930's and were in the vanguard of what was then the New
Left. Their recruitment and cooperation with Soviet intelligence wreaked
havoc on British intelligence, and also compromised U. S. security in
those sectors where they had authorized access.
14
160
1 For instance, about 900
members of the. Venceremos Brigade, "a group of American youths,
recently completed a round trip to Cuba. This travel was financed
by the Cuban Government. While in Cuba, they were exhorted to
actively participate in United States revolutionary activities up on
their return to the United States.)
A sabotage manual, prepared in' turned up in the
hands of individuals responsible for recent bombings! _
. While the potential for widespread, well-organized
incidents oi violence generated and controlled by the Cuban intelligence
service is considered minimal, jsolated occurrences of this nature must
be considered probable. i.TheL Services appear to have assumed the
passive roles of observers and reporters."}
The communist intelligence services maintain contacts
and exert influence among a variety of individuals and organizations
through the exploitation of ideological, cultural, and ethnic ties.
Most of these liaisons are maintained with some degree of openness
with individuals associated with the Communist Party, USA, various
of its front groups, /ether pro-Soviet organizations] nationality groups,
and foreign -language newspapers. These contacts are exploited as
sources for and propaganda outlets of communist intelligence services.
Regarded individually, these efforts cannot be considered a major
threat to our internal security; however, in total, they represent a
sizable element of our population which can be influenced in varying
degrees by communist intelligence service operations.
2. Inte lligen ce Ope rations . Persistent and pervasive
intelligence operations wTiicfiliave their inspiration and direction supplied
by communist intelligence services represent a major threat to the
internal secu rity-}* ~]
15 -
161
(DELETED)
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162
B. Assessment of Current Intell igence Collection
r.*Sg6pe fin d Eff e ctiveness" ."** The scope of overall intelligence
efforts is encompassed in the threefold goals cf penetration, intelligence,
and prosecution. . Domestic implementation of these goals is delimited
by agreement among United States intelligence agencies. Intelligence
components of the United States military services are immediately *
concerned with protecting the integrity of their personnel and instEfl-
lations.
Methods used in these endeavors, employed in varying
degrees by U.S. intelligence agencies dependent upon their specific
tasks are: penetrations; defectors; double agent operations; physical,
technical, and photographic surveillances; examination and analysis
of overt publications; information supplied by friendly intelligence +
services;/and COMINT.' ' **
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163
(DELETED)
2. Gaps in Current Coverage
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IV'. OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS
__ __ „ ,, y-
A. Asse ssment of Current Internal Security Throat
1. Communist Party. The Communist Party continues
as a distinct threat to the internal security because of its extremely
close ties and total commitment to the Soviet Union. There are many
' thbuSfnds of people in the United States who adhere to a Marxist
philosophy and agree" with the* basic objectives of the Communist *"
■ Party although they do not identify themselves specifically with 'the"
i : organization. The Party receives most of its finances from the Soviet
• Union, adheres to Soviet policies explicitly, and provides a major out-
let for Soviet propaganda. The Party will without Question continue to
' implement whatever orders it receives from the Soviets in the future.
! There is little likelihood that the Communist Party, U^A,
will instigate civil disorders or use terrorist tactics in the foreseeable
future. Its strong suit is propaganda. Through its publications and
propaganda it will continue its efforts to intensify civil disorders, and'
foment unrest in the Armed Forces, labor unions, and minority groups.
The Party is on the periphery of the radical youth movement and is:
* striving to strengthen its role in this movement and to attract new *
members through a recently formed youth organization, but it does *
not appear this group will achieve any substantial results for the "
* Party in the future.
"•"•■•2: Socialist Workers'-Party a nd Other Tr o*«tadat .Groups. '
These organizations have an estimated membership of] The
major Trotskyist organization, the Socialist Workers Party, has
attained an influential role in the antiwar movement through its
youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance, which dominates the
Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam and which
has more than doubled its size on college campuses in the past vear.*'
' Trotskyist groups have participated in major confrontations with'
authorities both on and off campuses and have consistently supported
civil disorders. At this time they do not pose a major threat to
instigate insurrection or to commit terrorist acts. The propaganda
of these groups, while emphasizing student unrest, is also aimed at ,
creating dissatisfaction in labor organizations and in the Armed Forces.
The Trotskyist organizations maintain close relations with the Fourth
International, a foreign-based worldwide Trotskyist movement.
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166
4. Pu erto Rican Nati onalis t Extremist Groups . The
radical Puerto Rican independence movement has spawned approximately
ten violently anti-American groups committed to Puerto Rican self-
. ^termination. Revolutionary violence is a major aim of the estimated
members of these groups and if sufficiently strong, they would
"noTTTesitate to mount armed insurrection. Since July, 1967, some.
130 bombings in Puerto Rico and in the New York City area have been
attributed to these extremists. American-owned businesses have
been the main targets, but there has been a recent upsurge of violence
against U.S. defense facilities in Puerto Rico. .
B. Assessmen t of Current Intelligence Coverage
1. Scone and Effectiveness. Coverage of the Communist
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167
Coverage of the .Trotskyist and ' "igroups
Current live informant cover^u can furnish
information on the general activities of these groups and it should
serve to warn of policy changes in favor of insurrection or sabotage.
Informant penetration of the Puerto Rican independence
groups provides information on the objectives of most of these
organizations as well as the identities of their members. However,
these sources have limited ability to provide advance information
regarding violence committed by these groups or by individual members.
2. Gaps in Current Coverage. ' u/
Closer coverage at the policy-making levels of the Puerto
Rican independence groups is needed to obtain more comprehensive
information on persons involved in terrorist activities. The small
memberships of many of these organizations is a major reason for
the limited coverage.
. 3. Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection.
The selective use of electronic sur"veillanccs~would"n"iaterially enhance
the intelligence coverage of the policy-making levels of these organizations.
A particular benefit of electronic surveillance in the Puerto Rican field
could be the development of information identifying persons involved in . ,■
terrorist activities. ' Communications intelligence coverage and travel \
control measures could be improved to provide greater awareness of ',
the travel and other activities of individuals of security interest'. Through \
the establishment of additional informant coverage on college campuses,
the involvement of these organizations in the radicalization of students
could be assessed with increased accuracy.
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168
PART TWO
RESTRAINTS ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
. The-Committee noted that the President had made it clear
■ that he desired full consideration be given to any regulations, pplicies,
■-.or procedures whiah tend to limit the effectiveness of domestic intelli-
gence collection. The Committee further noted that the President wanted
the pros and cons of such restraints clearly set forth so that the
President will be able to decide whether or not a change in current^
. policies, practices, er procedures should be made.
During meetings of the Committee, a variety of limitations
and restraints were discussed. All of the agencies involved, Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), the three military counterintelligence ^
services, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security
Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), partici- f
pated in these considerations.
In the light of the directives furnished to the Committee by
the White House, the subject matters hereinafter set forth were reviewed
for the consideration and decision of the President.
I. SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL RESTRAINTS
A. Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence
Preliminary Discussion
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169
Nature of Restriction
Advantages of Maintaining Restriction
Advantages of Relaxing Restriction
(DELETED)
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B. Electronic Surveillances and! Penetrations 1 'y-
Preliminary Discussion
The limited number of electronic surveillances and
penetrations substantially restricts the collection of valuable
intelligence information of material importance to the entire
intelligence community
Nature of Restrictions
Electronic surveillances have been used on a selective
basis. Restrictions, initiated at the highest levels of the Executive
Branch, arose as a result of the condemnation of these techniques
by civil rights groups, .Congressional concern for invasion of privacy,
and the possibility of their adverse effect on criminal prosecutions.
Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions
1. Disclosure and embarrassment to the using agency
and/or the United States is always possible since such techniques
often require that the services or advice of outside personnel be
used in the process of installation.
3. Certain elements of the press in the United States and
abroad would undoubtedly seize upon disclosure of electronic coverage
in an effort to discredit the United States.
4. The monitoring of electronic surveillances requires
considerable manpower and, where foreign establishments are involved,
the language resources of the agencies could be severely taxed.
26
62-685 O - 76 - 12
172
Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions
1. The U. S. Government has an overriding obligation to
use every available scientific means to detect and neutralize forces
which pose a direct threat to the Nation.
2. Every major intelligence service in the world,, including
those of the communist bloc, use such techniques as an essential part
of their operations, and it is believed the general public would support
their use by the United States for the same purpose.
3. The President historically has had the authority to act
in matters of national security. In addition, Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provides a statutory basis.
4. Intelligence data from electronic coverage is not readily
obtainable from other techniques or sources. Such data includes infor- -■••
mation which might assist in formulating foreign policy decisions,
information leading to the identification of intelligence and/or espionage
principals and could well include the first indication of intention to commit
hostile action against the United States.
5. Acquisition of such material from COMINT without .
benefit of the assistance which electronic surveillance techniques can
provide, if possible at all, would be extremely expensive. Therefore, this
approach could result in considerable dollar savings compared to collection
methods.
- 27 -
173
DECISION:, Electronic Surveillances
and Penetrations
_ Present procedures on electronic coverage should
continue.
_ Present procedures should be changed to permit
intensification of coverage of individuals and
groups in the United States who pose a major
threat to the internal security.
_ Present procedures should be changed to permit
intensification of coverage
More information is needed.
NOTE : The FBI does not wish to change its present procedure of
selective coverage on major internal security threats as
it believes this coverage is adequate at this time. The
FBI would not oppose other agencies seeking authority of
the Attorney General for coverage required by them and there-
after instituting such coverage themselves.
- 28 -
174
C. Mail Coverage
Preliminary Discussion
The use of mail covers can result in the collection of
valuable information relating to contacts between U. S. nationals and
foreign governments and intelligence services. CIA and the military
investigative agencies have found. this information particularly helpful
in the past. Essentially, there are two types of mail coverage: routine
coverage is legal, while the second — covert coverage — is not. Routine
coverage involves recording information from the face of envelopes. It
is available, legally, to any duly authorized Federal or state investi-
gative agency submitting a written request to the Post Office Deoartment
and has been used frequently by the military intelligence services.
Covert mail coverage, also known as "sophisticated mail coverage, "
or "flaps and seals, " entails surreptitious screening and may include
opening and examination o f domestic or foreign mail . This technique is
based on high-level cooperation of top echelon postal officials.!
Nature of Restrictions
Covert coverage has been discontinued while routine
coverage has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth of publicity
arising from disclosure of routine mail coverage during legal
proceedings and publicity afforded this matter in Congressional
hearings involving accusations of governmental invasion of privacy.
Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions
Routine Coverage:
1. Although this coverage is legal, charges of invasion
of privacy, no matter how ill-founded, are possible.
2. This coverage depends on the cooperation of rank-and-file
postal employees and is, therefore, more susceptible to compromise.
29
175
Covert Coverage :
1. Coverage directed against diplomatic establishments,
if disclosed, could have adverse diplomatic repercussions.
2. This coverage, not having. sanction of law, runs the
risk of any illicit act magnified by the involvement of a Government
agency.
3. Information secured from such coverage could not be used
for prosecutive purposes.
Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions
Routine Coverage :
1. Legal mail coverage is used daily by both local and
many Federal authorities in criminal investigations. The us/ of this
technique should be available to permit coverage of individuals and
groups in the United States who pose a threat to the internal security.
"/
Covert Coverage :
1. High-level postal authorities have, in the past, provided
complete cooperation and have maintained full security of this program.
2. This technique involves negligible risk of compromise.
Only high echelon postal authorities know of its existence, and personnel
involved are highly trained, trustworthy, and under complete control
of the intelligence agency.
3. ' This coverage has been extremely successful in
producing hard-core and authentic intelligance which is not obtainable
from any other source. An example is a case involving the interception
of a letter to a establishment in! . The writer offered to
sell information to the! _ _ .nd enclosed a sample of information
available to him. Analysis determined that the writer could have
glven( information which might have been more damaging
30-
176
DECISION: Mail Coverage
j Present restrictions on both types of mail
I coverage should be continued.
Restrictions on legal coverage should be
removed.
\ Present restrictions on covert coverage should
': be relaxed on selected targets of priority foreign
intelligence and internal security interest.
More information is needed.
NOTE:!
The FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail coverage
because it is clearly illegal and it is likely that, if done, infor-
mation would leak out of the Post Office to the press and serious
damage would be done to the intelligence community .j The FBI
has no objection to legal mail coverage providing it is done on
a carefully controlled and selective basis in both criminal and
security matters-.
*>
31
177
D. Surreptitious Entry
Preliminary Discussion
Nature of Restrictions
Use of surreptitious entry, also referred to as "anonymous
sources: and "black bag jobs, " has been virtually eliminated.
Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions
1. The activity involves illegal entry and trespass.
2. Information which is obtained through this technique
could not be used for prosecutive purposes.
3. The public disclosure of this technique would result in
widespread publicity and embarrassment. The news media would portray
the incident as a flagrant violation of civil rights
Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions
1. Operations of this type are performed by a small number
of carefully trained and selected personnel under strict supervision. The
technique is implemented only after full security is assured. It has been
used in the past with highly successful results and without adverse effects.
- 32
178
2. Benefits accruing from this technique in the past have
been innumerable |
3. In the past this technique, when used against subversives,
has produced valuable intelligence material.
. DECISION: Surreptitious Entry
Present restrictions should be continued.
Present restrictions should be modified to permit
procurement !
Presehrrestrrctions should also be modified
" to permit selective use of this technique against other
urgent and high priority internal security targets.
More information is needed.
NOTE: The FBI is opposed to surreptitious entry
,33 -
179
E. Development of Campus Sources
Preliminary Discussion
Public disclosure of CIA links with the National Student
Association and the subsequent issuance of the Katzenbach Report
have contributed to a climate adverse to intelligence-type activity
on college campuses and with student-related groups. It should be
noted that the Katzenbach Report itself does not specifically restrain
CIA from developing positive or counterintelligence sources to work
on targets abroad.
Restrictions currently in force limit certain other elements
of the intelligence community access to some of the most troublesome
areas: campuses, college faculties, foreign and domestic youth groups,
leftist journalists, and black militants. It is recognized that these are
prime targets of communist intelligence- services and that the opportunity
for foreign communist exploitation increases in proportion to the weakness
of a U.S. counterintelligence effort.
Nature of Restrictions
The need for great circumspection in making contacts
with students, faculty members, and employees of institutions of
learning is widely recognized. However, the requirements of the
intelligence community for increased information in this area is
obvious from the concern of the White House at the absence of hard
information about the plans and programs of campus and student-
related militant organizations. At the present time no sources are
developed among secondary school students and, with respect to
colleges and universities, sources are developed only among
individuals who have reached legal age, with few exceptions. This
policy is designed to minimize the possibility of embarrassment
and adverse publicity, including charges of infringement of academic
freedom.
- 34
180
Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions
1. Students, faculty members, and others connected with
educational institutions are frequently sensitive to and hostile towards
any Government activity which smacks of infringement on academic
freedom. They are prone to publicize inquiries by governmental
agencies and the resulting publicity can often be misleading in
portraying the Government's interest.
2. Students are frequently immature and unpredictable.
They cannot be relied on to maintain confidences or to act with discretion
to the same extent as adult sources.
Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions
1. To a substantial degree, militant New Left and antiwar
groups in the United States are comprised of students, faculty members,
and others connected with educational institutions. To a corresponding
degree, effective coverage of these groups and activities depends upon
development of knowledgeable sources in the categories named. In this
connection, the military services have capabilities which could be of
value to the FBI.
2. Much of the violence and disorders which have occurred
on college campuses have been of a hastily planned nature. Unless
sources are available within the student bodies, it is virtually impossible
to develop advance information concerning such violence.
3. The development of sources among students affiliated
with New Left elements affords a unique opportunity to cultivate informant
prospects who may rise to positions of leadership in the revolutionary
movement or otherwise become of great long-range value.
4. The extraordinary and unprecedented wave of destruction
which has swept U. S. campuses in the past several months and which
in some respects represents a virtual effort to overthrow our system
provides a clear justification for the development of campus informants
in the interest of national security.
-35
181
5. Contacts with students will make it possible to
obtain information about travel abroad by U. S. students and about
attendance at international conferences.
DECISION: Development of Campus Sources
Present restrictions on development of campus *
and student-related sources should be continued.
Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit
expanded coverage of violence-prone campus and
student-related groups.
CIA coverage of American students (and others)
traveling abroad or living abroad should be increased.
More information is needed. ,
NOTE : The FBI is opposed to removing any present controls and
restrictions relating to the development of campus sources.
To do so would severely jeopardize its investigations and
could result in leaks to the press which would be damaging
and which could result in charges that investigative agencies
are interfering with academic freedom.
36 -
182
F. Use of Military Undercover Agents
Preliminary Discussion
The use of undercover agents by the military services to
develop domestic intelligence is currently limited to penetration of
organizations whose membership includes military personnel and whose
activities pose a direct threat to the military establishment. For example,
although the Navy has approximately 54 Naval ROTC units and numerous
classified Government contract projects on various campuses across
the country, the Naval Investigative Service conducts no covert collection
on college campuses. The same is true of the other military services.
Nature of Restrictions
The use of undercover agents by the military investigative
services to develop domestic intelligence among civilian ,.,_
targets is believed beyond the statutory intent of the Congress as
expressed in Title 10, U. S. Code, and in current resource authoriza-
tions. The Delimitations Agreement (1949 agreement signed by the
FBI, Army, Navy and Air Force which delimits responsibility for
each agency with regard to investigations of espionage, counter-
espionage, subversion and sabotage) reflects the current missions
of the FBI and the military services. Further, there is a lack of
assets to undertake this mission unless essential service-related
counterintelligence missions are reduced. There is also concern for
morale and disciplinary reactions within the services should the
existence of such covert operations become known.
Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions
1. If the utilization of military counterintelligence in this
mission is contrary to the intent of the Congress, discovery of employ-
ment may result in unfavorable legislation and further reductions in
appropriations.
2. Lacking direct statutory authority, the use of the military
services in this mission could result in legal action directed against the
Executive Branch.
3. The use of military personnel to report on civilian
activities for the benefit of civilian agencies will reduce the ability of
the military services to meet service-connected intelligence responsibilities
- 37 -
183
4. If expansion of the mission of the military services with
regard to college campuses is to provide coverage of any significance,
it will require corollary increases in resources.
5. Prosecutions for violations of law discovered in the
course of military penetration of civilian organizations must be tried
in civil courts. The providing of military witnesses will require compli-
cated interdepartmental coordination to a much greater extent than the
present and will serve, in-the long run, to reduce security.
6. Disclosure that military counterintelligence agencies have
been furnishing information obtained through this technique to nonmilitary
investigative agencies with respect to civilian activities would certainly
result in considerable adverse publicity. The Army's recent experience
with former military intelligence personnel confirms this estimate.
Since obligated service officers, first enlistees and draftees are drawn
from a peer group in which reaction is most unfavorable, morale and
disciplinary problems can be anticipated.
Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions
1. Lifting these restrictions would expand the scope of
domestic intelligence collection efforts by diverting additional manpower
and resources for the collection of information on college campuses and
in the vicinity of military installations.
2. The use of undercover agents by the military counter-
intelligence agencies could be limited to localized targets where the
threat is great and the likelihood of exposure minimal. Moreover,
controlled use of trusted personnel leaving the service to return to
college could expand the collection capabilities at an acceptable risk.
3. The military services have a certain number of personnel
pursuing special academic courses on campuses and universities. Such
personnel, who in many instances have already been investigated for
security clearance, would represent a valuable pool of potential sources
for reporting on subversive activities of campus and student- related
groups.
- 38
184
DECISION: Use of Military
Undercover Agents
. Present restrictions should be retained.
The counterintelligence mission of the military
services should be expanded to include the active
collection of intelligence concerning student-
related dissident activities, with provisions for
a close coordination with the FBI.
No change should be made in the current
mission of the military counterintelligence
services; however,, present restrictions
should be relaxed to permit the use of trusted
military personnel as FBI assets in the
collection of intelligence regarding student- .
related dissident activities.
More information is needed.
NOTE- The FBI is opposed to the use of any military undercover agents
' to develop domestic intelligence information because this would
be in violation of the Delimitations Agreement. The military
services, joined by the FBI, oppose any modification of the
Delimitations Agreement which would extend their jurisdiction
beyond matters of interest to the Department of Defense.
39
185
H. BUDGET AND MANPOWER RESTRICTIONS
The capability of member agencies, NSA/CIA, DIA, FBI,
and the military counterintelligence services, to collect intelligence
data is limited by available resources, particularly in terms of budget
and/or qualified manpower. For some agencies fiscal limitations or
recent cutbacks have been acute. Budgetary requirements for some
agencies, other than the FBI, are reviewed and passed upon by officials
who, in some instances, may not be fully informed concerning intelligence
requirements.
The military services noted that cuts in budget requirements
for counterintelligence activities have the effect of severely hampering
the ability of these services to accomplish missions relating to coverage
of threats to the national security. Budgetary deficiencies have occurred
at a time when investigative work loads are increasing significantly.
Manpower limitations constitute a major restriction on
the FBI's capabilities in the investigation of subversive activities.
The problem is further complicated by the fact that, even if substantial
numbers of Agents could be recruited on a crash basis, the time required
to conduct background investigations and to provide essential training
would mean several months' delay in personnel being available for use
against the rapidly escalating subversive situation.
-40 -
186
In the event, as a result of this report, additional
collection requirements should be levied on the agencies involved,
it would be necess ary to prov ide (or essential funding. For exampie,
• — — ~ ' li
DECISION: Budget and Manpower Restrictions
Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as
to projected manpower needs and ether costs in the
event the various investigative restraints herein are
lifted.
Each agency must operate within its current
budgetary or manpower limitations, irrespective
of action required as result of this report.
More' information is needed.
41 -
187
PART THREE
EVALUATION OF INTERAGENC Y CO ORDINATION
i. ' cuiIren^ Procedures to effect coor dination.
There is currently no operational body or mechanism •
specifically charged with the overall analysis, coordination, and
continuing evaluation of practices and policies governing the acquisi-
tion and dissemination of intelligence, the pooling of resources, and
the correlation of operational activities in the domestic field.
Although a substantial exchange of intelligence and research
material between certain of the interested agencies already exists, much
remains to be done in the following areas: (1) the preparation of coordinated
intelligence estimates in a format useful for policy formulation; (2) the
coordination of intelligence collection resources of the member agencies
and the establishment of clear-cut priorities for the various agencies;
and (3) the coordination of the operational activities of member agencies
in developing the required intelligence.
II. SUGGESTED MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
It is believed that an interagency group on domestic
intelligence should be established to effect coordination between the
various member agencies. This group would define the specific require-
ments of the various agencies, provide regular evaluations of domestic
intelligence, develop recommendations relative to policies governing
operations in the field of domestic intelligence, and prepare periodic
domestic intelligence estimates which would incorporate the results
of the combined efforts of the entire intelligence community.
Membership in this group should consist of appropriate
representatives named by the Directors of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, the Centrai Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, tlie
Defense Intelligence Agency, and the counterintelligence agencies of the
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, In addition, an
42
62-685 O - 76 - 13
188
appropriate representative of the White House would have membership
The committee would report periodically to the White House, and a
White House staff representative would coordinate intelligence originating
with this committee in the same manner as Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant
to the President, coordinates foreign intelligence on behalf of the
President. The chairman would be appointed by the President.
This interagency group would have authority to determine
appropriate staff requirements and to implement these requirement-
subject to the approval of the President, in order to meet the '
responsibilities and objectives described above.
DECISION: Permanent Interagency Group
An ad h °c group consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA,
DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies
should be appointed and should serve as long as the
President deems necessary, to provide evaluations
of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic
intelligence estimates, and carry out the other
objectives indicated above. The ad hoc group should
be tasked to develop a permanent organization to
.carry out the objectives of this report.
A Permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA,
NSA, DIA, and the military counterintelligence
agencies should be appointed to provide evaluations of
domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic
intelligence estimates, and carry out the othe^-
objectives indicated above.
No further action required.
More information is needed.
NOTE: The FBI is opposed to the creation of a permanent committee'.
for the purpose of providing evaluations of domestic intelligence'
however, the FBI would approve of preparing periodic domestic '
intelligence estimates.
43
189
Exhibit 2
752 Documents
Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan:
Anclys'r- and Strategy
July, 1970
Memc-atattni :or: H. R. Kuk'eni.v-
From: Ton - . Charies Hu.--;on
Subject: Domestic intelligence revii-.y
1. Backqrcvnd
A v-Tr^-i; ennp consisting of the top rfon-ie«:c intelligence
cikirils if the Ffsl C!A. DIA. NAS. ana jj.li if ;' e mil:'"..-,'
service^ ?.:•,. t roiiiLir! - - throughout June to dv^u^s the p.-obler^s out-
lined by tru- i.esijent iiii-I tc draft the attached report. The dis-
cus/k'r.s were f:ar.'< :ir.d the qiaii;- of vcrk firJl-raic.' Cepperat'On
wa.; ox«-t;!-;ri. and aii were delign : ed that an opr-Trunity was
finn.l'.y a' hand to ;. 'dress thenseives jointlv to the serious internal
Security threat which exists.
I partic ,-.'Ud in ail meeting:-., but re'tricd my involvement to
keeping the committee on. the tarrei the Piesiucnt established. Niy
impression :hat the report would be more ticci.rnte and ".he reconir
nie::d:tt: on-, more r.elptu!,::' the agencies were allow. ?d wide lati-
' tude in expressi:.^ their opinions and working ou: arrangements
which thc> felt met ths President's r.oiii'-emcnts co:sistent with
the resc'trce? .:nu u:!s,ie::s of the ntemiier agencies..
2. Mr. Hoover
J went Into this exercise fearful that C.l.A. wouid refuse to
coope-atc. in fact, D.^k Helms [Director of Central intelligence]
was most cooperative and helpful, ar.d the only stumbling bloc':
•was Mr. Hoover. He attempted at the first meeting to divert the
committee from operational problems and redirect its mandate to
the preparation ct another analysis ot existing intelligence. I de-
clined, te i.equiesce in this approach, ar.d succeeded in getting the
committee back on target.
When the working g:cup completed its report, Mr. Hoover re-
fused to go along with a single conclusion drawn or support a sin-
gle recommendation made. His position was twofold: -
(1) Current operations are perfectly satisfactory and (2) No
one has any business commenting on procedures he has established
for the collection cf intelligence by the F.B.I. He attempted to
modify the body of the report, but 1 successfully opposed it on the
190
Documents 153
grounds that the report was the conclusion of all the agencies, -not
merely the F.B.I. Mr. Hoover then entered his objections as
footnotes to the report. Cumulatively, his footnotes suggest that he
is perfectly satisfied with current procedures and is opposed to
any changes whatsoever. As you will note from the report, his
objections are generally inconsistent and frivolous — most express
concern about possible embarrassment to the intelligence com-
munity (i.e., Hoover) from public disclosure of clandestine opera-
tions.
Admiral Gayler and General Bennett were greatly displeased
by Mr. Hoover's attitude and his insistence on footnoting objec-
tions. They wished to. raise a formal protest and sign the report
only with the understanding that they opposed the footnotes. I
prevailed upon them not to do so since it would only aggravate
Mr. Hoover and further complicate our efforts. They graciously
agreed to go along with my suggestion in order to avoid a nasty
scene and jeopardize the possibility of positive action resulting
from the leport. I assured them that their opinion would be
brought so : l :e attention of the President.
3. Threat Assessment
The fir?;; 23 pages of the report con.-titute an assessment of the
existing internal security threat, our current intelligence coverage
of triis threai, and areas where our coverage is inadequate. All
agencies concurred in thii assessment, and it serves to explain the
importance of expanded intelligence collection efforts.
4. Restraints on Intelligence Collection
Part Two of the report discusses specific operational restraints
■which currently restrict the capability of the intelligence com-
munity to collect the types of information necessary to deal effec-
tively with the internal security threat. The report explains the
nature of the restraints and sets out the arguments for and against
modifying them. My concern was to afford the President the
strongest arguments on both sides of the question so that he could
make an informed decision as to the future course of action to be
followed by the intelligence community.
I might point out that of all the individuals involved in the
preparation and consideration of this report, only Mr. Hoover is
satisfied with existing procedures.
Those individuals within the F.B.I, who have day-to-day re-
sponsibilities for domestic intelligence operations privately dis-
agree with Mr. Hoover and believe that it is imperative that
changes in operating procedures be initiated at once.
1 am attaching to this memorandum my recommendations
on the decision the President should make with regard to these
operational restraints. Although the report sets forth the pros and
cons on each issue, it may be helpful to add my specific recom-
191
754 Documents
mendations and the reasons therefore in the event the President
has some doubts on a specific course of action.
5. Improvement in Interagency Coordination
All members of the committee and its working group, with ths
exception of Mr. Hoover, believe that it is imperative that a con-
tinuing mechanism be established to effectuate the coordination
of domestic intelligence efforts and the evaluation of domestic in-
telligence data. In the past there has been no systematic erfort to
mobilize the full resources of the intelligence community in the
internal security area and there has been no mechanism for prepar-
ing community-wide domestic intelligence estimates such as is dona
in the foreign intelligence area by the United, States Intelligence
Board. Domestic intelligence information coming into the White
House has been fragmentary and unevaluated. We have not had for
example, a community-wide estimate of what we might expect
short- or long-term in the cities or on the campuses cr within thd
military establishment.
Unlike most of the bureaucracy, the intelligence community
welcomes direction and leadership fror.: the White House. There
appears to be agreement, with the exception of Mr. Hoover,
that effective coordination within the community is possible only if
there is direction from the White House. Moreover, the community
is pleased that the Wnite House is finally showing interest in
their activities and an awareness of the threat which they so
acutely recognize.
1 believe that we 'vil!. be making a major contribution to the
security of the country if we can work out an arrangement
which provides f° r institutionalized coordination within '.he in-
telligence coirur.ucity and effective leadership from the White
House.
6. Implementation of the President's Decisions
If the President should decide to lift some of the current re-
strictions and if he should decide to authorize a formalized do-
mestic intelligence struct:ire, 1 would recommend the following
steps:
(A) Mr. Hoover should be called in privately for a stroking
session at which the President explains the decision he has made,
thanks Mr. Hoover for his candid advice and past cooperation, and
indicates he is counting on Edgar's cooperation in implementing
the new decisions.
(B) Following this Hoover session, the same individuals who
were present at the initial session in the Oval Office should be
invited back to meet with the President. At that time, the Presi-
dent should thank them for the report, announce his decisions, in-
dicate his desires for future activity, and present each with an
L92
Documents -. 755
autographed copy of the photo of the first meeting which Ollie
took.
(C) An official memorandum setting forth the precise decisions
of the President should be prepared so that there can be no
misunderstanding. We should also incorporate a review procedure
which v iil enable us to ensure that the decisions are fully im-
plemented.
I hate to suggest a further imposition on the President's time,
but think these steps will be necessary to pave over some of the
obvious problems which may arise if the President decides, as I
hope he will, to overrule Mr. Hoover's objections to many of the
proposals made in this report. Kf-.vir.g seen the President in action
with Mr. Hoover, I am confident that he can handle this situation
in such a way that we can get what we want without putting
Edgar's nose out of joint. At the same time, we can capitalize on
the goodwill the President has built up with the other principals
end minimize the risk that they may feel they are being forced
to take a back seat to Mr. Hoover.
7. Conclusion
. I am delighted with the substance of this rcrort and relieve it is
a first-rate job. I have great respect for the integrity, loyalty, and
competence of the men who are operationally responsible for
internal security matters and believe hat we are on the threshold
of an unexcelled opportunity ;o cope with a very serious problem
in its germinal stages when we can avoid the necessity for harsh
measures by acting swift, discreetly, and decisively to deflect the
threat before it reaches alarming proportions. •
1 might add, in conclusion, that it is my personal opinion that
Mr. Hoover will not hesitate to accede to any decision which
the President makes, and the President should not, therefore, be
reluctant to overrule Mr. Hoover's objections. Mr. Hoover is set in
his ways and can be bull-headed as he!!, but he is a loyal trooper.
Twenty years ago he would never have raised the type of .objec-
tions he has here, but he's getting old and worried about his
legend. He makes life tough in ;his a~ea. but no: impossible — for
he'll respond to direction by the President and ;hat is all we
need to set the domestic intelligence house in order.
193
22.1 Tom Hustom memorandum
I
OPERATIONAL R£SV :1 A;>:~"S ON .. .'.•".Ll.ir.ZXCC CO..;..~C". .'. .V.
A. Inter:) rctivv ?.'j:i':r.i'.".- ■'■■:-. C."r: : .--r icatlons Intelligence, (pp. 2j-?.i',
Recommendation:
Prcscr.t interpretation should be broadened to per. .-.it'
and program for covu.-ajc by NSA of the- commui-.icat.o..
of U. S. citizens using ir.ier.-.ationai facilities.
Rationale:
The FBI doc-s r.ot have the capability to rnonito.-
intcr national communications. NSA is current. y
doing so or. a restricted basis, and tiie informa-
tion it has provided has been most helpful. Muc. •
of this information is particularly useful to the
White House and it would be to our disadvantage
to allow the FBI to determine what NSA should, co
in this area without regard to our own require-
ments. No appreciable risk is involved in this
course of actio:-..
B. Electr onic Surveillances and Penetrations, (pp. 26-28)
Recommendation:
■ ' Present procedure's should be changed to permit
intensification of coverage of individuals and
groups in the United States who pose a major
threat to the internal security.
ALSO, present procedures should be changed to
* pcrir.it intensification 0: coverage o. foreign
nationals and diplomatic ustau.*s:..-;.ents i.-. tae
United States of interest to ::\c intelligence
community.
Rationale:
At the pros- ... t'.r.-.e, le&s than of. eii.-ctro.v.c
penetrations ..re operative. Tr.is ir.clv.Gos
cover, . e of the fi^'u'oA ;.r.ci organized crime
tarp.et-. v-'iii; o... . a .cw :.ui:".on;-..:c. a;:ai:'.^t
■ subjects of pre-.- .ig .'.-.'..: rr.ai r.cturity ir.Lcreit.
■'." i I
- /'/
194
Page 2
Mr. Hoover's statement that the FBI would not oppose
other agencies seeking approval for and operating
electronic surveillances is gratutious since no other
agencies have the capability.
Everyone kr.ov/lcdgable in the field, with the exception
of Mr. Hoover, concurs that existing coverage is grossly
inadequate. CIA ^nd NSA note that this is particularly
true of diplomatic establishments, and we have learned at
the White Mouse that it is also true of New Left groups.
C. Mail Coverag e (pp. ^29-31)
' . Recommendation:
Restrictions on legal coverage should be removed.
ALSO, present restrictions on cove'r t coverage
should be relaxed on selected targets of priority-
foreign intelligence and internal security interest.
Rationale:
There is no valid argument against, use of legal mail
covers except Mr 4 . Koover : s concern that the civil
liberties people may become upset. This risk is surely
an acceptable one and hardly serious enough to justify
denying ourselves a valuable and legal intelligence tool.
Covert' coverage is illegal and there arc serious risks
involved. However^The advantages to be derived from
its vise outweigh the risks. This technique is particularly
valuable in identifying espionage agents and other contacts
of foreign intelligence services. • [
D. Surreptitious Entry (pp. 32-33)
Recommendation:
Present restrictions should be modified to permit pro-
curement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic marerial.
ALSO, present restrictions should be modified to permit
selective use of vhis technique agairst other urgent and
high priority inte :"Kii security targets. v '.~// -'-T/ .
195
Rj.tior.alc:
le^ai: ■ Jt amoun-s
r.d could resulc
Use of this toc'..r.:cuc is c.
to. burglary. It is also
in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it
is also the most fruitful tool ar.d car. produce the
type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any
other fashion.-
The FBI, in •
Mr
conduct such operations wiJ
no exposure. xne
Hoover's younger days-, used to
sat success and with
information secured was invaluable.
Page i
KSA has a particular interest since it is possible by
this technique to secure materials with which NSA car.
. break foreign cryptographic codes. We spend millions
of dollars attempting 'to break these .codes by machine.
One successful surreptitious entry can do the job
.successfully at no dollar cost. ■
Surreptitious entry of facilities occupied by subversive
. elements can turn up information about identities,
methods of operation, and other invaluable investigative
information which is not otherwise obtainable. Tnis
technique would be-particularly helpful if used against
the Weathermen and 31ack Panthers.
The deployment of the Executive Protector Force has
increased the risk of surreptitious entry of diplomatic
establishments. However, it is the belief of all except
Mr. Hoover that the technique can. still be successfully
used on a selective basis.
E. Development of Campus Sources (pp. 34-36)
Recommendation:
Present restrictions should be relaxed to pcriv.it expanded
coverage o: violence-prone campus and student- related
groups.
ALSO, CIA cc\vr,.:;e of American students (a:-.d others,
travciir.g or livhi:' abror-i: shouic: be increased. ,
^y/^/ / -<
196
R^ic:;
The FISI docs not currently recruit any campus sources
among individuals beiou- 21 years of age. This dramaticaUy
reduces the pool from which sources may be drawn. Mr. Hoov
is afraid of a young student surfacing in i'r.c press as an FBI
source, although the reaction in the past to such events has
been minimal. After all, everyone assumes the FSI has
such sources. .
The campus is the battle-ground of the revolutiohary
protest movement. It is impossible to gather effective
intelligence about the movement unless we have campus
sources. The risk of exposure is minimal, and where
exposure occurs the adverse publicity is moderate and
short-lived. It is a price we must be willing to pay for •
effective coverage of the campus scene. The intelligence
community, with the exception of Mr. Hoover, feels
strongly that it is imperative the we increase' the number
of campus sources this fall in order to forestall widespread
•violence.
CIA claims there are no existing restraints on its coverage
of over-seas activities o£ US nationals. However, this
■ coverage has been grossly inadequate since 1965 and an
■explicit directive to increase coverage is required.
, F. Use of Military Undercover Agents (pp. 37-39)
. .. Rcjcommcndation:
Present restrictions should be retained.
Rationale: . • ■ .
The intcllu'.er.co community is agreed that the risks
of li'ftin;; these restraints arc greater than the value
of any po::.;i':,lo ir.toili^.i-.-.co which .ccuid he ac-.y.:: rod
by doin ' =.o. ' ,- — / ■ - -/
<st
197
P*Z*
BUDGET AN'D M AX P O V»' ':'- T-L 'X ■- 5 T RI C T IP N" 5
(pp. 40--U) .
Recommendation :
Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to
projected manpower needs and other costs ir. the event
the various investigative restraints herein are lifted.
Rationale: ..'•:■'.
"In tile event that the above recommendations arc concurred
.. in', it will be necessary to modify existing budgets to provide
' the money and manpower necessary for their implemcr.tatior..
The intelligence community has been badly hit in the budget
squeeze (I suspect the foreign intelligence operations are in
the same shape) and it rr.ay fei will be necessary to make
some modifications. The projected figures should be .
reasonable, but will be subject to individual review if this
. , recommendation is accepted. ' - . <
MEASURES TO IMPROVE DO?.SSTIC INTS1.LIG5XC5 Q?SaA:'GK-
~~~ (pp. 42-43) " ' ■ ■ : T
■ Reconim.cndci.ion: '
•" ". A permanent committee consisting of. thc-F31, CiA, NSA,
DIA, and the. military countcrintcliigcr.ee agencies should
be appointee! to provide evaluations of dorr.esv:c intelligence,
• - prepare periodic domestic ir.tclliger.ee estimates, anc carry
out the other objectives specified in the report.
Rational
The need for increased coortiinr.tior., joint estimates, and
responsiveness to the V/hite Mouse is obvious zo i:\c-.
intelligence community, There are a number of operational
problems which need to be worked out sir.ee htr. rioovov i.~-
fearful o: any mechanism which rni:;ht jeopardise his <":v.v^:.o:.~.;.'.
CIA would pvrfcr'an ad hoc committee to see ho v.* tne isysiem
"worhs, but Qj.h*:v mombe :'s behev..- vn.z v.:: r. v:<>\..u .:.:: :'•'■<■'; v.e--.
iKt: esi abli .-hnien: o*.' c.";Vc-.ive coordinat:*:-. ar.u ..cmj cpov ..».:•'■£•
The valr-i- o; l:u.;n.j; i;;i::i^e;icc co.n'C:'.o:\ v::-;u rair.vA :..
proportional to the availability oi joir.: operation: - , ar.c. .v- - ■■•■
and tin- eo-ab! i:;hmem: o: ibis ir.h,* r -agency p;;v«'.ip \u cs.-.. ■■ ■. ■•'-■
*7
198
Exhibit 3
Jujy 14, 1970
MEMORANDUM FORs .' MR. HUSTON
SUBJECT! Dorocctic Intellige nce Review
• - , c.y.-n'- ' ; —
The recommendations you have proposed as a result of tho review
have been approved by tha President.
Ho does not, however, want to follow "the procedure you outlined ' '
on page 4 of your memorandum regarding implementation. Ha
would prefer that the thing simply be put into motion on the
"basis of this approval. ■ ' '
The formal official memorandum should, of course, bo prepared,
and that should be the device by which to carry it out.
I realize this is contrary to your feeling as to;' the best way to get
. this done. If you feel very strongly that this procedure won't work
you had better let me know and we'll take another stab at it.
Otherwise let's go ahead.
H. R. HALDEMAN
199
Exhibit 4
Retyped from indistinct original 23.7 Tom Huston
memorandum
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 23, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR:
RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
The President has carefully studied the Special Report
of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) and made
the following decisions:
1 Interpretive Restraint on Communications I ntelligence.
National Security Council Into Lligence Directive Kutnber 6 (NSC1D-6)
2. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations .
Also, coverage of foreign nationals and
diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the
intelligence community is to be. intensified.
3 Mail Coverage . Restrictions on legal coverage arc to
be removed.' Restrictions on covert coverage arc to be relaxed to
permit use of this technique on selected targets of priority foreign
intelligence and internal security interest.
U Surreptitious Entry . Restraints on the use of surreptitious
entry are to be removed. Ihe technique is to be used to permit
proc.r2r.ient of vitally needed foreign crytographic material and
against other urgent and high priority internal security targets.
(fSC 06875-70
200
Retyped from indistinct original
-2-
5. Development of Campus Sources . Coverage of violence-
prone campus and student-related groups is to be increased. All
restraints which limit this coverage are to be removed. Also, CIA
coverage of American students (and others) traveling or living
abroad is to be increased.
6. Use of Military Undercover Agents . Present
restrictions are to be retained.
7. Budget and Manpower . Each agency is to submit a detailed
estimate as to projected manpower needs and other costs required to
implement the above decisions.
8. Domestic Intelligence Operations. A committee
consisting of the Directors or other appropriate representatives"
appointed by the Di rectors , of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the
military counter-intelligence agencies is to be constituted effective
Augvist 1, 1970, to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence,
prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, .carry out the
other objectives specified in the report, and perform such other
duties as the President shall, from time to time, assign. The
Director of the FBI shall serve as chairman of the committee.
Further details on the organization and operations of this committee
are set forth in an attached memorandum.
The President has directed that each addressee submit
a detailed report, due on September 1, 1970, or the steps taken
to implement these decisions. ^Further such periodic reports will
be requested as circumstances merit.
The President is aware that procedural problems may
arise in the course of implementing these decisions. However, he is
anxious that such problems be resolved with maximum speed and
minimum misunderstanding. Any difficulties which may arise should
be brought to my immediate attention in order that an appropriate
solution may be found and the President's directives implemented in
a manner consistent with his objectives.
TOM CHARLES HUSTON
Attachment
cc; The President
H.R. Haldeman
201
Retyped from indlnstinct original
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE INTERAGENCY
GROUP ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND
INTERNAL SECURITY (IAG)
1. Membership . The membership shall consist of
representatives of the FBI, CIA, DIA, MSA, and the counter-
intelligence agencies of the Deportments of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force. To insure the high level consideration of issues and
problems which the President expects to be before the group, the
Directors of the respective agencies should serve personally.
However, if necessary and appropriate, the Director of a member
agency may designate another individual to serve in his place.
2. Chairman . The Director of the FBI shall serve as
chairman. He may designate another individual from his agency to
servo as the FBI representative on the group.
3. Observers . The purpose of the group is to effectuate
community-wide coordination and secure the benefits of community-
wide analysis and estimating, '..'hen problems arise which involve
areas of interest to agencies or departments not members of the
group, they shall be invited, at the discretion of the group, to join the
group as observers and participants in those discussions of interest
tc them.. Such agencies and departments include the Departments of
State (I & R, Passport); Treasury (IRS, Customs); Justice (BM)D,
Community Relations Service), and such other agencies which may have
investigative or law enf orcetnenj; responsibilities touching on
. domestic intelligence or internal security matters.
t,, white House Liaison . The President has assigned to Tom
Charles Huston staff responsibility for domestic intelligence and
internal security affairs. He will participate in all activities of the
group as the personal representative of the President.
' 5 Staffing . The group will establish such sub-committees
or working groups as it deems appropriate. .It will' also determine and
implement such staffing requirements as it may deem necessary to
enable it to carry out its responsibilities, subject to the approval ot
the President.
202
. -Retyped from Indistinct original
-2-
**• Duties . The group will have the following duties:
(a) Define the specific requirements of member agencies
of the Intelligence community.
(b) Effect close, direct coordination between member agencies.
(c) Provide regular evaluations of domestic intelligence.
(d) Review policies governing operations in the field of
domestic intelligence and develop recommendations.
(e) Prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates which
incorporate the results of the combined efforts of the intelligence
community .
(f) Perform such other duties as the President may from
time to time assign.
'• Meetings . The group shall meet at the call of the Chairman
a member agency, or the White House representative.
8. Security . Knowledge of the existence and purpose of
the group shall be limited on a strict "need to know" basis. Operations
of, and_papers originating with, the group shall be classified "Top
Secret-Handle Via Comint Channels Only."
9. Other Procedures . „ The group shall establish such
other procedures as it believes, appropriate to the implementation of the
duties set forth above.
Retyped from indistinct original-
203
Exhibit 5
UNITED STATE!
Memorandum
"o Mr. C. D. DeLoach/j ' date: Jrritcr^O, 1969
from W. C. Sullivan
<;/ ■
subject: MR. TOM CHAIiLES .'.HUSTON
STAFF ASSISTANT TO TIE PllESIDF.NT
Keference is made to the enclosed memorandum from W. C. Sullivan
to Mr. DeLoach dated June 18, 1969.
Mr. Huston did come in yesterday. The first thine: he said was
that he had made a mistake in going to Mr. J. Walter Ycagley as
Yeagley did not seem to know anything about the Hew Left. Mr. Huston
then went on to say that President Nixon called him in and discussed
with him in some detail the need for the President to know in greater
depth the details concerning the. revolutionary activities stemming
from the Hew Left. In particular, said Mr. Huston, President Ni.voii
is Tntovc-c'o>i in ill infnrmt ion possible relating to foreig n
xnnue nces and me iiiiaucin^ of the Kt;w Lui'L. iie ej*hu hu mis
requested by the President to also go to otner members oi the
•intelligence community to develop whatever materials they may have
,ithin their jurisdiction.
Mr. Huston said that on completing his work, it will be
presented to the President for his use.
I told Mr . Huston t'hat I was not in any position to make
commitments in this matter, that if he had such a request to make
it would be necessary for him to put it in writing and address his
letter to the Director who made- the decisions in such areas.
Mr._H'U3tca snicl t'-.it hewculd do this.
HECOHMSKDATIOIf: RcC- 7j
• — ._— =-Por-the - information of "tKo^nivcetor .
Enclosure
WCS:lml/ (5) _ (
'}■ v
Tli;s rlr:.:unvi)t ir. :;; •:■}■( t<:J. i.> rr:--y.---.-.--'- !r. •<<,•■< • >■.":.-.•;.' .,:<' ,■.-: v,t for'rifcscmi-
i ji^'j$ ration o .;'<■■; ''.'•*• ?;'->•"»' <Vi>;*.< «-;?»*'< ?.. .'"- -•...-.■ /■■ '> ■/ in ttiiivlvi r ,occa\inf)a by
£iS& * ' _ yr.ii- C'>r.imittnii a\'<'' Hie cur. I- ;.' ;;.:■•;.' ■•-■■ !> : il-^do^td io uuuuthvracd jjcrsost-
iicl without the expi'CoS approval of Uio i-'iJl .
fVA
62-685 O - 76 - 14
204
Exhibit 6
the white house" ,\
WASHINGTON
June 20, 1969
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR -HIE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVE:
FROM: Tom Charles Huston j
Staff Assistant to the President i
The President has directed that a report on foreign
Communist support of revolutionary protect movements in this
country be prepared for his study. He has specifically requested
that the report draw upon all the resources available to the
intelligence community and that it be as detailed as possible.
"Support" should be liberally construed to include
all activities by. foreign Communists designed to encourage or
assist revolutionary protest movements in the Unitud Statei
On the basis of earlier reports submitted to. the President
on a more limited aspect of this problem, it appears that our
prescnu intelligence cuiltiutiun *j..i;.iabiii.Lic:£, xn l!il.^ ai^a .~>ay
be inadequate. The President would like to knew v:-iiat resources
we presently have targeted toward monitoring foreign Communist
support of revolutionary youth activities in this country, he-/
effective they are, what gaps in our intelligence exist, because
of either inadequate resources or a low priority of attention,
and what steps could be taken, if he directed, to provide
the maximum possible coverage of these activities.
I have asked CIA, NSA, and DIA to submit their contributions
to me by Monday, June 30th. I would appreciate it if the Bureau
would provide their response to the President's request by that
date- _
Since the Bureau has primary responsibility in this
[area, I would like to discuss the matter further with your staff
iafter I have had an opportunity to evaluate the initial
I- ■contributions. The i'rosident hac assigned a high [jiicrity to
this project, and I want to insure that he receives the most
complete report that it is possible to assemble .
- "~ ._ - "i-;'~ ■**" " Tom Charles Huston
iriir\o0/vinli Pii-.t.
rti'i '•> ' iin
TBfa--
205
Exhibit 7
UNITED STATES v.Gv'KRNMKNT
Memorandum
to :Mr. Vi. C. Sullivan dati.: June 30, 1S69
from :C. D. Brcr.nanC
i/irnr.iaon support it>r'ivcvowjtio:iaky potest .
'movement;-; hi 'j-iiiJ uhj.tjjo "states .
SUBJECT"
Tiio Director approved lay inoGorandua of G/23/09
which advised wo were preparing a report for Ijr. Tom Charier;
Huston, Staff A:;:jictnnt to the President , at his vcqucsjt
rccardinn oi'.r coverage of foreign coaumiirjt support of
revolutionary youth aotiviticy in. the United States to reach
hiu by CAO/eS. l.'o advised Mr. Huston ei-.cli t. report weald
bo f ortlie.cr.!in;; .
Our report acts forth the traditional. ciianr.-::3.
for co-.si.:'.:nint suy-pori of revolutionary activity in this
coa.ntry by the established basic rcvol'.'.tionary [;i'oiu<= ui:der
foreign domination snoh as the Cci.umnist Party, VSh., and. the
Socialist V,' or ho :•..■•; Tarty. V,'o alio cover the cap: I.j.J.J \.U:- of
Uc:-tilc intoll'w'.'or.cc operation:-; directed at the United yt:::t:.?:
"' by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Co:.:VH'.i>ist Ci/ii.a.
Ilc::t v;c shew the newer, bolder arenr.^y of rj'.'i:.;.-::t
an'' cb'rcction b::in;; utilised by revolutionaries; often
vithoat any attei.:j>L to conceal their purpose . Ti.^se > noli-r'.e
international, co.nfort.acer; which in this paric:! of I::Sstvvy
arc ostensibly ?&■•■ p".ac:o in Viotnai; but \.'!iich v.jr.o have tb.u
usual ui:'.V:.;."J.yii'.; real of ctestroyia.;; United OtaUs pre. ••!.:■ ;;.-.•
in va.-rld affairs. The case of internal::! coal fc.":V.). :'.',.•
cc:".:i".:ii'-.:'-;.it:> with revolutionary intent !•./ lie,' J-'-ft a>\:" b'"-' : '
c;,-;.n...i::/:;: ; d)'< "o;,'i :: fro:.i t!:o United Ctatos ana abroad, is ti" ;t
The- scotio'i deal? a:; '..'lib ear c>ve>.a; ; :.: of. tl.a abo.o
throats to our jiito; )■'• J soonrity «:".'•">.• .ly sbi...... (•.•■;• s::;.oa;;
rcliaaoo ir.-C:: fi".; I'si of J ive ii>fc-:i. ' r •.•:,. -J :"-'.-.0 l"-;.. : >''-' ! :".i-.iill-
tecbairi -:: oOifrSsvec' by t h: !'.;;biy so;;.cU.- a a.!:.} I- ;: It.-:" ie
of c .- i.i . c; ' - ■' »'i' : ocva., ; ;,o,.
V.r-.O '.:■.,.:.:■•!■. <?•)•
:■.■ .■•,>,5:iOSA ■ f .:
...i ■ ■' (r.,i r.i. ,..■:■• :•• - c. ..■
Tto rf« fll >«.'../ ••■= !»'";««•! !.", ••''•'•'7,':'':,.!,? 4 "i',,;/,'i /•• ^/V.^ ,"•„,■■ -.;;,a/« '>.</
ftdwitlwut tlic cxi»™» m»oval of t/ic, * M •
206
Memorandum. to Mr. 17. C. Sullivan
RE: FOHEIGH SUPPORT FOR IlEVOLUTIOiJAnY PROTEST
MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Our report shows that the FBI has boon aware from
the inception of tlio New Left and bine!: extremist movements
that they pose new and unique throats to our internal security.
It shows we have readjusted our investicativo intollicenco
efforts to cope with the new problems created. It stresses
the fact that those movements arc developing increasingly
into hard-core revolutionary cleiiieuts which v;ill c'lOiraml
still creator attention in the form of increased covcracc
as it appears there will be increasingly closer lini:s between ;
these movements and foreign communists in. the future.
Wo have prepared a transmittal lot tor to !.'.r. Huston
subuittinj or.r report. Inasmuch as this doeunent is not (;oin^
directly to the President, no copy is Ueinr; forwarded to the
Attorney General at this tii::e.
actio;:-
With your approval, the attached report and letter
will bo forwarded to Ilr. line ton.
■; )
lh
f«\
207
Exhibit 8
O
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
' Memorandum
Mr. DeLoach' :• date: June 5, 1970
from : w.C. Sullivan-? I ^7
SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PR£SIDENT ON JUKE 5, 1970)
This memorandum is for the record and for possible
reference use by the Director.
Following his conference with the President this N
morning, the Director advised me that the President had
appointed him Chairman of a special Intelligence Committee
for the purpose of c oordinating a more effective intelligcricc-
gathering function as ^ jolTrr-^f^r»rtrqn-'ttie^a'ft~'bI~tiic~'Eirv'b'a~u.
Uentral intelligence Agency (CIA)~ ::atfonar~cr{.'Cii'i T lt':/~7.ge':icy
(NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) ta^psjire_rhat
compr ehensive information_is being pbtainec! for the President's
use Wiiich~yiT T~ provide " iiim'wi th "a world- wide pic cure "of - t.'ow Left
and other subversive activities. *" ~. "
The Director advised ne that among those present at
the meeting with the President were Richard Helms, Director
of the CIA; Admiral Noel A. M. Gayler. head of the NSA ;
General Donald V. Bennett, head of the DIA; and Mr. T. C.
Huston, White Staff ..Assistant , all of whom the President had
designated to serve on the Committee under the direction of
the Director. Additionally, there were present Assistant to
the President H. R. Haldeman; John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant
to the President for Domestic Affairs; and Robert II. Finch,
. Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
The Director stated he wanted immediate action on
this. He advised me that he wanted all of the men on the
Committee contacted and instructed to be in his office for a
Committee meeting at 11:00 a.m. Monday morning, 6/S/70. This
has been arranged and has been made the subject of a sepffcite
memorandum.
,c/\/rr) prom
This document is prepared in response to ymir request and is not (or ilisscmi-
»Ub - jqjc nation out. title yonr Committee. Its vxr in iimitni !o oifiriul pmcccdinns by
your Committee and the content man ""' •*'■ diulusid t.o it.-iatdhorizid person-
( __ . - nel ,witttout the express approval of the FDI .
r 13 1
208
Memorandum to .Mr. DeLoach
RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT ON JUiil-. 5, 1970)
The Director also instructed that a working committee
meeting comprising the same individuals should be scheduled
for Tuesday, June 9, and he instructed me to serve in his place
at that meeting to insure that the instructions he issues to
the Committee on Monday are carried through in specific detail
by members of the Committee on Tuesday. Arrangements have also
been made for this meeting to be held Tuesday afternoon at
3:30 p.m. utilizing the facilities of the United States Intelligence
Board conference rooms.
The Director further instructed that this working
[ committee should henceforth meet each Tuesday and Friday for
the purpose of implementing his instructions with the aim of
I completing a draft paper by June 22, 1970, which the Director
land others may review for approval aRd sign prior to its
(presentation to the President on July 1, 1970. Arrangements
Ifor this will be implemented at the working committee meeting
Ion Tuesday, June 9, 1970. The Director will be promptly
Ifurnished with a report on each meeting.
RECOMMENDATION :
For the information of the Director and for the record.
/•Jib ;.:. Mi$
FBI *
209
Exhibit 9
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
S$S
Mr. DeLoach-
from : if. cVsullivan
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
date: jvine 5 ( 1970
SUBJECT:
INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)
Pursuant to the Director's instructions and relative
to his role as head of the above-captioned Committee, I have set
up a meeting to take place in the Director's office at 11 am
Monday, 6/8/70.
I talked personally to the following individuals who
will be there: Mr. Richard Helms, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, General Donald V. Dennett, Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency; Admiral Noel Gaylor, Director of the
National Security Agency; and Mr. Tom Huston, Staff Assistant to
the President at the White House.
The first three mentioned indicated they would like to
take one of their assistants with them;' however, they had not
decided which one, therefore, the names are not available. As soon
as they make the decision, I will submit the names of these assist-
ants in a separate memorandum.
The details for the meeting of the working groug are being
worked out. At this point it is expected it" will be held at
3:30 pm on Tuesday afternoon. This also will be the subject of
■Separate memorandum.
RECOMMENDATION :
Fc/r the information of the Director.
17CS:clu/ J (5)
RECEH
^This'documatt is prepared in response to
"nr™"™ 1 .™- " vrcpnrea ,n response to V ovr rrqur.-.t and i, not for disscmi-
nd ic-.lhoitt me cT'm-ss approval of the I-'L't . i-uson
8
210
J
TO
UNITED STATES GC iRNMENT
Memorandum
r
Mr. C. D. DcLoach
WaC- Sulllvaji
SUBJECT:
DATE: 6/6/70
IHTEHAGF3:CY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
(Established By The President June 5, 1970)
Reference is made to ray memorandum to you dated
June 5, 1970, captioned as above which indicated that the
Director will meet with the heads of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency and a representative of the White House staff in the
Director's office, at 11:00 a.m. 6-8-70. In accordance
with the Director's instructions I will be present. Unless
there is an objection I will have with me Mr. C. D. Brennan,
Chief of the Internal Security Section which will have the
responsibility of preparing our portion of the report on
the New Left and related matters. I believe Mr . Brennan
should hear and will benefit from the Director's remarks.
I have been advised that as of this date the heads
\of the other agencies do not now plan to have any of their
assistants with them. exceDt Admiral Gaylor of NSA who will bring
I an assistant, Benson Buffi-am.
It occurred to me that in addition to the remarks
the Director has in mind he may wish to give consideration
to some of the major points in the enclosed statement prepared
for him. - ■
RECOMMENDATION :
That this memorandum and the enclosed statement be
furnished to the Director. »' *
Enclosure
WCS:sal
(6)
?ECEi\
FBI '
")
This document is prepared hi response to 'jour request and. is vnt for tli$s<
nation onisidc ?/»«>• C»nnni!Ur. If* v*c. h b'w'tnl in offivhl proceed in gi
Lsscmi-
7 ««* u «- —.".<■<, .- ;/ proceedings by
your Committee and the context mtvj not !>c disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without ths express approved of the FiJI .
211
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEETING
I am sure you gentlemen will all agree with me
that our meeting with the President on Friday was of very
special significance. The President clearly recognizes
that we are confronted today with uniaue and complex problems
arising from subversive activities on an international scale.
There is a distinct relationship between these activities and
much of the disorder and violence which increasingly
threatens our internal security. The President made it.
abundantly clear that he expects us, as members of the
intelligence community, to do more than we have been doing
to bring the worldwide picture of these problems into better
perspective for him.
Having been designated by -the President as Chairman
of the Committee to meet this challenge, I feel a special
responsibility. First, I would like to state that I agree
completely with the President's view of the situation. Con-
sider what has transpired in the 1960s. We have witnessed
the emergence of widespread racial unrest which threatens
to grow much worse before it gets better. Wo have also seen
the emergence of a new left militancy which has consituted
./massive mob rule in action. From what we have learned to date
//it is apparent these are not solely domestic problems. There
/ are definite foreign links to our domestic disorders.
\ Yet, the foreign aspect of the problem is different
than that which we experienced in the past. Prior to the
1960s, foreign-directed intelligence and espionage activities
constituted the main threat to our security. We in the
intelligence community geared ourselves accordingly and met
that problem successfully. We coordinated our activities in
doing so. But the nature of the problem -jas such that it
left us to a marked degree free to operate independently in
regard to our respective problem areas.
Today, it is mandatory that we recognize the changed
nature of the problem -confronting us. Unless we do so, we
■ will be incapable of fulfilling the responsibility levied
. upon us by the President.
The Plain fact is that there currently are thousands
of individuals inside this country who want to see our form of
, r-i>„-, B °v? rnment destr °y ed - They have in fact pledged themselves
'-/LlVEl? | ilffi] t0 achievin e this goal. They have put their words
JUG 5 13/5 "
r n i
212
into actions constituting revolutionary terrorism ,. and the '
total effect of their actions to date has boon disasterous.
In addition, they are reaching out seeking support
from this nation's enemies abroad to further their objectives.
Thus the links to Cuba, China, and Iron Curtain countries
already have been established and promise to grow because of
the equal determination of various international communist
elements to destroy our form of government.
In contrast to the rigidly structured subversive
organizations of past experience, the current subversive
forces threatening us constitute widespread, disjointed, and
varied autonomous elements, the destructive potential of which,
is manifold.
Individually, those of us in the intelligence
community are relatively small and lioited. Unified, our
own combined potential is magnified and limitless. It is
through unity of action that we can tremendously increase our
intelligence-gathering potential and, I am certain, obtain
the answers the President wants.
I am establishing a working committee to insure
that we achieve the desired unity. It will be the job of the
committee to (1) assess the overall nature of the problem as
we know it today, (2) examine individually and together the
respective resources of each Agency to insure full utilization
of them for the benefit of all, and (3) devise coordinated
procedures designed to penetrate the current nebulous areas
of subversive activities here and abroad as they relate to
our domestic. problems.
The first meeting is set for tomorrow afternoon,
Tuesday, June 9th, and you have been furnished the details
as to the time and place.
The working committee will hereafter meet each
Tuesday and Friday for the purpose of preparing a comprehensive
study to be completed in rough draft form by June 22, 1970,
for presentation to the President on July 1, 1970, in final
form. This should serve as the foundation of our committee's
existence and purpose and as the basis for a coordinated
intelligence effort best suited to serve the country's
interest at this time of crisis.
REIVED FROM
1 AUG 5 IWJ - .
213
Exhibit 10
OTROHU »©■■■ "O. "•
UNJTED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
r. DeLoacn
to , : Mr. DeLoacn DATE: June 8. 1970
i ' •.-, V-" '
I ' ■ •■■.'.•'
from W. C. Sullivan
./• -
SUDJF.CT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY TICS PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)
■MEETING IN DIRECTOR'S OFFICE, 11 AM, JUNE 8, 1970
This memorandum is to record meeting of captioned Committee
in the Director's Office 11 am, Monday, 6/8/70, which was chaired by
the Director with the following persons present: Mr. Richard Holms,
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ; General Donald V.
Bennett, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) ; Admiral
Noel Gaylor, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) ; and his
Assistant Mr. Benson K. Buffham; Mr. Tom Isuston, Staff Assistant to
the President at the White House; as well as Racial Intelligence
Section Chief George C. Moore and myself.
The Director pointed out to the Committee that the
President, in establishing this special intelligence Committee,
recognized definite problems arising from subversive activities on
the international scale and expected the Committee to coordinate and
plan so that the world-wide picture could be better brought into
perspective for the President. The Director stated that he well
recognized t<ie importance of the work of this Committee and he states
that along with organized crime this is equally important.
The Director further commented concerning the foreign aspe
of today's subversive domestic problem aid stated that prior to the •
1960's, the main threat to our security nas foreign-directed intelli
gence espionage activities but today we lave a different problem
marked by highly organized, dissident groups seeking to destroy our
form of Government.
In_outHning the work of the Committee, the Director poin'.
I out: (1) The situation should be thoroughly explored to determine!
I exactly what the problem is. (2) Each agency must explore the ,
' facilities which must and can be used iai order to develop tacts
for a true intelligence picture. The Director noted the President
7" r hY'- ""''mentioned restrictions which were"' hampering our intelligence opera ^
•'' u, ~ ' and- accordingly we should list for the President in detail such
' m 6 -WCS:chstfe)' NATIO&USvn'-.T.-YU.
"inai Sanctions
u,:.
0»» w -~r. -,.. "'■ • a-ii.-.;:i!i...- ■.• i r
214
Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach
BE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY' THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)
MEETING IN DIRECTOR'S OFFICE, 11 AH, JV'KE 8, 1970
restraints and restrictions together with tix- pros and cons involved
so that the President can make a decision as to which ones should be
utilized. (3) The Director stated it was rncst important that the
foreign connections of domestic problems be determined pointing out
that we know Cuba, Red China and the Soviet-bloc are deeply in the
picture. The Director also commented the importance of ascertaining
what is happening in foreign countries concerning this same subversive
problem and how it has been dealt with by those countries; for
example, the Director mentioned that the water cannon had been used
most effectively against the hippies in Paris, as well as elsewhere
and maybe the application of this tactic should receive consideration.
In this regard, the Director commented the - " picture of what goes on
abroad would more appropriately come within the purview of the CIA,
DIA and NSA.
The D irector stated he was establishing a worjiing. sub-
committee headecF'Dy - Assistant Director. WilliaraCr." Sullivan and
composed'-Of" designated representatives of the other agencies present
i"TKrtTio~first"meoting- would" be at 3:30 pm; G/9/70 at the U. S.
IrfCBTltgc-'nce 'Board Meeting Room and subsequent thereto a meeting
would -be held; c.very Tuesday and Friday in order to draw together the
raw material in order to' present a final report to captioned Committee
for-scrutiny and' evaluation on 6/22/70."* The submission of the final
rep"ort~tb i'the President will be on 6/30 or 7/1/70. The Director
emphasized it was most vital that all agencies give this matter top
priority.
Following the Director's initial remarks, those officials
present commented that the aims and goals presented by the Director
were realistic and that all present would cooperate in the fullest
in getting organized and getting on with the highly important task
which faces the special Committee.
During the discussion all agreed that the initial primary
problem facing the Committee was to concentrate upon methodology in
intelligence collection. The Director stated although brevity is the
Key" - a detailed listing of all the items which are currently
obstructing the FBI and other intelligence agencies in attaining their
goals must be set out clearly with pros and cons so that the President
is able to make a determination as to what he is willing to let us do.
Some of the matters to be considered in this regard mentioned by the
."AUG 5 l-.ji'j' ._ 2 - CONTINUED - OVER
W
215
Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach
RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)
MEETING IN DIRECTOR'S OFFICE, II AM, JUNE 8, 1970
_Di rec tor _we.r.c_ :
and
_(2) ljunitatipns on telephone surveillances
It was agreed that the President is extremely anxious
for the utmost degree of cooperation among all the agencies in
coordination of this matter and the Director pointed out that
I there is certainly no problem with respect to coordination and
the Director wanted it understood that the President expects
*5?_ S£oup_jto work _together__as_a team. '
At the close of the meeting, the Director again emphasized
that the importance of this matter dictated that each agency put Us
top experts to work on this matter and that it be given the highest
priority in order that this deadline is met as expected by the
President.
ACTION :
You will be advised as to the results of the mooting
of the working committee which takes place tomorrow. 6/9/70
at 3:30 pm.
RECr
!l U
- 3 -
216
6*1t0wit >QI*
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
MR,
DE /t ; ACHp^" P ATE: 6/8/70
FROM : W. C. SULLIVAN.-.
-/?
SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE Oil INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970) /
My memorandum 6/5/70 advised that the details for
the meeting of the working group of captioned committee are
being worked out. Arrangements have been made for the
working group to meet in the United States Intelligence Board
Conference Room at 3:30 p.m., Tuesday afternoon, 6/9/70.
"As of this time, the following members have Deen designated:
FBI - Mr. William C. Sullivan Acting for the Director
CIA - Mr. Richard Helms, Director of CIA
Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA
DIA - The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) member has not
yet been designated. In addition to the DIA member,
there will be representatives from each of the three
military services - Army^,_Navy , and Air Force, , . ._ . .' ___
HSA - M r... Benson K. Bu ffham . ."
White House - Mr. Tom C. Huston, Staff Assistant to the
President .
Arrangements have been made for use of the Conference
Room and all of the above members have confirmed their
attendance. When the DIA representatives are designated,
you will be advised.
ACTION :
■ ,.1,
:R?H : hke
I ' (6)
For information.
RECl
: .Thin document is prepared, iu response, to a our mutest and is not for diascmi-
1 'nation outside inr-i.r ComhiiHcr. Its rxr <"» iiwital to offiewl proceedings by
AUb b i'V your Comoiill' ■•: n,id the <f l-r-l ;,>trt not If disclosed to unauthorized. pcrsorL-
. * nel without the express c^roi-al of the FiSl .
FBI
217
UNITED STATES OJVERNMKNT
Memorandum
c
..y
\
To MR. DE LOACH..'
from : K. C. SULLIVAN
DATE: 6/9/70
subject: ' INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)
My memorandum 6/8/70 sot forth the members of the
working group of captioned committee, which will hold its
first meeting in the United States Intelligence Board Conference
Room at 3:30 p.m., Tuesday, 6/9/70, with the exception of the
Defense Intelligence Agency members.
Set forth below are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
working group member and the member from each of the three military
services. The additional names listed ace the alternates for
each of the agencies.
DIA - Hr. James E. Stilwell,
Deputy Chief, Office of Counterintelligence and
Security, DIA
(_- Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Philbrick
Array - Colonel John IT. Dov/nie,
Director of Security, Assistant Chief of Staff
. for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Mr. Elihu Braunstein
Navy - Captain Edward G. Ttifenburgh,
Director, Naval Investigative Service,
Naval Intelligence Command
Mr. Harry Warren
Air Force - Colonel .Rudolch C. Roller, Jr.,
Commander, 1127 U.S. Field Activities Grouo,
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Air Force
Colonel D. E. Walker
ACTION:
formation.
This docimmU i'.s prepared in rcrpnuar In >tour ir.qm-.tl. ova! is v>£ fnr (lissnni-
nation oi;Ui t! "- yr.:;r Vomi) , i , 'cc. lir, r*r h; i'^i't--! to offkiu 1 n:Q»%Hii*a.-i t>y'
your C'«jiiW(7*-\' «;.*•'/ tits (<•.':'. ni uay «:<».' .'.■' iiischiivd to u;;a>;ih0iiwd person-
nel without the express approval of the Fiil ,
EX&&
T 11
_e.M 01- lie i
UNITED STATES Ct. EK»'-" U
Memorandum—
J --J ■ Mr. C. D. DeLoaJcj) DATE: J"»e 10, 1" G
I :
; .1 -
.'.om Mr. IV. C. Sullivan -
<?
•injECT: -INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ES^AE-LISMED DY THE PRESIDENT JUNE 5, 1070)
MEETING OF TliE WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE JUNE 9, 1970
6
This memorandum records the results of the Working
Subcommittee meetinir on June 9. 1970.
of the Pre
Mr. Tom C." Huston, White 'House, spoiled" out the "desires
President, furnishing members with a "Top Secret" outline
(copy attached). This outline addresses itself to the Purpose,
Membership, Procedures, and Objectives of'the Committee's Review.
In his oral presentation, Huston emphasized the President was not
interested in being told what the current problem is, but rather
what the future problems will be and what must be dnnp *n ,-™.nf?r
them. Ho stressed the Committee should provide the President with
the pros and cons of any restraints so that ho can decide what
action is to be taken.
It was agreed that all papers and reports prepared by
the Committee will be classified "Top Secret - Handle Via' Comint
Channels Onlv" because of the President's desire that the existence
and work of the Committee be tightly controlled. (The 1 reference to
Comint Channels refers to communications intelligence and insures
that this matter will be handled in a secure manner.) .
At the meeting various members discussed the restraints'
currently in effect which limit the community's ability to develop
the necessary intelligence. In accordance with the President's
instructions, the next meeting of the Working Subcommittee will
consider all restraints restricting intelligence collection efforts
across the board, as well as submissions on defining and assessing
the existing internal security threat, both domestic and foreign;
It was agreed that the Working Subcommittee would next
Imeet at 1:30 p.m., June 12, 1970, in the Conference Room of the
U. S. Intelligence Board. Results of this meeting will be promptly
furnished the Director.
ACTION :
■ . . : FqrVinforraation. r
' /'V ' >">?•■; ; ■ •
n6i'osurei. r y4 ! , /
WCS:la.K/ch'Gfi!l/
TBI
219
mrenACsxsr c=aisK3 as iNTtLxiGaicj;
(Aa of 10 b.b. , Jftm« 9, 1P7:;
FBI
/ Dr. tflUl.-ui C. &nl.Uv=n
Ur. Bol-.tIu 15. J'coro • . .
Hr. Gaorgc C. ilotrrs
dr. tUlliam 0. Crcjar '
Hr. Frod J. Cacoidy — — <, ' '
Ceati-sl Tntplll^ctco £~^ay (C&A)
U-. Rlehanl EaXj^a
•''Jlr, .Saoca Acglotoa
( Oofone-3 Intolllr-^sso /Sr^crjy O&A)
- Ui-. Jaoca E. StilVJOll
Llc-jtsnant Colonel Docnld 7. Philbrick
Dapartg-'rat of tha Armr "" '
■^ Colonol Jolui S. Downio
Hr. Elitm Bra una tola
Papa rtc.CTt of th.3 Eayy
i(/|~p •'j CBJTt^ 10 Bdrard Q. Rlfcabarijh
''■"» 5 J9/:Hr. Carry uarrea
m
i-y wtmnit is ;)rc/)nm/ jm rr.::pnr-!-'> ro ffn'tr rcv-'fst ami ;■? uo/, /or (li-nrim'-
\„ 0'itnitlr your OoPViHn <-. .'/.; ('■■<- i\* ii ; .:;Ud t<> rrijivkd iirorr.niira-: hij
ytfr Comv.iilfcr o,ul tin: co.:i»;:il ;>.-..■;/ ,':.-. .V iihcloscd to itiifiatliorizcjQ^^^Q^^ _ ^VtH
el without the express ui>ijrovul of the FHI . * ""
-685 O - 76 - IS
. 220
Dopart^aut of tt»a Air forca
'Colonel thidolph C. Zallcr, Jr
Coluocl 0, £. WaUJcar
i . "
national yeourlty A,-;t>n<:r
"Mr. 'Uanaon K. Euffhaa •
I
Hr. J«uaes Q*a«rlerr
Br. Leonard J. Sunco
tthlto llouaa
' Kr, Too C. Huston
Phone: Code 143, Extension
FBI '.
221
1CI -1
June 10, 1070
INTERAGKXCY COffiilTTSE OK IKTKLLIGKfcCE
WORKING SuCCOlQIITTEg
. , Minutes of
First Ueotlng
Room 7E-26 , CIA Headquarters Building
June 9, 1970, 3:30 to 4 p.m.
Wllllau C. Sullivan
Assistant Director, federal Bureau of Investigation
Presiding
KM BIRS PRESENT
•
Mr. Richard Hellas, DO
Mr. Jihi Angleton , CIA
Mr. Janes Stlltroll, D1A
Col. John Do-yule, Amy
Col. Rudolph Roller, Air Force
Mr. Toe C. Huston, Shite House
Capt . Edward Rlfenburgh, Havy
Br. Booson K. Buffhaa, NSA
Mr. George C. Moore, FBI
Mr. Donald E. Moore, rBI
Mr. Wllll*» 0. Cregar. FBI, Secrotary
Observers:
Mr. Charles Slther, OSI
Lt. Col. Donaid ?. Phl'.brlck, D1A
Mr. Ellbu Braunsteln, Ansy _
Mr. Harry Barren, Nav7 ~* '
Col. D. K. Talker. Air Forco
Mr. Jaaes Gengler, NSA
Mr. Loonard J. Nunno, HSA
Mr. Fred J. Caseldy, FBI
hCv.LlV uJ IKOIVl Excluded froa nutomtlc
» downgrading and
MW -j Wh declassification NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
. . Unauthorized Disclosure
/ Subject to . Criminal Sanctions
FB,
222
o
IC1-U-1
June 10, 1970
1. Prefatory Ream-lea ' •
.Prefatory renirkd of Vllllaja C. Sullivan circulated
to all nenbcrs at the aoetlng.
2 . Background to the Crostlon of Conalttec
' • Hr. Ton C. Huston of the White House briefed the
Coaualttee on the President '*s concern over the energence of
the threat fron sporadic vlolonce and anarchism .'row the New
Loft, as well as the President's concern as to whether the
Intelligence conaurilty is doing everything possible to cope
with the problen. Ur . Huston enphaslzed that an effort nust
be nade for coanunl ty-wlde analysis and assessnent of Infor-
mation so as to be In a position to advice the President an
to what is going to happen In the future and what position
the Intelligence community will be In to be aware of those'
dovolopoento . An outline defining the purpose and ■eabersblp
of the Couisittee, as well as procedures and objectives of
the CoBBlttec's review, <u distributed at the nee ting by
Ur. Huston.
3 . Classification Batters
The Chalrnan asked for coEnents regarding the lovel
of classification for papers or reports prepared by tbe
Coimlttee. Ur. Buffhaa of NSA suggested the adoption of a
code word. AfVer some discussion, Mr. Helns, Director of CIA,
reconaendod the classification "Top Secret - Handle Via Comnt
Channels Only." In addition, Ur . Helns suggested the nainte-
oance of a "Bigot List" reflecting the nanes of all personn
in each noaber agency or department who will work on or have
knowledge of the work of the Couittee. The Coimlttee
unanlnously concurred In adopting both suggestions.*
•Moabers are requested to furnish their "Bigot List" to the
Secretary at the neotlng of June 12, 1970.
RIPEIVFD. PROM
C)
Aua 5 im _ 2
• FBI
223
4 . Requlroaealo for ftext Kaotlns
It ma agreed that at the sen iseetlnft aenbera will
table ■ Hat of tbone restraints which they consider haapor
their Intel 1 igence-col lection activities. The list should
Include the pros And coos of these restraints.
<Hr. Buffhaa noted that In the outline dlatrlbutod
b)r Mr." Huston the Conalttee was called upon to define nod
assess. the exlnttcj internal security threat. ar . Ouffnaa
felt thin was Bonfltutn". that should bo ^.-orlnd on maodlatelr
by the experts tro-v. thy rionbor agencies or departments.
Mr. Huston suggested that the FBI prepare such a paper froa
the donestlc standpoint and CIA froa the foreign standpoint.
All Benbora concurred, and It was agreed CIA and FBI sill
distribute these papers for the Costaittee's consideration at
the next neetlng.
5. Security of Connlttee'a "orlc
Uenbers took cognisance of the necessity for tight
security to insure the existence and work of the Connlttee
not becoue known to unauthorlxed pornona. As a result, it
vu agreed that the Cosaittoe would continue to aeet in the
CIA Headquarters Building,
6. ■ Next Meeting
The next ooeting vlll be at 1:30 p.m., June 12,
1970, Roob 7D-64, CIA Headquarters Building.'
•Menbera please note <:hange in roo» nunber.
iCEIVED FROM .
AUG' b 1916 . . 7 3 - ~
224
Exhibit 12
top secrl. .•
us1b sub-committee on domes tic.in.t elltgence
I. - Purpose
f' (A) To define and assess the existing internal security threat.
(B) To evaluate the collection procedures and techniques
/ presently employed and to assess their effectiveness.
.' (C) To identify gaps in our present collection efforts and
i recommend steps to close these gaps.
i
" * (D) To review current procedures for inter-community
coordination and cooperation and to recommend steps
to improve these procedures.
(E) To evaluate the timeliness of current intelligence data
and to recommend procedures to increascboth its
timeliness and usefulness.
\
(F) To assess the priorities presently attached to domestic
intelligence collection efforts and to recommend new
priorities where appropriate.
Membership
(A) FBI, Chairman
(B) CIA
(C) NSA
(D) DIA
(E) Military Services
(F) The White House
.'in
-'- ■ • t>.*.; i
m .-> 131-5
V
; EB1-
NATIONAL fT.riTRITY INFORM""""!
Subjed. to Criminal Sanctions
225
-2-
III. • Procedures
(A) Although the sub-committcc will be officially constituted
within the framework of USIB, it 'will in fact be. an
independent, ad hoc, inler-agcncy working group with
a limited mandate.
(B) Operational details will be the responsibility of the ^_
chairman. However, the scope and direction of the ',
review will be determined by the White House member.^.
(C) The sub-committee will submit its reports to the White
House and not to USIB. Report will be due by July 1, 1970.
(D) To insure that the President has all the options available
for consideration, the WH member may direct detailed
interrogatories to individual agencies in order to ascertain
facts relevant to policy evaluation by. the President.
Information resulting from such interrogatories will,
if the contributing agency requests, be treated on a
confidential basis and not be considered by the sub-
committee as a whole.
IV. Objectives of the Review
(A) Maximum coordination and cooperation within the
intelligence community. The sub-committee may wish
to consider the creation of a permanent Domestic
Intelligence Operations Board, or some other appropriate
mechanism to insure community-wide evaluation of
intelligence data.
(B) Higher priority by all intelligence agencies on internal
. security collection efforts.
'"CFiV'f' ' i 'RDf/h ^ Maximum use of all special investigative techniques,
' ' ' 7/ including increased agent and informant penetration by
«JU o 1975 I / both the FBI and CIA .
FB:
226
(D) Clarification of NSA's role in targeting against
communication traffic involving U.S. revolutionary
leaders and organizations.
(E) Maximum coverage of the overseas activities of
revolutionary leaders and of foreign support of U.S.
revolutionary activities.
(F) Maximum coverage of campus and student- related
activities of revolutionary leaders and groups.
(G) More detailed information about the sources and
extent of financial support o£ revolutionary organizations.
(H) Clarification of the proper domestic intelligence
role of the Armed Services.
(I) Development of procedures for translating analyzed
intelligence information into a format useful for
policy formulation.
itf.Ci.r-..- ;i?nr/i
AUG S i'jjf,
FBI
227
Exhibit 1.3
0((-.i-il W -O. 10
UNITED STAI1-.S (JOVKRNMENT
Memorandum
10 : Hr. C. D. DeLoach .date: June IS, 1970
Mr. W. C. Sullivan-
r
SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE 0U INTELLIGENCE
(ESTADLIc!i::.U UY T.'E PFSSIDr.;T JU".:"- 5. 1?70)
MEETING OF THE WORKING SUBCXUMITTEE JUIJE 12, 1970
This memorandum records the results of the Working
Subcommittee.
At the meeting of June 12, 1970, the Committee agreed
I on an outline for the report to be furnished to the President
' by July 1, 1970. This report will cover three specific areas
1 of__interest: (a) an assessment of thff current internal security
threat along with the likelihood of future violence; (b) a
listing of the current restraints which deter the development
of the type of information the President desires; (c) an
evaluation of interagency coordination.
With regard to an assessment of the current Internal
security, threat, the Committee agreed the President does not
desire a recitation of history but rather desires information
as, to what the problem JLs and a n est imate of what the future
problen^will be.
The White House representative advised the restraints
portion of the Committee report to the President should include,
In addition to identifying the restraints and a listing of the
IP.5P.S _and_cons of removing or modifying the restraints, a brief
paragraph allowing the President to indicate what action ho
desires be taken. Specifically, this would provide the President
the opportunity to indicate whether he desired the restraints
to bo continued, relaxed, or that he needed additional infor-
nation upon which to make a decision. It was the sense of the
Committee regarding the third portion of the report that a
permanent operations committee was needed to coordinate operations,
prepare estimates of potential violence during future demonstra-
tions, and to develop new policies. The creation of such a
committee was endorsed by the White House representative who
. indicated such a committee would probably be desired by the
President.
7 &F$m •
This document is prepared in response In i/onr request, and is not fur dissemi-
nation outside your Committer. I!:: use is limited In official proceedings bu
Mia r % (7) VOi'.r Committee and the cnulaii men t:i.t lie disposed to unauthorized persoii-
' " " ' m net without ilic express oppror.ul of the Fill .
FBI
CONTINUED - OVER
228
Memorandum Sullivan to DeLoach
Re: IHTERAGEKCSr COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
The next meeting is scheduled for June 17, 1970,
at which time the Conraittee will consider the first draft
of the report. •
ACTIO:) : '■■.... ,^- . ..
For information.
REGION) FROM
FBI
- 2 -
229
l.:
"truttt ', of
r>,--.:.)r. i : ':•■£". I ■ •':
Coilffl'fnri.' \\<iu:\ 7V'- 1 '!'
CIA i:n;ici<-..!->ricr<- V. ::;•••.■■
. June IV., li!70. 1:30 to " .:
William C. S'.-l liv.m
Assistant Dtrcct'or, l-.-.leral \:-iv: '■■» of I:.w,ti[..-.t ion
' 1'rcsiiliiiK
MEMCr.r.S PilESF.KT
•r. i"i.:; C. Ilurvton, Kliitc I!ou:;e
T.r . .' ■.-"■" .'irtftoa, CI."
lir. .!:•. •■■■ jt ilv;..'ll , Di.\
Col. .!'..;..! Uu-..nlo, Arir.y
IT. Ci.-.vios. aitlior . Air Force
Capt.'i. -f'i i'.lfiMihuv a, Navy
i:r". r.-ir-.'ir. \i. !<-jf r:-..-.:j. :..-;/.
Mr. G-.'ori-.c ( -. Ignore. rr.I
Mr. 'ioi:.-- . fi K. .'.'■ooro, l'. l I
Ur. William 0. Cronar, FP.I , Secretary
Observer'-. : "*
Col. I':u(!ol;>'.i Koller, Air Forr6
Lt. Co). ConalU f. l'liil!>rlck. DIA
Mr. r.lilm nr.-.iis-Mtfin, Army
!,:r. Hr.rry Y.'arrvn, i.'.-.vy
Mr. Jnat's Gentler, Ii.-!A
Vr. Leonard .1 . ■J'.inr.o, NSA
lir. Ilic'i.irU Oii-.T, CIA
Mr.. Fred J . C:.:.:;iuy, FIJI
RECEIVED FROM .
,.,.. , Grmni 1
( w ""-^ • ^ , '. J "'i"'.! '.'."•:, :', ut " r,!: "- National security infokmatio
FBI
• do-:. '•:-:• in." .•■ml
clcel; ■•■ i l'n::.l >oi>
Unauthorised Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
230
-v. ; n f "i i". i;.qr. of tl:
Tl?.> siinutcu of the first uoc:' ■ •:■■• ;>rovc-1
•»lth po clia
2 • D i ■' t- '• t N'. t :. o : i of FT) I .'"uh-ii/'.i-icin l\nt i I > -i. ".'•■!• !:ini» a.^d
An.-u.-SKii-- : til'.' j.'xistiii.- Internal ':" ■'.::■ VI:"" "..- •. r."t~'T :?rii.' «; 1 1 c "
Tlic mi contribution was clr«.-.'.*':rii-. to nil cusMiPi'fl .
It was pi.'ircHntcd by Mr. Huston of the '...hitc I'.o-.isr th.it : ■;•;
report ho l-iblcd to porr.iit an in-depth i\vuj.i — l,y all L;(: .,!, ers
and that tho contents of the submission bn r,i ..-.:■ : ..<( at. the
next sicc-tin?. In this regard, .Mr. Huston rei Loin led that the
ar.sossr.cnt p.-.;: or should not be lengthy; :::-.;, uld .-."..'iess the
current threat and estimate what the future threat v/ill bo.
J - CIA' s Subm i ssion Entitled "Doflnlng an d As : -,cfisin5 the
r.:-:i:'.ti: ■■; .:-ti-r::.-.l .Security 'inroat ■• :.Tiv:if ;;~
The CIA representative advised his Agency's submission
, would bo circulated to all members in vine for an in-depth
discussion at the next Committee taoetinu.
4. Distribution and Discussion of "I .irt of restraints
Inhibitiii-; IntcllirrcMice-CoUectToT T Kllortr."
The restraints papers submitted were read by all
ncmbers. Mr. Huston indicated that tho Mil nub.aission was in
the form he desired; Ho suRRested the restraints nortion of
the report be patterned after tho Fill subnission with a .-<>n-
cludinr: paracraph after each individual restraint providin-
the President with the option of continuing or nodi fyin-; the
restraint or asking for additional iiuora.-.lion on which to
b.i-se" a decision.
5. Preparation of Report
A sorrcested outline distributed to all r:ev.herc was
R?Sf IWD^ROft? ' " W3S aBrfcod tl>at tl,e m would Prepare
AUb ii BIS .
FB!
- 2 -
231
■; : '%#
'tho lir: -r. Hv.-ft to be circulated to :• ; '.
1070, foil;;'.'*.*);: .*:uu,jiKssion of inputs i-.i ...
liter ilna 10 a.m., June 15, 1970.
Co:r.r!ttteo cenbern discussed t!v
T'ccoimcnuir.rr «'l lie es-.tnbliahaent of n nor.:: !>• :t
operr.ii-r.r'. co:,:aittce. V.r. Huston ct.'"l';: i <-•.;
Itself to -this mid Include (1) her? th>: cr.— •
constituted, (2) to r.'i:o™ it vould reoort , (:.
natters, nnd (1) the connittea'n area cf n .
Include opcrntlons, preparation of e.":tlnnt«:s
of policy reconmondations.
6. Kext Meeting
The next mcctlm? will bo held on Wednesday , Juno 17,
1970, in the U. S. Intelligence Board Conference Room 7E-26.0
•• •: o:
1 Juv:»:
> 1G,
•hers
no
f ; ■■■. : i
■ liiy
of
: i Ml •
•iJiCt
•:ice
^: •• r<
port
addresn
■. . !! V
ould
be
i 1 roc
rndural
pon-tibilitj
• to
, and
deve)
opnont
*Ueoboro please note change In room number.
DECEIVE!.!. FROM ■ -
, 0> ti lii/5
FBI
232
Exhibit 14
i;-:Ti:i:-"iv '•:.'.•(.•" i.VT-iri'K!-: <)■: r" i. i ■ i .:
Vi'ohk i •■■•."• sur.cor.Mrrv;-.!.
AGORA
T'.i'.rd J'.ei't'.ir.':
' - l-SI'"; ( -inforcncc K«»-> -. VI".--:'.
on v.odni'.-;d iv , Jur..- 17., l'l'/O, at !:.. . i.
1... 1070
1. Api-rnval of '• i riiityi; of r.lUi.-iC. Sull iv.-.n
Second '.I'.'t-f. :n',{
2. ni^e-iasion cl Docusi'Mirs by . All Hcj-I'.ns
Li} 1 . • ? J2 : l_.'- :i _i < - '-■> , «-_i_t i"»-"i' ■'•? iir.ii-.it
.'"^ nn ti A. isrs* i n.; i !m V. .:i. -; t. ; nrj
• Inter n al .Secu rity iM.-:;nl"
3.. Diric ui.sicn of- Docuunn ;.s Su!>- All >[i-,:i '..-•.• r>;
ti_U_tr'J_by Ai : /. -.TfT.'i"- -C.i iliiti t K-d
"I.i :>r _of_ I'o'iMMml ^ i 'lii l>i i. int
Int el ) JEanec-Col !>-— ■■ .en t:f;o rt.-"
t
i - Wc^vlnty of Fii-.st Pro ft o_f . Will lao C. SulUvnn
Cocni • u-i.: i:.;;><-rt '■ • : <..i !.;i :.<v.i
to""A'fi'~k r:: niTyi ; f:'"jC:^' "■'■./,"" Hi? ;i
6. Date ac! Place of ;«■*{. M«etinn
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION!
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
eElVEDI!^-...-. "
I
FBI
233
ici- ,: -:i
.Inn.- I 'J. !?'7()
J NTK.n.AG >...-<;. .' ! fiHlTTK': •"•'< INI!'.::. !:: ' 11
vv{' ! .;-.:'sg SDMX);.i , .itT!'K. .
.-I', uu*. a-- 01
''*■'» . v i't t y.cc l i :>;."
Conff:; i.n("7 jiC'O!.-. '/(.'■-'.'•J
Ct/> .'fi'.'.'iou.irl erf "!'.. L'dii).
Juno -U-. 10 70. 2- ti. r.s'.
T-H • ' : - C. M;li ■ van
Arsistaot 'irrucW- . • '■ U-.-j-r i i;.'n:*-; -f ! n; • *. ii;:it ion
A'K« : i-.KilS ?Ki;<IKT
Mr. Too C. llustor. . Whit-- i!i>o:ic
llr. J«'W An? i' '.on , CI-'.
-r. J::- -i; Stll^-li , Di!>
Wol. Jn:\n [.ioviui;, Arnw
•* Mr. Charl»."s -'iit::;T, A l '■ Vf-r.i;
Caoc. ':iir..--l :'. ; ;'.:'-.. -.mi- r. I- , ;-',-.v* -
Mr. Benson K . ': il f.hani , : '■*!
Mr. C'iinrlos n , i:\-i-.'.i).-ii-, , ri;,
llr. G'.'orrTP C. i'o'iro, FT-;
Ur. William C. C.r;c«i , :!!, Secretary
Otiservri s : "*
Col. ij. K. '-fa i ice", AJr :'--:-i-o '
Ur. Klihn iirsi'.inst-ein,' ■' •'■
Kr. Iljrry Cj-rea, Navy
Ur. B. (.. Wilir..-(l. !!;:'.••
Mr James Cj-Mii'.it.'r , NS*
Hr. Leonard •>' . I.'.mrio, *-■■■'
Mr. Ilichcrd ' i..T, CIA
Mr. Frcl J. i.'»s»"tUy, >T;
RECEIVFn FROM
■$B.r> r.n'5 .
I 1 Ft I _
Six.:-.. -.! frr-n a i. ■•.:.*=. h, NATIONAL SECURITY JN'FORMA' 1
^r,""":..''.'--"^?'"!., ^Unauthorized Disclosure
■'--" --'■• Suojcct to Criminal Sanctions
234
lCi-M-3
Juno 19, 1970
1. Approval of Minutes of Second Meetlm ;
The minutes of the second meeting were approved
with, no changes.
2. Items Tap nnd Three on the Ag enda
The Chairman suggested that Items two and three
appearing .on the agenda for the third meeting not be discussed
Inasmuch as the Information contained thi.ri.in had been In-
corporated into the draft report. The Committee concurred In
tills suggestion.
3. flevlcw of First Draft of Committee neport
Detailed discussion developed regarding the draft.
All neitbers contributed valuable suggestions in ways to Improve
the report. It was agreed that the FBI would attempt to Incorporate
suggested changes Into a second draft. This draft is to be
circulated to all members as soon as possible, after which the
recipients will attempt to obtain appropriate hir;ii-levoi Cott-
le rrencc within their respective agencies or departments.
4. Date and Place of Next Meeting
Tho next meeting will be held on Tuesday, June 23,
1970, In the U. S. Intelligence. Board Conference Koom 7E-26.
62-686 689
REIVED FROM
- FBI -
- 2
235
Exhibit 15
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
■ Mr. C. D. DeLoach\_>
date: j un e 19, 1970
FROM : ff . C> Su ll iwa £>
&
subject: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY T»3 PRESIDENT JUNE 5, 1970)
MEETING OF THE WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE June 18, 1970
In two previous meetings of the above-captioned committee
general discussions took place and the ground work was prepared for
dealing with the substance of the report. Yesterday, a third
aeeting was. held which extended throughout the afternoon and into
the early evening. Memoranda has been prepared and submitted to
the Director on the previous two meetings. Yesterday, the members
of the four intelligence organizations worked _out_the report. I
received the impression that Admiral Noel Gayior'of" National Security
Agency may have been_a_moving force behind the creation of this
/committee. The Program which we discontinued a few
years ago was raised immediately and figured prominently in the
Idiscussion. : , • V '
v . ' At the very beginning, tho -White House reDresentative
made it very clear to all members that the report had to be
working subcommittee report andany ODinions, observations, con
£i" s -. io il s . o r _recommendations..of..jLnaividual ."agencies "should not ;
^ul'd not be~set" forth with one exception.,
President did want aj definitive""
and
He said that the,
recommendation relative to creating
la group, or committee which could deal. _with operational problems and"
|objectives_of the member agencies and present estimates, evaluations
and interpretations on the-current. security threats and or obi ems
("suiting -from the student-professorial revolutionary activities,
Iblack extremism and related security matters^. He said the President
is of the opinion that all government agencies involved in intelli-
gence activities would have something to contribute and that through
such a group or board authority ,would be exercised to better . . /
(coordinate the collection of iiJ&iligeMe.jj,
The men representing the Army, Air For ce,-*«vy— Rational 1
Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency went into great
detail concerning intelligence operations, techniques ,,1'ftroceaures,
^FPFIV:!: eS and et cetera - following a detailed discussion concernin-
'■VLULIVthe nature/of the security threat to the United Sta l g s t gaay 1 . '""
;«;;.!'• :o|i;
""ne aii present were very friendly and cooperative to
.each other, jiBxer.t.heless, the_fac.t._remains that in such a_comp.lex
f%re^jis_int.elli5ence operations, difficult and serious issues are
v.. Pound 1 tq__come up concerning which, there will be disagreements.
^u-otiLc 2-; \'T ""'"■ /"":' /;"- ;V;.;" st '""-'' "> ">^Mo>,wi^tinsD - over
62-685 O - 76 - 16
236
Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach
RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT JUNE 5, 1970)
MEETING OF THE WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE June 18, 1970
In view of this it is probably fortunate that no member was
permitted to make any decisions, recommendations, or conclusions,
et cetera, in that the President reserves this rirjht for hiraself
only. Each_coritr'Jver3ip.I iE::ue p hits been so set up in writing
that the President may quickly and simply indicate whether he
wants or does not want any changes made.
II
Contingent uppn_what the President decides, it is
Clear that there couid be. problems i nvolved for .the . Bureau .
For exam ple, the reactivation of the , Program, et cetera.
I We are completing the first draft of this report now.
As soon as this is done, the report wijh a cover memorandum
explaining the various issues involved will be furnished to
I the Director either late today or early tomorrow morning.
RECOMMENDATION :
For the information of the Director.
RECEIVE i : R0M
ms r. Bis
. FBI-
- 2
237
Exhibit 16
0*4 MM. 1>C no. »» ^^^ ^^»
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
. TO : Mr. C. A. Tolson date: 6/20/70
from :W. C. Sullivan
■•***
SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGE.7CE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 19V0)
Attached for the Director's consideration is a copy
of a first draft of the report prepared by the working committee
in connection with captioned matter.
The first 36 pages of this draft present an assessment
of the present internal security threat under appropriate
captions. This is material with which the Director is
thfirou£hl_y_farailAar and it is not believed he need spend too
much time reviewing it unless he so desires. There is nothing'
I controversial in this portion of the report.
Material relating to investigative restraints and
limitations discussed by the working committee is set forth in'
Section V (pages 37-59). This material is set forth in
•accordance with the President's request, with the pros and cons
outlined and with no recommendations of any kind made by the
committee. It is clear that in this portion we have controversial
.issues affecting.the Bureau as well as the other agencies on the
'Committee.
The final section of the report (pages 60-65) sums uo,
in accordance with the President's request, the committee's
observations concerning- current procedures to effect interagency
coordination and suggested measures to improve coordination' of
intelligence collection through the establishment of a nermanent
interagency committee chaired by_the Director or a person
(designated to act for him. - - - -
Jr? 9 ."?* a ? re ?. with . th e scope of tnls proposed committee
gage
see
■nor do I feel that an effort should be made at this time to engage
in any combined preparation of intelligence estimates. I can
*"* a committee could be helpful if it was limited to meeting
RrTTIUnS^ftilSl y t0 deterrain e how to bettor coordinate operational
Uh\StlVr_13CtitfiJjy£s against particular targets in the intelligence fieldr
AW? i' laib ^ The working committer is scheduled to meet again at'
j.?... = ., Tuesday, June 23^ in order "to reacri agreement on a
|nal dra ft of^this report. : : —
TdiJdiJPS-bsf ..■,.:,,. , •
»r C«»»-at« «-'rf % '"r.7: ,.':* T", 7 '-•■";'■' "> «//■•'-•■'•' .v-^'TIIItJED - OVER
; t, *" W'M. the t / ?w approval of the FUl^t^ '" "'"""'"""'^ virsai-
238
Memorandum to Mr. C. A. Tolson
RE:, INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE _
OBSERVATIONS :
"''" '- . If committee agreement is .not_r.eAChed at Tuesday s
meeting on the controversial points involved, it would appear
we have four possible courses of ac tion:
(1) We can offer no objection to the report and
wait to see what the President decides (I think this would
be unwise )
(2) The Director can voice his objections to the .
President verbally
(3) The Bureau can take a. position in writing in the
report opposing any relaxation of the investigative restraints
discussed on the grounds that the arguments supporting these
restraints outweigh the arguments opposed .
(4) The Bureau can take a position in writing in the
report that it is opposed to the extensive scope and ramifi-
cations of the proposed new committee, while at the same. time
noting that we would have no objection to a committee which
would be limited to meeting periodically in order to effect a
better operational coordination among member agencies with
regard to particular targets in the intelligence field.
RECO MMENDATIONS :
(1) That approval be given for the Bureau to include
in the final committee report a statement opposing the
relaxation of investigative restraints which affect the Bureau.
(2) That the Bureau take a position at Tuesday s
meeting of the working committee that it is opposed to a new
committee of the scope described in the attached draft, but
that we would not object to a committee limited to better
coordination specific intelligence operations or problems-
ICF.IVFD FROM
^ EBJ
- 2 -
239
Memorandum to Mr. C. A. Tolson
RE: INTERAGENCY C0MHITTE2 ON INTELLIGENCE
RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED :
(3) That, In addition, the Director give
consideration to expressing his objections verbally to the
President.
(4) That, if the Director's schedule permits, final
meeting of Director'3 committee take place in his office at
11_ a.m., Thursday, June 25_. At that time the Director can
inquire' if other committee members have any further comments
and, if not, he can present them with, a copy of the final
report. (If the Director does not wish to* present this
report personally to the President, we will prepare
ajpproprlate_transiaittal letter for liaison to handle.)
IJFCEIVFn. FROM
' . FBI
3 -
240
Exhibit 17
ICI-A-3
Juno ID, 1970
INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
. WORKING SUBCOMUITTEK
AQEJIDA
Fourth Keotlu;; "
03IU Conforonco Room 7E-26
'on Tuesday, Juno 23, 1970, at 2 p.m.
1. Approval of Minutes of Wiman C. Sullivan
Third Hoot loR
2. Bovlow of Socond Draft of Wllllaa C. Sullivan
) Cocralttce Report to ba
^ Circulated to All Uenooro
3. Onto and PI nee of Xei>t Hoetlng -y PaA } Msm-yi oSa'-n '.-
:ifl!IVED FROM
AUti ft W5 ,
)FBIi .
Group 1
Exoludud from autoaatlc
dcrogradlnf; and
decla B9 lfic«tion NATION a L SECURITY INFORMATION
■UnauthorizGit Disclosure
' ■• Subject to Criminal Sanctions
241
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
( Memorandum
to : Mr. Tolson DATE; June 24> 19?0
from : Mr. IV. C. Sullivan
subject:- INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE OK INTELLIGENCE (AB iiOC)
(ESTABLISHED BY TilE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)
The final meeting of the working committee was
held on 6-23-70 and there is attached a proposed final draft
of a report for the Director's review.
During the final working committee session, a
number of changes were made in the prior draft which the
Director has seen. Significant change s include the following:
1. Two of the investigative restraints previously
listed have nowbeen compJ.ete.l_y__cJ,irai.nated. _.
<^ ■
2. The FBI's objections to the six remaining
restraints have been snelled_out specifically, in. appropriate
footnotes which include the basis for our nosition. " In
addition, some of the key wording in the marrative has been '
msdiijed in accordance with the observations the Director
made to me Monday. For instance, the term ''restrictions"
in the decisions section relating to electronic surveillances '„
(page 28) has been changed to "procedures." In the same
write-up (page 26) , reference to electronic surveillances
haying been "substantially reduced in recent years" has been
taken out.
3. In the section dealing with Evaluation of
interagency coordination (pages 42-43), tha_reierence to I
.restrictions on FBI and CIA Headquarters liaison contacts has ['■
been removed and the specific reference to. the Director as
/•rin.--!!- P ro P° sed chairman of an interagency committee has been ,'
i.H\ / !-! <, ?- 1 3*, e &3| Instead, the report merely indicates that the ' ' V
•-' • chairman!] would be named by the President. *•'
osure c ';' - B'
Tht3 document it v.rrwrr,! ,-,. * _ ^ m
nation okIsMc ynh.r roiii'i:iiiir'c"'"r '■"„'■" •""!'•'' TT'7' '""' '* vnt fnr ''''"" '"
WCS:mea- 1 iz fT> ?'"'"* Cmamitlc.c (:::<! /'/,. cm-l.-ut »■';",', V„» L '•'■', '? /"■"■'""' P'Mccdii::,.; >
Encl
m
242
Memorandum Tf. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson
RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC) - -
4. The prior draft contained a number of —
proposals relative to a permanent interagency committee
including a full-time working group staffed by the various
intelligence agencies. In the proposed final draft, these
proposals hnve been toned down, sor.cwhat and the proposed
full-tine wori.ir.;; ^roup is mentioned only. .ill. passing, as
a possible future eventuality.* In fact, after QpjiHider.a_ble
d iscussi on" the wording of this whole section was framed
with a view of eliminating any suggestion that the
proposed interagency committee would interfere with the
internal operations of any individual agency. In addition,
a footnote was added expressing the Bureau's specific
views concerning any such committee or group.
5. The section on budg et ajid manpower
restrictions (pages 40-41) was revised to make it clear
that the FBI does not haveany. problem_with regard
to review and approval 'of Its budgetary requests.
Copies of this proposed final draft are being
furnished to the member agencies for their review so
that all interested parties will be fully cognizant of its
contents in advance of the final meeting of the
Director's Committee in his office at 3 p.m., Thursday,
June 25, 1970. Those present will be Mr. Richard Helms,
CIA; Lt. General D. V. Bennett, DIA; and Vice Admiral Noel Gaylor,
NSA. Each man will ho doubt be accompanied by an aide.
ACTION: " ■
RECEI
Upon approval, this report will be printed and
assembled and then delivered to the Director's Office with
a transmittal letter to the President in time for the
Director's meeting. Due to the extremely sensitive_n.a_ture
of the report, each copy is being numbered and a record
will be kept of each recipient. The Director will note that
at the beginning of the President's copy there will be a
form to be signed by each agency's head indicatine. approval
of the report.
♦Since the concept of a full-time working staff' was all
but eliminated, a footnote was not taken regarding this item.
AUG b IP*
IUI -2-
243
Exhibit 18
' , M 6i. «a -* •'
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
■ Mr. Tolson
¥t
date: June 26, 1970
rROM :Mr. W. C. Sullivaf
o
subject: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)
The Director, as Chairman of captioned committee,
held the final committee meeting in his office on the
afternoon of 6/25/70. Present were the other committee
members; namely, Mr. Richard Helms, Director of Central
Intelligence Agency; Lieutenant General D. V. Bennett,
Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; and Vice Admiral
Noel Gayler, Director of National Security Agency. Also
present were Mr. Tom C. Huston, White House Presidential
Assistant who had served in a liaison capacity with the
committee; Assistant Director designate C. D. Brennan of
the Domestic Intelligence Division; and the writer, H. C.
Sullivan.
, _ The purpose of the meeting was to review in final
form which the President had instructed the committee to
prepare to assess the current internal security threat to the
a>untry and evaluate the capacity of the intelligence community
to deal with that threat.
:"?-> The Director opened the meeting by. commending the
committee members for the outstanding effort and cooperative
spirit they had displayed "in working together to compile the
comprehensive report.
The Director then furnished each committee member a
copy of the report and carefully covered in a concise manner
all of the items dealt with in the report. On each and every
point the Director solicited observations by each committee
member to insure that they fully understood every issue analyzed
and were in complete agreement with the contents of the report.
In this connection, lir. Helms and Admiral Gayler suggested three
minor additions be made. After securing the concurrence of all
committee members, the Director instructed that this be done
immediately, ■ j /
WCS:pat»MM
(3)J IVUI/. CONTINUED ■> 0?EH
Tialio-n' o,;MJr „„„,■ Cm,,,,.;-:-,- ';■■ . . . j!, ■ .,':. C ; / " ■' • ,'"" for !" MC! t~-
J
244
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)
With that, all committee members signified their
full and unqualified approval of the full report and so
indicated by affixing their signatures thereto along with
the Director's as Chairman of the committee. The Director
stated that he would arrange for the transmittal of the report
to the White House promptly on 6/26/70.
The Director instructed each committee member to
insure that all working copies of the report at the agencies
involved should be destroyed and fixed this responsibility
on the agency heads who were members of the committee along
with the responsibility of insuring that copies of the final
report retained by them for reference should be afforded the
utmost security.
The Director then concluded the meeting by thanking
the respective members of the committee and so dismissed the
committee.
RECOMMENDATION :
For information./
r?r.f:riV| : FROM
AUG 5 id/5
FBI .'
2 -
245
June 25, 1970
The President '
The White House i .
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
o
The Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc),
which you established on June 5, i970, nab completed its assessment
of the current internal security threat and related matters. A
special report setting forth tho findings of the Committee is attached.
This report is divided into throe parts. Part One
sets forth a 6ummary of the current internal security threat.
Part Two summarizes various operational restraints on intelligence
collection and lists both the advantages of maintaining these
restrictions and the. advantages of relaxing them. Part Three
provides an evaluation of interagency coordination, including
suggested measures to improve the coordination of domestic
intelligence collection.
r
This report has been approved by all of the members
of the Committee representing tho Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. . — >
Sincerely yours,
Enclosure , . •••■■.
*J/»
l \ WCS/mea •-*•
w / ■
if'ifT . ,MM
'„„o, S ,o'r" . NATI °^ n r ; n^ 1 ^ ""NATION-
^ J Unauthorised Disci.-mn-c
-' p [J | ■/. Subjoet t0 Criminal Sanctions
246
Exhibit 19
thz v/.hits mous
'WASHINGTON
July 9. 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security Affairs
In the future, I would appreciate it if your agency
would address all material relating to matters of domestic
intelligence or internal security interest to my exclusive
attention.
The President is anxious to centralize the-
coordination at the White House of all information of this
type, and your cooperation in this regard would be appreciated.
Dr. Kissinger is aware of this new procedure.
TOM
Z.-CLL.. kU
A CHARLES HUSTON
247
Exhibit 20
24.3 Richard Helms memorandum
. - : ' . SECHET/SSN'SITiVE .
'.' 2o .7'juL/ 1>'V0
i- .
sS>Z?.:.:<5SX "OR T.-3 ?ZCC?.D • . . • • :
S T J5J:.Cr: Discussion vit'i Attorney General Mitchell on
Do.-estic Intelligence ' .
1. ' TMrin; a private meeting vith the Alr.orr.37 General on '
27 July 1970, it becar.e clear, to -./ great surcrise, that he
• .had heard nothing whatever about the president's instructions
■ en "Domestic intelligence" until thai 73r7r.orrJ.n3.. In other ."' ;
words, the Attorney General had not been told of the r.seting at '
• the White House on 5 June 1?70 or- of the ad hoc committee ir.eet- ' ■"
■ i"g3 chaired '07 the F3I which had followed or about the report-
-which was sent to the president around 1 July,, setting forth :
..constraints on do.-estic intelligence collection. As I understand
it, the Attorney General first heard about these natters when the
. Director of the P3I co.iplair.ee to hin about a r 1 sao,ranc''jr. fro.-
• .'!r. T0.-1 Charlo.i Huston which r.ust "ce ■essentially the s?_~e tey.t
A3, tho j>R3 I received under date of 23 July V3T0 (£5C -OoS/S-'/O) .
2. I told the Attorney General that ve had -cut our backs
into this exercise j because we. had thought that hi knew all about
it and 'fas behind it. The Attorney General vas frank with r.e.
In addition, he said that he-had told Mr. Hoover to "sit tiVj-.t"
.until he_(th^Attomey General) had an opportunity to discuss . ' '.
•„ni 3 v.-.oie r.aV.er vita the President upon his return to V.'ashinjtj-n
.front San Cle-ente ne:ct «isl(, . •
"3. In cor.n.ection with the p.-ohle-s involved in acrostic
intelligence collection, I again suggested to the' Attorney General
tnat he hive 1 talk with y.r. San J. Pacich who, I sointed out. has
no:,- lull/ retired frc.n the ?2I . The Attorney General nrain -..rote
do'.-vi Mr. Fapich's nane.
. ." ':.' . ■.-.'. Sich.ir:' h'eLns - ■
■■■.•'. .. .-. ■'■■-.'■.■■■ .'.''•• ' ' ■'• Director • , .
Distributive: •."'"'■ .'• ' ..•.'■■•- '"•.'.. ' •' '
Oric - CCt's file • ■ '•■".'"''''■.'■•. '.
U: - S?. w/SO Ci'J7< -70 '
' SECRET/SENSITIVE
248
Exhibit 21
25.3 Richard Helms memorandum
MSMORWD'JU FCS
!••-. "icMaiu-S
-as K£l.-ssrss,»>*- ■■- ■■■■
D07.e3t!.c
Ki.cr.ar- >•■
249
Exhibit 22
__ 25.7 Tom Huston memorandum
THE V.'HITE -HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 5, 1970
EYES ONLY .'■•"•
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: TOM CHARLES/HUSTON
SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
In anticipation of your meeting with Mr. Hoover and the
Attorney General, I would like to pass on these thoughts:
. .. . . . /JT
•I.- More than the FBI is involved in 'this operation. K5A, '
DIA, CIA, and the military services all have a groat stake and a
■ -great interest. All of these agencies supported the options
selected by the President. For your private information, so did
all the members of Mr. Hoover's staff who worked on the report
.. (he'd fire them if he knew this. ) '■
250
-2-
. ■ • . r - .. ■
3. We arc not getting the type of hard intelligence we need'
at the "White House. W.e v/ill not get it until greater effort is made
through cormr*up.ity --.vide -coordination to dig out the information.
.by using ail the resources potentially available. It is, of cou;*:e,
.a matter of balancing the obvious risks against the desired
results. I thought we balanced these risks rather objectively
■in tli e report, and Hoover is escalating the risks in order to
cloak I lis. determination to continue to do business as usual. .
4. At some point. Hoover has to be told who is President.
He has become totally unreasonable and his conduct is detrimental
.to our'domestic intellig-ence operations. In the past two weeks,
he has terminated all FBI liaison with NSA, DIA, the military
cer-vices, Secret Service -- everyone except the White. House.. He
terminated liaison with CIA in \lay. This is bound to have a
crippling effect upon the -entire community and is contrary to
his public assurance to, the President at the meeting that there
v/as close and effective coordination and cooperation, within, the
■ int-elligcnce community. It is important to remember that the
entire intelligence community knows that the President mace a -
positive decision to go a+icad and Hoover has nov/ succeeded in.
forcing a review! It" he gets his v/ay it is going to lock like ha
is more powerful than the President. He had his say ir. the -. ;
footnotes and RM decided against him.. That should close the
matter and I can't understand why the AG is a party to reopening it.
All of us arc going to look damn silly in the eyes of Helms, C-ayior,
Bennett, and the military chiefs if Hoover can unilaterally reverse
a Presidential decision based on a report that .many people worked
their asses off to prepare and which, on its merits, v/a.o a fireg-
rate, objective job. . * ■ ■
5. The: biggest risk we could take, in my opinion, is to ccr.r
to rc:jard the violence en the c art \ •." : ■; and in the c*:ios as a tcrr.r ;rr.r
phe.-iomcrv.v.i which vill sim^'iy go av. a-/ c-.s.coz-n a:- the Scvar.'::.:*.
251
General was kidding himself when he said the campuses would be .
quiet this fall. Davis predicted that at least 30 would be closed-. '
dbwn in September. I don't like to make predictions, but I am
not at all convinced, on the basis of the i1-.teliig3r.ee I have seen,
th^t'v/e are anwway near over the hemp on this problem, ar.e I
am- convinced that the potential for even greater violence ;s
present, and we have a positive obligation to take every step .
within cur power to prevent it. ■". .
6. Hoover can be expected to raise the following points
• in your meeting: • . . ..■■•'■'■.'■■'.''
. .' (a) "Our present efforts are adequate." Ths answer
is. bullshit I. This is particularly true v/ith regard to FBI campus
. coverage. ' " . ..'..'' ;••-
(b) "The risks are too great; these folks are going to '
' get the President into trouble and RM had better listen to me."
The answer is that we have considered'the risks, we believe they
' are accontr-.ble and justified under the circumstances. V'a are
willing to weigh each exceptionally sensitive operation on its .: >
-merits, but the Director of the FBI is paid to take risks where
■'■ the security of the country is at stake. Nothing wo propose to ..
do has 'net been clone in the past -- and in the past it was always ^
done 'successfully. ~ *'
(c)' "I don't have the personnel to do the job the
.President wants done." The answer is (1) he has the people and/or
(2) he can get them. ' . .
(d) "I don't object to KSA conducting surreptitious entry
if they want. to. " The answer is that NSA doesr.'t h?.ve th= people,
can't get therri, has no authority to get them, and c.hov.ldn'i have -.;
to «ot them. It is an FBI job.
62-685 O - 76 - 17
252
(c) "It v/e do these things the 'jackels of the press' an^I th
-ACLU will find out; v/e cz.n't avoid leaks." Answer: V. r e can avoid
leaks by using trained, trusted agents and restricting knowledge of-
sensitive operations on a strict need to know basis. V/e do this
on. Other sensitive operations every day.
(f) "if I have to do these things, the Attorney General
will have to approve thorn in writing." This is up to the AG, out
I would tell Hoover that he has been instructed to do them by
the President and he is to do them on that authority. He needn't . -v
lock, for a scape goat. He has his authority from the President
" and he doesn't need a v/ritten memo from the AG. To maintain
security, v/e should avoid written communications in this area.
; • (g) "We don't need an Inter-Agency Committee on
Intelligence Operations because (1) we're doing fine right r.ov/ --
.good coordination, etc. -- and (2) there are other existing groups
which czn. handle this assignment. " The answer is that we are " , '•
f»o"tng" lousy right now and there aren't other groups which can ;'■ ■
do the job v/e have .in. mind became : (1) they don't meet; (2) they
don't have the people on them we waist or have some people v/e
don't war^t; (3) they don't have the author ifcv. to do what we want •-
done; .(4) ultimately this new operation will replace them; and
(5) 'they aren't linked to the White House staff. ■ . . • .
There are doubtless* another dozen or so specious arguments
that Hoover will raise, but they will be of similar quality. I hope
that you will be able to convince the AG of the importance and
necessity of setting Hoover to go along.- V.'c have worked for
nearly a year to roach this point; other 3 have worked far longer
■ and .had abandoned hope. I believe we arc talking aV.eut the zutura
of this country, icy surely oo'.v.estic violence ana disorder
thz'c.r.i'jp. the ver"' fabric c: o'.. ; :' society. ■Ir-.velU^once ir. r.cfc the
curs, hv.t ii: can provide tho.cia-.i"" 1 - 5 ^ t ' n: '- n -"-''' 33 iX c " l '~ possible.
?.t:»'7-'i*Jr:\'3Dv-ant , .v, it r.z..\ pvovi.j vs 'vi : :h t'r-s mean? to prevent t'-vj
253
-5-
deterioration of the situation. Perhaps lowered voices ar.d noace
in Vietnam will defuse the tense situation, v/o face, but Iv/oui-i-':
■ v/ant to rely on it exclusively. : '
There is this final point. For eighteen months v/c have
■watched peoole in this government ignore the .President's orders,
take actions to embarrass him, promote themselves^at his
expense, and generally make his" job more difficult. It m?.Ues
' mc fighting mad, and what Hoover is doing hero is putting
himself above the President. If he thought the Attorney General's
advice should be solicited, he should have dene so before the
report was sent to the President. After all. Hoover was chairman
of the committee ana he could have asked the AG for his comments
But no, ho didn't do so for it never occurred to him that the
.'President would not agree with his footnoted objections. He
thought all he had to do was put in a footnote and the matter was
settled. He had absolutely no interest in the views of NSA,
CIA, DIA, and the military services,, and obviously he has
...little interest in our views, or apparently even in the decisions
'of the President. I don't see how we car. tolerate this, but ■ .
beinn- a fatalist, if not a realist, I am prepared to accept the
fact that we may have to co so. '. . w . •.
TOM CHARLES HU5TOJ
MEMORANDUM
254
Exhibit 23
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA1H1NOTOH
August 1, 19T0
r '."':-';:V'
. CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN ..,'--. ■', "*. • **: >■&*,
,'••■ "SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW. "'"■*." " "V :'..'- *y-~-5W$f,
"Mr; Hoover has departed for the West Coast where he plana to vacation* *'. ?~\-;
for three weeks. If you wait until his return to clear up the problems • v„.f ,.»•'':
v .....' ■] .• * .■ VI*
.:.. surrounding our Domestic Intelligence operations, we will be into the new .•■•;.
'.school year without any preparation. . ■ ' .:.*-.'v
The situation in Portland is beginning to look very tense — the American ft'.'
' ! Legion Convention could become the first battleground for a new wave 'qf youthful',
; -violence. Coming ju6t as the school year begins, it could serve aB a catalyst;;", .
■; V for widespread campus disorders. . ' '. ■",.■ i V ••'■■ .";'.''
I recommend that you meet with the Attorney General and secure his; support";'-
~ for the President's decisions, that the Director be informed that the decisions,.
will-stand, and that all intelligence agencies are to proceed to implement them ';
at once. . ....,'
" loW\
TOM CHARLES HUSTON
255
Exhibit 24
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
September 18, 1970 «.'
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Pursuant to our conversation yesterday, September 17, 1970, I
suggest the following procedures to commence our domestic , . -. .
intelligence operation as quickly as possible. '
I-. Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit . A key to the
entire operation will be the creation of a interagency intelligence
unit for both operational and evaluation purposes. .Obviously,
the ' selection of persons to this unit will be of vital importance
to the success of the mission. As we discussed, the selection
of the personnel for this unit is an appropriate first step
for several reasons. First, effective coordination of the
different agencies must be developed at an early stage through the .
establishment of the unit. Second, Hoover has indicated a strong
opposition to the creation of such a unit and, to bring the FBI
fully on board, this seems an appropriate first step to guarantee '.
their proper and full participation in the program. Third, the
unit can serve to make .appropriate recommendations for the type .-
of intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the various •
agencies.. In regard to this third point, I believe we agreed •-.'-■
that it would be Inappropriate to have any blanket removal of
restrictions; rather, the most appropriate procedure would be
to decide on the type of intelligence we need, based on an
assessment of the recommendations of this unit, and then to ■ • . .
proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such
intelligence. •' •
To proceed to create the interagency intelligence unit,
particularly the evaluation group or committee, I recommend that
we request the names of four nominees from each of the intelligence
agencies involved. While the precise composition of the unit " :
may vary as we gain experience, I think thats^wo members should
be appointed initially from each agency in addition to your
personal representative who should also be involved^in the
•proceedings. Because of the interagency aspects of this^request, .
it would probably be best if the request came from the White^ -
House. If you agree, I will make such a request of the agency- .;
256
-2-
heads; however, I feel that it is essential that you work this •
out with Hoover before I have an jr. dealings with him directly.
2. Housing . We discussed the appropriate housing of
this operation and, upon reflection, I believe that rather
than a White House staffer looking for suitable space, that
a professional intelligence person should be assigned the task
of locating such space. Accordingly, I would suggest that
a request be made that Mr. Hoover assign an agent to this
task. In connection with the housing problem, I think serious
consideration must be given to the appropriate Justice Depart-
ment cover for the domestic intelligence operation. We
discussed yesterday using IDIU as a cover and as I indicated
I believe that that is a most appropriate cover. I believe
that it is generally felt that IDIU is already a far more ex-
tensive intelligence operation than has been mentioned publicly,
and that the 1D1U operation cover would eliminate the problem •
of discovering a new intelligence operation in the Department
of Justice. However, I have reservations about the personnel
in IDIU and its present operation activities and would suggest
that they either be given a minor function within the new
intelligence operation or that the staff be completely removed.
I have had only incidental dealings with the personnel, other
than Jim Devine, and cannot speak to their discretion and
loyalty for such an operation. I do not believe that Jim
Devine is capable of any major position within the new
intelligence operation. However, I do believe that he could
help perpetuate the cover and he has evidenced a loyalty to you,'
the Deputy and other key people in the Department of Justice,
despite his strong -links with the prior Administration. I
would defer to your Judgement, of course, on any recommendation
regarding Jim Devine' s continued presence in such an intelligence'
operation.
3- Assistant to Attorney General . We also discussed the
need for you to have a right hand man to assist in running this
operation. It would seem that what is needed is a man with
administrative skills, a sensitivity to the Implications of the
current radical and subversive movements within the United
States, and preferably, some background in intelligence work.
To maintain the cover, I would think it appropriate for the man
to have a law degree in that he wi' ". be a part of the Department
of Justice. You suggested the pc- bility of using a prosecutor
who had had experience with cases >. . this type. Accordingly, I
have spoken with Harlington Wood to ask him to submit the names .
Of five Assistant U. S. Attorneys who have had experience in
dealing with demonstrations or riot type cases and who are
mature individuals that might be appropriately given a sensitive
257
-3-
assignraent in the Department of Justice. I aid not discuss the
matter in any further detail with Wood other than to request the
submission of some nominees. I would also like to suggest that
ve request names from the various intelligence agencies involved
for personnel that might be appropriately involved in this activity
or vho might serve as your assistant.-
In summary, I recommend the following immediate action:
(i) You meet with Hoover, explain what must be done, and.
request his nominees for the interagency unit.
(2) You request that Hoover assign an agent to the task
of locating appropriate housing for the operations.. •
(3) I request that other involved intelligence agencies
submit' nominees for' the interagency unit.
• (U) I request from the agencies names of appropriate
personnel for assignment fo the operation.
Finally, I would suggest that you call weekly meetings to
monitor- the problems as they emerge and to make certain that we ...
are moving this program into implementation as quickly as possible i
H.B. Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that. if you would like
him to join you in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy
-to do so.
258
Exhibit 25
-jnited states govhivxmext . department of justice
Memorandum ■• \ [.,/.,.
to : The Attorney- General , date: Dec 4, 1970
from : Robert C. Mardiah
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
subject: Intelligence Evaluation Committee Status Report
As a result of my discussions with Director Hoover of the FBI
and Director Helms of the CIA and in consultation with Justice
Sharpe and John Dean, it was decided to limit the first'meeting
of the Evaluation Committee to representatives of the CIA, the
FBI, Justice Sharpe, John Dean and myself. John Doherty, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, also
attended. Director Helms designated James Angleton, Chief of
.the Counter-Espionage Section of the CIA as his representative
and Director Hoover designated Inspector George C. Moore, Branch.
Ch'*'?* 1 nf **i<= Tnf-prnsl ^pruriti/ Division as his reoresentative-
Our" first meetir.g was held in 'John Dean's office on Thursday,
December 3, between the hours of 9 AM and 12 Noon. I indicated
that the purposes of the meeting weiB (1) to reach an agreement
as to the goal sought to be attained by the Committee, (2) to
identify the membership of the Committee, and (3) to define the
role Justice Sharpe was to play, and to reach .agreement with
respect to his housing .and staff needs.
After considerable discussion, it was the unanimous opinion of
those present that the goal sought was to provide for access by
one authority to all of the intelligence in the possession of the
United States Government respecting revolutionary terrorist acti-
vities in the United States and to evaluate this intelligence to
determine (a) the severity of the problem and (b) what form the
Federal response to the problem identified should take. We also
agreed that this evaluation would, of necessity, disclose the
sufficiency of our present intelligence resources, as well as the
priorities which the government should attach to the problem.
259
"' We also reached unanimous agreement with respect to the question
of the composition, initially at least, of the Committee.' Al- -
/though we could identify approximately thirteen separate intelli-
gence units within the government, it was concluded that partici-
' pation by all of them would be. cumbersome and counter-productive.
Recognizing that we would need to bring in other intelligence
units at a subsequent date,' we agreed that the Committee would be
limited for the present to the following:
1. Central Intelligence Agency ,
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation
3. National Security Agency
4. Department of Defense
" 5. Treasury Department (Secret Service)
Both the CIA and FBI representatives were in agreement that
Colonel Downey of the Army would be' the most effective person to
1. --^»-*- f-~— the Dc"-rtn , .ent of n^fpncp nrovided he would be . „
permitted to report directly to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense rather than through the chain of command in the Army. No
recommendations with respect to the representatives of the National
Security Agency or the Secret Service were made.
The group agreed that the Attorney General should speak personally
to Secretary Laird, Secretary Kennedy, and Admiral Gayler and
request that they designate their representatives to the Committee
and that a specific request be made for Colonel Downey as the
representative of the Secretary's office rather than of the Army.
) I informed you of this request orally after the meeting yesterday
and am awaiting your reply.
We agreed that it was absolutely imperative that there be no dis-
cussion or communication of our activities except between the
participants and the heads of their respective agencies and between
the Committee and you and the White House designees.
f~~We also agreed that in the event of a leak the governmental responr:
•' would simply be that the activities of the Committee were an attemi
260
• to upgrade the intelligence-gathering activities of the IDIU
which had heretofore been made public and that Justice Sha"rpe I
had been employed as a consultant by the Attorney General to- /' .
assist in this endeavor. '■ " < —
The Committee determined that Justice Sharpe would be housed in
FOB #7 for convenience and that he would be furnished secretarial
support from the. Department of Justice and technical advice as
needed from the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Internal
Security Division, John Doherty.
The meeting concluded with the further agreement to meet again
as soon as possible after designation of the representatives by
Defense, NSA, and Treasury.
cc: _Mr. Ehrlichman
Mr. Haldeman
261
Exhibit 26
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
:•' ^Memorandum
¥
:Assistant Attorney General .'-, IS 7 DATEiFebruary 3, 1971
Internal Security Division ? ' -V . * .;<_ .
K.:
Director, FBI
subject: .INTELL IGE;;CE EVALUATION CCB-IMITTES :•'■ : . ■ t ■ '
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELTffilEOUS - -'/■" **..
Reference is made to your letter dated February 2,
1971, -which consisted of a draft of a "proposed charter" of
the captioned organization which has been provided to this
Bureau for review and comments.
In this regard it is requested that an appropriate
change be made in the wording of paragraph IV entitled "Staff"
to clearly show that the FBI will not provide personnel for
fha proposed permanent intelligence estimation staff. The
' wording" would then be consistent with our position as seated
in my letter dated January 27, 1971, prompted by manpower
and budgetary problems.
Although we are unable to provide any personnel
support,' you may be assured of our continuing full cooperation
in providing all relevant intelligence which might be of
assistance to the Coeomittee in fulfilling its responsibilities.
'62-113887 ■ •
ms- m
wrewMt SEcaffifr omsm
±£±/-fj.3.-.£.
11
DEPARTMFU 7 •''•" "■-::rr
.1
FEB 5 1971
R.A.O. (_
Listen & Policy riasr.ir
Terra Dj-t^o
262
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT \V \V "^ '' •' DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
DRAFT
Memorandum v
.to : See Addressees Below ".'. V DATE:February 10, 197]
from : Robert C. MardianV' *
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
subject:
Intelligence Evaluation Committee
J..X~~ — AUTHORITY ;
_Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances. !
II. MISSION ; ■'-■■'._.
To provide intelligence estimates to the responsible
:. Government departments and agencies on a need-to-Jcndw
basis "in order, to effectively evaluate and anticipate
' — problems to appropriately respond to civil disorders.
In carrying out this mission, the Committee shall have
access to all pertinent intelligence in the possession
of the United States Government.
III. MEMBERSHIP ; : '■ • •
Members of the Committee shall consist of representatives
of the following departments and agencies: Department of
Defense; Department of Justice; Central Intelligence
Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Secret Service;
National Security Agency, and, when necessary, representa-
tives of other departments or agencies designated by the
Committee. . ^
IV.. STAFF :
The Committee will be supported by a permanent intelligem
estimation staff* consisting of representatives from merabc
The Federal Bureau of Investigation advised it would not proy
personnel for this staff.
263
departments and agencies and headed by an executive
director appointed toy the Committee. :
• •:.•' i '.•'"*
V. ' PROCEDURES AND FUNCTIONS : .-
The permanent staff will perform the following functions:
::: .r 1. when requested by the Committee, the Departments
or Agencies represented shall furnish to the Committee
" staff all pertinent information relevant to the stated
request of the Committee. Such requests for intelligence
data shall first be approved by the Committee. The
Executive Director of the permanent staff may initiate
requests for information from member agencies subject to
review and approval by the committee. .
2. Prepare estimates from time to time as directed by
- the Committee.
3. Report, information gaps to the Committee as such
gaps are identified. ,
4. Recommend to the Committee no less often than
monthly subjects for intelligence estimation.
5. Prepare other relevant studies and reports as
directed by the Committee.
6. Provide for the security of information received
and the protection of all sources of information—
VI. OFFICE SPACE AND FACILITIES :
The 'Department of Justice shall provide necessary office
space, supplies, and incidental administrative support. \
264
' '.'■ ' ■ -3- :
. ■ • ■* ■ ' .' < ■ ■
ADDRESSEES: - ' . .%:;..
Inspector George C. Moore
Mr. Benson Buffham
Mr. Thomas J. Kelley
Colonel John W. Downey
Mr. Richard Ober
265
Exhibit 27
(Ed. <-:isi|
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
, Memorandum ■ r "*■■■"'"_ ^
'•»-' to : THE ATTORNEY GENERAL . <■"'< . DATE: February 12, 1971
subje . Tntelligence Evaluation Committee
'• Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division.
Attached is the final draft of the charter of the Intelligence
Evaluation Committee which has the approval of the entire IEC
staff, other than the representative of the Federal Bureau of.
Investigation. The Bureau advises, as you will note from tne
attached memorandum, that they will riot provide personnel to
work with the Committee staff for the purposes stated in the
charter Also attached are two memoranda from the Director to
me, dated January 27, 1971 and February 3, 1971, in which he
e^ate? h's r<? = = "">" = fnr >"»i"g unwilling to participate.
Although it might be possible to continue the work' of the
Committee without the FBI evaluator, in-, view of the fact that
most of the intelligence information available is Bureau inror-
mation,- I do not think that the quality of the intelligence
estimates 'would be sufficiently improved to warrant continuing
our effort without their cooperation. I think all of the
present members of the Committee other than the FBI member agree
with the above assessment.
"pending your further advice, however, we will continue to operate
on the basis of the exception noted with reference to Bureau
participation.
cc: Honorable John Ehrlichman
Honorable H.R. Haldeman
^ OF 77^,
/ ° RECEIVED \^
Forney &t
266
Exhibit 28
U.S. GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
June 11, 1973
To: Colonel Werner E. Michel, Chief, Counterintelligence and
Security Division, The Pentagon
From: Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division
Subject: Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC)
The IEC has been engaged in evaluating the potential for violence
during various domestic situations. Now that the war in Vietnam has
ended demonstrations carrying a potential for violence have virtually
ended; therefore, I feel that the IEC function is no longer necessary.
Accordingly, effective immediately, the IEC is no longer in exist-
ence. If, in the future, estimates are needed concerning' the potential
for violence in a given situation, such estimates can be handled by
ad hoc groups set up for that purpose.
From: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate
93rd Congress, Second Session on S. 2318, April 9 and 10,
1974, issue on Military Surveillance pg. 221.
267
Exhibit 29
me-iorakdum for mitchell, ehrlichman, haldeman
Unsigned on Justice Department Stationary
Dated January 19, 1971
"All those vho have been involved in the project firmly
"believe that the starting point for- an effective domestic intelligence
operation should be the implementation of the Special Report of the ,
Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc Committee Report of June 3/
1970). -
■ "Since the inception of this current project the general
climate of public reaction, the
has been significantly altered by the "incidents which have confronted the
Army in its intelligence operation. According, the current activities of
the working group would be subject to extreme adverse public media and
congressional reaction if discovered. ..-'-'
..."As noted above, there is considerable doubt as to how
significant a contribution the proposed committee vould make to
existing domestic intelligence operations without Implementation of the
Ad Hoc Committee Report.. . .
"Based on these observations, we have concluded and strongly
recomment that the existing plan for establishing a physical office with
a committee chairman and staff be rescinded and future meetings of the
working group be called on an Ad Hoc basis in John Dean's office; that
any deficiencies in intelligence should be called to the attention of
the existing agencies and corrections should be made through the normal
structure. If this fails to produce the requisite intelligence, it Is
then recommend that the questions raised by the Ad Hoc Committee Report
be re-examined to determine how either partial or full implementation of
the recommendations in that report might be accomplished."
It was further recommended that the group adopt the problem-solving
approack whereby appropriate* agencies develop intelligence estimates of
problems the group anticipates the government must fact in the near future.
There was also a discussion of "cover" for Justice Morrell Sharp
and Doherty since they were both recognized in the EOB.
62-685 O - 76 - 18
T«
FROM
SUBIECT:
268
Exhibit 30
JKOUTE IN ENVELOPE
UXil'EI) STATUS GOVERNMENT
-i .r » i , v . ,-.-,. 1 -Mr. Sullivan
Memorandum -.m^l i-Mr. Mohr
C- D. Brennan dati:: March 25, 1971
* JUNE
,,..-£ 1 - Mr. ltosen
1 - Mr. Brennan
DIRECTOR'S MEETING 3/31/71 WITH 1 - Mr. Wannall
ATTORNEY GENERAL, MR. RICHARD ' 1 - Mr. McDonnell
«ELM8 AND ADMIRAL NOEL GAYLER
Sullivan
ni.hoi.
II,,™;,... (II.
C B ll.,l",. ...
C-1*'
C ■'
Dull*/
C.jit-
Tclr. lt„..m . -'
llnlnis
G^dy -
We have "had no indication from any source as to the reason why
j Attorney General asked the Director to meet with him, Mr. Helms and
I Admiral Gayler on 3/31/71. Since Mr. Helms is Director of Central Intelligence
/ Agency (CIA) and Admiral Gayler is Director of National Security Agency (NSA),
I both of which agencies arc deeply involved in production of foreign intelligence, .
1 it would appear tiiat the meeting will probably cover this subject matter.
One of the most pressing problems of the Administration relates to
the control of activities of criminal subversives, such as the Weatherman
grouu, the East Coast conspiracy and the Blactf Panthers. Production of
intelligence relating to the proposed activities of such groups has ramifications
both in the domestic field and the foreign field, the latter because of indications
of possible foreign direction and control of these radical militants.
269
Memorandum for Mr. Brennan
Re: DIRECTOR'S MEETING 3/31/71 WITH
ATTORNEY GENERAL, MR. RICHARD
HELMS AND ADMIRAL GAYLER
While Bureau has primary responsibility for internal security matters
which includes production of domestic intelligence, recognizing the possible
foreign ramifications of the present problem relating to criminal subversives, it
is felt we should take advantage of any resources of MSA and CIA which can be
tapped for the purpose of contributing to the solution of this problem.
• Our principal sources for production of intelligence in Oris area are
/electronic surveillances and live informants. We have telephone
! surveillances and jmicrpphone surveillance targeted specifically for the
jorgjuijzatipns. In addition, wo have approximately potentfal informants' aid
sources in various stages of develppment for this same purpose, many of whom
are currently providing significant intelligence data. . In various ghetto areas
where criminal subversives are. concentrated we have over 6200 ghetto informants,
parsons residing in the areas or having contacts therein, who have agreed to
provide us with any information of interest to the FBI which comes to their attention
As noted above, we feel that the foregoing matter is the one most
likely for discussion during the 3/31/71 meeting; however, any matter in the
foreign intelligence coUection field would appear to be a possible subject for
discussion, in view of the presence of Mr. Helms and Admiral Gayler and
considering their primary missions.
ACTION:
Foregoing is submitted for the information of the Director.
270
Memorandum
to : Mr . C . D . Drennan
from :W. R. Wannall OjV- JUNE
ijj y ■
subject, DIRECTOR'S MEETING 3/31/71 WITH
ATTORNEY GENERAL, MR. RICHARD
HELMS AND ADMIRAL NOEL GAYLER .
1 - Miss Holmes
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
.1 - Mr. Dalbey
DATE: 3/29/71
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. CD. Brennan
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.J. McDonnell
Memorandum 3/25/71 in captioned matter reported that
we have 13 telephone surveillances and one microphone surveil-
lance targeted specifically for the production of intelligence
relating to activities of domestic criminal subversive
individuals and organizations. The Director has asked that
these electronic surveillances be identified.
The microphone surveillance covers the residence in
San Francisco of Huey P. Newton, Supreme Commander, Black Panther
Party .
j The 13 telephone surveillances are:
1. Black Panther Party Headquarters, Chicago, Illinois.
2. Black Panther Party Headquarters, Los Angeles,
Black Panther Party Headquarters, San Francisco,
Black Panther Party Headquarters, Oakland,
California.
3.
California.
4.
California.
5. Black Panther Party Headquarters, New Haven,
Connecticut.
- 6. Black Panther Party Headquarters, Bronx, New York.
7. Junta of Military Organizations, Tampa, Florida
(a black extremist organization).
8 Huey P. Newton's residence, San Francisco,
California. (He is Supreme Commander of the Black Panther Party).
9. communist Party USA Headquarters, New York City.
WRW/YJ JM : dgo A :Aj
CONTINUED - OVER
271
Memorandum, W.R. Wannall to Mr. CD. Brennan
RE: DIRECTOR'S MEETING 3/31/71 WITH
ATTORNEY GENERAL, MR. RICHARD
HELMS AND ADMIRAL NOEL GAYLER
10. Jewish Defense League Headquarters, New York City.
11. Worker Student Alliance Headquarters, Chicago,
Illinois (affiliate of Students for a Democratic Society, a
New Left extremist group).
12. Nancy Sarah Kurshan's residence, Cleveland,
Ohio (the New Left extremist activist) .
13. Nancy Barrett Frappier's residence,
San Francisco, California (contact point of the underground
Weatherman, New Left extremist, violence-prone terrorist group).
ACTION :
The above is submitted in compliance with the
Director's request.
272
Exhibit 31
OFFICII "F THK OIMRCTOR
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OK JUSTICE
FKDEItAL UUORAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON. D.C. 2051S
l/
April 12, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES
ci-.!-.- ' v ''o'n':
■/!
Mr. FclfT- |
5!r . c.v, ;
! Mr. F.oscn I !
Mr. Tav-'l
■ ; Mr. Walura— —
' ;-lr. t ■■■' ■■
Tele, ltoom..-
M.,i ii^>;»=-(/
Candy.-—
i' March 2% 1971, I attended a meeting with the Attorney I mi»
General, Mr. Richardltelfrrs, Director of the Central Intelligence AgeiqjF
(CIA), and Admiral Noel A. Gayfer, Director of the National Security
Agency.
This meeting had been requested by Mr. Helms and was for the
purpose of discussing a broadening of operations, particularly of the very
confidential type in covering-intelligence both domestic and foreign.
1 ■ ' ' There was some discussion upon the
part of Mr . Helms of further coverage of mail. C ■'» " ■'■ •
I stated to the Attorney General, Mr. Helms, and Admiral Gayior
' that I was not at all enthusiastic about such an extension of operations insofar
as the FBI was concerned in view of the hazards involved. The Attorney
General stated that he thought before he could make any final decision in
this matter, Mr. Helms should make an in-depth examination of exactly what
he and Admiral Gayior desired and then submit to the Attorney General and
myself the results of this examination, and he, the Attorney General, would
call another meeting of this particular group and make the decision as to what
could or could not be done.
Mr. Helms said he would take care of this very promptly.
05
Ubhi
. '-V.»s,
•\ jbhn Edgar Hoover
V' Director
JEH:EDM (1)
273
Exhibit 32
Jf :,-.,-,,STA,-i,SC i OVKKNN,K^0UTE IN EN S^LOPE^ ^ ^
''"lemoTandivm
Mr. C. D. PeLoach ' u.vi i: : July 19, 1966
V.'. C. Sullivan ,' t ,\) r DO f.'OT FIIJS
"3LAgi< BAG" JOBSi/
Cill
Ctl-
— — >
1
r..^,'."^i;
The following is set forth in regard to your
request concerning what .authority we have for "blacl: baft"
•jobs and for the background of our'polioy and procedure:;
in such matters.
■ !S— 5l° 1\PJ- phi-zip- authorization for "bj.nck._b.-.'*,"
J .^.?...^£°H-."MJ;i ii " d «.jrhc\.nu{>;ai!~'"'"Sucli a~t'o'cb'niquo involves
trespass and is clearly illegal; therefore, it would bo
impossible to obtain any. legal sanction for it.- Despite
this, "black ba;c" jobs have been used becnus:.- they represent
an invaluabl e- techniq ue in combat in?; subversive activities - "
of a clandestine nature aimed directly at ujiderminin;,' and
df<5TT*nyi n^ niir nation.
-* The present procedure followed :i.n the use of this
technique calls for the Special Agent in Charge of a field
office to make his request for the use of the technique
to the appropriate Assistant Director. The Special Af;cnt
in Charge :.n>st completely justify the need for the use of
the tcchr.i.-.uc and at the same tins assure that it can be
safely usee without any danger or e.-r.barrass.c.ent to the
Bureau. The facts arc incorporate i:i a r...-::;iorr.iiOim which,
in accordance with the Director's instructio.--i , is sent to
Mr. Tolson or to the Director for approval. Subsequently
this ncir.oranciur.; is filed in the assistant Director's office
under a "Do Not File" procedure.
In the field the Special /-seat ia Charge prepares
an informal memorandum showing that l-.o obtaiuc :; ouroau
authority and this nccoi-mdua is filed in his safe until
the next inspection by bureau Inspectors, at which tine - it
is destroyed.
274
Meir.orar.ium to iir . C. D. DcLoach
Re: "DLAOK BAG" JODS
V/c hr.vc used this tcck'.i icp.c or, r. highly selective
basis, but with wide-range effect j ,vi-ness , :.:i our opera lions.
V.'c have several cases in the espionage lie id,
Also through the use of this technique we have on
numerous occasions been able to obtain material hold highly
secret and closely guarded by subversive (croups and organisa-
tions which consisted of membership lists and mailing lists
of these organizations.
This applies even to our investigation of the
You may recall that recent: y through a
"black bag" job v/e obtained the records in the possession of
thrcc_higli-r.-.n!:in(; officials of a organization in
. These records gave us the c.o:;ipi e to membership
and financial information concerning the operation
which we have been using r.iost effectively to disrupt the
organization and, in fact, to bring about its near disintegratioi
275
:-.cv :.:::■ \:- to Mr. C. D. DoLoach
: "f!. : ..\C:-: I3AG" JOV3S
In short, it is n vc:ry valuable v;c::ipon which wo have
\;:;r:d to coi.i'ial tho highly clandestine: oL'jort.*; o f :iubvor:uve
elements scGl:infc to undermine our Nation.
il' iC.OMJ.n-.'MIA'i'IOM :
Vov your infornatioii .
No more such techniques
must be used.
276
Exhibit 33
J;iiii.i:i.ry (>. i'.;>J7
f.ii^JUrtANDUM 'J'OK ;v')i{. TOL;-JCN
V-'.u. iji" LUAC'l
.'. ;;.;t? chat rsisue^ta are .»tlU being insula by iiursau
,;:.iic:a!s lor the use oi "SlbicijKHj ,,: i-icHnli'Tues. ijiayM previously
i;v.i.i.:ateo '.hat I uo not isitsari co approve any ^uth rsfqaauts ia i.".a
i'-iiur-;, :jm, 'jonsoqueniiy, no such recoiK&jonii'.ilion;] ;.:huu:J :io
.-su'ui-niUao ior approval oi such ii>attnrs. T!)is practice, whiiva
hwiuicB uloo uurra;;iitlcus -jntrances upon ;)rej!j!Kcs vl any '.;i)W,
'i/iii ijct ;:!soi ,vit:i zny approval in ilio iutur-i.
vary truly your 3,
John l^d.j.ix "or.ytr
UA.'.vctor
J^;:K^i(7)
277
Exhibit 34
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ij .
WASHINGTON. DC. 20530 V I I - ft " "S" bl^ 1 /^""^
r**
n
■xmMiMkIL
Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Church:
By letter of September 22, 1975, from Mr. John
Elliff of your Committee staff, Mr. Elliff requested
certain information with respect to surreptitious
entries conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation against domestic targets. Attached and
transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to that
request.
Slmcerely,
rciksu--,
MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
278
I'MTI-.l) STATKS UKI'AltTMKNT UK JliSTICK
I'KDKIIAI. IIUIIKAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON. DC. 20S3S
(IS-3) 62-X16395
September 23, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE:
SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES - DOMESTIC TARGETS
Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 22,
1975, from Mr. John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence
Task Force, to Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel
for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney
General, wherein Mr. Elliff made the following request with
respect to domestic targets of surreptitious entries con-
ducted by the FBI:
1. Statistics on the volume of such surreptitious
entries in inclusive categories such as "subversive,"
"white hate," organized crime," or "miscellaneous." These
statistics should be cleared for public disclosure.
2. Committee access at FBI Headquarters to a
complete list of specific targets, represented by the
statistics in Item 1, above.
3. Delivery to the Chairman and Vice Chairman
of the list of specific targets requested for access in
Item 2 , above . * —
With respect to this request, from 1942 to April,
1968, surreptitious entry was utilized by the FBI on a highly
selective basis in the conduct of certain investigations.
Available records and recollection of Special Agents at FBI
Headquarters (FBIHQ) , who have knowledge of such activities ,
identify the targets of surreptitious entries as domestic
subversive and white hate groups. Surreptitious entry was
used to obtain secret and closely guarded organizational and
financial information, and membership lists and monthly
reports of target organizations.
279
Re: Surreptitious Entries - Domestic Targets
When a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of a field
office considered surreptitious entry necessary to the
conduct of an investigation, he would make his request to
the appropriate Assistant Director at FBIHQ, justifying
the need for an entry and assuring it could be accom-
plished safely with full security. In accordance with
instructions of Director J. Edgar Hoover, a memorandum
outlining the facts of the request was prepared for
approval of Mr. Hoover, or Mr. Tolson, the Associate
Director. Subsequently, the memorandum was filed in
the Assistant Director's office under a "Do Not File"
procedure, and thereafter destroyed. In the field
office, the SAC maintained a record of approval as a
control device in his office safe. At the next yearly
field office inspection, a review of these records would
be made by the Inspector to insure that the SAC was not
acting without prior FBIHQ approval in conducting
surreptitious entries. Upon completion of this review, .
these records were destroyed.
There is no central index, file, or document
listing surreptitious entries conducted against domestic
targets. To reconstruct these activities, it is necessary
to rely upon recollections of Special Agents who have
knowledge of such activities, and review of those files
identified by recollection as being targets of surreptitious
entries. Since policies and procedures followed in reporting
of information resulting from a surreptitious entry were
designed to conceal the activity from persons not having a
need to know, information contained in FBI files relating
to entries is in most instances incomplete and difficult
to identify.
Reconstruction of instances of surreptitious entry
through review of files and recollections of Special Agent
personnel at FBIHQ who have knowledge of such activities,
show the following categories of targets and the approximate
number of entries conducted against each:
1. At least fourteen domestic subversive targets
were the subject of at least 238 entries from 1942 to April,
1968. In addition, at least three domestic subversive targets
were the subject of numerous entries from October, 1952, to
June, 1966. Since there exists no precise record of entries,
we are unable to retrieve an accurate accounting of their
number .
- 2 -
280
Re: Surreptitious Entries - Domestic Targets
2 . One white hate group was the target of an
entry in March, 1966.
A recent survey of policies and procedures of the
General Investigative and Special Investigative Divisions
at FBIHQ with respect to surreptitious entries, disclosed
that with the exception of entries made for the purpose oi
installation- of authorized electronic surveillances, the
technique of surreptitious entry has not been used m criminal
investigations.
A list of specific targets has been prepared for
review by Senators Church and Tower , and appropriate FBIHQ
officials are available for a discussion of this list.
281
Exhibit 35
Hay 9. 1975
Honorable Hugh E. Kline
Clerk
United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Colombia Circuit
United State3 Court House
Washington, D. C. 2C001
Re:
•United States v. Ehrlichraan
(D.C. Cir. NQ.74-1G82)
Dear Mr. Kline:
This letter states the views of the. Department of
Justice concerning an issue raised in this case: the .
legality of forms of surveillar.ee in the United States
without a warrant in cases involving foreign espionage or
intelligence. Copie3 are enclosed for distribution to
the Court.
It is the position of the Department that such
activities must be very carefully controlled. There must
bo solid reason to believe that foreign espionage or
intelligence is involved. In addition, the intrusion
into any zone of expected privacy must he kept to the
c.ininum and there must be personal authorisation by the
President or the Attorney General. The Copartr.'.cr.t believes,
that activities so controlled are lawful under the Fourth
In regard to warrantless searches related to
foreign espionage or intelligence, the Department does not
believe there is a constitutional difference "between
searches^ conducted_by_wirctapping and those involving
physical entries into private presides. Cne lorn of search
Is no less serious than another. It i3 and ha3 long been
the Department's view that warrantless searches involving
physical entries into private premises are justified
282
under the proper circumstances when related to foreign
espionage or intelligence (See Brief, p. 45, n. 39) .
The discussion by the Special Prosecutor (Brief,
Part IB) raises questions which, in our view, are not
presented by this case. The physical entry here wa3
plainly unlawful, as the Special Prosecutor, argues,
because the search was not controlled as we have sug-
gested it must be, there was no proper authorization,
there was no delegation to a proper officer, and there
was no sufficient predicate for the choice of the particu-
lar premises invaded. For these reasons, we fully
support' the Special Prosecutor in concluding that the
entry and search here were unlawful.
■ Respectfully submitted.
JOHN C. KEEIEY
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Enclosures
283
Exhibit 36
CENTRA!.. INTELUGI.NCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, O.C ZO'JOS
ofncf of int uiRCCioa
2C February Vl'IO
Personal and Confidentia l
The Honorable J. Fd;;ar Hoover
Director " • '"
J'cihi.i I I'.uriMM of Investigation
Washington, ).'. C. "
Dear Mr. 1 [oovcr:
Mr. ha:; orally informed me that you wish to have the
idcnlily of llic: Fill' ;i|;cnt who was the source of co-lain i nfor mai.ionr
coiiununi rated to an employee of this Agency, Mr.
Till:; information rri:a r :liiv: the disappearance ui inn: 'l'iiwn'i::::_ lUji.> was
in t uiei_j^a_s :nvd_le _. . ....
Jo view of your personal interest in lliis matter, 1 instructed
Mrj. to report to me in person.
1 have reviewed this complicated east: in detail with Mr:
and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. A:; a point
of honor and personal integrity, Mr.' j.vas adamant that he
could not disclose the identity- of hi s source. Under further pressure
from me, Mr. " 'maintained his position, slating that in de-
fense of it lie was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.
• it;
[-}'■'
AUG
Mr! explained that the . l ' eases
■had been j^iven extensive news coverage," niuch of it bein;: sensational
in nature. He stressed that there was umbar lassini; public speculation
as io tin: possible involvement of the CIA and the Fl'.I in Itiha's
' disappearance.
:; I:-; 1 :, . .
\\]\
62-685 O - 76 - 19
284
The purpose of conference with the District
Attorney of Denver was to solicit his i;opd offices to nMimvi: pre s-
sures ami (he ]ii)ssilik serving of a subpoena on,
lie .lino sought to orient llu: District Attorney properly so Mint In:
would not continue 1o have an or ronoous impression of flu: ntli-s of
the CIA ami the L r l',l, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.
Mr. affirms th at b efore i:oinL- to District Atto.rncy
McKcv iU he called upon the FBl' ■ _ 'Mr.
and sought to. coordinate with him our respective interests,
lie also "solicited Mr. to accompany him to Hie District
Attorney.
Mr, 'states that Mr; j_cfusod absolutely t... -
;-. I |! cooperate in this mailer. Instead, Mr. i:n<:ai;<:d in an oral
'..i-i'i 1 |i ,:xcn:,n K« durinj! which he remarked thai; our representative in
u. c^i, :' lloul der was "lyin ;:" and then proceeded lo challen ge tin: ver.-ic:ily of
Mr. .Subsequently, Mr. • 'conferred wilii
the District Allorney alone. lie was successful in .persuading (In:
District 'Attorney t„ m .-,k c a favorable p ublic state ment which i',.id
the effect of pulling tiiis issue f C;:ardiii;; and oilier rumors
lo rest as f.ir as the public was concerned. -
1 have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. 1 - . -.
1 feel llin.t p oor judgmen t was employed in passing the information in
qucslioh'i'o 'and later to Hie District Attorney. This should
only have been done with specific Fill approval. 1 wish (o assuro'you
that 1 do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am
taking steps to impress once ayain this elementary fact upon ail Agency
officials.
With regard to Mr. ' .1 have no reason to doubt liiat
he has acted honcsllv. 1 believe that hollas reported to me in coed,
faith, lie is sincerely' interested in preserving a sound workin;:
relationship between the CIA and the Kill. ' Nevertheless, because a
situalior of this sort adversely affects tiie relationship between the two
a|;enci e; J 1 am taj'.inn administrative action in this mattei v/ilh re:;ard
to Mr.
AUG ii'l
'i:---V\..:F.. J- -i^-./j •?!"•■.-■•.■- :•■■■
■-~~> *■*'■ .-:->•<■
285
I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our
mutual efforts in makim; certain that wc have not overlooked factors
possibly ha vim; a significant bearing uii U.S. intelligence and internal
security interests. 1 shall pursue this matter through our respective
liaison offices.
V
]n closin;;, Mr. Hoover, 1 wish to state that tlii:; At;rncy can only
fully perform itr. duties in the furtherance of the national security when
it iia:; llw: closest com re! inalion and teamwork with the Kctii-ra I I'.urea-.: of
Investigation. Furlhcnnon:, it is necessary that v/e continue to eon-
duct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I I rust that we
can coordinate closely :.ny future developments or action:; in these ease:;
in order to prevent the airing in public of conflict:: or <ii J I '• rettces helwce
the two agencies. 1 feel stroni;ly that there are representative;-. .||' the
news media who are eae,er to exploit alleged difference:; on a national
scale. Disturbi nj; as this experience has been, 1 wish i.o thank you in
the interests of our common cause lor bavin;; communicated with me
in such a -forthright and candid maimer,
> ■!■:- - ■..•"' '.-'\ ' ■; - ""■ - ■ ; :
I Sincerely,
r . n . • '■ f A, -r*'-''-' +~ 'Kich.-u-d Jlolms
_J\ . /i.i-.i.,-.- ,, j*'c.--.v> ■■'■■•'-<■ '■I't-y -V'.-v <-—l s\
AlUi:lirti>!iil!i - :i/s :• H ')' , 1 '..~ V J
\:\\r. ... in'''; ,.., , ,;\ . '.... .i-v .-■•; • •.--->••• ■•'•■■■•'•• ^
WJG'iiuii .*-, ,..-... v .;..:."v. ,..V- '- - ^--^ r- -
• FBI. •;^::'-~ -•"^■•;-; ;/■■•-■"
286
Followim; arc typewritten clarifications of the
handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the at.tached
document:
Page 2, lol'L margin -| acted properly. II"
Page 2, liottom of page - "1 do not; agree, .violated the
third agency rule &■ refused to identify
tlie alloyed FBI agent who was the source
of the information. II"
Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgot:; it jr. a two way
street. II"
Page 3j IjoLLoiii of page - "This is not; sal J st'ac: lory . J i-.'aiil: our
. Denver Office to have absolutely no
contacts with CIA. 1 want direct liaison
hero with CIA to ho lennj nal.ed ■'>. any
contact witli CIA in the future to be by
letter only. II"
287
Exhibit 37
February 26, 1970
BS LIAISON
QVCL, */
Honorable Egil Krosb, Jr. 'l-fit/ f
Deputy Assistant to tho President jl
for Domestic Affairs
The Whits HOU3C c .-\- Q L- ; f ~ flApy- ■mi- ; . ," - ■ " I i ) -', i x. ,- •
Washington, D. C. """ ~~~ '
Dear Ur. Krogh:
Pursuant to your request of February 23, 1970, /]— >
there nre enclosed 13 memoranda concerning source3 of f undB./ i\ I j
utilized by revolutionary groups. jl I I
Sincerely yours,
Enclosures (13)^C*
RLS:mst -*"
(9) -.v*V ■■•^
* iL
/Oo - L i 1 l ' ''';/'■ '/' i -/77
9 -H6-27 1970
V.f 6/>">7. 7n /_>. _
£*//
.^-)"
^ '- '•?=»- zz\
r? MAR 1,2 ,1970 v^
: <__ n
"i^CD
J^-JLc-t/JX/L-
A
288
February 26, 1970
PEOGBTSSrVE LABOR PABTT
The Progressiva Lr,'oer Party (PLP) is an active
comnunlst party is tho : United States pliich adheres to tha
revolutionary dnr.: ; -..;..io n'f -;:,.- Ci-.ir.oca Cci.rv.jiist Party and
its leader !;to Tsc-'::^, !■«'.•.'■;.• ior tho PL? are obtained
fron duos paid by ussbers of tU= organization.
The PLP also derives incone from the sale of its
naKazice •Vrosres-r.ive Lr..:-...-," r..:d its monthly nousoapor
"Challenge. " FLr >:s Jojrsf'iv-j bulls nailing of these
publications dirc:::lv to i-ctir-. China, in the uast. The
PLP in January, 10VO, prj ».t.-;i .:u,000 copies of "Challenge,"
and in February, 1SV0, I-s.OOO issues of "Progressive Labor.'
EJS:mst <
(8) v^T"
289
February 26, 1970
REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA
The Republic of Hew Africa (RKA), a black extremist,
separatist organization, ?as formed in Detroit, Michigan,
in March, 19G3.
RKA activity has been curtailed from Its inception
by lack of funds.
GXT:ek»
(8)
OK
290
rebruary 26, 1970
snmn.-T national ccorj>n:tTiNG cmmirrBK
The Student National Coordinating Connittee Is a
black extrenist nor^r.rrcrsbip orr.-.-.isation which was founded
in 12C0 and lrhich until July, 1:~GD, mas known as the Student
nonviolent Coordinntir.j Coi.:iti;CG. Tiic group is currently •
led by li. Hap Iirc-.-n v;:o serve:; as rational Cuairnan.
The organization is currently active in Atlanta,
Georgia; Cincinnati, C.:io; cud text ior& City. The
organization's national ofiicl is located in New York City
where it maintains en cii ice orovic-d by the Saint Peter s
Episcopal Church at i^o. Viji >..';th Lireet. The group operates
nationally uith lees ti;an 50 rjecbors and is consistently reported
to be in dire financial condition.
Additional revenue is ohtnined through the psyoont of
dues by Student ICationr.l Cocruinntir.!;. Corsittce affiliates and
recently efforts have been r.u-Jo by t:io iJcw Hots, organization to
publish a news bulletin entitled "National £::CC" which it is
intended would cell fov3E« a cow. Publication of this ne-ss
letter has not net with success tna to date only one issue is
knosn to have appeared.
A) eff'
&
291
STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COLTJITTEE
RC?:pab, ,-iP
292
February 26, 1970
craonraisT partt, dsa
293
February 26, 1970
SOCIALIST WORKERS PART?
Tho •; votskyist Socialist Workers Party (StfP) is
hoi'.ciqu;..-.-'. •.•;:«'.! ^ Saw York City and is the largest, and most
active :-i i:.;. o: .:. .lunist splinter groups. Through its youth
oi'fili:,::: . ■■:■::. ':=::ip.3 Socialist Allinr.cn (YC.) , the ST.?
c::'.-vt£i .■•'■::..■■■ . :'vcr the Student Mobilization Coaraittee to
End the i .':•.:.• : : • " : .otnan (SMC), a broad-based student antitjar
group. ■>;•..-• ST...' -clso naintain3 fraternal ties with the
Fourth C.-:-':c.i-.'.'-.-:^or.al,. a European Trotskyist organization.
T.t:j ;-.--inary source of funds is the monthly
Bu^tniii::': ■■;.' J: : :.'*oen dollars extracted from each member.
In nddiv..:.---:, >...■ -.los are also realized fron the sale of
publicum:'..-:.:.. • Elections in support of ST, : P political
candid;. ■■■::.. •■: ,-t. collections at large public rallies, and
through •'.■.■. c-T'.'-rol of front orcanizations
FGB:ser
(S)
294
February 26, 1970
YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE
The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) Is the youth
organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SEP) and has
been described by the ST.P as the naln recruiting ground
for the SV.'P.
A YSA publication in an article outlining the
organizational concepts of the YSA states that the
nenbership and each local chapter are responsible for
financial support to the organization through 6uch activities
as payncnt of ninlaal dues based on ability to pay, literature
sales and fund raising projects.
The YSA is subsidized by the SWP which furnishes
varying nnounts of money to the YSA on a continuing basis.
DPW:soe
(8) ,'J£
-V.
295
February 26, 1970
STUDENT UODILIZATION C01DJITTEE TO .
END THE Ytttt IH VIETNAM
The Student Mobilization Coruaittee to End the War
in Vietnam (SL'.C) is controlled and dominated b? the Your.i;;
Socialist Alliance- (YSA) T:hich is the youth organization
of the Socialist Workers Party (SOT). The S"C has local
chapters in all sections of the United States and nitords
the YSA a broad base organization for popular support.
The SMC local activity is financed by the
individual chapter concerned and in turn these local groupjj
contribute toward the expenses of any national action
sponsored or supportod by the SHC. The local chapter^
organizo their ora fund raisinn projects and are assisted
by°contributions froa their neabors and supporters.
ser
DFiT/jan
(S)
296
February 26, 1970
VENCEREEOS BRIGADE
The Vencerer-c-s Erigade (VB) rcas organized in
June, 19G9, for t!ie purpose of supporting the Cuban revolution
by assisting in the current sugar' cane harvest. It is head-
quartered in Kcw Yori: city and is conposed of the National
Executive Co;.:;.:ittci, r:~ic::?.l recruiters and the brigade nenbers
who travel to Cub:-.. T^e Evocative Comittco is conposed of
individuals representing a variety of Kew Left groups, which
groups have also provic'.od organizational support. To date a
total of 702 indiviiiuaia have been identified as having
traveled to Cuba undor VB auspices.
With regard to finances, the V3 Executive Cocnittee
instructed the regional recruiters that each region could be
responsible for raisi::-; travel funds for transportation of
participants to at vhicb points
the Cuban Government <roiild assuce financial responsibility.
All excess funds were to be sent to the national office.
L'oney to support travel expenses was obtained through
various fund raising affairs sponsored by the organizations
lending cuppcrt to i'.)- YE. These projects included bazaars,
fila showings, and coiiees. In addition, infornation has been
developed disclosing- that each traveler provided his own fund3
for transportation and incidental expenses, and in sone instances
they were arbitrarily assessed a proportionate amount to cover
the travel expenses for those without funds.
; /
FBG:bjp/LM
(8)
297
February 26, 1970
STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
Beathernan Faction
Weatuernan national leaders, such as William Ayers,
liar': Hudd, and Jeffrey Joacs, since their election as
StuOcnts ior a Democratic Society (ErJ) national secretary::
in June, 19G0, have appeared as speakers on a nuober of ccile;;e
campuses throughout the country. • They have received honorariums
froa these colleges ranging iron §200 to $750 for their speaking
engagements.
This faction is and lias been in severe financial
crisis since Into Pall of 19G9. Because of its violent and
nilitant activities, forner sources .of funds are no longer
available, _ . »
• Teatherr.an- nenbers live in residences called "collectives,"
and the rent they pay usually i3 very noninal, Ueathernr.n
necbers, because they are in severe financial straits, often
ireceive nonoy froa their parents to help defray expensec. Lost
o; the ti;-;3, however, nenbers of the collectives cove ii'eousntlv
liroa one place to another to avoid payin-j rent. The individual.:
in the various collectives take alnost daily trips to "liberate"
(steal) iriiatover they need, such as food, clothing, »nd house-
wares,, at local supenaarkots and other stores.
•WNPiLU
](fD
p'
y
Vtf
298
Students for a Democratic Society
Worker Student Alliance Faction
This faction of SDS has obtained operating funds through
the sale of literature and requests for donations tfirouf-,ii its
■mblication, "Uev Left IiOtes." Donations amounting to iron
:,il to $50 have been received fron many Worker Student Alliance
(l.'oA) Bcubers located throughout tho United States.
299
Students lor a Denocratlc Society
The '""A faction recently has held National Council
meetinrr; i;j :;■:.-./ iisven, Connecticut, and Los AnGele3, California.
The ):>>:: ;;-.! iccj for the auditoriucs where the nootinns were
ls'.-}.ii i:;.- v'vo'i c'.onation3 iron delegates, trho paid sues ranging
ii-on vS ,.-. •+*■*. It v?.3 stressed at both neetings by WSA
leadcrr -*:iui: thia faction 1b in dire need of funds with which
to operate.
r.evolutio;:ury Youth Hovenent Faction
This friction of SDS has no operating funds on a
natloi.M loci at this tine. Local revolutionary Youth
L'ovemcy s.l'iVi.) chapters operate on their ova, and any funds
they r.'.i.: covin iron local necbers. During the Tall of 1969,
i:icha£A . r ic;.c::y, considered to be one of tho top leaders of
V:':s ;.....■/■., r.ado a nucbor of speeches on college canpuses
\.\;-jv<! I- : >.i---\c.: jarorariufca Kvej-i^i^j; -"". : ? 'for each cngageri-aa'S.
Cacbriu^c Iron and Steel Conpany
The Cambridge Iron and Steel Company, Canbrldgo,
liassr.c^scT7;.:, vas created in early 1969 to support eucb
org^nii.ai:icr..'j r.j SC3 in the Cambridge and boston areas.
62-685 O - 76 - 20
301
February 26, 1970
TODERGROOND PUBLICATIONS
The '.lev Left relics heavily on printed propaganda.
The Hen Loft his an enormous propaganda mill churning out
publications c:-nen:-.ing the "Establishment" and glamorizing
the "rebels." There arc over 200 New Loft underground
newspapers published on a regular basis in the United States.
Ti:o central thene which pervades these papers is a
criticisr. oC tlv.-. "llr-tablishncnt" in general and law enforce-
ment, the drali, and the Vietnan War in particular. Featured
articles are nip.ed primarily at the "beatnik typos" and
morbidly curici-n v.iio nay be intrigued by the activities of the
New Left. Al: o featured are obscene photographs and
psychedelic drr.vir.rT5i .as well as announcements of interest to
sex deviates a:i:i hallucinatory drug users. Youth, particularly
students, are '.he nain target of these publications, which are
effective vehicles for agitation and recruitment in that they
reach a large ' <:3i*tion of the student population.
For the nost part, the underground papers are in
poor financial condition and often niss publication dates due
to a lack of iuncis. Papers circulated in large urban areas
are usually sol'- - 'Tit, while those in university communities
are str::;c.:i.ir. : : o seep in business. Generally, funds are
receiver, ^'ror; :v:;v Ttising, subscriptions, donations, and
benefits. Volunteer labor is used in most instances.
i
AttoL'.pts by Hew Left leaders to unite these
underground ;;;:v.'-s into some type of network have been unsuccess-
ful to oa'ic, r:r.--j there are no concrete political philosophies
[agreeable to -c'j.\ . Vhile the editors share similar goals, they
diverge cicely arj to the means. However, over 100 underground
papers arc nii'ilintod with the radical Liberation Hews Service
■bich provides i)c;s packets concerning New Left activities.
{ In a for; instances, authorities have prosecuted
publishers for printing obscene material . However, ninor fines
'or probation h.-.va ueen the general result and have been
offset bv an increase in the paper's circulation. *
TPD:ml
(8)
303
February 26, 1970
HSIION OF ISLAM
Approxlcatoly 100 Tsolos or llcsques of this
fp.naticnl eXl-;:o~ro cult c::ict in tho Unites! State3 today
vie a a total r.=: :.->"-'.:l , i in o-kce-3 of Vi:o Eonbershlp
Biipr-ortn thin organisation. Principal incooe is derived
fr'oa coriorohin 'dues', sjjecinl cenbership ttsoessnonta and
iroa oale of its official publication "l iahnnnn d Speaka."
Ens:hls^AJW
(8) . 7
^4/ '
304
February 26, 1970
BLACK PASTEES PARTY
The sources of income for the Black Panther Party
(BPP) are many and varied. In the initial years of its
existence froa 19uo to 19C9, one of its chief sources of
income v.as the proceeds frc.-a criminal acts perpetrated by
individual members t,Uo split T;itli the Pr.rty. Uore recently,
the chief sourco of funds for the D?P has been numerous and
regular contributions froa individuals, radical groups and
syapathizcrs in the United States and overseas. These
individual contributions have increased greatly since
December, 19G9.
ABF:ek» , ,,.
(8) ~«-#--,h—'
305
DLACu PACTIEU PAITTY
Sizable donations are known to have been mado to
thA npp hv several prominent individuals and personalities.
The BPP also roooivo.i incocie from the regular sale
of its weekly nov :oapcr and fro.s the sale of revolutionary
paraphernalia such as p-nphlcts, posters, buttons, and nreetinq
cards.
Another source of iiicor.o for the BPP is fees received
for public smooches anl appearances !.;ado by its representatives,
particularly at institution:: oi* learning. The fees received
by its representatives for thoro appearances vary but have
ranged as liich as 51,E0C) for a single appearance of BPP Chairman
Bobby Scale. D-.irinrr :■..-' ID re-fiv-^oiitativos oi the EPP nade a total
of 13D appearances at various institutions of learning.
Another source of ineone for the BPP is proceeds
received from various public benefits and rallies held
specifically for the purpose of raisins tionoy for. the
regular defense funds of the B."? established to pay legal
expenses.
TThile no firm evidence has been developed to date,
it Is noted that there has been an increasing- nunber of
articles of a pro-Arab nature appearing in the BPP nevfspaper
306
BLACK PAimiER PAHTY
and every effort ia bein;; cindo to determine whether the
Arabs arc supporting t:io Dine!: Panthers from a monetary
standpoint . It is noted that i.:ldrid;;e Clo.-.vor, the
E?P Minister oi' ?!niorr.:r.tion .-nd a fugitive fron justice,
is presently re:-;.:, din;; in Arab territory and is supported
by them.
307
February 26, 1970
THE HE? SODILIZATiOTI CO'XIITTEIJ
TO E.'D THE EAIl III VIETKAU
The Hew Mobilization Conaittee to End tho War
in Vietnam <1"C) maintains its liaadouarters at 1029 Yoreuat
Avenue, Quito 900, Korth-cst, Vr.rjhinfiton, D. C. It also
maintains an otii.ee at 17 Ea3t Seventeenth Street,
Hew York City. .
The K!C is not an individual menbership organization.
It is a coalition of man? organizations v.nioh are locate:!
throughout tbe United States. These organizations include
the Coixzunis't Party, Socialist Y.orUcrs Party, V.onon Stri?:a
for Peace, Chicaco Peace Council, Los Angeles Peace Action
Council, Student .Mobilization Conaitteo to End tho T/ar in
Vietnam, and the American Friends Service Coonitteo.
HMC's prinary function at the present tine is to
protest the United States intervention in Vietnam.
The H!!C receives financial support in the forr*
of donations from sympathetic individuals and organizations.
In September, 1969, it was reported that tho
following individuals were described as beinr: acoug tao
principal individual financial donors to the i-.lX:
/
sJfJ
(8)
SSC:pab yt"^
TO
309
Exhibit 38
unitki) statkn (.. .cknmkxt
Memorandum \ - » r - ° cL ° ac ,»
1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
1 - Mr. Felt
Mr. V/. C. Sullivan ' dam:. March 12, 1970
I'ROM
. . / 1 - Mr. Casper
V ■ 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Al : CD. Brcnnan'. j/ 1 - Mr. C. D. )3ronnan
X V 1 - Mr. Shackelford <
snijhtrr: lirw Li;FT j.;ovEUEHT - FINANCES
IS - MISCELLANEOUS
PURPOSE :
"/•-#
To obtain authority for the attached airtel to the
field requesting financial information concerning New Left
groups.
BACKGROUND :
By memorandum C. D. Brcnnan to Y7. C. Sullivan, dated
11/7/G9, the Director approved a letter to all offices pointing
out the recurring allegations that various tax exempt charitable
foundations have contributed large sums of money, directly or
indirectly, to the Movement. It was also pointed out similar
allegations recur concerning financial "angels." The field was
instructed to bo particularly alert to such allegations and any
information developed along such lines should be promptly reported
to the Bureau with recommendations as to whether additional i/
investigation is warranted. "mi~
By letter dated 2/26/70, in response to a specific
request, we furnished the White House with material concerning
income sources of revolutionary groups. Such an inquiry is
indicative of the high-level interest in the financial aspects
of revolutionary activity.
Because of the sensitive nature of any direct intensive
financial investigation of large foundations or funds, prominent
wealthy individuals who limit their activities to financial
support, or politically oriented groups such as the Vietnam
Moratorium Committee, embarrassment to the Bureau would likely
result. It must also be noted such financial support is so
diverse as- to frequently be in the form of ^furnishing bail money
^ _-_:.-'■ 16
446997-70 -» ,,, f l1A f| IV tgyV
to persons jailed during disturbances, purchase of equipment,
Enclosure - - •• ■ /- '' / ->' /..' SF C- $J 'fvv^
V
'7RLS:mst ZX-ll*]
IV(8) m'\ CONTINUED-*- OVER -
310
Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
HE: HEW LEFT MOVEMENT - FINANCES
and underwriting costs of large rallies or meetings. Such
aid rarely would be picked up in our review of bank records
of the organizations involved.
ODriKKVATIOKS :
In order to put these recurring allegations into
perspective and be in position to be responsive to future
high-level inquiries along this line, it would bo desirable
to obtain from the field, a comprehensive survey of known
instances of financial aid by foundations or funds, prominent
or wealthy individuals, or politically oriented groups, at
the same time it would be a propitious instance to reiterate
the Bureau's interest in these matters on a continuing basis.
RECOMMENDATION :
The attached airtol to the field be forwarded
containing instructions along the above lines. f ,
*k> , 1 <&
R-
311
Exhibit 39
Airtel
To: SAC, Albany
From: Director, FBI (100-446097-70)
NOT LEFT MOYFMENT - HRftKCEO
IC - msCELLAKEOUS
CUDED 4/1/70
1 - llr. DeLoach
3/1G/70
1 - Mr. J. P. Hour
1 - Ur. Felt
1 - Llr. Car.per
1 - llr. \7. C. Sullivan
1 - Ur. C. D. Brennan
1 - Ur. Shackelford
PEnSOIIAL ATTENTION
S-' g
<£ B
ReJ-.Su let dated 11/10/69.
The abovo referenced lottor directod your attention
to tlio n?ad to develop information indicative of support of
tlio How Left Movement by ta:;-05:oapt clicritcblo fouptiations
or financial "angels." Allegations of thin type of support,
as v:o3.1 uu support by politically oriented croups audi us the
VietDas Moratorium Counittoo . to End tho War in Vietnam
continue to circulate.
Because of interest in tho sources of funds of \
subversive and revolutionary croups OKhibitod by lii(jli officials^]
of thn (iover:ii:3nt it is essential to got tho above allegations
into ^proper .perspective.
You nro instructed to ourvoy your files to determine
any instances chore financial cupport, including gifts of
equipment or facilities, has been furnished to Hew Left croups
or individuals by 1) t ai;-cxon:pt charitable foundations or
funds; 2) prominont or wealthy Individuals, or other individuals
who have contributed over $1,000 in a single contribution;
3) politically oriented croups including; unions. Such support
would include nnd not be limited to, furnishing ball money to '
arrested demonstrators, furnishing printing equipment or office
space, nnd under -./riting the cost of conventions or rallies.
Individuals end organizations listed should be documented
whore possible. REC . gg y' _u£.-
2 - All Offices (PERSONAL ATTENTION) \ "
EX-UTJ ■ " K
ft:
RLS:mst
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-— .:ot:T wigs: tvo ; U
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312
Airtol to a/iC, Albany
RE: V,Z\1 hT.VT MOVELiEHT -.FINANCES
100-4 <lU9<)7-70
Thin survey is expected to be cxhsiustive and thorough.
The results- should bo prepared in a letterhead memorandum under
the caption of this communication. The deadline of -i/l/VO must
be complied with.
Tiie Bureau's continuing interest in the financial
aspects of Hew Left Movement investigations, both orcanizations
and individuals, is beinj; reiterated. You should remain
continually alert for information of this type and insure it
is promptly reported to the Bureau under the above caption.
NOTE:
See memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, dated
3/12/70, captioned as above, prepared by RL3:inst.
313
Exhibit 40
The Attorney General July 27, 1370
Director, FIJI —
INTKUAUiaiCY COMMITTKK OK INTKLLIGIiKCI!-
There 1:; enclosed :i copy c.l ;\. letter o:\tcil .Inly '.'■'•,
1970, v.l 111 : •- 1 1 :» i: I : i ; i r- 1 i i L , athiressea to ir.c from Mr. -Tom Charles
Huston, While i;ousc Presidential Assistant.
l r or your lr.fcrr."'lion, 6:1 .Ju.-io '■>, 1070, the President
established :i:i :;■:! ioc intevayency euni;viUae on Jhte ; !:"cnre cliaireJ
by me an:! :;i:o ir.c.hKihvv Ills' J.'ireclors cl tix- Ccidral !::;el!;-."!;re
Agency, II::: !>fem:o r«lolii ,; .u»co Agency, aud {•.■■'.: .'ia.'vii-aal i^-curiiy
,?.j:i.':u:y. ?■:•. iii.iMou scrve'l in a Ji:ii:joii capncilv '..'i:h l.i'.i' com; .iUco.
This ccn:u'iltee v::is rC'iuosteu by the i ; roskieni It) .fi'ilnsil n report
jisspBiiiii;; the current internal .security tnreat. |)ro.h.in" an «.'v;-.:'.i;it io;i
of iutel'ia.cv.ce coilaeiion procedures, kie:Ui!'yi:v. an:u; n\ our present
collodion c-ii'ui'ls with rceorair.eiKled measures to caiae :;ncii ':..:'•:;,
and reviftwir.!.' current procedures lor interagency couruinniioa v.uli
recommended slops to improve such procedures.
The finnl report of till;; comniiitcc v.:ir; coivploled on
June 20, 1370, and delivcrc.i to the President. Thin report sol forth
ciylit speciiie areas (corrcsponjim; to the oi;'.iit" nu;r.:;cTi:-.i p.iv;r;;:j;:!3
In the attached letter from .V.'r. i.iistnn) which had been reviewed i;y
the conir.-.illoe. The iirst six related to current rosanints on ime:-
llsrcncc collection oroceauros; the t-evciuii was concerned wili; bndyol
and manpower ueeas in the event the various reslrahas wore related;
and liio eiyhlh area dealt wit 11 the iwssibie o:il :•! j|i:_;hi:o.iL ul a jv.:r.: .aneiit
Interagency cuir.ir.u'.ee on doiroscic intelli.;ence. In caen arc:; the
report of the coi-rutteo v;:is presep.teu to shov: the :i:.vauin:;c:; and
clUiadvanlay.es nl ::ny chnir-.cs in current policies ami also to ailow
the President to inuicatc his desires.
, iffvt j Enclosures - 2
•.LI/!.!' -*" • i-.'';'-iJ
All;, HIK.':sfv.-/c!kii •>
_' 15)
314
The Attorney General
A;; .-;.'■ I out In lb:: :•;':•.-■'•! ■•'. 1 d'er fro:- ' 'r. iee "-
!t 1 3 ii!i!"f.l tli-it. lha :-'re:;h'en! Iris e>reeled In? )•-•! emiem of !■'■::.'
lnve.Mticalivo restraints ciiractly ufleciliii: the responeibilitie;) 0:
iho'Tljl. ''These include:
1. Intensified use of electronic servn: lllnrices a erf
penetration:', to effect coverne.0 of individuals :iti.i i:roaps In the.
United : laics '.'.'no pose a major threat lo l!>.- ; le.Pu'ir.il seoijruv;
clear the Idli's ooposltion lo the relaxation of our present eedce
of selected roveraae on n:a;or internal security threads throe si
the use of Isiis trchnleue. 1 pointed out that Hi" :' II 'n-"l ir.'e^::
electronic surveillance coverage is ndeouai.o ril t h Lr; li-n.v but
that v.'e would not obiecf to other agencies S'-osiny Ihe aelhorif-' oF
the Attorney c'oaorai lor any covcreeo rcejircd by them and tl'.cre-
n.fter lnstitutim; such covera'.ve themselves.
?.. Hemoval of Instructions on Irstl me.il eov:ra" :
and relaxation of covert mail coveraee lo normli use of tills bees.
on r.eleclcd tro-pots of priority forciyyi inlclii ;:ace and ini.::rns: e
interest. Tn this connection. In le.e report of dune ?..}, l'.i'i'l;, I :e. ■■.
clear the IT'I's strops: objection lo iainlae.ioe.lins any covert ;■;■:;■
It Is the Fbl's oosilion that if covert mail coveraee is i-epicae-a.
It Is 11!: e I y ihat iniorvselion v.ould lea!: out of the cost oiiice i.-> '".■
press ant! that serious oar.iae:e \vouid be cone to the intelliaeasa
community because of the very nature of this coveraee. V. o have *
objection to lo.eil mail coveraee, provided it i!i need on a car. -pis
controlled and .selective baj;is in Loth eriniined and .security in:.".;.
3. The removal of restraints on the use. of surry
:cn
entry. I
andlarsalnst other urgent and hi^h priority targets.
!/rn i-!<0ivr . . •
315
The Attorney General
i. An Increase In coverage of vio!eiicc-.ftroiu> campus
p.nd r.tudent-rf.'i.ateu ('.roups ami Use removal of nil ic:::t i-:tint;: which
liniil rnica covcraae. in li-.o report of .'nine :\'.i, iU'i'U, the tl.U specifically
objected k: ro:r.i.".i;v: any of flic present controls anil resti-ie'.i"ns
relating to the development oi campus sources, it was pointed out
Hint to re!:::-: I lie:; o restriction:} weuld scvereiv .:crc-.>:»i-ui:-.'j our iiivos-
llpations and could result in Scales 10 liic press which would bo .
clamacjn:: anil which could lean to char:',es lhai. iiivesii;>,ativc agencies
arc iritorfcrint; with acauemic freedom.
In connection with the proposed establishment of a
permanent Interagency 'committee on domestic hnoills.ence, in the
rc])0i-l of .kme :•::">, i'JVO, I specifically ir.neu clear niv optxi'silioii Cu
Euch a committee wiuie poinliiin out that tin; L-J.I would approve of
preparing periodic domestic intelligence estimate:-;.
Denplte my clear-cut and specific opposition to the
llftlnp of the various. investigative rcstrainls referred to neovo and
to the creation of a oermaucnt interagency coir.n-.illce on domestic
lnlelll''e:ice, flic ri.'I lr. prepared to implemeni the iiislrucuens oi
the White House at your direction. Of coarse, we would continue 10
cec'r. your specific authorization, where appropriate, to uiiiiac i.iie
various ircusitivc-iiivesdlgalivc teehmqucu involved ln.indiviuual eases.
• 3
62-685 O - 76 - 21
316
Tlio Attorney Ccnural
I would .r.poraclalu :•. r-Vos:v>t c::oi-c.*::;i'.in nf yruiy v!'.:-.vs
ccvicoii'.i" : i I:; i^aiior, noli-r: C.:-: o/efaw.'jc ei-'l iuvl'.x In i.'ii: iii^Um';:
letter that an iiitoi-aissncy aunnnUco he cuiLSiiliilcd by Au<ui::.l 1. 1'JVO.
V.'c are taking no action to Implement Ilia instructions contained In
Mr. lluaton'u letter pending your reply.
317
Exhibit 41
Llr. Toi:;on 10/20/70
.
The Kxocutives Conference
rxixirrivj;:; coi:rEr.i:::cE - 10/20/70
Thor;o in attendance at the Conference? today Included
V-.i: :.r.v:: . Vo'.xv , t".:lliv:i» , i'.ifjhop, !:i'on:ian , Ca llaln-.n , Ca:;per,
Conrad, Felt, Gale, Kuucn, Tr.vci, V.'a!tcr:j and Heaver.
The Conference examined tko ciiicciicjn of ..v.'licthor tlio
carront situation demand.-, inten:;ific tiua <;.? certain .'jocurity-
iype investigation:; . In particular , reference wan undo to
(1/ llfi:i;:r; of the" c::i:: !: .L * t ; T j.. orator U" t on report v:rii:i:!:; ;md
invent i ;.;:t ion :Ln V'rio?.'iiy XI and L'riori ty III, Liccur.i. i:y Index
car.*.:: , CO '.he iiitcnnj fica 1:1 on and cxpaneien of j.nr <:;:>: .Ircatlon.'i
01" bind:, v.iu. co am i ethnic [:-'tu'.;> oxtre;.:!:: t:; nndf.^
. ' . . . '_ .Iriicyt.
lie:.):.; are Ijeinc individually considered below.
I.Lftin:; of exl:; tin;; r.:oi-r. fcorium on report v.-ri tin;; and i.nVw-fci — ""'
Cation in Priority II ::nCi Priority III, Security Inde;: cane:;.
Tliovo are approximately 10,050 individual:; currently
ine/.r.dod in Priority II and I'riori iy III of tlio Security Index.
Virtually no inve:;t.Lf'ntion Up.:; bee;: eo:uU;c U:d rc;\ardin;*:
appro::i;;nteiy G /.I'.'A of tn.o:",o individual:; :;iuoc the. i).:po:3itlon
of tin; noratoriu;.i in Kebr'.-nry, 10G:'. ).:any of tbr:;o individual:;
lii'.vo cuanp.c-'l residence and/or e-.'.pioyi.'.ei:.'; a.;::! iiiol.r vdioroabout:;
arc; unline.vn . i'o fuifi 11 our cuvro-i i rc.;po:i:;ibiIitiou , v.o
nliould knev: whore they are. /. / ';,'.'/ \ "")' •/:'■">■
\'y \0 •'• '.:■ -> / -/.•'•/ •■'
L.ai;-'W ' f) ...'. :__...
1 -• l.ir. i:-jhr ■.. ■, ■■■ - > .
1 - "r. Sullivan (.:'•■■■'■■'• \ ( f \ •>> '' '■'(.'.' f .' !!70
1 - .".v. Pourer " '£'■/ " ~~
I - j'.a.eh n.\;: ; :l.':i:int Director ■'•-•'•
cu:: :.',!v.;/ . , ' , """ ' • - . .->..(-.>
■ C.u.) /' ,,. — co::tii:u!;o - Q'.tm
318
liciiioi'.-iniii.'in to l!r. Tolnon
r.ii: ).aI;cuti.v;;l; cohimucr: - io/2o/7o
IX tha i-.ioj ! :itoi-iii:a ia roaei ndo/I , thu field will
jiio required Lc r'.-opan npp;.\->::;.;::a Leiy I:,"1j l'rio.- i. t y II cases
j.'X.-ji- report:: and approximately ys,7G!.i Priority III case:: to
j'.vurjj'y voaidencq and cinloymoni: . Cpcnin;: of tkeao c.mcs
j.wouJil be r. i.iiiii.'orot! oj tli a proportionate mar.bc-r opened o;icli
1 month to inatn.-o all arc reopened by Juno JO, l'.;'/l.
UXacI: Student Union;; and rjlr.iilar ftroup::: on college cni:puaca.
In -J.!!;;?, black ntudon'c:.; h.-.(;an i'o
.!.'-Hij tiioir ov.'n
;:roupa to pro.jcoi; their c!cir.:iml:.; , i::::ny oX which indicate a
cor.Mi.tiiont to b.lac:.': nsticnnJisaj.. Theao ;;roura arc an toiio:.:oiia
and have a r.ixvu;: acnao oX coaou purpose.. The ];laci: li.iuther
Party Jin:-: made open otiori;;.; to orc.an j.;.'.o tlio l'.iaok .M.miont
Union;; nationally . and other black e::trci!l:;t !; roup:: have iiaod
thoao o;-!;ani.i;ai:i.onu to pro/leol thoir c:-.tror.u:.-,;vi and :.:ep:irnti;;m.
Canon:; disorder:-, involvini; black .-.tudenta liv-roancd
'.'■'.'• per cent In the !.C(,:)-','l: aohoo 1 year over the pi-Ci'l.f.n:j year
indioalii::; that thaao i;ioupa j-cprcaont a real potential lor
violence and <■ i.. ; ;iu t;t:i.ou . In the print, v.c have opened oaaoa on
theao orfani ant ions following evidence oi' bind; o:;tre:.i: a i
activities; ho.vcvor, in view oX tho vast .tnoroa.-.o in violence
on eollc;;o enrapusc::,' it li; Xolt that every BJ.iif:!: :;tuclciit Uiiion
and aiwl.iar croup, regardless oi.' their n.-.st or present
j lnvolvraicnt in >i.i r.oaTR:. : . snoiu.d bo the sulne,--.}. of n"l['.-.e:vi-r<i-
/preliminary Inquiry tbrou;;h established scarce:.; and iniorr.innts
Ito determine brieiau'ound, aiir,:'; an<l purpose:;, loaders and koy
.activists. It is estimated that this •vculd cause tho Xiold
/to open approximately 4,000 cnsc.c involving organization;; and
/tlio l:oy activists and lenders connected therewith.
Students Cor a ocr.ncratic Society (SDS) and militant Nov; I^i't
Cannes oi(;nnla.at ions .
At tho end of-t.ho ].f!C0-70 acadcn'.lc year , the various
faction;: oi: tho r,»V., excludi.!!;* tho Wc:r[:hcri;:nn laotiou, wliicli h:o;
bccor.o aii or:;a.n1:'.;:tion in it:: can vi.[:ht, oon:::!:: led of a
rarailiov.-Jliip.oJ: a|ajvoai;,iatcly 2,ii()!i individual;-,. In addition
to the ;.•:!';.': ;:vor.p:;, ihcro arc about '.>.:',:! tolally independent
rti'oup'i oil i.'olt<"'" can'oiaic:: wlilcli r.rn pr--oo:i)-.iV:i'.l at ilcv.' I.-. , :.'t-
tyr-.i: -ami :.r:, Iip.i,v.;cr.; ol tlio !.;■': ideology. ~<A 1-: t;:;!'. i.:.ia tad
Co:ri.'T.i."JK!) - ovra
319
i.'ei.ioi :uiuUi.i J.u i.'.r. 'x'olr.uA
it;:: i:>:;:ciiJ.'ivj'.:; coi:r - r:ia:i;c
io/::-j/7o
that' the i.!t:r.ibc:r:iliip cf thnr:o ori;ani:'.a 1: iocrj cturaiatn oi
.-.bout -;,0()0 i..oial>.'. - r.'.!i- At tha present tiiii:, v/o :',;■(! con:ir.ct.ln;;
investigation:) oil nil o-" ther.o oi'^::ui.'.'.:;ti.c:iii: but linvc :!Ot,
In t : '.o p:i.-.t, initiated : nvc.;;t j (;:•• t L'-iii:: oL' the i.i'.div Ldua 1
i:<(.-ii'i!jui:.': oi ::iu;li or;;an i -.'.:'. tion:j , with the exception of the
hay .''.ctiviuir. and individual:; who are kr.ov.n to bo violence
prone .
Majoi' cav;:pur;o:i ucro:;rj tho nation have been completely
disrupted by violent ticno'.int'vr.'C jcn.'j , boi'i;.;ln;-.:j , nr:.on:; and
other terroristic actr.: perpetrated by thc:;e oi't:a:i.U:.n ttour; .
It i :; , thoroioro, j)rLpi:o:;cMi that cn:;er. bo on.-. ued on a ll
J 11M1 v?nn:: .(:: iK.'J.onrMnfr to r.uch u r;:ani:'.at j.o n:; <.o de J .:or;.)i.no
whether they have ;i propensi ty ior vjo.le .ice . 'ft i;h.'-:;
I proposal v.cro ii.ipiciuor.iod , it x:; e.:; i.?.i,.a J i.T':..i that the Xield
f v.'ould bo required to open approximately £;,. r jQO nov; caoo::;.
Jewish Defense I/ea^ie (JI)L)
The JDL 19 an anil -Paw I..o.ft and bind: nnti.onall£iin
ornnnlr.atiou, tlio violent nature of which !ia:i boon illustrated
by its direction of attack::; against dinlov.utj c establishments
in the llc.v York area and alleged j implication .In bombing; oi
offices of foreign countries. ].'e«ibors have participated in an
ei,.!n;nir.!> - c fu
320
Mci'.ioran'.iun to !':i'. Tolaon
kk: ]j:ixu-i'iv;;j C0kI''i::ii;kci-: - 10/20/70
nttc
1 ;l 1 1 i '
oi.'' V,
i;iotv>
i.HVC!
load<
p.cti'
pj.'Oll'
r,at:ti
i.-.ouibi
llK-cai
I roan!
ptcil !>i.;:hj:)c!:ii;n £ ar, ■ international. riJijht. Till:;
ant ;r-'o>p o.C Je'.'.'i:;h youth clai::;:; a n:; tl.ona.l member:
(10(1 v.'iih chapter:; in :\]>pvo:-:li.::itcJ.y "0 oi' the ua.jru'
cully have n
a:; boini; in
oi' violence
oi' the vio'io
t that invo:;
oi' individuals should alr.o include thy lower lo
j.p o::c.l,u:jivo of? tlio:;o '..'ho npiK.-ar a:.; i,:e;;iberri onl
of j'lnauoiaj. ;u;::j.:; ianco they ai'iord . This vnuL
n the opening oi' approximately U00 additional c;
:>.■:.;!>
■o .1
v.'iih chapter:; in appvo.:li.:a tely
i.tan area:; oi the country . \<0 p.ver;
itxun thcr.r: j'DL li'.ei.ihor:; identified
i.|) position:; , participant:; in acts
1 organisational a'/'iair:;. In vio'.v
Sure oi' -the oi'fpnir-.ation, it it; fol
;hl.p
ndpr
vol
y .
321
^ • • r
Memorandum to Hr; Tolcon
KK: Einrill'IVES CONFERENCE -10/29/70
RECOiUiEimATIOi; :
If the Director approves, appropriate instructions
'will be issued to the fioid to implement the above ^rograws
Idesitp.ed to expand our security investigative covoraso of
extremis i' elements.
322
Exhibit 42
UNITED STATES 'GOVERNMENT
Memorc ndum
:MR. C. D. BRENN
ROM : MR . G . C . MOOR
■i r
ubjf r^BLACK STUDENT GROUPS
i _0N COLLEGE CAMPUSES
RACIAL. MATTERS
date: November 3, 1970
To recommend that attached airtel to all offices be
sent regarding discreet preliminary inquiries on all Black Student
Unions (BSU) and similar groups on college campuses.
On 10/29/70 the Executive Conference approved a program
to conduct discreet preliminary inquiries, limited to established
sources, on BSUs and similar groups, their leaders, and key
activists to determine if the activities of these groups and
individuals warrant further active investigations.
RECOMMENDATION :
If approved, the attached airtel w ill be sent to
all offices regarding the above cases. '
CEG:ekw
(7)
£C<fr
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr,. Casper
1 - Mr. G. c'. Moore •
1 - Mr. Glass
ill! /./
■dl mow „^',r,Yn..
//-£~-7*
u
o
323
£
-A
Airtel
To:
From:
SAC, Albany
Director, FBI
/ BLA_CK_SIUD"NX GROUES_ON
COLlSGE.CAl-TUaiiS.
. RACIAL yj-.mxs
BUD£D: 12/4/70
November 4, 1970
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. J. P. ttohr
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Casper
"1""- Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Glass
PERSONAL ATTENTION
3 E
F
L Increased campus disorders. involving black students
^oo n definite threat to the Nation's stability and security
and indicate need for increase in both quality and quantity of ,
intelligence information on Black Student Unions (BSU) and /
§ similar groups which are targets for influence and control by
° /iolence-prone Black Panther Party (BPP) and other extremists. _
7he distribution of the BP? newspaper on college campuses and
—speakers of the BPP and other black extremist groups on campuses
clearly indicate that campuses are targets of extremists. Advance
information on disorders and violence is of prime importance. Ue
must target informants and sources to develop information regarding
these groups on a continuing basis to fulfill our responsibilities
and to develop such coverage where none exists. , i ft
^\\X\ REC-84 / -' '/--•-'' •'' /'.:-■ ■ / P
Effective imra; liately, all BiUs and similar organizations
organized to project the demands of black students, '..-hich are not
presently under investigation, are to be subjects of dircreet,
preliminary inquiries, limited to established sources and care-
fully conducted to avoid criticism, to determine the size, aims,
purposes, activities, leadership, key activists, and extremist
*lf-
1/ 1$
*y
SEE«KQIi:jPiiGJ, J TWO
*bv ro 1S70" ~
/-
324
Airtel' to SAC, Albany et al
BLACK STUDENT GROUPS OH COLLEGE CAMPUSES
interest or. influence in these groups. Open individual cases
on officers and key activists in each group to determine back-
ground and if their activities warrant active investigation.
Submit results -of preliminary inquiries in form suitable for
dissemination with. recommendations regarding active investi-
gations of organization, its leaders, and key activists. These
investigations, to be conducted in accordance "ith instructions
in Section' 87D of the Manual of Instructions regarding investi-
gations of organizations connected with institutions of learning.
Each office submit by airtel to reach Bureau by
12/4/70, a list of BSUs and similar groups by name and school
which are or will be subjects of preliminary inquiries. This
program will include junior colleges and two-year colleges as
well as four-year colleges. In connection with this program,
there is a need for increased source coverage and we must
develop network of discreet quality sources in a position
to furnish required information. Bear in mind that absence
of information regarding these groups in any area might be
the fault of inadequate source coverage and efforts should be _
undertaken immediately to improve this coverage.
A prior inquiry or investigation of a group or individual
is no bar to current inquiries and inquiries should not be post-
poned until submission of airtel due 12/4/70. Initiate inquiries
immediately.
I cannot overemphasize the importance of expeditious,
thorough, and discreet handling of these case;;. The violence,
destruction, confrontations, and disruptions on campures make
it mandatory that we utilize to its capacity our intelligence-
gathering capabilities.
Above instructions supersede instructions in Bureau
letter to all offices 1/31/69, same caption.
NOTE: See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan, dated
11/3/70, captioned "Black Student Groups on College Campuses.
Racial Matters," prepared by Ci£G:ekw.
325
Exhibit 43
"N
tOM
J
UMI ED states COYl-.K.NMENT
Memorandum
1 - Mr. W. C. Sul.liv
1 - Mr. J. P. Molir. '
1 - Mr. J . J • Casper
L'BJECT:
I,
Ur. C. D. Brennan
Tz*..-
DATE: 11/3/70
K. L. Shackelford.
M
i -
i -
i -
SECURITY INVESTIGATION'S -OF INDIVIDUALS
YfHO AUK MEMBERS OF THE STUDENTS FOR A
DEMOCRATIC S0CJ.KTY AND MILITANT NEW
~LEFT CAMPUS ORGANIZATIONS
Mr. W.
Mr. C.
Mr. H.
1 -
1 -
1 -
1
M.
D.
L.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Felt
Brennn
Shackc
IV. N.
W. II.
D. P.
Mr. R. J
n ;,■;. "
lford ."
Prcuss
Floyd
White
Stilli
ng
'u-: ,
PURPOSE :
Ik
To obtain apnroval of attached airtel to all office
which instructs the field to initiate investigation of all
members of the Students For a Democratic Society (SDS) and
proeommunist New Left-type campus organizations.
BACKGROUND :
Memorandum dated 10/29/70 from the Executives >
/Conference to Mr. Tolson recommended that investigation be
initiated of individual members of the SDS and members of
proeommunist New Left campus organizations who follow SDS
ideology. The recommendation was approved by the Director.
At the end of the 19GU-70 academic year the
f actionalizcd SDS, with the exclusion of the Weatherman .
faction, had a membership of about 2 , 500 individuals. The
proeommunist New Left-type campus organizations have a
membership of about <\ ,000. The purpose of the investigations
of these. individuals is to determine the propensity for violence
by members of the above organizations. Attached is an airtel
to all offices advising of investigation of all members of
the SDS and militant New Left campus organizations.
In order that the Bureau remain aware of t
of such cases handled by the field, the field is bei
instructed to include figures as to cases opened and
closed on the "administrative pages of the quarterly
reports. No handbook or manual changes arc necessar
/
RECOMMENDATION:
\
lf\ \ That attached airtcl.be approve
ic number
ng
ascs
New Lof t .--
y ' ?,.■ /
-.■'j>r '
6iw
Enclosure '-'"■* < -:i
Q\100 r; 1^900a i j
RJS:jlm t\\'' i
326
i - P.r. V,'. C. Cnmvan
] - V.v. J. P. :!••■!!•■
1 - Hi-. J.J. C:\::]:ue
1 " VL/'l/hi}'- 1 - < <■-!■-
..Airtcj.
To: SAC, Albany
From: Director, 1 ? ;>I (100-<!3L:;K3)
^ ZIXW.'.ITI IITVEC'TIGiYTIOiilS OF INDIVIDUALS
.vico'.'.iL': i.i'."rxir.3 a' t.!:: siltc:;::?::; I'oit a
D'Mccr.vi'iC ;:"c;.".iv /.;:.•:• ; i .ilitai.t iuiw •■
L';j.i ; V C.'.-U'J.'i Oj.GAI;I«jA'i'I01:3
1 -Mr. C. D. 3ronnr,n
1 - llr. II. L. .'Jiir»c ! :oiIo
1 ■- Ur. 17. II: Ptx-ursse
1 - Hr. W. Jl. Floyd
1 - Hr. D. p. l.'lij.ta
1 - Ur. R. J.. Stillinr;
PLUCJiiAL ATTKiTIo:!
KXfnotiva i(::,;:odlr:toly , tl:o field is i:::':tructt:d to
initiate i!ivi!r.i:i:c'atit>:i of nil i.ioi.'.ljov:; oi' tlia f/iv'iaat:; I'or :i
Dc:.v;'j.v.'iti<: Knc tot;' iCC>) mid M'raucri; oi !::'i)C;'«.;.:ani:;; , i.'i:i.J.it:;iit
Haw LjiS-tyi'a caiv.ir.s or;'.:ini::a'iior.3 \:',:o follow iiK :iUvi)cacy
^
~'-|of revolution and violence. _ ,,^,, j^Q./JJ, ;?,/
.1 Mor.bovn of the Ks'to'bs i:-.vu:',ti:;-.!tad r;!nulcl iivVlada
J .'.
] 1 i".o::i'jovr; oi t/:a i ;,v;.:.o'l!.j i'retior.n o
Iliirc:in i:; nv:i;:o ta:it i.i-:.;jy i3';o ois.'i'.vlfvs
fori.::.:l ua;.!!>a.v::i'.ij) iu not a. rcu'.'isiio .I' 1
activity. A r - you arc :;.v;ara, :i0.'] ai:;l o
m:y -oriei.ta'J i;.voun:; aro-cicarJ
siwiiar :".i iivir,: j.yi
nooiic oi v.v,' i j. .co and
i:;i-.-:i.';t-Lc)iini".t revolution o:i t':io Nation 1 :" c:';:oa:;aa. At:
tliuir intent i;:-. l-. oryr-taiii-.ieu , the :ii:;:-.:ra:)C-j to tin:: > aiXe-oal'y
of revolution a:Kl violence isj, of ■.:u-ac:;." , .ity , ;;im**c : ; _ i -. : ' m *-. - cj i i "•;
i-.:.!:n!r: i.ia:'iiu'- :'.■■■:, folla.vjar" . Tiiar.e r.'iYen:.:.: riicl-jui^todly arc
the breeding ;:voa;u! for i.-cvoiutiouar.'. :•.:, o::tv.ii:'..i.::t:i :■.;.:
t.orvoi-j ■; t:i. La;:io and good ;ii;r.l;;:.'.ciit .':■:. >:dd bo U::cd U; tw.;:.;j
investigations, :.< aurin:;' in Luiui taa objective -.:". to idont/.:iy
potential and nutiial o::ti"Ci.\i:;ts, revolutionaries aa:= _ '■'■ .vr ''.'.'.r.tf:
and to :-.:-.:;oc3 tiicir . throat to 'ilia internal Gconrj.t./ oi' !.".'." ~
Govo.vnr.io.vt. Q |., ov 10 ]3?n
K:\cli office should includo on the "^•■ii''i^tv:;t ;.i'j.- i?/jo;
of future quarterly ila.v Lai i .'Joveria;' t i'f.Movtrj info:': ;: .::.o : :•';'
to tho iu'.:'i!)'ji' of individual c:ir.UR •.lpoiJC'l r::;u ti:o iv.:i.r;or '-•:■'■
iiioivith::'.!. car.: 1 :.: c'J.o.'.:ad j..: thi.'j cata':or.i' ciur.'.ij,'; th-:: portiiiont j
[lorioJ of the iu:v; Left Movc;:'.ant roj;ort:i. M j-
?. - All Of. fiocr; (i-EHoOIIAL AT'i'aiTlUi!) ..'
\r, ;
%iuoV v a£:j's7o : ..' - •■ ,';■■■
i ■
MAIL II(X).Ml.^J TKLKTYl-K I'MTdf
zy. v;m: iy.ge tv;d • ■
327
Airtcl to Albany
lie: Security Investigations of Individuals
Who arc Members of the Students for a
Democratic Society and Militant Hew
Left Canpus Organizations
100-439048
Each individual investigated should bo considered
for inclusion on the Security Index. In the event your
investigation establishes that the subject meets the criteria.,
his name should bo recommended for inclusion on the
Security Inde;:.
BOTE :
Sec m.-;aornndui3 Mr. 11. L. Shacl:clf ord to Mr. C. D.
Brcnnau, dated 11/3/70, captioned as above, prepared by !:JS:jlin.
328
Exhibit 44
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
O.M
I
Memorandum 0/-'''-^^™-
MR. TOLSON dati:: September 2, 1970
w. m. feltj^-^v \:Fj2&%h-
•BjECT- SECURITY INFORMANTS
RACIAL LN FOKMANTS"
i #lt'/-'l|-
•3 PURPOSE:
" £? .
•;: To recommend consideration be given to returning to previousstandards
'p permitting field 10 develop security and racial informants amongWudi'iits 18 years
~ of age and older witli full individual justification and Bureau approval. ,[ , / v
i'~~— ' . : :-<\..:::...:::: ■— -■ • ■ rf, , JjMA
'■ BACKGROUND: • "" ■^■■■"XY v
■';, Our current rule is that "Students under age 21 years" are not to be ^ > '^.,
~i developed eidier as security informants or racial informants except under highly
•'^unusual circumstances. Former rule of "under 18" was modified when two student -
r Informants went sour. / ^~. / / ) ?-
' i '-'- — \'C \Xl' jJ ' ' '■',
■'..C URRENT DEVELOPMENTS: V^I'l" .'' ' ■ (l
j Never in our history have we been confronted with as critical a need for
^informant coverage. Tgrnorisi violence is all around its and more lias been -i
C Sthreatcned. Even our own doors are being threatened by Weatherman fanatics.
■: SBombin.gs . assassination of police officers, kidnapping and torture murder are all •
•■■ hpart of the picture. Tiiese violence -oriented black and wliitc savages are at war
•j "Witu the Government and the American people. , .-. ,.< , - '■
^« Careful surveys havv.-'been made during inspections conducted in New Left,
| Jand Racial fields, hi every instance Inspector left strong instructions Willi SACs to ■
Jigdevelop more and better informants. These offices have informally indicated, *""• ..
| ^however, that their productivity would be greatly enhanced Jj.yut-lower ^ig o L the
f f age requirements cited above. - ^
'BEEP 21 1970 ^,
, Particularly critical is the need for reliable information about the -
j ,' activities of violence -oriented groups on campuses. We kho'w'tho "Ncv/~Le!t and 8
j j the Black Panthers are currently recruiting 18-year-old freshmen students. The. c
', . Students for a Democratic Society have actually reserved for recruiting purposes >-
■ a room in die Student Union Building at near-by University of Maryland. If we O
( I could develop informants among Uiese new members we could guide them to key
WMF:wmj (SJ^f/...- // j c\>» '' §
. \ - Messrsr-Splliv^;'. "Mohr, Brennan CONTINUED - OVER li/kP ^ ?,
u
329
" Memo (or Mr. Tolson t
Re: Security Informants
Racial Informants
positions. By the time they are 2L years of aye they are almost ready to leave
college and have been subjected to the corrosive influence and brainwashing of_ullxa-
•' liberal and radical professors.
OBSERVATIONS:
The important consideration, of course, is to protect the Bureau from
'•. possible embarrassment. Many of our 18, 19 and 20-year-old men and women are
'• highly intelligent, mature, and loyal citizens. This has recently been recognized
, by" the Congress in lowering the voting age to 18 years. It is felt the same concept
can logically be applied to the revolutionary conflict at home and particularly on
jeampuses^ ^ ^ . _._,. _..^^/ ;j ,,..;..., ,.*. ^ t don > t hold this view.
Development of all security and racial informants, regardless of age, is
i ■ very closely supervised at the Seat of Government. It is felt that selective use of
; • the 'lij through 20-year-old age bracket on specific SAC recommendation and Willi
' ; close scrutiny at the Seat of Government can be of tremendous benefit. These
'■ realtors will continue to be very carefully looked into during all field inspections.
HKCOMMENDATION:
■That Ihe appropriate Manual citations be changed to read "Students
iiiid.-r ageT8. ..." If approved, to be implemented by Domestic Intelligence
Division.
V&
■h
.\E:vr::r>i.i.\: (9/3 /70) , hcs-.csh - \/\jd^
— I strongTy urge the approval of this recommendation. As tho
monoiv.ii'ium states, these are indced_critical.._tincs. No one can predict
will- accuracy tho outcome of the revolutionary struggle going on in
this country at this time. Those under 20 years oi age are playing a
predj<:inant role in campus violence. Two of the subjects in the
University of Wisconsin case are under 20. Logic dictates that wo
concentrate on the actual participants and where tho ac tion actual lj^ls.
— ■ w.c. suiirvnrsi - • *^
, i_ -2- ^ A
^H o.K but I want^
any between 18 & 21 yrs
,to be approved by
fJSoyers also.
H
330
Jl.'Y'-'^".'? f f. u i: ii a i. iiiikf.au of investigation
nA9UINCT(iK, U.C. 2 Ti 3 r.
In Rrplr, /'fm.r /.V/rr
September 15, 1970
;
) (A) TRAINING - LEGAL INSTRUCTORS —
The follow-in:: significant decisions reported in Aiunisi. 1070,
should 1)0 read by all Local Instructors: U.S. v. I'ivh a. 312 F. Supp. 4l>6
(1070) (D.C.) (Civil Aeronautics Board regulation peniiiuin:; airline per-
sonncl to open suspicious package is constitutional; an airline official's
position makes him a credible and reliable informant.); U.S. v. Dnnniivrs.
425 F2d 030 (10(19) (2d Cir.) (example of strong affidavit lor searc.n
warrant, based principally on information from confidential informant:
permissible to delav execution of searcii warrant (within ten-riav limit)
until suspect is in premises;: U.S. v. Mitchell . -125 F2d 1353 (1070) (3c ii
Cir.) (example nf finding prohaofe cause lor arrest from combination oi
Spinel I i and Dr.-i^r circumstances); U.S. v. Rob ertson. 425 F2d 1330 (1370)
(5th Cir.) (no i. iiranria warnings required lor street interrogation of suscect
concerning automoouc tact and title registration with defect indicating car
possibly stolen): U.S. v. Goad . 462 F2d 80 (1070) (10th Cir.) (arrest~oi
suspect standing, in ooorwav io home, by officers standi ng outside v.ili not
support incidental search of home); U. S. v. Main . 312 F. Simp. 73G (1S70)
(D.C. , Del.) (affidavit for search warrant .stated probable cause but con-
tained much of what court labeled "excess verbiage"); U.S. v. Avers. -120 •
F2d 524 (1070) (2d Cir.) (lineun requires warning of rirjn to counsel
separate and distinct from Miranda warnings given lor interro::ation):
U.S. v. Campbell . '120 F2d 547 (iu70) (2d Cir.) (recording of telephone
conversation made by consent of one nariv thercio is admissible in cvider.ee):
U.S. v. Bednarski . 312 F. Supp. 013 (1070) (D.C. Mass.) (no Miranda
warnings required for use in evidence of books and records volu'niaiuv given
to officer by suspect during noncustodial interview): Dess v. Montana. 312
F. Supp. 1325 (1070) (D.C, Mont.) (illustrative discussion oi slamirng lo
protest unreasonable search and seizure!; U.S. v. McK innon. 420 F2d 345
(1970) (5lh Cir.) (search of vehicle at tow-in garage 3U minutes after arrest
of accused on highway could not be justified as incident to arrest): Caninb
v. Wainwritdit , 420 F2d 300 (1070) (5th Cir.) (seizure of package tlTFo^H
from vehicle lawfully pursued by police was proper as taking of thins'
abandoned); Woodbury v. Belo . 426 F2d 023 (1070) (51h Cir.) (officers
searching suspect's home under search warrant for narcotics taken in
armed robbery properly seized gun, not mentioned' in warrant, as instru-
331
mentality of rubbery): U.S. v. Krosla ck. 420 K2cl 1120 (11170) (7th Cir.)
(defendant's riiiht against self-incrimination i.s violated when officer testifies
thai defendant, on interview, refused lo talk): Bosley v. U.S. . '120 F2d 1257
(1970) (D.C.) (M iranda requires officers lo warn an arrested suspect of his
rights as soon as practicable after arrest); U .S. .v. Con/ale? ,- I'ere?,. 426
F2d 12U3 (1070) (fith Cir.) (search of arrestee is incident In arrest when
made shortly 'after at jail or place of detention rather than at actual time
and place of arrest; search of woman's pockctuook sitting on colfee table
in room in which she was arrested on narcotics charges was proper).
(Security Letters on attached pages)
9/15/70
SAC LETTER 70- 48 - 2 -
62-685 O - 76 - 22
332
(D) NEW I, EFT AMI) BLACK EXTREMIST TERRORISM - INFORMANT
COVERAGE -- You have Iwnn advised in the p;i.st nl' the growing incidents
of terroristic acts by Ihe Mew Left and black extremists and the need .
for intcnsilicntion of our invstigntions and development of new sources
to combat these escalating problems.
However, a review of the New Left Movement - Violence
airtels submitted monthly by each field office indicalcs generally that
your informant coverage ol terrorist organizations and individuals is
grossly inadequate.
You are. therefore, instructed to immediately institute
an aggressive policy of developing new productive informants who can
infiltrate the ranks of terrorist organizations, their collectives,
communes and staffs of their underground newspapers. The Bureau
fully recognizes that ihe development of sources lo penetrate these
groups is made extremely difficult because of their immoral conduct
and use of drugs. It calls for initiative and new approaches to develop
the needed intelligence information.
Concerning black extremists, it is essential that quality
informants arc developed at a regular rate. These informants snouid
bo the type who can obtain advance information concerning planned
acts of violence or who arc in a position to furnish information. concern-
ing contemplated acts of violence.
You should include in Item 4 of your monthly airlel on
"New Left - Violence: Internal Security - Miscellaneous (Weatherman) ."
as outlined in Bureau airtel to all offices May 13, 11170. constructive
plans to implement the program outlined above concerning New Left
terrorist organizations through informant development. Recommendations
relating to the development of a specific source or plan of action should
be submitted to the Bureau by separate communication.
9/15/70
SAC LETTER 70-48 - 3
333
(C) SECURITY AND RACIAL INFORMANTS --^ Never in our liislory linve
we been coni'rtinLed with as critical a need lor informant coverage. Ter-
roristic violence surrounds us and more has been threatened: Bombings,
assassination tit police officers, kidnapping. and murder arc all part of
the picture. Fanatics are at large who are at war with the Government
and the American people. Particularly critical is the need for reliable
information about the activities of violence-oriented youthful groups o'n
campus.
As you are aware, you have been previously instructed not
to use campus student informants under the ape of 21. In view of cur-
rent circumstances, you are authorized to develop student security and
racial informants who are 18 years of ai;e or' older.' This presents you
with a tremendous opportunity to expand your coverage, which is
expected. However., in- no way are your obligations lo exercise
selectivity and tight control lessened in this most sensitive area.
Appropriate manual and handbook changes are forthcoming.
. Very truly yours,
John Edgar Hoover
Director
9/15/70
SAC LETTER 70-48 - 4 -
334
Exhibit 45
jVIciuurandu.
m
• Mil'. CD. UKENIIAK
■Of,
1/ I
: tIK. G. C.
'A,
RACIAL COIIFERKHCE
1 - Mr. .). I'. tlolu- ' ,' •■•
1 - Mr. C. I). Brennan' : : . .
1 - Mu. A. Rosen ','•,'
da n. November 2, 1970 j;'-
1 - Mr. J. J. Casper ;;;.
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore.
1 - Mr. R.l. lihackclford.M
Mr. J.C.ilichola
.UIljtClj;-prir CO; .;;;r;!| JA n.O;! TO
— \;>'kco:<uikc;s oi" buck aiid hew
Vv'
i ■
■'AT
■u,
J
OCTOBER 22-23. 1970,
?01)IFY>TIISTRUC'nO'IS
co;:ceh;:
LEIT" PUlSLlC'AlTEARAiXES
To obtain authority to send attached airtel to all field
offices concernin;'. the recording of public appearance:; of black and
New left extremists.' ... •
Memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan !i/?l/ft'J obtain-
ed authority to instruct the field to expand the u.-.e of concealed
recording devices In covering such appearances. Since that time, the
field has reported a large number of .such appearances and Special /
Agents in Charge (SAC:;) have always demonstrated .sound judgment in/
affording, such coverage under secure conditions. On a number uf /'
occasions, because of extremely short notice concerning appearances ,
there has been insufficient time to obtain iiureau authority. Because
of this, valuable evidentiary material has been lost. Recordings are
the 'host possible evidence of extremist statement.', actually made in
the event of prosecutive action. This matter vas discussed in depth
at captioned conference with field supervi sors. It vas the unanimous
recommendation of those supervisors that present instructions con-
cerning such recordings should be modified in on-:; respect to allow
SACs to arrange on their own initiative for recordings. i .■ """";
. ,-.,„,. .(ten / ■ - . -. x|< .o
i ho. rcconcr^ritliiiion has merit;. SAC;; have uniformly demon-
strated excellent judgment in making such record) n;;.s to date and
should Ijc >*,iven authority to record public appearances b\* black and
New Left extremists whenever full security can he a:;:;urcd ex te nt when ,
S ?££JL— -P"'' ;u "- 'hu-'e r, a rc_afc_ .educational institutions. When at educational j
institutions, the iicld must still obtain prior Iiureau authority. \
This will j;ive the field necessary '6lcxihi.lL ty to record public
appearances even when advance notice is extremely shout. The modi-
fication will in no way supersede or conflict villi authority to re- '•
O-Vcord statements $;ivcn in individual cases under invest ij/al.' ion such
h
,ry-
the Antiriot law investigations which arose out of violence at the
.j> '< 8/GSJ Democratic National Convention on subjects known-ar, -.ihd- -Chicago
■ v\. 7" and their defense attorneys William 1-1. Kunstler and Leonard I.-
* V^ Ueingla-ssi ' o ULC S i<-'.'0
' JCM:ekv:-.Cy)
^DECiB^^'-r..
CONTINUED - OViiK
335
Koiiiornndiiiii Co Mr. (.'. I). Ilremian
UK: RACIAL COr!FE:<»!CE, OCTOBER 22-23, l'J70,
RECOMMENDATION TO KODIFY INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING
RECORDINGS OF BLACK AND NEW LEFT PUBLIC APPEARANCES
ACTIO:!:
If approved, attached airtcl will be sent to
all field offices in accordance with tlie above. No Manual
changes are nc-ees.:ary.
•fev
oi»
\0\ )Ks
l/l'"v- ; "- %
336
11/5/70
Alrtel
To:
From:
SAC, Albany
Director, FBI
1 - Mr. W.
. CY Sullivan ■
1 - Mr! J.
P. Kohr
1 - Mr. C.
D. Prcr.nan
1 - Mr. A.
Rosen
1 - Mr. J.
J. Caspar
.PERSONAL .
MTZMICK
1 - Mr.' G.
C. Hoo're, .*., -.
1 - Mr. R.
L. Shac'.-.eifcr
■I-'- Mr. J.
C. Mi chela.
USE OF COKCFALED RECORDING DEVICES
IN COVERING PUBLIC APPEARAKCES BY .'
BLACK AH) KEW LEFT EXTREMISTS
I. „.i: - r . . " ' ' • "■ ■■ ,
' ' ' •' ReBulet to nil offices 5/22/69 ',:hich set forth',
instructions to expand the. use of concealed recording devices-
by a Special Agent or proven source in covering public ^ ;.
speaking, engagenents by black and Hew Left e.\trcr,iists.^ Thovc
instructions required j'.ureau authority prior to use of such .
concealed recording devices.
V
Effective upon receipt of this connur.ico.tion/ . ... •
Special Agents in Charge (SACsj nay, en their ovi: initiative,
a»i:-i^rize the use of concealed recording devices by a :;pocia! ■
^■j^'iger't or proven source in .covering public appearances by Mr.c!:
■ -iqvnd jew Left extremists except i;hcn such appearances o.re at .
' eauctional institutions.' All other ir^tructions set forth in
"'"rolei remain in effect. RB, 1 &* / " .- ?,-'.
■ " ._-*'•-■■
:!;'>';<■'..-,,, J n t he event-'d)p3ippcarances at educational
institutions, prior r>ureau authority nust still. b»-obtained
before utilizing concealed recording devices. /
;■-:.-• f) !'j/0 ^
•It is reiterated that such recording devices are
to be utilized only viien full security-can be assured.
Information developed as a result of such coverage must be
promptly furnished to the Bureau in forn suitable for
dissemination in accordance with instructions sijt forth in relet.
2 - All Offices
JQI:fb
■•" (127)
L5 ■•-■iUnw.M'J
J
V
TIlLKTVi-E CNITu
SEE t!OTE PACE TWO
337
Airtel. to SAC, Albany
RE: USE OF CONCEALED RECORDING DEVICES
it! coviciuiir, public apfearal-ces by
.BLACK AMD I-KW LEFT EXTREMISTS
Ench SAC must, personally insure that maximum
possible use. is made of this extremely valuable investigative
technique.
The fore;?,oin,<x in.ro way supersedes or conflicts
with instructions to record statements "by subjects of
ir.-.ii vidua! cases ur.der investigation. J.ii thai: ror;nrd,
recipients should refer to Chicago airtel .to all continental
offices and San Juan dated 5/29/69 captioned "David T.
Uclli nger, aka, et al (Travel of Defendants), ARE - Conspiracy.
See memorandum C. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. lineman
dated- 11/2/70, captioned "Racial Conference, October 22-23,
1970,. -Recommendation to Modify Instructions Concer.ni r*
Record) n.".s of lUaek and tew Left Public Appearances,"'
prepared by JCM:ckw.
338
Exhibit 46
J£
UNI'I l.l) S'I'A'I I'.S COVI-.I .1KNT
Memorandum
r> C- >■■■ ,
|^ :).Ut. C. D. UltKNNA^
|o.\l : MH. C. C. MOOHKf; \ ■
HircrHiEY III.ACK VIXTIIKMIST PUOGUAM
' KACnAI.-aiVlTliNS
I. - Mr. 17. C Sullivan
1 -"Mr. J. P. Mohr
1 - Mi". C. IK llrcnii.iii
1 - Mr. Casper
D.vi I.: December 21!, 107(1
1 - Mr. Conrad
). - Mr. I!. I). Cotter
1 - Mr. 0. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Class
/
To recommend that the attached-., alrtel be sent [0.J1J 1
r'-'oifices setting up n Key Hindi I-kctroniist /'(KBK) - Pro:;rnm to I ntensi fy
our coverage on certain black extremists. ^V
Because of the" -.violence potential of a I 1 -black extre;
o required that the field yivc priority at tent ion to the
ists,
we hav
investi;cat ions of nil black extremists
by -the field indicates that there is a
on a jv roup of black extremists who are
activists and are particularly extreme
and vocal in their calls for terrorism
the violence -pro no PJ.aek Panther Party
"rcvo lu t ion " is en terin.", the bei^inninc;
strui;;cle and our investigations indicate thoie ai
more likely to resort to or to order terrorism ji
therefore require particular attention .
The in Jo nan I: ion sub;n
need for intensified cov
either key leaders
a;;it.iti ve , an ti-Governi:
and violence. Lender;
have indicated thnt the
phases of netuaJ armed
e r t a i u e x t r cm i s t s
tactic and
i I: tod
jvera^e
nont ,
of
Intensified coverage to brini; to hear the tola 1 ..eaoaljil-
il^.CrL •!_ t.h'- Uurea.u.. on inves t ifa trons of these mdu lciunU 1^
warranted. V/e should coyer .eycr.y. facet _oi" their current nativities, '
future plans, weaknesses, strengths, and personal Jives l.n m-utraj i;'.e
the e L'j oe't.Lvonosr; ol each iCif. JJ . The finances, travel, u tternni.'-.'S , ""' i"
*allll""pnr.;KlTi1.o violation of*"VuUb'rnl and local law ul those individuals 1
should receive the closest investigative and supervisory attention..
I'ol lowin;; the receipt of an investi!',nf ive summary report,
reports on these individuals should be submitted every ;)() days,
with interim letterhead memoranda, in order that our intensitied
coverage can be better to 11 owed and dissemination made on a timely
basis. A.bou.i Sf._e.as.es arc involved in thitv intensified coverage.
KKCOMMKND A'nON: 1 tlC'S - . /
' "That the attached airtel be sent to oach.Iiold office.
Enclosure . .t ; ' v/"- l -0-? ""* " "\
, /.
CJ;G:el:w
(9)
/ <','
"r' ( / \\f *
\W>
^
339
December
1070
Alrtoi:.-
REC-3
To:
From :
KEY n
IUCIA
#A
GAC, Albany
Director, FBI
1 - Hr. W. C. Sullivan
■' 1 - Hr. J. P. I'.ohr
■"' f-.'iX - l!r. C. D. Drcnnan
'S> "'j\jY - Hr. Casper
1 - Mr. Conrad
jack r;:iT.i;i.;isT pucgrah
l i.Lvrrijr.s
1 - Hr.
1 - Hr.
1 - Hr .
R. D. Cotcer
G. C. Hoore.
Clasy
Dnr-J.iv; your investigations or black c;:trc:r.iist orr.ani-
zntions and individuals, yon tinva A"ur:\:L:;iied indorsation in:li-
catin;; that certain individuals are c;;tre.:iely aotjvo a.'id r'.ost
vocal in their an ti-i'lovcrn..:ont statcneivts and their caljs lor
terrorism and violent. Although the violence potential in all
black o::trc:.iist:: necessitates continued priority attention by
nil oriices, there aro certain individual leader;: and activist*
_wlio can bo considered ns Key Black Extremist:; (k;!i~) . -.
| At this tii-.-o, ilio. Bureau is dor. iania tin;; those on the
\-ntt.ackcd list a:; V.r.L::. The toivi K'.Jfi doe;; not recuire tii.it an
I'indiyiduai a.: ,a;a.lly hold an oificiai position in "an c:,-,'.T..ni;-.atio;i
.-.but i;; to include others o.f equal importance because ox their
^influence as black extremists .
2 - All Ol-ficos (Enclosure) /* [
■C.:C:ckw .'
(123) .
^l
mail iiikimI ... I ri:i.i: i-vi-i: i-:ar|; |
;:iE, hot.-: iv.gu tiia.ju
•■-. a . f ) \\r,..^ I /
1
340
Airt'>] to SAC, Albany
KliY BLACK BaTBlUIST PROGRAM ^
informant coverage on the subjects. All avenues .of invosti-
• uativi: attention mist bo explored and necessary recommendations
.' to the Bureau must be made promptly.
The desirable coverage must include, but not bo
limited to, the fol lowin:: investigation ; Ther;c investi'sitions
must be conduo ted with initiative and imagination in order that
tlie desired results arc achieved. Bach of these eases will
receive close scrutiny at the Bureau.
(1) All KBEs must be included in Priority I of
the Security Inde;:. IX not already so included, promptly
submit I'D- 1122,
(2) All KBBs must bo included in the Black
Nationalist Photograph Album (BHIVi) . Promptly submit
photograph and rcuujred background on each nBB not
presently in the BilPA and when a subject is designated
a KBB.
•(.';) All aspects of the finances of a KBB must
be determined. Ban!: accounts must be Monitored. Safe
deposit hoses, investments . and hidden assets most be
located and available information re^ardin;v them must be
reported.
(1) Continued consideration must be pivon by
each office to develop means to neutralise the effectiveness
of each KBK. Any counterintelligence proposal must be approved
by the Bureau prior to implementation.
(o) Obtain suitable handwriting specimens of each
KBB to be placed in the national security Tile 'in the
Laboratory. When possible, obtain specimens from public
records, law enforcement agencies, and similar sources,
fiend specimens to the Bureau under separate cover letter
by registered mail for the attention of fit? I'BI Laboratory .
V.'hen they arc of value as evidence;, so state in the transmittal
letter and request their return after copies have been made.
Specimens should be sufficient to permit future comparisons by
the Bal.ioraT.ory.
341
Airtel to- SAC, Allinny
KEY ULACK liXTIHCillS'T PROGRAM
(G) Particular efforts should ho made to obtain records
of and/or reliable witnesses to, Inflammatory statements made
which may subsequent ly become subject to criminal proceedings.
Promptly record all such information in interview report .form.
(7) Vi'liero there appears to be a possible violation
of a statute within the investigative jurisdiction oi the
Bureau, the substantive violation character should be included
in subsequent .communications and the possible violation
vigorously investigated in accordance with existing instructions.
(8) Particular attention mrst be' paid IfO 'ravel -by
a K11E and every effort made to determine financial arraivc-
racnts for such travel ~" "" "
.. fravel in fori.', at ion must be submitted to
the Bureau and interested offices by impropriate! 40flMunication
to permit coverage of the Klin. It vV'iJ I t>t the. responsibility
of the office of origin to insure that ^Jae activities of the
KUD are covered by auxiliary offices.
(9) The Fodci'al income ta>: returns of all I.T.Ms must
be checked annually in accordance with existing instructions.
If no invest inativo summary rcoort lias been submitted
in each case, such a report must be submitted to the l.ureau by
2/lf)/71. Thereafter, an investigative report should be sub-
mitted at least every 'JO days. 1'urthcrmore , • appro'iriate
communications suitable for dissemination should be promptly
submitted in the interim to hoop the I'.ureau fully advised of
the activities of each liTJE. The words (Hey lilac!: l.l-tremist )
should be included in the character of each cctimunj cation
submitted except those communications (including reports)
■ which are prepared for dissemination.
KOTE: Sec memorandum C. C. Moore to & I), nrennan, dated
12722/70, captioned as above, prepared by CEG:eliw.
342
Exhibit 47
<<
"X
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
lJvo
26 February 1970
Personal and Confidential
The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Hoover:
Mr.| .lias orally informed mc that you wish to have the
identity of the" FBI agent who was the source of certain information _
communicated to ah employee of this Agency, Mr.;
This information rc^arding^ the disappearance of ojiol'immas Riha was
in turn passed ttj -. '
Mr.
In view of your personal interest in this matter, 1 instructed
to report to mc in person.
I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr.'
and have requested him to reveal the identity of. his source. As a point
of lienor and personal integrity, Mr,[ f.vas adamant that he •
could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure
from mc, Mr. 'maintained his position, stating that in de-
fense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.
Mr.'
^explained that the
AUG
icascs
had been given extensive news coverage," much of it being sensational
in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation
as to the possible involvement of the CIA and'thc FBI in Kiha's
' disappearance.
5 W;i . f
,FBI .
J
343
The purpose of Mr. _J._ ; - ^ conference with the District
Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pres-
sures and tho possible serving of a subpoena bnj ■,
He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he
would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of
the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.
Mr.,
/affirms that be fore goin g to_Di.strict Attorney
McKcvitt he called upon the FBIj_ ^ _ t . _ r -. ; -- lJ - Mr/ . .. ~
and sought to c oordin ate with him our respective interests.
Tic also~solicitcd Mr.: 'to accompany him to the District
Attorney. '
Mr. | ista1;cs that Mr. v .,, . '.re fused absolutely to
cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr.j ^ ibngaged in an oral
exchange during which he remarked that our representative' in
Bou lder was " lying" and then procee ddd to, challeng e the veracity of
Mr. . Subsequently, Mr.[ . conferred with.
the District Attorney alone. He was successful in .persuading the
District Attorney to make a favorable' public statement which had
tiie effect of putting this issjg^ifjjgardi'ng'i "" rand other rumors
to rest as far as the public was concerned.
I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. L , j
I feel tha^.poor ^adsincnt was employed in passing the information, in
questiorft'oi ^^^..^...and later to the District Attorney. This should
only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure '^ou
that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am
taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency-
officials.
*'* rt E ai| i '» Mr., I have no reason to doubt that
he has acted honcstly_. 1 believe that he has reported to me in good,
faith. He is sincerely- interested in preserving a sound working
relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a
situatior of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two
agcncic_£U_ I_amjtaking administrative action in this matter with regard
toMr. L ■ ' """ ;"".//" "" -
(7
~*%
■,nv-
-:..-.
. „ i
■VI
Vu/-
. -.
t
J.
-o .
.X
344
I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our
mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors
possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal
security interests. 1 shall pursue this matter through our respective
liaison -offices.
In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only
fully perform its duties in the furtherance -of the national security when
it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the l-'odern] Bureau of
Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to con-
i duct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we
can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases,
in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between
the two agencies. I feel strongly that there arc representatives of the
news media who arc eager to exploit alleged differences on a national
scale. Disturbing as- this experience has been, I wish to thank you in
the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me
in such a forthright and candid manner.
).;., - -.■'*■ A' > --..-■■■■!.
Sincerely,
■-EIV
'ft
Jk
yj^O,.-*J>^^\j*bUL**>*As'l-
B
Attachments - a/s' '■_ ^ : j \- !\ , ,AAA
, ,:^l-.^ --**-■■■-
I. ... V. ' 3
"T- Richard Helms
,vo".-v •
v .. \ Director
■ ,- _> ..' / ■
~A^
K—
345
. Following are typewritten clarifications of the
handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached
document :
Pdge 2, left margin -
Page 2, bottom of page
'acted properl y. 11"
"I do not agree. .violated the
third agency rule & refused to identify
the alleged FBI agent who was the source
of the information. H"
Page 3 i end of 3rd paragraph
"Helms forgets it is a two way
street. II"
Page 3, bottom of page
"This is not satisfactory. .1 want our
Denver Office to have absolutely no
contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison
here with CIA to be terminated & any
contact with CIA in the future to be by
letter only. H"
. UNI'I'KI) S'l'A'l I'-S Cl .NMKNT
Memorandum
346
Exhibit 48
y\ :Mr. C. D. DeLoach UATt: 3/6/70
irom :Mr. W. C. Sullivan
M.0JECT: HELATIO.NSIMPS V.Ti'II
CENTHAI, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE) •
.Item, Number 37 in the material subm i tted to the •
Director' " ' | _.. .[,.
discusses CIA cri rrcisi:f~which c bu 1 d~g c~n era t e"f roiii ~'Ag o ri c y" be l'i c f :
that Bureau has railed to cooperate and oiler necessary assistance
in collection oi positive intelligence in the United .slates
Memorandum is to deal with specific cases believed, !)/'_/ ' i
to evidence lac): of cooperation and. to briefly comment on "policy
of cooperation we have adopted with CIA.
SYNOPSIS:
Mentioned Item j points out CIA belief that
more aggressive action should have been taken in field of !
collecting posi I i \ o intelligence in the United States. " "
notes Bureau's; ac,:ion in this field, for the most part , HKs been ""
restricted to coi-in.1 ianee with requests by State Department when
political crises occur in some country. lie points out CM belief
that acquiring needed data would mean inc rease d technical surveil-
lance covera;;e, de\-elt )j)inejit_o£. informants [■
... - ,, -- • ... ...,,._ ..,._J cit . es tw ° specific cases occurring
in 1969 where bureau dcclincS CIA's request for technical coverage
suggesting to Agency that it make its request directly to the
Attorney General. Review of specific cases mentioned set forth
with Director's comments relative thereto being noted. Our
bv SAC ?ol-r"r P rT i, m°ynV ith C ™ m0St recontl y delisted to field
•. „»'■'? " C ° Py ntta «"'<"l. SAC letter calls for
wi?h CIA 3 u «"«'iction but shows our willingness to cooperate
OBSEItVATIONS AND ACTION - OVER
347
Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DcLoach
HE: HnlATIOKSIIIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CIA has repeatedly raised the issue in the past cf
our coverage in the. positive intelligence collection area and
wo can reasonably expect similar issues to be raised in the
future.
KKCOMMEimED ACTION :
That we prepare a carefully worded letter to CIA
outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and
counterintelligence work affecting the United States and
forthrigiitly ask CIA if it is satisfied with the status quo
and if not what do they have to suggest as changes.
2 -
62-685 O - 76 - 23
348
Exhibit 49
U.NITKD STATES c;OVKK*.Ml-)NT
Memorandilm
>.± J : Mr. C. D. DcLoach
i«Jm : W. C. Sullivan
l-iijuct: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
■TIIK PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD AND JOHN HC CONE
uatu: March 7, 1970
1 - Mr. DcLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Hayncs
^ Director! - |
. disc'usses~a dispute wo had 'with CIA in-May, 19G3, as a" result
of a communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It was pointed out that
in our communication to PFIAB we attributed certain information
to McCone, then l ""^'-"|- nf nH i\i»fiOT"P"i n l Ji rc M 1 Vl'.p. iffl n,f "^ of
X increasing wire taps on| . . McCono '■"
charged that the information, attributed to hi'm was not so
becauso ho had- never mado any such statement and he could
prove it. The fact was that the information relating to
McCono had been given us by one of his subordinates who had
-• indicated the information originated with McCono. McCono
_J maintained that wo should have checked .with him before going
on record that any information had originated with him.
A rn-1 hy tnHimhl-iniwifiiiiiliriMAn— tMrr-Tiutlrr , fH -rl n-r 1 tlint
^X in April, 19G3.I . . . ..;_■_ . had discussed
with Richard Holms apd James Arigleton of CIA "McCone 's alleged
position with tlio "'■'""; tfiat JtfWliaf".ln .fnw-nf •"•!•"— 7 tho ■.
•v board telephone taps on . ^ -The '- '■'
' Bureau, of course, was Opposed to this and advisccTllelm.s that
wo would request to make our position known before the board.
At tho conclusion of tho meeting in April, 1963, Helms. . - - .j.
V' specifically asked what he should tell McCone apd," [?*"""'
told him lie. should toll McCone exactly what had- occTirrdd at '
tho meeting; that the Bureau was opposed to across tho board
wire taps and tho Bureau intended to do adviso PFIAB.
RECOMMENDED ACTION :-
None. We do not believe, in light of tho' facts sot
forth, that CIA will mako an issuo of tlfis mattor.
RHII:wmk/sof i ^ \ 1 /
(5) pi y Al y
L
\J-
^.v.-1
349
Exhibit 50
20 March 1970
The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
D ir c c to r
Federal Bureau of Investigation j
V/ashin-jton, D. C. '•
i
i
Dear Mr. Hccver: .
We have completed our review of domestic positive. intelligence
collection engendered by your letter of 11 March 1970. Y/e warmly
welcome periodic reexamination by our two agencies of the imblenicn-
tation of the 19i>6 agreement and the collection of positive intelligence
which you proponed. I concur also v/iih your' comments that there is
a need for cluse coordination of our efforts In the field of ;-;ositivo and
counterintelligence collection. To be most effective, I a;;rtc that it
is essential for this Agency, together with your Bureau, to conduct a
continuing analysis of clandestine collection activity. The product is
of "rowing importance to the national security and to the United Status
Intelligence Community. Therefore we endorse your proposal for a
reexamination and bespeak your decirec as to how this might be ' \
conducted. \
With regard to the 1966 oct of ground ruler., which you sent to
the then Director, Vice .Admiral William F. Habere, Jr. , the compe-
tent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an'
cifective and realistic agreement, I welcome your statement that no
major problems have been encountered since its adoution.
1 feel strongly that there are other related subjects,- of similar
Importance to Lac national security, which "warrant periodic ree::amma-
tlon since- they have a direct bearing- on domescic-clande jtine collection
of positive intelligence. i
+S-
350
Ac ;\ result of oar review,- c:i ^OiiiorcJ by your lelicr, I believe
that the following eu'ojcct:j arc csscrvi:i;j,oi your p~r;c.r-.;l cer.siucratio
r - - - .
(1) /-.r.^io e- .vor.i-.nj
For several years your Bureau cud boon reecp-
llvo So requirements and lea-Jo v.'hlch. reruiUed Ja valuuMs
covcrire. '
--■•■-■■■ "1 '
'V
On Z October I960, two related request!) for audio
coverage were submitted by tiiio Agency psrtainia.'. to
poaltivc intelligence tar .gets;
Your llurcau repliod tl-.r.t- henceforth ti:c
Agency should refer ill such esses
General for aoaroval.
directly to the .Attorney .
It is aureate! that tee queaiion of «v.idio covers
Le rcopcaei between representatives of your bureau .-.nd
this Agency. I v/onid v.'elcorr.o your thoughts and obscrva
Uoao on this subject.
351
{Z) :.' ~.\l Cove r.- '?. Another much uccuud ir.tciH-
£oncc tool i-j rr.ail covc7.'.;;c, lta iiv.norLancv r.aa busr.
prsvcn in Iht past. I l'.;vc f:.e in-.-,rcts;c;i ;;:.U it i:a::
bcca vlinc.;r.;ir.'ji--J. ar.i I v/oald su-jjcct La;-.t our rearcsdn-
tstlvcs saouM cuifcr and e^ai.aicc ta^atiicr v.-i:cti:cr .t;.ip
tosct r:iij'..t bD deployed D. gainst co.-i-.iv.unicatioan of
tho New J-cft, a-.d identified foreign areata.
(3) CI,'. Ti-c :-.;: cM. 5-crvlcc a. A significant cxucndl-
ture of thli; /-.^oncy'a money a^d r-ci-conncl ;-:a5 been com-
mitted to research and development for taa i:v.provtmc::t
of tec^rjical .-lids. Thi.i Agency bar. T.-rovido:! y:-;;r jjur'j.iu
v/lth an appreciation of our rcscurccc and cr.p.i-.uiiHics, and
has offerer! you at esse or gratis car nioet sophisticated
acuipfnent. :"
Altiioa;ja. v/e wiLl cordin-ae t:;oaa e-ervicc^. \vc would .v/eienmo
any eiu^^cc-tio^-j from your Jjur-jau for i'.;Tprov.:x = r.; in ir.o
technical fi-.ild includi:,.; proposal!: ;:ot/ t'ueae Ai^act-j caa be
bolter ern^i^yc-J. ; " •
I
P.iriorlir . .•. ii;r.;c I'-i^r cot: cc lion »i:m vc ->ortj :: .; ;)i :>r:-jitive
foreign iulelH:;cace ic. as you a&y, only i.ici-Ju.-ital to -/our
main intcrn.il c^curitv csd count cri^tv. ill rjcnco rcoon-Mbili-
ttec, J realise tlv.it your -cci-sonnd crc coiviuwv.at <:t c dia-
»Uvcnti-;e in cirryin^ out t.-.c cvAliiAVijrj wij-d repeating
prcceascs nccc:c<.\r\* for Lhc conduct i>f positive i:;t::l!l-?cr.cc.
At our 19^6 co-ifercuce^v/c o:\fer-ed to' inotit-.itc jyjoiiivc ir.tci-
ll^csco trainiu3 cour&cc* iucludixi^ reports wrltiKg caj.
352
f.ialjzii, f-ir :£! personnel. h\ celicitin ; yuur views on
t'.ic iiusircbiiity o'i t:.i.? I;.-;::: ei irAi:::.". -, I v.i;h_l.> rclter.Ue
cur v.-ilii::fUoca to -rrsvii: :uc.-. in:tr-.:cf;'jn.
I
(5) f, : c- -.lnr.vj on Q-,:va;iti-?n :>.Tvico3. Given fee
jjrov.in^ aop^iaiicilion mi incro.-3->-i i;i--;.-;ilitis:j cl hostile
iutelli ;crico ocrvi-c*;;;, it 13 su^octea t:-.C;t CIA Jr.J I\UI ;'
c:<pcrta i:-. this fictt! meet £D required .".t. our Tcs-,tctivc
ICe>iJo'i».rtora,. the \.'.-.ohi'.i;iori ani *'.V./ Ysric i ; "ic-l-:i Oiitccs,
*ia cr-'-r'to i:co--) .-ibrcar.t o£ ncv.* cev::!o:i:n.:'r.tc. .•.'.o-.-i'; , ^_
. o:"rr.'.'.i.!i ( opc-ru-ciou-l t."r.if.3, «r.d viivoriv :i:inoi'.j:^ oi
o.-;poi;:io:i services. i know that you'r/ili ^ jrec v/itli :v.c ;
to.it n-> opportunities for improvcri-.cr.t shsuUi bn over-
looked whic:: c\i^i:i hcl;< to r.c -j^tc t':o. clhi'orts 01 i.cstilo '.
sci-vicea wi-o :rc cUsr,;o.i wit:-. u-.d-.-rr.ii:i: = -i tro security _
oi the 'Jr-.itcJ states-. Tissue scsuiu.nr. should .il:-o provide
c.n.urr-^c-r tur.it/ to c:-:;>lorc f.tii v.^viso r.-j\v ::i^nj to pene-
trate r.nd :icu'ci'aii£-j t.iosc i^in:lc*l iorcea.
353
(2) ' ?.'av: ?.cit --■n:' 1 r..-.c:-l /^ttrrr. T^cre is already
n :.ubstsr.tial c:;cU.-_n,:c c* iruo:vruilioa i:*. this :.ckU !.:::*.:-
tetior.s 01 tr.enpowcr r^isc a. aoricus cuc:.t:o:i:o'tJ v.Liaihcr
b-oti: z/.cr.cicr, c^rv Iv^cp tjo.cc v-itl> iV-tur^ u::-rci:c:.-.blc
•Jcv\:lci-,:n.:r.t3. The incrocrjiujly clock cr>:-.vu-;:tisr. bct-.vceu
these io-cco ia tr.e 'unite! Ctatus aaJ "csotilv ui=i*r.ciits
cbi'OAu has bs.cr. v.-cli cst-'iblisiricd by. iotii o; cr.r s: ; r.r.c!i-3.
IXici it*..ould be in our mutual interest to vUl^r^ini; ;:o-.v
\vc Ci.i bes; cn'-io:/ rorc wisc-iy our ii:vi:U:d r.i-fo jv.ct,
knov/;~' v ' t/..-.t tb:;: ".r;.-oI-irii,» v.hieb cr.il/r-.'."-.::! cj/.-ibii-.-.n.
hijs.cV:i:'.";, assASsis-iisa. and the dc:.^-anip ; oi i.:v cniorcc-
nuat c. r iico;s, ii ir.'.drn^ior;;:! :,-. scope
(9) Kgi-ftor.3 •■•■■■ t.\ Domestic Field Or.icc- ?.r ; :! !.; ■-.I
^y.-2Siii£' '■' ~° ! ' :Jt "'•' 1 t; '"' it S--T- - ri; •*«/" aori^'-is cj.-iiicts
in t!:is ayca-tut.ti'.cro .-.»"/ be r':oin for ir.v.-.roviR^ s;-.e c.:iz\iiy
ofli.-iis&u ir. arJtr to rr^.ani positive in:-.-.li> ;unco cslicctioi:.
Given the c'.'.j-.g -jinj situations both i'.cro ;:n-i csror.d, ooriodlc
2"e-o:c:miruitiori o; iicld rcls.ticns could assist both ajciiciec
to rrtii;e mutualiy-aijrc-ed idjuslnicr.ts.
judr.:
co-jn;
fore.;
vi'.ioi
Mr. Hoover, I via:; to accuvo you tii.'.i I vr.iuo hijhiy ysv.r r.-c-rj r.onal
:«r.t in Siiiii-.-; b.:^rir.j on the nitiaiv.l uocurity. . I :;.-.jv/ that your
rioucc 13 durivsd iro;-.-. a. unique liu;::.:-.,-! oi .■ic-iic.-.tc-.i service to oar
.ry. In t/.io spirit, I \. - olco»no ni^csrciy 711:7 oiiscrv.r.:ioa.T on the
oiaj ajer.d,-. :•.;;. i solicit your '.'.:ou;hts n: ;ardir.;; ,:r.y cl.-.c- item
i you deern v.'O-t.-.y oi the r.itustUm ci your Bureau s.-.d t::is A;;cacy.
Fa i it 1; '.illy yourn
Ii.icr.ird ilcinis
.Oiluctor
354
Exhibit 51
d'<
March 31, 1970
Honorable Richard Helms
Director ■ -
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Helms:
I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 20 setting
out your observations with respect to various matters ol mutual interest.
I certainly appreciate your kind comments concerning me and i siiare
your convictions as 10 the need for close coordination of our intelligence
collection activities in behalf of the national security.
Your letter suggested nine particular areas which might be
the subject of further discussions aimed at improving the coordination of
our operations. A number of these topics are highly sensitive and complex
and I will therefore mxte no effort here to set forth my views in detail.
However, in response to your letter and as a prelude to any direct discus-
sions on these matters, certain observations on my part may be appropriate.
With regard to electronic surveillance and mail coverage,
there Is no question as to the frequent value of such operations in- develop-
ing needed intelligence. Cn the other hand, the use of these measures in
domestic investigations poses a number of problems which may not be
encountered in similar operations abroad. There is widespread concern
by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type coverage.
Moreover, various legal considerations must be borne in mind, including
the impact such coverage may have on our numerous prosecutive responsi-
bilities. The FBI's effectiveness has.always depended in iarge measure on
our capacity to retain the full. confidence of the American people. The use
of any investigative measures which infringe on-traciitional rights of privacy
must therefore be scrutinized most carefully. Within this framework, .ho^ev^r,
I would be willing to consider any proposals your Agency mayuiUket
7
355
Your oiler to make available certain technical equipment
developed bv the Acenc'y is most welcome and I iully reciprocate your
v/lllingness to cooperate in the exchango of r.elevant scientific data.
I am prepared to designate appropriate representatives of the FBI
Laboratory to meet with CIA technical personnel at any mutually
convenient time. -
With respect to the inclusion of positive intelligence courses
In our training curricula, I am sure you will recognize that our training
programs must be designed primarily to fulfill our own widespread and
demanding"responslbilitics. While I appreciate) your offer, I do'not
feel It would be feasible at this time to include the proposed courses
In our training schedules. I would certainly have no objection to the
holding of seminars between specialists of our two agencies in selective
areas of interest when justified by specific circumstances.
I-
There Is already a considerable exchango of Information
between our agencies concerning New Left and racial extremist matters.
Frequently, as you have pointed out, there have been substantial connections
between subversive and extremist elements in the United States and their
counterparts abroad. We will continue to furnish your Agency information
being developed by the Bureau which might have a bearing on your
intelligence requirements. At the same time, we aro definitely in need of
additional Information from your Agency as to the foreign aspects of the
extremist movement in the United States, including foreign funding and
support of local extremist organizations, while I do not believe there is
any need for detailed discussions on this point, if you have any specific
suggestions to make we would be pleased to consider them.
<P
356
. Similarly, I am not awaro of any major problems which exist
at this time "in connection with the coordination of our Held liaison
operations. It has been my long-standing policy that acriou3 questions
affecting the coordination of our activities with other Government
agencies should be handled and controlled at a headquarters level in
order to avoid administrative confusion and misunderstanding.
In line with my letter of March 11 and the obrarvatlons
contained in your letter of March 20, I will In the immediato future
• designate appropriate officials of the Bureau to meet with your representatives
lor detailed discussions of these matters. It is my earnest hope tliat such
conferences will lead to a sharpened understanding of the responsibilities
and objectives of our respective agencies and v/ill servo to promote more
effective cooperation in our joint commitment to the national Intelligence
need3. -
Otnccroly yours,
J. Edgar Hoover
357
Exhibit 52
i-~Mr. DcLoac.
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Conrad
date: April 14, 1970
■J^ : \
. LU*
... • UNMKD ST. VI ES GOV E' M£M\_
^/ Memorandum
■ < : ' Mr. C. b. v DeLoachpV
r> ' •■ ■
om ':. W. 0. Sulliyajj
lyECT: AREL,ATIONS WITH CENTRAL ' . v- ^ .
INTELLIG ENCE AGENCY (CIA) — _ xrZ^'
Reference my memorandum 3/30/70 summarizing proposals of
CIA Director Helms regarding FBI-CIA coordination in intelligence collection
activities. Director approved' meetings between CIA and Bureau representa-
tives to further explore these matters. \f\r\r\y
On afternoon of 4/13/70, Inspector D. E. Moore and myself met
briefly with Mr. J ames. Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA,
X and Mr.j~ = " "*'" r *]&f his staff. This session was strictly exploratory
• in nature and was aimed at defining the scope and limitations of our
.. ■ . discussions with CIA on the points in question. Angleton noted that CIA
iJirec.ror Hejms wiii be closely fuiluwiug ilic outcome of those discuccicr.c
and is personally interested in resolving any current proDlems in tms area.
o
Mr. Angleton indicated that a A would like to direct initial attention
I to two of the items cited by Helms, namely, the question of audio (electr onic
1 surve illance) cov erage and the suggestion that FBI and CIA specialists^
V, f ^ jhold periodic seminars to coordinate our information.
I The Bureau's position regarding electronic surveillance coverage, as
outlined in the Director's letter to Helms of -.3/31/70, was reitereated with
emphasis upon the problems such coverage often pose with regard to •
prosecution as well as adverse public reaction to this type coverage.
I made the point that the Bureau has not received the necessary
support in this area from responsible quarters; that in the past the Bureau
had a substantial amount of coverage of this type in the interest of both our
own counterintelligence responsibilities as well as the national securicy
interest but that we have had to retrench in recent years largely as a result
of the "lack of support for such operations, i ~""'~ ~~ " -~r~- ■-
X
?.;
1." Anglptnn nntpri that in rp snonftp. t o CIA 's "request ibr" electronic
coverage of two^ ' . , f _- in the Fall
of 1969, the Bureau had requested that they ta ke thi sjchatteiuic with the
Classified by /X - - . !" . ^
WCS:mea fv«.m,.t 1™,,, cds. ours,-* i>7yeONTIN.UE£ft-:£>.V.ER
(4) "
3
57APR24 197Q
|b/tc ol Dccl;i>si/icalion InJcti
358
. 'Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach'
•RE:. RELATIONS WITH CIA.. ... ....■; .* . .; .■■ :._, ■..,.. : .... ...
Attorney General. • He said that CIA has been giving the question of
approaching the Attorney General considerable thought but this would
involve a whole new.set of procedures and policy-considerations which....
would have to be carefully considered. Angleton said that his staff was in
the process of drawing up a proposal on this point for Mr. Helms to'
consider and that they would probably have something specific for the
Bureau to consider at a subsequent meeting.
Concerning the proposed seminar,' in line' with the Director's
letter to Helms 3/31/70, I pointed out that we would certainly have, no
objection to such conferences where the occasion justified them. From
Angleton's r emarks, it appears that CIA is primarily interested here in the
y ,-_ ._._ pnd would like to furnish the Bureau with details of an extensive
research project CIA lias und ertaken in recent years to correlat e all available
^ source information regardingF^ ' : ~ ~ " This
(apparently would not involve any commitment by the Bureau and would represent
essentially an opportunity for us to see what CIA has done in this field and
i how ii iniiiiil lie in wiui iiiy current bureau interest, \vher. CIA ™iw™ any
jfirm proposals in this regard, we will submit specific recommendations.
Angleton said that CIA would be in touch with us when they have
firmed up various proposals and at that time Inspector Moore and myself
will meet with .them again as required. The Director, of course, will be
kept fully informed and no commitments will be made without his prior
approval.
ACTION:
For information.
4
-2
359
EXHIBIT 53
,\\)
(V
(
••' I
w
MEMOSAOTUM FOR: Chief of Operations
_ SUBJECT: Project HTLINGUAJ
1.-" ■ Tlic HTJL1NGUAI, proj^ct_out!inr. is attached. It; in self-
explanatory as a project with t'ac excepcion. that having been awai-e^
of tlic previous operation, you undoubted).'/ will have certaiu questions
which we hope to answer in this cover memorandum,
2. . The personnel required for the project on the part of the
Security Office is approximately the same as the number and grades
of those currently used with the exception that Security is running
the project through full-time use of sonic employees ?rid part-time
of 6th"ers"v/n~6~HnoiiIa. B"s on ocner regular Security jobs. Their total
time is between seven and eight people full -time-. WiLli the personnel
freeze and the mounting backlog, Security cannot continue the present-
operation without a sta.ff increase as indicated.' . -
3. ' - The only added function that will be performed by Security
in the new project is that more letters will be opened. They are -jres-
ently able to open only a very limited nuinbe r. Under the new set-u*j
with fid i- time craploj-ces, Security" will "be ableTto^bbtain toe addr'essor
and addressee on the total correspondence as against approximately
75 percent at the present time.
4. The added space is necessary to enable the opening of
more letters. Presently letters are opened without the knowledge ■'
of the Post Office Department on a completely surreptitious basis,
namely, swiping a 1 etter.prooo.ssin^ it at ui^ht and returning it the
next day. The processing is after hours .in the Security Office's New
York office. This not only involves overtime but is impossible to
handle on any increased scale. It will be necessary to get an added
room for this processing with .permanent equipment. The cost for
360
page two -
tliis added room is included; however, it is not known whether added
space may be obtained without cost, la order to acquire more letters
for processing, added room may be necessary at the airport- in New
York. This cost is included; 'however, again it may not be necessary
to expend any money since the Post Office may be able to handle the
matter for us. In other words, it is necessary to get the mail de-
livered to a separate room where no other Post Office cmoloyees are
present. At the present time, an unwitting Post Office employee is
working with our people. The item for space in "Washington, while
possible, is not probable, since this space does not need to be at any
particular point in. the Y/ ashing ton area.
5. Oux Security people arc documented as Id en 27
So far there
-has been no suspicion in the rrrJn post office in New York or at the air-
port that they are other than u\tm 27 • The cover story is
■ that they are doing certain research work on foreign mail for the
~Iden 28 • , » , '
' 6» The Table of Organization within the CI Staff is not an
estimate—it is based upon actual work production for, similar work
in Registry. '.^-*
v 7. The courier cost attributed to this project is not solely a
project expense since the same courier can also handle Security pouches
from New York. The cost of the courier at the present time is borne
by the Security Office,
8, The equipment cost will not be a recurring item v--ith the ex-
ception of "Miscellaneous", which covers large amounts of film for
microfilming the letters. t \
9. The scope of this project could be greatly expanded, since
it docs not cover a substantial amount of mail which cpmes into other
post offices and since it i-, envisioned that only a relatively small n':r-
361
■ page three -
project as currently envisioned, a detailed analysis can. be made to
determine whether it should be abandoned, expanded, or maint.vlned
at its present scope. It is our opinion that the Agency v/iil desire to
expand the project to the maximum extent possible within the' limits
of security and the limits of the Post Office Department's cooperation.
■ 10, It is desired to point out that the Security Office advises
that they cannot continue the project unless added slots are made
available to them. From the DD/P standpoint, we believe that we
are not at the stage of cither developing the project as indicated or
■ discontinuing it, since the material is not being exploited nearly to
the extent that it could be.
U. • The cost of the project appears large; however, from the
above analysis you can sec that this cost is almost entirely the salaries
of staff employees, including he. adc. carters processing. The cost of
1 many oi~iacTA^c1rTcy T ^pr"6Jects v.-ouici appear very high if the to'.al sto££
personnel (including headquarters) cost was added to them.
.. ^ ... Sicaed: j.?.23s Agister*
- • '•' ■."'■' ,\ J J?.rn : rt Anrlctcn ■
' ■'•■- " ■ •/ ■ ' , . CHrJ^ Counter intelligence Staff
Attachment (1) "' "'' * ;. ' . % . ',•'* ... - . ■" ' /...''?
/v 'DC/CI:Iden 4 :jbr (iS Nov 55) • • .- ' - : /" : .- ; "'
Distribution: •.. '.-.".'..;". ;•■
Orig Is 1 - Addressee •' '* * '.-•'-. ' : * • '■";.
V* * ■'-"•' -.i^-ci/siu • ; [_,'. : r : '- , - • -' '•';;' :v -
. Si - C/CI Chrono ' •' • •" '•-'■ '•"..'■:
1 - To he informally handed to Iden 15 by J.dcn 4
11/21/55: Mote by Mr. Aur;le?on on the cover sheet to COP:
Dic'k: The work n\i this was done by Irion 4 and Jdrn 20
362
Exhibit 54
O-UnKev. 10-16-70) )
ROUTE lis ENVELOPE.
Federal Bureau 01 Investigation
Uarch 10, 1972
Director . BY CIA COURIER
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C 20505 -
ATTENTION: Deputy Director (or Plans f JAMES . AfiGLETOH
REt^BUNTEB PROJECT : .i ■
T>ear Sir:
| — | i. For your information, i ..* cades'"- communications which may be
of interest to you.
the investigation conducted W
dum and furnish the results. ^\
Q 2. U will be appreciated if you will have
as requested in the enclosed memorandum
r~| S No further investigation is contemplated with regard to this matter. -, ,
REC-50 ;'--. ■ • 7fc?
[— ] 4, You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection
with this inquiry. _ ^^^^ ^mm^i
I — I 5. Please note change in caption of this case.
LJ ro MAI 10 1972.
| — | 6. Status of case: □ Completed CJ Incomplete ^ **//
Very truly yours.
eirncratlii.j aitf Yfcrli Edgar Hoo«lr I ( /V»
de = liS3i"i^- lon ^Director \, ('
Ene mx,*xx*JiztxMXiixjmx£MjMix
JMA»A3P*JfttM^f4MA!CTWiCra?XirZ
Kb, Reference Is made to go»r Y^ic^t^tion on
Hunter Report »•■. J V^> "!, traffic we
9,i'M/'\f\' f ^ ljj/2"
363
Exhibit 55
8 AurU 1?69 --' :
MEMORANDUM POR:THE RECORD
SUBJECT: HTLTNGUAL.. V" V" •'■'■"
L On 7 April 1969 I ran into Bill COTTER as he was leaving '*•' '
Headquarters Building during the early a:'tsmoca; Ha asked for a few
words and then proceeded to^ell tae that he waj oaiii3 way o:;t for the
last time and would bo sworn in as Chief Postal Inspector, the samo
evening. . . . . .
2. COTTER said that in his conversation with the DDP, COTTER
had mentioned his concern about the future of HTUNGu'AL, and iha DD?
had told him todiscuss it in detail with .the CI Staff.
3. COTTER then expressed himself to me as follows: COTTE?.
comes to the post Office Department from the Agency and in fact
knows how HTLINGUAL. works, whereas the former Chief Postal . '
Inspector, Keary MONTAGUS, theoretically knew only that the opera-
tion was a "cover," " which, was permitted under the regulations. This
placed MONTAGUE in a position to testify under oath en the Kill in.
such a way as to — in effect -- protect HTLINGUAL,. COTTER will not
be in such a position and will he particularly vulnerable in the event
of a flap in view of his own past affiliation with the Agency.
4. At the moment COTTER feels that he will probably have to '
brief the Postmaster General in 3ll fairness to the PMG and the DCI, '
who placed COTTER in hi3 new job. COTTER plans, however, to enter '
into hi 3 new job without making any internal incuirie3 relating to
HTLINGUAL, and h-s will do nothing ume.-s the'ope ration is mentioned
to him by MOXTAGUE (who will he gone in a few days), or in seme
other context. In any event, COTTER will ultimately take a look at the
operation, but, before talcing any action, will contact tha CI Staff for
-685 O - 76 - 24
364
a discussion. • COTTHIl regards KTLINGUAL, =.3 CI Staff busies a a *
rather t h-**" Office of Security "business.
5. It is noted that the Long Committee, -which, was causing the*
Bureau and the Post Office Department some difficulty, i3 no longer
functioning and that Mr. COTTZR in under no immediate jrhreat from
the Congress to justify the activities of his Department. Y/hile
Mr. COTTH3. will undoubtedly inspect the HTUNGuAL activity in
his new capacity and may even find it nacessary.to brief the Postmaster
General, ha has given U3* assurance that he will consult with us prior
to. taking 'any action. Therefore, the CI Stall sees no requirement for '
concern at this time and would not -wnnt any action taken to suspend the
KTLINGUAL. operation* ■:. ; *.,"
SA/C/CI
Orig to DDP; DCI-on 24 apr w/note from
CCI on cover sheet: This is a new memo on the subject -
the first one did not take into account
the facts- 3et forth in paras.' 4 and 5. J. A.
-./
1 copy - SA/CCI chron
" CI/SIG
365
Exhibit 56
.^'3 Kay 19/1
' L MEMORANDUM FOR THS RECORD I
SlJejSCT : DCI's Meeting Concerning HTLINGUAL
^ 1- A t 10:00 A.M. this date, Mr. Helns convened the follow-
ing in his office to discuss the HTLINGUAL operation: the DD?,
the C/CI, the D/S, the DC/CI, a.-.:i C/CI/?ro-J2.-.-i..
2. The DCI opened the meeting with a reference to an in-
quiry as to possible mail tampering by Government agencies, ad-
dressed to the Chief Postal Inspector, Mr.. Cotter, by Dr. Jeremy
J. Stone on behalf of tha Federation of American Scientists. On
the question as tey/jt may have prompted the letter, the DD? men-
tioned the possibility that the information might have come from
Herbert Scoville, a member of the Federation's Council who, while
in CIA employ, had been briefed on the Project. It was stated
'-" that Mr. Scoville had not been a consumer of HTLINGUAL material
for many years, and could not know that HTLINGuAL had continued
beyond the time when he was informed of it. The DCI stated that
he was not over-concerned about Mr. Scoville.
3. The DCI then asked, who outside of CIA knows about the
HTLINGUAL operation or gets its material. The C/CI replied:
only the FBI. The D/S added, "and the little gray man." He ex-
- plained that a postal" cleric "had been engaged since "the beginning
to bring the bags to the room in the airmail facility where the
material is screened for "take"'; that the man had been checked
and cleared by Security, and was paid a $50 monthly bonus for
this duty. (The D/S did not state what this clerk knew about the
^ — 'activity beyond the screening and copying of exteriors.)
4. The DCI then asked, who in the POD knows the full extent
of the operation - beyond cover surveillance. The C/CI replied
that only Mr. Cotter knows, for he had been witting while with
. CIA and the O/S. The previous Chief Postal Inspector, Mr. Monta-
gue, had never wanted to know the extent of examination actuallv
done, and was thus able to deny on oath before .1 congressional
co.ifaittee that there was any tampering. Mr. Colter would be u.-.-
366
v. able. to make such denial under oath. In an exchange betv/ean
loyalty to CIA ccald b-; assumed, his cile-.-r.?. is that hi eves
- loyalty now to the Postmaster General.
5. When the DCI mentioned the theft of ?2I cdcu::=- is frt.r.
. their Media, Pa., office, the DO? stated that ha had beer, -in-
formed that the copy of the letter mentioned in the press had
come from HTLIMGUAL. The C/CI/Project interposed, with apulc ~ : . : : .-.
to the DDP, that it had been positively verified front the Project's
record, and a raep had been written to the effect, that the Project
had never seen the letter, and that, as a piece of domestic mail,
the letter would not have been available to HTLIilGUAi., which has
access only to an international airmail facility.
6. Mr. Helms stated that ha would accept the evidence of
the ETLINGUAL record, but he then' asked, how long has the FBI
known about the operation and how long have they been getting its
material. The C/CI replied that F3I awareness came in 1958 when,
in January., they requested permission from Chief Postal Inspector
Stevens to examine mail to/from the USSR. Stevens had advised
CIA of the request and had sanctioned CIA's revealing the opera-
tion to the FBI and therefater servicing- the Bureau with items of
national security interest. • This was five years after the opera-
tion had started in 1953.
7. Mr. Helms asked whether the FBI passes the material to.
other agencies, or' outside its headquarters office. The D/CI
replied that it did not, in accordance with the original agree-
— ' -riant; that the unit receiving the material passes only sani-
tized leads within the Bureau whenever investigation is war- -
ranted.
3. The DCI then inquired how many persons in the F3I know
about the operation or are privy to its take. The C/CI/Projact
stated that he had originally been told that only a small unit of
t-.'o or three see and handle the material, and that this had been
ronnir^pn 'iv rhe FBI liaison officer., idr. Papich, about three
367
in the r'3I know about it una .
~~> 9. On the question of continuance, the DD? stated that he
is gravely concerned, for any flap would cause CIA. the worst pos-
sible publicity and embarrassment. He opined that the operation
should be done by the FBI because they could better withstand
such publicity, inasmuch as it is a type of domestic surveillance.
The D/S stated that he thought the operation served nainiy an
F3I requirement. The C/CI countered that the Bureau would not •
take over the operation now, and could not serve essential CXA
requirements as we have served theirs;, that, moreover, CI Staff
sees the operatic, •. ■ - ioreicn - surveillance.
10. Mr. Heliai .J.l.sn asked what should be done: do we want to
continue the operation in view of the known risks? The C/CI re-
plied that we can and should continue to live with then. •
- - J 11. The DCI then stated that he would have to discuss the
matter with Mr. Cotter, and requested the D/S to arrange a meet-
ing. After that meeting, he said, he would determine whether Mr.
Blount should be i. ...orraed.
12. As the meeting closed, the DCI told the C/CI/Project to
monitor the operation niost discreetly, and bring any problem or
difficulty directly to him. '.
13. The meeting ended at about 10:45.
368
Exhibit 57
3 June 1971
'<
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT. : Meeting at DCI-'s Office Concerning
HTLINGUAL
1. At 10:30 a.m. this date, Mr. Helms convened in •
his office the DDP, the C/CI , the D/S, and C/CI/?roject
to report on recent action taken by him concerning the
HTLIMGUAL operation..
2. Mr. Helms stated that en Monday he had briefed
Attorney General Mitchell on the operation. (Noter Mr. ■ ■
Helms may have meant Tuesday, 1 June, Monday having been
a holiday) . Mr. Helms indicated that Mr. Mitchell fully
concurred in the value of the operation and had.no "hang-
ups" concerning it. When discussing the advisability of
also briefing Postmaster General Blount, .Mr. Mitchell
encouraged Mr. Helms to undertake such a briefing.
3. The DCI then indicated that yesterday, 2 June
1971, he had seen Postmaster General Blount. Mr. Blount's
reaction, too, was entirely positive regarding the opera-
tion and its continuation. He opined that "nothing
needed to be done", and rejected a moments rilv held
thought of his to have someone review the legality of the
operation as such a review would,' of necessity, widen the
circle of witting persons. ' Mr. Helms explained to the
PMG that Mr. Cotter, the Chief Postal Inspector, has been
aware of the operation for a considerable period of time
by virtue of having been on the staff of CIA's New York"
Field Office. Mr. Helms shewed the Postmaster General a
few selected examples of the operation's product, in-
cluding an item relating to Eldridge Cleaver, which at-
tracted the PMG's special interest. A mention by Mr.
Helms of the I! little gray man" in Mew York (the postal
clerk at the Airmail Facility in Jamaica who provides
the mail to our intercept personnel) brought forth Mr.
Blount's remark that he hoped that this man would not re-
tire prematurely to take advantage of the Post Office
Department's currently . of fered attractive bonuses for early
retirement.
i. In an aside, Mr. Osborne mentioned that; he had
seen Mr. Cotter since Mr. Helms' meeting with the Post-
369
-2-
roastor General and that Mr. Cotter reported that he felt
that his stock v/itn the Postmaster General had oor.2 up
several notches.
'5. . It was obvious that all present vers gratified
by' the favorable reception'Mr; Keims had r.et in briafin-
the two mentioned Cabinet officers. ""*
6. The DCI took the occasion to stress again the
security aspects of the operation and stimulated that,
in the event of any sort of security f lao or even a
suspicion that a leak of soss sort had occurred, the
intercept operation was to cease immediately and our men
were to be withdrawn to the New York City base. Mr.
Helms wished to convey the importance of stooping first
and investigating later . ' If a subsequent investigation .
showed that indeed no damage had occurred, it would then
be possible to resume the operation.
7. Both Mr. Helms and Mr. Karamessir.es recomr.er.ded
tight control over the number cf Agency persons cleared
for, and witting of, the operation.
8. The meeting ended at 10:40 a.m.
Z2 July 1971
370
Exhibit 58
me:\:cra:-::.l'm eor the record
SUBJECT: Project SRPOTNTER
1. The following is to record my :^nov/le:djc o± events
rc^r-rcTr.^ the SRPOINTER Project during the last few months.
A]roi-o;:iinately May 1970, I was required to designate curtain
clots to be released by IOS during FY -197?.. Amonj; these, I
designated three .slots for SRPOINTER based on the premise
that these slots and the Project contributed nothing to the Office
o£ Security, hi:': were of direct interest to and in support of the
DD/P.
2. At approximately the same time, it was learned that
j'oen Uc-y ■ If.den h<) , .had contacted'
1A\'. Karnrncs nines and advised that, he would like to see
SRPClriTER abol.ir.hed, since he felt that with all of the various
Congressional investigations being conducted in various areas,
SRPOINTER was vulnerable to possible compromise. He advised,
that if SRPOINTER was not abolished, he felt ih-r^t it. was necessary
for him to brief Postmaster General Blount on the Project.
- 3. It is understood thai; the DD/P was amenable to the idea
of abolishing SRPOJMTER, but the Chief, CI Staff, did not concur
and indicated that lie would appeal to the OCI on the basis of the
value of the information bein^ obiaiaed by SRPOINTER.
4. It is understood th-.it sometime later, a meeting win held
by the OCI at which time he agreed that eRorts should be made to
continue SRPOINTER. It was subsequently learned, that the DCI
discussed the Project with the Attorney General who stated -h-at
he was convinced of the value of thp Project if the Postmaster
371
General concurred. Subsequently, the DC1 met with Postmaster
General and briefed him on the Project. The Postmaster General
advised that if the UCI and the Attorney. General v/crc convinced
of the value of the Project, he would concur in the continuance of
the Project, but that the Agency must understand th?„t the Project
should be kept in such a statu:; that it could be discontinued imme-
diately if it appeared that a comoromisc was imminent. He also
suggested thnt we determine the status of the Post Office repre-
sentative assigned to the Project, since many Post Office employees
v/cvo retiring u:ider the liberalized retirement pro;-;r?-m i:\ the Post
Office.- 1 subsequently had the New York Field Office check this
and was advised tiiat the Post*! representative assigned to the
Project had no intention of retiring.
" 5. In regard to the. three slots for SUPOINTER, I had pre-
viously indicated to the Director of Security that during discussions
with the DD/P, he should indicate that if the Project was to continue,
it would be necessary for the DD/P to give us the three slots which
we would be losing. After the decision of the DCl, the Director of
Security stated that he felt that, since the DCI had now made the
Project an Agency Project arj opposed to merely DD/P, that it
would probably be better to approach the .Executive Director-
Comptroller on ill:: basis of returning the three slots to cur T/O.
He advised the DD/P of this, and the DD/P. concurred. Subsequently
the Director of Security stated that he had discussed it with the
DD/S, who concurred and suggested thai the Office of Security pre-
pare ?.n appropriate memorandum to the Executive Dircctor-Cornptrolle
Jclen 18
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)
372
Exhibit 59
Id £ {jD-ruurr l •; i j
MEMORANDU'vlTOK THE KECOKD
SUBJECT: Mail Intercept Program
n
1. The attached memorandum from Chief, CI v.-as orally briefed
to the Director (and the DDCI), he was shown the activity reflected on
page 12, and he read the entire attachment giving random examples of
production. I used the attached Talking Paper as a basis of presentation .
to the Director. The Director expressed his agreement with, the desir-
ability that this project be passed to the FBI and his lack of conviction
that the product to CIA is worth the risl-; o£ CIA involve m ent. Ke directed
the DDCI to discus3 the activity with th.2 Acting Director, FBI, with a
^ view to offering the FBI the opportunity to take over the project, including
the" offer of detailing the CIA personnel involved to the FBI to implement
it under FBI direction and responsibility.
2. Since Mr. William Cotter had indicated that he was unwilling to
continue to collaborate on the project beyond 15 February unless it were
cleared with appropriate superior authority, t he Dir ector agreed that the
activity would be suspended unless Mr. Cotter would accept its contiau-
ancc for the time beisg unde r our assurances that the matter is being
pfo5ecutcd~at a very high level.
3. Mr. Osborn advised Mr. Cotter of this conclusion, and Mr.
Cotter requested that the project be suspended until appropriate resolution
of the problems involved. This has been done. ' .
uM-
W. E. Colbv
Attachments
^ WECrblp
' Orir.i=il - C/CI via DD/P
1 - IVi-rMrnl Security
TALKING PAPER
SUBJECT: Mail Intercept Program
T
— 1. A program of intercepting mail between tha United States and
' the USSR has been in. existence in New York since 1952. This program
{has provided inform atio n n[ Interest to the F3t, ?.s w£ un de r s tan d' i t A
.dealm g^^i^JJoviet a ctiviti es vis-a-vis inz United 5:a tes and wi th respect
ito /imericana who maintain active contacts with Soviet and other Com-
^munist areas. The program was most recently briefed to thrm Attorney
General Mitchell and Postmaster General Blount in June 1971.
2. Considerable efforts are made to conduct this operation on a
totally secure basis, but it is of course possible that it leak. V/hile the
recording of the addresses and return addresses is totally legal, the
opening of first-class' mail is in conflict with 39 U.S. Code, Section 4057.
A contention can be made that the operation is nonetheless within the
constitutional powers of the President to obtain foreign intelligence in-
formation or to protect against foreign intelligence activities (powers
statutorily recognized in 18 U.S. C, Section 119, with respect to bugging
and wiretapping.
■ 3. The political risk of revelation of CIA's involvement in this
project is in any case substantial. In my view, this political risk is not
justified by the operation's contribution to foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence collection. It may well be justified by the contribu-
tion it makes to the FBI's responsibilities for internal security, a matter
best judged by the FBI. If this is viewed as sufficient, I recommend
strongly that the project be assumed by the FBI rather than running the
extra, risk of possible public revelation of its association with CIA. CIA
would naturally provide any support desired by the FBI and would hope to
receive such material as might be of value to CIA from the FBI.
4. Pending resolution of the above, the project is suspended.
374
The Project
A.
n? s
ins
It
ins
est
fie
di
tic
i ;ic
c t tic
ir> t
provi
ight
s in
,](is t
ensir
s i.-'.ii
ilabl
nail
3 i f.n
into
:'.C5
LTltO
the
lava
i an
;li c
: to
in
ed
So
i:tf
So
acn
ila
d a
ann
th
tcrccnt !'ro]
to give US i
viot intclli
ornation abo
viet realiti
dc&iic, econo
ble fron any
perspective
ot be obtain
is Agency an
cct IS
r.tel.li
gence
ut Sov
es 'and
mic, s
o tiler
to So
ed fro
d the
a
gea
act
ict
th
cie
sn
vie
u! t
rai.
i) as
cc
ivi
-Ar.i
e s
nti
urc
t i
10
1C
ape
tic
eri
cop
fie
cov.
nci
s
con
e o
an
TV
li
Hi
:res
-ite
nter
cs a
no. i
cor.
f So
d go
c I'r
ts a
d re
tii
tc
ac
vie
vc
ojc
nd
clli.
tior.
rest
ts a
t in
nincn
ct a
acti
rccs
cr.ee
al
nd
tcr-
tal
dds
vi-
i nc
e Agcn
or.al 1
a dc ~. i c
or. orj;
c basi
ov.lcdg
cctor
specti
d fron
dividu
sspor
scd on
that the
i.e., a
tain cor
tli
i:r.
dc
re
an
in
pa
3 a
Project is particularly produ
cy and the PHI in pursuing in
ends to visiting. Soviet stude
ians and intellectuals, trade
anizatior.s such as the USSR I
s for exploiting the Project
c we have fron every Soviet B
that each visitor to the V.'es
vc Security Service. The Pro
the USSR and the USA, is bas
als the KC3 approves because
s, their foreign exchange
KG1! and CRU defector infor
visitor is a KCB agent or
'cooptec:" It is also knov
rcspondence to thc^ United S
cti
ves
nts
n
for
loc
t i
jee
ic
it
ci
tio
ope
tha
tcs
tlioir
vc in
tigat
, exc
c c i a 1
itutc
this
ir.tc
s apn
t, li
lly c
con.tr
educ
n, it
ratin
t no
v.'itli
supp
vc r
angc
sts
of i
purr
ligc
ovco
itec'
n cc r
Is t
tion
is p
v;it.
ovie
ut
orting b
no opera
scier.ti
and exnc
he USA',
osc is i
n cc s e r v
by the
to -nil
■Asd with
her: , the
, etc.
resumed
h the ;;c
can r.a
GB aopro
oth
sts ,
rts
no
ice
to
.r
ln-
val.
C.
In n
tcctin
udents
ssing a
'..••tile
rrespon
. serve
n.'.e rep
intern
the ac
during
urccs h
in
on
d A:
id
tii
nee
th
sen
sc
cni
he
stanc
inuin
eric
c o 1 o g
c US.
v.'hcn
c US
tativ
curi
cally
acadc
den ti
cs tli
C con
ans .
ical
The
he ;'
in an
c or
y con
acti
nic y
fied
e Project provides the only r.cans
tact between KCB controlled cxchr.n
Tiic concern is the spotting and a
missionary v:ork these Soviet studo
Soviet student not only nnintains
ocs back to the USSR but often ret
fficial canncitv as a scientist,
diplonat
cc
vc
ca
11
r.c rcnev::
.-r- !.
is contacts
fact
is illustrated by
32 Soviet exchange students, in
r 1371-1972 reliable collateral
as coopted KGB agents and ID ns
375
coohted GKu arcnts. To Gate 10 of the 35 Soviet exchange
students here for the' ncudcr.ic year 1972-1975 have been
identified as ;XU cooptces.
'S>. The Project provides irtfornation o thcrv.'isc unavailable
about tiic Soviet contact.-, am! travel of .'v-cricaus to the
USSP. v:iiicli is often important i.hcn checking applicants for
Agency or other Govcrnnont cr.ployirer.t and in con firkin;; re-
ports fror; Clandestine Service, Poncstic Contact Service
and PSI agents, contacts and informants.
i". Project material recorded- for 18 years ^ives basic in-
formation about Soviet ' individuals and institutions useful
to the analyst looking for specific leads and in iraunin.p
trends in Soviet interests and policies. ..
P. In addition to the obvious value of the Project to the
CS , tiic PP.1 recently advised us when kc ucre reviewing its
current rcquirer.cn ts that the Project information is c>:-
trencly valuable v:it!i respect to information about East-
'.'.'cst exchange students. Project information 'helps the V'M
develop sources and assess Soviet students. The -P2I r.ntici-
-' pates the Project uill provide insirht into the developing
trade relations ulicro no PP,I .coverage 'is possible. The
Pi! I has benefitted from leads to Ar.ericnn students '.:hc have
been in the USSR and, in particular,, from the kiiowledfa that
. the sons and daughters of CPtiSA and Pront Croup officials
who they expect will be tiie left leaders in 5 to 10 years
'nave studied in the b'SS, - *. Often there arc no other leads to
this inforration. The PBI also notes that quite often the
Project information nernits it to correlate lead information
which lias been outstanding for several years.
II. A. The P-roject originated in the Spring of 1952 i.iicn the
then SR Division' of the CS (now SB) bc.^nn to examine the
positive, operational and counterinteliir.en.ee information
potential which might be obtained fror, a" systematic rconitor-
int of postal communications between the United States and
the Soviet union. • ' ■
". In November 1952 an a[;rccHe.it v:as readied with tiic then
Chief Postal Inspector Clifton GARNER to survcill and photo-
graph postal covers (exteriors) at the Mew York City postal
376
t'r.cility v.-Jiic.:-. processed n 1 rnai 1 to anC fron t'le ;?SS':'.. As
agreed, v.-i til New York Posts] Inspector ilonry "OXTACUE , ex-
amination of mail covers by CIA personnel documented .is
"est Office Department officials was begun on 17 February
103 5. .
{.'.. flccnsior.nl exploratory openings conducted at a secure
CIA jr* t.ill.'itior. nearby "roved so rewarding that continua-
tion on- a hiyhly selective basis v:as deemed necessary in the
national security interest.. .. •-...■........,
1). In .':av 1954 ?!r. Allen '.'.'. DULLES, DCI , and ;ir. Richard '
IIELIIS, the Chief of Operations, DDP , too!: the first initia-
tive in the series of briefings to insure that each Admini-
stration has known the Project existed. They advised Post-
master General Arthur E. SUNMERFIELD that an exar.ina.ticn.
was being made of the "covers" of nail to and fro- the
Soviet Union (such examination is legal) . While "r. -SU!n!F.R.-
FIELi; did not cor.uent specifically, it was clear that he was
in favor of the activity.
P. . When the yield fron the activity transcended the inter-
ests of the Soviet Division, responsibility for it was
transferred in 1955 to the Counter Intelligence Staff of the
BDP, v:hpre it has remained to the present.
!\. In January' 195S, the FBI requested the Postal jnsnecticr.
Service's permission to examine mail to and fron the Soviet
Union. CIA was advised of the Bureau's request and arranged
in February 195 8 to regularly provide the Bureau with iters
of internal', security interest. . The FBI is the only non-CIA
agency which receives copies of the Material in its raw form.
. G. In February 1901 :'.t. DULLES and Mr. i :!:!.? 'S discussed the
"mail surveillance" activity with Post-aster General Edward
;;.V.' and Chief Postal Inspector MONTAGUE. "r. DAY agreed
that the activity should continue and made the caveat that
the Post Office Department need not know the extent of the
mail exa.-.ination . . .
:!. The first US postal official to be fully aware of the
clandestine aspect of the mail surveillance was ex-CIA
er.nlovce :ir'. William COTTER upon his appointment in April
.19 60 as Chief Postal .Inspector. :ir. CO .Tip knows about the
1'rojoct because of his duties while wit:'. CIA.
377
T. I- cnrlv .Jisnc 1971 "r. K^I."?, I'd, briefed t-.t tnrncy
■~ c :: r r a 1 "ITTCiliU.i. and Pes trvn." tcr 0::cral ?i. '*'..'!;':' p.r.'J sh. ~".-*'. : .
.) selected samples oT information obtained. This i.as the:
Tirr.t ti.r:c officials at ti:is level v.erc briefed about the
details of the operation. Doth Cabinet norbers concurred
in the continuation of the activity, ilr. iiiii.iSS advised
"!r. Bi.GLW'T that '.lr. COTTLiP knew about the operation as a.
result of his CIA service.
•J. The present Postmaster General has not been briefed by'
any CIA official.
[I. A. Fro- its initiation the security risk associated v.'ith
this undertaking has been fully recognized. The security
:r.ccha:iics of this Project whicii \:crc carefully laid ini-
tially arc continuously 'reexamined and, witli the possible
exceptions noted bcloi:, it is believed that security is as
tifht as it possibly can be.
J. ."ail is examined only in a vault area i.'ithin a restric-
ted secure area of federal Buildinr. Ho. Ill at JPIC Inter-
national Aimort. ""
C. Prior to June 1972 a CIA Technical Services Division
(TSD) technician participated in openinr the r.ail to es-
tablish if- it had been previously opened. Until the 7S!)
laboratory v.as closed in .lime 1972, a considerable r.r.'.cun.C
of valuable postal intelligence and chemical censorshin
information on the Soviet l.'nion vas collected.
D. In every instance, the openinrs are nade as technical 1\-
secure as possible Following standard surreptitious entry
•Procedures evolved by the "Agency. Kxpertly rosealed en-'
vclopes arc returned promptly to the mail flov.', Kith the
delay never exceeding. 24 hours.
Z. Control over copies of the examined letters' in the
''reject oTfice at Headquarters is strinrcnt. Each iter, is
lof.gcd. Each person, translator, analyst, and cleared
recipient directly, involved iii the Trojoct or with Project
".-.terial is thoroughly briefed and continually ir-pressed
•■.ith. the sensitivity of -the Project.' P.outin," of material
is via scaled envelope, by hand, to named recipients only.
378
: j y r, t "
i cor. tr
The co-;inrtPcntcd unit within the '.'"■'. ' r. .'nrrsv.c
iyer.cc I'ivisicn, '..'hich receives cpnj?.-; of the Projrc
'.'tnrir.ls, observes rigid security procedures, restr:
\c r.-itc rials to a United nurficr of S-'eci.-.l
isors in that Division who rcpularly handle
Dre sensitive information and arc aware of
f this Material. PiU Pieid OfCjccs receive
roject in for-.at i on and even the;: a cautionn
A rent -.it:
me r-
equally
or
t!ic senr.i
tivi ty
only dis
ruised
;-•■' stater
icr.t
CIA is ti-
.c sour
o
the ir.for
'.r.ntion
".a teriols
; arc
Luced and
never
; for-.at
included and hi ghlighted. .Ti'.e fact that
of the inforpation is protected by scurcing
to a coded identification. ' The rsi; Project
never placed in case files, arc never renroc
sent to PiJI Pield Offices. '
G. The "flap" potentials in this Project arc csscntia.lly
the same iiypothe tical problems tl'.is Agency and the nil. face
every day ir. our operations, However, to give a perspec-
tive to problems v:e have considered, the following areas of
concern arc noted:-
1.
d
ti-.a Jar:
Airport
t.ahes .p
:-.ovcd t
the re a
surpris
airport
only ob
ted cxt
i s g r
aica
lace
o .1
sons
c fo
dur
scrv
rio
untie
Air n
v.- Yor
, cou
lcc!;e
for '■
reed
inn t
able
rs v.-h
Id
!'OS t
1 Pa
v;h c
ill
roor.
c re
trv
CIA
tivi
h is
Office department employee .at
cility near .77:; International
re tlic screening of t!ic —.nil
ego that sachs of nail arc re-
lic could only speculate as to
noval, however. (In the event of
into the cx.nr.ining roor, at the
officers' worl:ir.'p hours, the
v would he the copying of sclec-
legal. )
r.n
to
of
r.e
ti
of
or
cl
ex
ex
Ove:
uc av;
indii
s'norl
cess a -
r. r o f
ncqu:
who
osc ti
ccptic
ami n a ;
loses
years , texts
lo on a rcstri
Is v:itkin the
p. rotational a
pahe n fairly
Project inateri
on. An indivi
all appro ciat
ail was being
however ,• no on
is done and vc
ex
cd
and
if."-
arp
bu
al -
rify
ni:
an d
est
r-.cn
e n
n<
v.-i:c
or
ncd
id
tha
'.cd rial
need
LUC S
: ten
inber
)t to
be co
jeeur
'..' i
linpo
: it
1 :ir.
to-':r.
rvicc .
re , it
of. per
the' r.c
rs dis
ty col
vc
ov;
has
sons
p. runt
lu di
en
s.Vs
cause
con
3>" CIA.
379
fro-, the Airmail facility
JFh Iritcrr.ational Airport.
transporting these letter!:
r.r. accident or be -attached by thujs , disc
session of ti:e r.sil outside the facility.
reason would be unknown.
to the Federal lluilclri
Conceivably the pers
could becor-e in vol ve-
in-..!
but
4. Conies of the examined nail arc couriered weekly
fron tile Federal Buildinp. at .JFK International Airport"'
to tiic y.c\i Vorl: City Field Office of CIA's Office of
Security for transmittal to Headquarters. it in pos-
sible that these copies could fall into unauthorized -
hands if the vehicle used was involved in an accident''
or if the individuals transporting the letters wore
subjected to a holdup. •' ' ";: :
5. Copies of the letters arc forwarded by the Office
of Security in Nov; York to a Headquarters-controlled
post office box by registered nail. A nail robbery
or train/aircraft accident is possible, resulting in
the loss of the nail.
ii. Fast incidents or publicity r.bcut US Government inter-
est in nail coverage which caused sonc concern with
respect to Project activities are. cited to jive sor.e
additional background. . ■ '
1. In rud-April 1965 there were press accusations
that the Internal Revenue Service had been cxar:inin^
mail to nttenpt to uncover information about foreign
asset holdin.es of US citj ions who were seeking to
evade or were delinquent in their taxes. Confressman
Ih;rward C, . HALL (n.->:oh) also claimed that he had -.
received unevaluated information t!:at other agencies ■
v.'crc "snoopinn' : into the nails. Senator "usr.cll F..
LOaG's Congressional Sub-Comi7.ittec to the Joint Cor--
r'.ittce on Internal Revenue tax conducted henrinfs into
these accusations. In !!ay 1905 then Postmaster General
GP.OXOL'SKi' stated publicly that the Post Office Depart-
ment had cooperated with requests for nail cover
examination froir. a nunber of Federal apencies including
the Food and Drug Administration, the Internal P.evcnue
Service, and the Department of Justice. :!r. CF.Oh'O'JSKI
62-685 O - 76 - 25
380
stated that he would hence forth ;ir;t severely the
nur'.iev of officers in the Post " r fico !'-epprt~cnt who
could authorize CA.nr.inntior. cf the rail. It should
be noted tlut Scnntor i,i\".T, 's Sub-Cn:--r.i ttcc dealt
nrinarily with .the examination of the --r.il by the In-
ternal Revenue Service s-:'. the . Pepartpon t of Justice.
Vh.o Post Office Bcnr.rtr.cnt w.-.s not unduly concerned
by the Congressional hearings and press accusations, .
and CIA's iiir.il cxnr.ininf: Project v;as not affected.
2. On 4 June 196S the late colu-nist Drew PliAP.SO:.
■.;rote: "Senate investigators have discovered that the
CIA not only watches suspicions i^ail , but actually
opens the letters as part of its secret intelligence
v;orh." There is no indication that cither Cor.j-rcss cr.
the -cncral public reacted to these allegations.
3. On 13 January 1971 Jcrcny STO.'.'E, Director of the ■'
redcration of American Scientists, V.'nshinrton , u.'C. ,
addressed a letter to Kill in-. J. COTTHP., referred to
above, who was then and is now the Chief Postal In-
spector, raisinf. sonc very precise questions apparently
designed to assist bin. with respect to legislation
S-TONT; had in ir.ind rcf.irdin^ entry into domestic and
forci.cn nail. Mr. COTTH-l forwarded a copy of the let-
ter to '-r. Howard DSnOiJ;-, 1 , Director nf Security, CIA,- _
soliciting; advice about what his. reply to ST0.':!2's
questions should include. Concern over the "flan -
potential" for the Ar.ency which the letter nip'.t'ca-';. .
p,cnccr pronptcd :!r. illiL.'IS to brief bet!: '.'.r. -JLOUMT , ..
' the Postn-.nster General, and i'r. !:ITCl:i"LL, the Attorney
General, in early June 1971. To our knowledge. STORE'S
letter was never- answered.
The following is n tabulation of Agency personnel briefed
'.c Project fron 1952 to 31 December 1972 and their current
A. Total number of persons briefed since inception . . . .- 43G-
thereof currently on duty in D'JP area .... 276
(h'ote:' only 90 persons arc cur-
rently active recipients of Project
r.'atcrial: sec separate breakdown)
381
on duty in other Directorates . ';
terminated (re tircd/rcsirncd/dece.-iscd) . . . . IZ(
"excludes Project perse.-..-!"! , TSD ncrscr.r.cl .involves! ir. the
technical aspects, am: OfL'icc of Security operating per-
sonnel in Ficlc and at Headquarters
IS. Active recipients of Project material ir. DDP area (as
ot 31 •JcccE'jer 19 72)
CI Staff . . ' .;g
Soviet Bloc Division 29
'..'cstern Hemisphere Division S
Africa Division 3
roreij.n Resources Division 5
-N'car Hast Division 1
Total DDP S9
Office of Security l
TOTAL 90
V. Present consumers of Project material anc! the typo of infor-
mation thcyVcccivc is as follows. In addition to current in-
formation, the Project provides file data dating bad: to 1955.
Tiic 'Project naintains a cor.paTtm'er. ted machine record system
•.."Hie': includes about two million nancr, of persons involved in
e'SA-USSP. contact. Institutional and organisation files are
also- r-nintair.cd for reference and analytical purposes. The.
analysts in the Project office- reference and collate information
to assist CI Operations and the Operating Divisions
A. CI Staff components' which oversee and coordinate cxnloi-
tation of tlic Project material receive material of interest
to the operational divisions, as v:ell as the foilov;ir.n :
Specific requirements which-indicate operational methods.
382
Specific requirements which indicate operational methods.
>>. i:io Soviet iiloc Hiyisicr. uses Proicct ratcri.-U for o^crh-
tionr.l lends and counterintelligence investif atior- . - It ex-
tracts and supplies infornn tior. for basic Tiles r-orsonnUt"
<-ossiers, nnd certain r.ncninc record p-o^rp-s sh D^visic-'
receives nnteri.ils to/froa or conccrnin/'thc folloi.in<- tvnes
of information: . • ••..*•=>
Specific requirements which indicate operational methods.
383 -•-.._.-.
Specific requirements which indicate operational ivuM.hcd
C. The .\l : jiivision receives Project material idea tifylr.jj'
ar.i! con corn in;:: .
Specific requirements which indicate operational methods.
i). The i;li Division receives Project r.atorial v.'hich:
Specific requirements which indicate operational methods.
i:. The Iiiforr.ation Services Division (IS: 1 ) nnu the Di)P
Area .Divisions concerned receive extracted information
iiioiitiryin,", .foreign students in the US5". 7;isscn-inaticr.
is by sterile r.cr'orandur, which, does not identify the
Project as the source'. • ■.•
T. The Fill requests and receives infornnticn and loads
fro:-: the Project material to/fro;?., identifying, or concern,
ia. f, :' ■"
1. Current- and former Soviet officials assigned to
the 'JS and UN' . . . "
384
2. Other Soviets in the lis - students, scientists,
v.-ritcrs, etc. (current and forr-er).
5. US students, scientists in tiic USSP., nncl subsequent
contacts (especially students who v.'cre sponsored by
subvorsivc organizations, and subversive individuals
\:':\o have received special invitations or special treat-
ment fron the Soviets] .
''■ . CPUSA and front organization officials' ar.d nenbers '
contacts with, and travel- in, the USS.U.
5. US defectors in the USSR. " > ' .
6. Contacts of radicals and subversives with the USSR.
7. Contacts with the USSR of r.ilitant, dissident, and •
protest groups.
8. Exchanges between US and USSR scientists.
9. Contacts with the Soviet Red Cross, particularly .
those by individuals rather than by the institutions
because experience has shown that the Soviets have used
Ucd Cross cover to help establish illc"al entrants . into
the US. -
10. Cubans and pro-Castro individuals in the US, USSP,
or third countries. . •
■11. Soviet Co-n-.ittee for Cultural Relations Abroad
(contacts with emigres and o:.ii'r;rc organizations in the
>'s) . - . ■ • . • . • • ■..-,.;
12. Correspondence between US nationals and aliens in
tne US with individuals attending such institutions
as the Central Konsor.ol School and .the .Friendship
University, including alien's i.r. the US who have pre-
viously been in the USS!l as students. .'.••-•
me :.issc;.iinntion of Project raaterial, i.e., the nur.oer of
.'ts sent to the PSI's Honcstic Intelligence division subsc-
-. *° ~e agreement of January 195S totalled 41,1.3s by 31
•jor 1972. On the average one report usually consists of
385
c : . I "
00 y.
fro:.-.
v
'..":) individual ite:r.s - ..-it!i a r,i;~.r..-.ry and trans 1 at i.-.r. , as
■ printe, '■.v.ic!'. also provides some correlated and analytical
'5?.cos based 0:1 Project file materiel.
s of 31 ileccn'icr 1-372 the Fill's active 1:: tci\ 1 j s t of n.av.cs •
. teres t consisted of approximately 200' of t'.'.c approximately
.:::.:es •.-::itc:! 1 istcd. (The jui.ni'.icr of nas-cs '•.ntci'.iis teti varies
;::ont:i to nonth.)
i:c procc-ssir.;: and dissemination statistics for
1071 and 1972 are as follows-:
:'ac calendar
Total itcr.s through facility
iotai items CIA screened
1'ctal exteriors recorded
.'.<— >ai interiors (contents) recorded
Votnl interiors for intelligence
exploitation
."otal for technical examination
. ctal selected on basis watclilist
.'otal (approximate) examined, analyzed,
translated, summarized, etc. (in-
des i tor.s on file not previously
tossed) ' '
(approximate) ite;r,s dissernina-
•.;it!iin T!DP
itens disseminated to P3I
DVO:
10 71
■1,375,000
2,260,000
2 5,000
10,500
0,750
] ,750
6,220
9,000
5,00.0
2 000
10
72_
i.
,350
,000
2,
,303
,000
33
,000
3
,700
,200
500
5 .
,000
3,050
3,S30
1,100
•reject is operated usir.fl the f o 1 1 ov; i r- p. •vcrsonr.cl :
V'.r. (2) officers of the Office' of Security (.'.'ov; Yorl;
«.'■ lOfTice) -.viio arc cnjrnncc! full time in screening and
ct:r.;> items to open and tiien opening, rd.ctocopyir.j; anc
;ealinr
tlie ite-r.s.
386-
.'■ . ilever. (7} officers .-,".,; t'..c, (3) do;!:? o" the lib?
Counter In tcili;".or.cc Staff i:.t. the i'roU'Cl of fi.ee at iie.ij-
.-.L:::r;crr, and arc enja^cd full ti::c ir. processing, iter's .
This processing includes translation, si:~.".arizir. ; ";, cor-
relating and indexing the in.forr.alion .
FK. The total cost' of the operation is nnnro.-iinately J2";0,031
per nnnun. Salaries account for approximately i 1 75, 000 of the
total cost '..•it!', the renainirir funds spent on film and other
reproduction costs., travel and equip-cnt main tcncncc.
X. Attached are rancor, sanplss of the nroductior. fror. the
Prbiect. ■ .'•
387
Exhibit 60
t 1697
TITLE 18.— CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Pace 4322
LEGISLATIVE IllSTORT
Reviser's JVnfc— nosed on title 10. U. 3. C. 1940 ed-
it 304. 306. MO (Mar. 4. 1009. eh. 321. }J 101. 183. 166. 35
SLat. 1123. 1121; June 22, 1934. ch. 710.40 Stal. 1207).
Section consolidates sections .104, 306, and 309 of title 18.
U. S. C. 1040 cd. Reference It) persons causing, procuring.
Aiding or assisting was omitted ns such persona arc prin-
cipals under section 2 of this title.
Minor chnnges were made In phraseology.
Amendments
1070 — Sulw.ee. (c). Pub. I,. 91-375 substituted "section
001 of title 39" for "section 500 of tluc 30".
Effective Date of 1970 Amendment
Amendment by Vub. I.. 91-375 effective within 1 year
ftftr Aug. 12, 11)70, on dale established thcrclor by the
Hoard of Governors of the United Stales Postal Service
and published by It In the Fedrrnl Register, see section
15(n) of Pub. L. 91-375, Pet out a* a note preceding section
101 of Title 30. Postal Service.
Studt or Private Cartage or Mail; Reports to President
and Conchess
Congressional findings of nerd for study rind rcc valua-
tion of restrictions, on private cnrrlane of letters mid
packets contained In thin section and submission by
United Stales Postal Service of reports to President nnd
Congress for modernization of law, regulations, and ad-
ministrative practice/;. .«cc section 7 of Pub. L. 01-375, set
out or a note under section G01 of Title 30. Postal Service.
§ J697. Transportation of persons acting as private ex-
press.
Whoever, having charge or control of any convey-
ance operating by land, air, or water, knowingly con-
veys or knowingly permits the conveyance of any
person acting or employed ns n private express for
the conveyance of letters or packets, and actually In
possession of the same for the purpose of conveying
them contrary to law, shall be fined not more than
$150. (June 25. 1948. ch. 645, G2 Stat. 777.)
I.KCIStATIVE HtSTOrtT
nrvlser's ffotr.— Vnsnl on title. 10. U. S. C, 1040 ed., I 305
(Mar. 4, 1900, ch. 321, ! 102, 35 Stat. 1124).
Same changes were made as In section 1604 of this title.
§1098. Prompt delivery of mail from vobroI.
Whoever, having charge or control of any vessel
passing between ports or places In the United States,
and arriving at nny such port or place where there Is
a post office, falls to deliver to the postmaster or at
the post office, within three hours after his arrival. If
In the daytime, nnd If at night, within two hours after
•the next sunrise, all letters and packages brought by .
him or within his power or control nnd not relating
to the cargo, addressed to or destined for such port
or place, shall be fined not more than $150.
For each letter or package so delivered he shall
receive two cents unless the snmc Is carried under
contract. (June 25. 19411, ch. G45. 02 Stat. 777.)
I.Kcisr.AT!vc History
lievlscr's fVofr.—Unsfd on title. 18. U. S. C, 1940 cd.
I 323 (Mar. 4. 1000, ch. 321. i 200. 35 Stat. 1120). ■
Chnnges were made In phrnseology.
§ 1699. Certification of delivery from vessel.
No vessel nrrlving within a port or collection dis-
trict of the United States shall be allowed to make
entry or break bulk until' all letters on board nre
delivered to the nearest. post office, except where
waybllled-for discharge at other ports In the United.
States at which the vessel Is scheduled to call and-
the Postal Service does not determine that un-
reasonable delay in the mails will occur, and the
master or other person having charge or control
thereof has signed and sworn to the following dec-
laration before the collector or other proper cuslonii
officer:
I, A. B.. master - , of the , arriving
from . and now lying In the port bf ,
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have to the best
of my knowledge and belief delivered to the post.
office at every letter and every bag. packet,
or parcel of letters on board the said vessel during
her last voyage, or in my possession or under my
power or control, except where waybillcd for dis-
charge at other ports in (he United States at which'
the said vessel is scheduled to call and which the
Postal Service has not determined will be un-
reasonably delayed by remaining on board the said
vessel for delivery at such ports.
Whoever, being the master or other person having
charge or control of such vessel, breaks bulk before
he has arranged for such delivery or onward car-
riage, shall be lined not more than $100. (June 25, .
194(1. ch. G45.- C2 Stat. 777; July 3, 1952, ch. 553.
fiG Stat. 325; Aug. 12. 1970, Pub. L. 91-375, 5 G(J)(15),
84 Stat. 778.)
Legislative IIistout
ncviscr's JYofc— n.nsrd on title 10. U. s. c, 1040 ed., I 327
(M:.r. 4, 1003. ch. 321, 5 204, 35 Stat. 11271.
Minor chnnges were made In phraseology,
AMENDMENTS
. I07O-- Pub. I.. 01-375 siibstltiilM "Postal Service" for
"Por.tmoijtcr General" in two Instances.
1052— Act July 3. 11152, provided for only the unloading
of mall from n vessel as can be expedited by discharge at
8Uch port.
CrrrXTiVE D*tk or 1070 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. I,. 01-375 **f!ecl1ve within I year
after Aug. 12, 1070, on ditto established therefor by the
llnard of Governors of tin; United Slatc-i Pontal Service
and published by it iti the Federal Hegl^tcr, see section
15(a) of Pub. L. 01-375. .net out ns a note preceding section
101 of Title 30, Postal Service.
Cross UtFr.nr.ncKS
Foreign letters carried out of the malls, see section 602
of Title 30, Postnl Service.
Section RrrEnnm to in Other Sections
This section Is referred to In title 30 section G02.
§ 1700. -Desertion of mails.
Whoever, having taken charge of any mall, volun-
tarily quits or deserts the same before he has deliv-
ered It Into the post olllcc at the termination of the
route, or to some known moil carrier, messenger,
agent, or other employee in the Postal Service au-
thorized to receive the same, shall be fined not more
than $500 or Imprisoned not more than one year, or
both. (June 25, 1940, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 778.)
I.EOISI.aTIVE IllSTORT
Reviser's A'ofr.— Uased on title tfl. U. S. C. 1040 cd., I 322
(Mar. 4, 1000, ch. 321. f 100. 35 Stat. 1120).
Minor changes were made In phraseology.
§ 1701. Obstruction of mails generally.
Whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs or re-
tards the passage of the mail, or any carrier or con-
veyance carrying the mall, shall be fined not more
than $100 or Imprisoned not more than six" months,
or both. .(June 25; 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 778.)
LEGISLATIVE HiRTOJIT
Jteitf jar's Note— Ilar.cd on title 18, U. 8. C. 1040 cd..
11 324, 325 (Mar. 4, 1009, ch. 321, if 201, 202, 35 Stat. 1127).
388
*. fiiiip 4323
1III.K Id. -litlMK.S ANIJ ■ Kl.UlNAl, PliUl.r IMJUK
li- Rrrll'ins 321 nnd 325 of Mile in. U. K. C. 1010 I'd., were
I cniif.nl Ida ted with changes of' phraseology ncccssnry to
'. effect rolisnlldatloil.
Words "cnrrlae.1-. horse, driver or", "car, steamboat". nn«|
"or vrstri" were omitted as covered by "nny cnrrlcr or
' conveyance".
The punishment provision In deilved from said section
324 rather than (mm sr-fMrni 325 which provided only n
fine of not more thnn 5100 nnd irlntcd only to ferrymen.
Ciifiss Hi:h:rf.ncf.s
Temporary employees of the postal service or enrrters
with custody, sec section lOOf) of Title 39, Poslnt' Service.
§1702. Obstruction nf correspondence.
Whoever lakes ntiy letter, postal card, or packacc
'. out of nny post olltrc or any authoiized depository
.for mail ma'ter. or from nny letter or mail carrier,
or which has b<-en In any posl office or authorized
. (.repository, "i" i" 'he custody of any letter or mail
► carrier, before it has hern delivered to (he person to
[ whom it was directed, with desinn (o obstruct the
correspondence, or in pry inlo the business or secrets
'. of another, or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys
the same, shall be fined nut. more than $2,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25,
K 1948. cli. G45. 62 Stat. 77B.)
£* I. re IS I. ATI VB Hi ST OUT
£■'' fleeter'* ,Vo(r\--liased on title 18. U. S. C, 1040 cd.. { 317
■- (Mnr. 4. 1D99. ph. .121. ( 194. 35 Strtt. 1 125: Feb. 25. 1925.
r. ch. 31R. 43 RlnL. 077; Aug. 26. 1035, ch. 093, 49 Stnt. 007;
i* Aur. 7. 1939. ch. 557. 53 Strtt. 1250).
r . section 317 of Mid title 1R. U. S. C. 1940 cd., was ln-
{ corpnrntcd In this and srctlon 170n of this title.
t . Minor chnngc* were mrtdc In phraseology.
V % 170.1. Delay or destruction of mail or newspapers.
I (in Whoever, beiiif,' a Postal Service officer or
*: employer, unlawfully secretes, destroys, detains, dc-
l lays, or opens any letter, postal card, package, bay.
t or mail, entrusted to him or which shall come into
£.his possession, and which wa.s intended to be con-
y veyed by mail, or carried or delivered by any carrier
\ or other employee of Die Postal .Service, or for-
warded throup.h or delivered from any post ofllcc
or station thereof established by authority of the
Postmaster General or the Postal Service, shall be
fined not more lha.ii $500 or imprisoned not more
i than five years, or both.
• Mj) Whoever, brine a Postal Service officer or
'. employee, improperly detains, delays, or destroys any
■ newspaper, or permits any other person to detain,
' delay, or destroy the same, or opens, or permits. any
'.'other person to open, any mail or package of-news-
* papers not directed to the office where he is cm-
? ployed: or"
Whoever, without authority, opens, or destroys any
mall or package, of newspapers not directed to him.
1. shall be lined not more than $100 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both. (June 2f», 1948. ch. G4!>,
■ C2 Stat. 770; May 24. 1943, ch. 130. §37. 63 Stat.
OS; Am:. 12. 1970, Pub. L. 91-375, $G<J>UG>. 84
Stat: 778.) '
LrctSLAnvr. UrsTonT
rtcvtxrr:* r.'o/r.- B.^cd on title in. U. S. C. 1940 cd.,
If 318. 310 (Mnr. 4. 1909, ch. 321. (f 105, 100, 35 Stnt. 1125.
1120).
6cctIon consolidated sections 318 and 319 of sold title 10.
U. 3. C 1040 cd. The embezzlement nnd theft provisions
of men were Incorporated In sections 1709 nnd 1710 of
this title.
Minor chnngca were mnde In phrnscology.
AMt.NIIMI NTS
H170— Suhscc. (ix). rid). '11.375. 5 fHJi (10) <A>. Inserted
"nrrrclCfi. deploys." prr<-edin|: •■dr1:ilie." :r; n MihsllUilc
for ". or sccrcles. or destroys nny such iclier, |n*;.1:\l card,
package. Imi;. or mall" d'-lchd ImMowIih: "IVj^trn -isier tlen-
rr.'il". substituted "Postal Service olli.er or employee" for
"pMStina-Mer or i'^-tnl IWvlrc employee", unci |n->cr'cd
"or ihr* Postal Service" lollowlnj; "Po^ma-Mcr tirnrr.il".
Suhscc. (b). rub. I.. 9l-:»7;.. S «ij( ll«HH». substituted
"rosLil Service olliccr «r employee" for "postmaster or
Postal Service employee".
1949— Subscc. (a). Act May 21. 1M9. S 37 (a), sub-
stituted "secretes" for "secrets" following "Postmnsler
General".
Stibscc. (b). Act May 24, 19-19, 5 37 (b). substituted
"newspapers" for "newspaper".
Kmsntvi: Daib or lf>70 Ahi:niimi:ht
Amendment by Pub. I.. 0I-37R rilertlve uliliin I yenr
nfter Aui*. 12. l'.'TO, on date estal'llshrrl then-fnr by the
Hoard of Governors of the United States l'or;lnl St vie
nnd puhllr.hed by It in the Fedfral It''j;lster, see wctlon
15(a) ol Pub. I., n 1-375. set unt ns a note preceding section
101 of Title 39. Postal Service.
§ 1701. Keys or locks stolen or reproduced.
Whoever steals, purloins, embezzles, or obtains by
false pretense any key suited to any lock adopted by
the Post Ollicc Department or the Postal Service
and In use on any of the mails or baqs thereof, or
any key to any lock box. lock drawer, or other
authorized rcreptaclc for the deposit or delivery of
mail matter; or
Whoever knowingly and unlawfully makes, forces
or counterfeits any such key, or possrsser. any such
mall lock or key with the inlenl unlawfully or Im-
properly to use. sell, oj- otherwise dispose of the same,
or to cause the same to be unlawfully or improperly
used. "sold, or otherwise disposed of; or
Whoever', beinr; cne.artcd as a contractor or other-
wist: in the manufacture ol any such mail lock, or key
delivers any finished or untmishrd'lorl: or the into- ■
rior part thereof, or key, used or designed for use by
tho department, lo any pcr.'.on not duly authorized
under the hand of the Postmaster General and the
seal of the Post Ollicc Department or the Postal
Service, to receive the same, unless the person re-
ceiving it is the contractor for Turnishinn the same
or encaced in the manufacture thereof in the man-
ner authorized by the contract, o** the npent of such
manufacturer —
Shall bo fined not more than $500 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both. (June 25, 1948,
ch. G45. G2 Stat. 778; Aur. 12 ,1970. Pub. L. 91-375,
S6iJH17i.84SUiL.778.)
Leg isi, ATI vr Histout
nrviw's Natr. -l!:iscd on title 10. U. S. ('.. 1910 cd.,
I 3H (Mar. 4. 1909. ch. 321, S 191. 35 Slat. 1 1 2S > .
lleferetice lo persons alillni:, rau.'dnr, or" aislsllni; was
omlltrd. Such. piTMins nrc principals under flection 2 of -
this title.
Mandatory punishment provision wits rephrased In the
alternative.'
Minor changes wcic mnde In phraseology.
Ami:ni»m»:nts
1970— Pub. L. !»|.-37.'i Inserted "or the Postul Service"
followlne 'Tost Onicc Depaitnicuf in. first ami Udrd pars.
ErFKTTivn 1*)atb or 11)711 Amtnomknt
Ameiidmciit hy Tub. I,. ni-37. r i elloctlve wllhln 1 year
after Aug. 12. 1970, on date established therefor by the
Board 'of Governors of the United Slates Postal Service
389
Exhibit 61
1? MAY W 3
SUBJECT: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)
Chairman, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, June 1970
1. On Friday, 5 June 1970, the President held a conference
with Director!} and officials of the intelligence community. This
resulted in the establishment of the subject Ad Hoc Committee.
2. The White House representative to the Working Sub-
committee of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence was Tom C.
Huston. Tie stated that the President's primary concern was to
strengthen and improve American intelligenc
possible in orde **""* "* ' * ' ' "
Ligence field. The
American intelligence community,
in spite of its achievements, had never fully realized its great poten-
tial nor had it functioned to the maximum of its capacity.
3. In the same vein, the Committee was informed that it had
been given by the President a unique and unparalleled opportunity to
make a great and enduring contribution to intelligence operations and
thereby to the national security posture as a whole. The Committee
was assured that there were no obstacles of any kind in its path.
4. Thefirst meeting of the Interagency Working Subcommittee
was chaired by W. C. Sullivanof the FBI and attended by Mr. Helms.
The following personnel attended:
FBI Donald E. Moore who was subsequently
succeeded by Charles D. Brennan.
Mr. Fred J. Cassidy was added to FBI
representation
George C._ Moore _ _
NSA Benson K. Buffham
Navy Capt. Edward tUfenburgb
AF Col. Rudolph Holler
Army Lt. Col. John Downie
390
DIA James Stilwcll
CIA James Angleton
Mr. Helms gave a brief resume of the President's conference
and turned the meeting over to Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Sullivan echoed
the remarks of Mr. Huston a*nd stated that the "deadline for the first
draft of the Committee Report would be due at the close of business,
?.?. Juno 1970, and the final version was to be on the President's desk
on 1 July 1970.
5. The Interagency Working Subcommittee met a total of
four times, to wit: 9, 12, 18, and ?..3 June. The agenda which was
gradually formulated in response to the President's request covers
all matters set forth in the Special Report which was submitted by
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover to the President and which was signed by Mr.
J. Edgar Hoover, FBI; Mr. Richard Helms, CIA; U. General D. V.
Bennett, USA, Director, DIA; and Vice Admiral Noel Gaylcr, USN,
Director, NSA. Minutes of each meeting were maintained and
submitted for approval during the course of each succeeding meeting.
The CIA representative, Mr. James Angleton, was assisted by Mr.
Richard Obcr of the Agency, and Mr. William O. Crcgar of the FBI,
functioned as secretary for the Working Subcommittee.
6. Mr. Huston kept reminding the Working Subcommittee
that its duty was to present the most thorough program and options
to the President and he expressed at times annoyance when the sub-
ject of political considerations were introduced into the discussion,
7. By way of background, it should be noted that Mr. Sullivan
and Mr. Huston had been in frequent contact on these matters before,
because Mr. Sullivan was extremely displeased by the number of
restrictions wbich had been placed on the FBI by Mr, Hoover.
8. It should also be noted that Mr. Huston informed the mem-
bers of the Working Subcommittee that his role would be comparable
on domestic affairs to that of Dr. Kissinger on foreign affairs. After
the report had been submitted, he issued an instruction from the
White House that all material relating to matters of domestic intelli-
gence or internal security interest be directed to his exclusive atten-
tion. (Sec attachment).
391
9. Mr, Hoover was known to have voiced his most strcnuouB
personal objections to the Attorney General regarding the establish-
ment of the Committee. It is our understanding that the Attorney
General interceded on Mr. Hoover's behalf at the White House and that-"
Mr. Huston was eventually relieved of hla duties.
10. Subsequently, with the emergence of Mr. Mrtrdinn as
Assistant Attorney Genoral for Internal Security, the Intelligence
Evaluation Committee was formed which held its first meeting on
3 December in Mr. Dean's office at tho White House. In' attendance
were interagency representatives.
IEC Membership
CIA: Richard Ohur
White House: John W. Dean III
Justice: Robert C. Mardian
FBI: George C. Moore
Treasury: Eugene Rossides -
' NSA: Benson K. Buffam
Defense: Colonel John Downie
Secret Service: Thomas T. Kelly
11. Intelligence Evaluation Committee met seven times
between 3 December 1970 and 20 July 1971. The work of the
Committee has been carried on by a permanent interagency ntaff,
the Intelligence Evaluation Staff, which has met regularly under
the Chairmanship of the Department of Justice official (currently
Mr. Bernard A. Wells) from January 1971 to the present. The Agency
representative, Uichard Ober, contributes Intelligence on foreign
aspects of papers prepared by the staff. Staff papers are distributed
to the White House (Mr. John Dean) and to the heads of the participating
Agencies.
12. In time, Mr. Mardian returned to the question of the report
and had many discussions with Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Dean on these
matters- at a time when Mr. Sullivan was having hie problems with
Mr. Hoover.
13. To the best of ourknowledge, the origin of this exercise
began when Mr. John Dean was at the Department of Justice and was
concerned with the May Day demonstrations (May 1, 1970). He was
subsequently transferred as Counsel to the President where he con-
tinued his close relations with Mr. Mardian. It is our understanding
392
that widespread civil disorders prompted the President to address
himself to this problem. It should also be noted that the President
and the Attorney General were aware of the complete breakdown of
personal liaison between the" FBI and the .intelligence community.
14. ■ The question of gaps in intelligence collection is embodied
in correspondence between Mr. Hoover and the Director of Central
Intelligence of March 1970. Prior to that period in January and
February 1970. Director Helms conferred with Attorney General
Mitchell regarding the inadequacies of domestic collection. Also
on 13 February 1970, Admiral Gayler. Director of the National
Security Agency, saw the Attorney General to protest the Bureau's
withdrawal from sensitive domestic operations of vital importance
to the National Security Agency.
15. William C. Sullivan resigned from the FBI on 6 October
1971 (Washington Post, May 17, 1973, page 20). Robert C. Mardlan
left the Department of Justice to work on the President's re-election
campaign on April 1972 (according to information from FBI and
Department of Justice officials). Executive Registry states on the
evening of 17 May 1973, that after checking the records, thoro is no
indication of any memorandum prepared by Mr. Helms concerning
the 5 June 1970 meeting with the President.
16. Most of the gaps In collection still remain as set forth in
the Report. There are two subjects of possible concern:
a. International airmail to and from the Union of
Socialist Soviet Republics and the United States has been
screened by this Agency under conditions of maximum
security control at a single international air facility in this
country beginning in November 1952. In some Instances, data
on the envelopes were recorded, and in some cases the envelopes
wore opened, contents recorded and rcscaled. This activity
■ was suspended in Fobruary 1973.
b. . Tho second concerns itself with thef '■
16 April 1971: Tho Agency proposed to the FBI the installa-
tion of technical coverage of the
23 April 1971: FBI Director Hoover turned down the proposal
4 '
393
23 April 1971: CIA Director Helms sent a letter to
Attorney Genera 1 . Mitchell requesting that
tho FBI turn-down be rcvoreed.
24 April 1971: The Attorney Genornl reversed the FBI
decision.
26 April 1971: Technical equipment was delivered from tho
Agency to the FBI.
18 May 1971; . All of the devices which had been Installed
in the ; ■ '(during the period 27 April
to IS Ma y~ wo r e""t o a ted and ill wore working.
3 Feb. 1972: Coverage waa slopped at Agency request
because Hoover had advised thnt he waa to
testify In Congrefia and would advise the
Congress that the installation in the/ ~ ~
'" " 'was initiated at CIA request. ~"— —
8 Dec. 1972: The Agoncy requested the Fill re institute
coverage of the
20 Dec. 1972: Tho Department of Elate requested the F_ni
institute all possible coverage of the,
22 Dec. 1972; Coverage was partially relnatitutcd.
26 Doc. 1972: '^institution of coverage completed.
16 Feb. 1973; CIA roquustod tho FBI to discontinue
tho coverage.
22 Feb. 1973:
Jamoa Anplcton
394
'- " ' THZ While. ,-:Ouo.- ;
«* WA 5 H I N G TO N
) ■ ■'"■ ■ . '
-• ' ••■•'. •■..'' July 9, 1970
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Helms
.Director, Central Intelligence .Agency
SUBJECT: Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security Affairs
In the future,. I would appreciate it if your agency
would address all material relating to matters of domestic
intelligence or internal security interest to my exclusive
attention.
The President is anxious to centralize the
coordination at the White House of all information of this
~\ l yP e . and your cooperation in this regard would be appreciated.
Dr. Kissinger is aware of this new procedure.
TOM CHARLES HUSTON
395
Exhibit 62
2. 1 TOM CHARLES HUSTON MEMORANDUM, SEPTEMBER 21, 1970,
SSC EXHIBIT NO. 42, 3 SSC 1338-1345 WITH ATTACHMENTS
1338
Exhibit No. 42 . ' ,'<?)
MEMORANDUM /y£&**~^
THE WHITE HOUSE
V/ASMNOTOX
September. 21, 1970 .
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HAL.DEMAN
SUBJECT: IRS Cc Ideological Organizations
I am attaching a copy of a report from the IRS on the activities of Its
"Special Service Group" which la supposed to monitor the activities of
Ideological organizations [e.g., Jerry Rubin Fund, Black Panthers, etc.)
and take appropriate action when violations of IRS regulations turn up.
You will note that the report Is loog on words and short on substance.
Nearly 18 months ago, the President Indicated a desire for IRS to move
against- leftist organizations taking advantage of tax shelters, rhave been
pressing IRS since that time to no avail.
What we cannot do to a courtroom via criminal prosecutions to. curtail
the activities of some of these groups, IRS could do by administrative action.
Moreover, valuable Intelligence-type Information could be turned up by IRS
as a result of their field audits.
ilCHAR
LES HUSTON
Attachment
62-685 O - 76 - 26
396
Exhibit 63
pr e sid'ehtla l" t ai::---\c- -papek
Maetin; with J. idgar
EHZ PR03I
Richard Helms, Lt. Gen. Sennett (DIA)
iayier, (XSA) '
■1
The magnitude of the internal security pforSIem we face
today rriay perhaps best be described in semantic terms. We have
moved from the " student activism" which characterized the civil'
rights movements in the early '60s through the " protest movement s"
which rallied behind the anti-war banner beginning with the March
on the Pentagon in 1967 to the " revolutionary terrorism " being
.perpetrated today by determined professionals.
iWe are now confronted with a new and grave crisis in pux
country -- one which we know too little about. Certainly hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of Americans -- mostly under 30 — are
determined to destroy our society. They find in. many of the legitimate
grievances of our citizenry opportunities for exploitation which never
escape the attention of demagogues. They. are reaching out for the
support — ideological and otherwise --of foreign powers and they
are developing their own brand of indiginous revolutionary activism
which' ia as dangerous as anything which they could import from
Cuba, China, or the Soviet Union.. '
The internal security problem we face today is complicated
by many factors:
FOLDZR TITLE:
- coirtAissa xiraa:
t
397
, :ir , - ;' un:i.<i; "ne trazitisr-al Conir.ur.ist party organization.,
the new rev-luiionary groups are not tightly structured
ar.c ciscipiined -- which means th;y are less susceptible to
?.biiUy -? rr.r.ir.ia;;-. ciscar.i. r.oir.m-.r.icaiior. lir>.s requires
far breeder coverage than has beep, traditionally required!
third, our people -- perhaps as a reaction..to the
excesses of the McCarthy era -- are unwilling to admit
the possibility that 'Yr.eir children? 1 could wish to destroy
their country. This is particularly true of the media .
and the academic commuriitv.
—J
** ^ our fo > &i & newer revolutionary organizations place a high
premium on violence. Terrorism has replaced subversion
as .the immediate threat.
THE REQUIREMENT —
The Government must know more about the activities of these
■ groups and we must develop a plan which will enable us to curtail
the illegal activities of those who are determined to destroy our society.
The immediate problem is the increasing recourse to terrorism.
■ This must be halted before innocent people are killed.
398
THE PRESIDE XX '5 COXCEn.-;
I want each cf you to rino-.v personally ^hat this Adrr_iz1is1r2.i~.cz.
is 'committed to the preservation of internal stability in this country.
I do not intend c.i 3it idly by while self-appointed r-jvoUitionaries
.is. being mobilized to halt these illegal activities. Our naw s.::U-
bombing legislation is an important first s:ep, but it io an' "titer-:
the.fact" measure. Good intelligence is tV.e best way to stop
.opportunity to act,
THE '-MANDATE
receiving at the White House,. I am convinced inai we are not
currently allocating sufficient resources within the intelligence
community to the collection of intelligence data on the activities
of these revolutionary groups. We need more hard information upon .
which to make decisions about courses of action open to the Government
in dealing with these problems as they arise. ~.
Consequently, I would like Dick Helms to designate the USIB
representatives from the FBI, CIA, NSA ( DIA and military services to
serve on a special sub-committee to review the collection efforts of
399
rec=--....ssd to -..= adiiriDcil st^cs ■:-;'rJ. ci. can be taken to strengthen
of the 5- ub-cornvr •.::?>-:.
."■.,'. Tom Huston can provide the sub-corr.rr-ltjee ".--ife detailed information
on the scope ox thi r C ', :<;,•. which :■:-.=.. = in. r.:iivi. I * Ju." d like to h=.ve"
CONCLUSION'
which has the opsra.tic:-.ai capacity to ccr.tr; 1 ; -ji:s tc- nu'r understanding
of this problem should reorient its priorities so as to reflect the
concern which. I have just expressed. V.'e need to insure that ' . .
the fullest possible inter-agency cooperation is being realized and
that all our resources are being utilized to gather the types of
information which will enable us to halt the spread of this terrorism
before it gets completely out of hand.
- •. I know_tbat_you \vill_cooperate_irL every wayiin seeing, tiiat—
this joint effort is mounted at once.
400
Exhibit 64
v.i :\'.;i2:-a;-'ru-'<:irjw s-Virri-'o-.i-:.:-:
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iVjii. .V.'ri^i ox' ACC -'i.-.d -Jco Heagsmuhla o'C tsa F3i caiiaCl to ^ilc vJietber
•;".;•« i-'31! could furai:i tha TTnita i-cuss thu list ot'.oorf co."-':— Lcut:;r., vhich
•vi-.j i''J.-rJ.3ied to cr.o 331 by J3S. 'Ihd 731 bj-> t-v-yji r.-cu-jj'^.i jy tha
Whi-3 i!ou*3 to .furnish a report on ti-.a funding or' v;--.ricud nilltx-i b
(5r;;ani-i'-tiO! , .3. &«y vculd lil;o 'to send the lnro~::ation •./a c.- 1 - •-'acufc
.uO.S 'io (;.•:.=; '.ihita h'oiisa.
t f.dvisy-i t'r..Vc i'rcrr) -i. didcloaurs :;Uat;'!poi::i, it' '& 'ih:.t-:s i!c)'J3>-! i; t;ii - "
i.-iinied taij en 1;c-uiHli J of -the Preslca/i;,. thefts v?.;i no :ll.r.clo:-;uf!
pr:i"oIa::i; bv.t in vv-jv oi' tha s'-iiwi'tLvB JiVctir-s r.<' fh:j !:;:'.ir.r>f .'•.ml of
o : 'hsr invr;j!ii<<ici"r:d :/.r.d yrccljpji^ I ";/or. tid in c'.r-s •':;•: this -r.'ji
'.'.::. Craea to ,';it hij ripproyrii.
v 'fold i-ir- J'Onv,sif.'.u0.3 ("..'ho aloo -./natrsO. 'i:o ".-"-^ '■.'•:« ItJCo ":•'■'■ c'-^n ho ths
;\':. y ainsj Cfl::«.ry.l) '•''.V'.i'; .'r.srj -..-.w v.o ';:.'cV>..;. 1 > l:i , i , u. An .Y.;s i.;; >.;■..»'■;
Attorney 0.:ner-_il had r.;<;.usstsd ths :>.2;xo~.Vit-Vja J.'rcni i:a in ■.!cjc":i:i. , .ncs
ri.th 'hfcii t'.i - .; clcsur-3 rrs^ulucion.^ . fj'iiio.s th.ys ,\':'zax~a:/ C-sMrai. ■v-u ir/ar
'this AjiHj^-a!; AtVirnsy G-Tsfiersi, thsr-.; certain."!../ •; !, .3 ;:o lirjo t'.s.'a in
i'umlshln^ t.ie difc-?. to hi;n.
X c'.'.il*:d '-'~~ Cirsrta ccn^omin^: this luatter ; .'~d .V-s './.'J.! .'.'..: t r,.y '-.nov
.".:•• r.:oon iwj jOojjVjIj .
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3. 0. Vi.rd.Li
:;::: i;r. CV^isrn
tlr. Vf.l;vib . • /
f/'jfx. :■ :i i.;-.(.i: V : OI , Apr.l ". 10, J.vVO, in th.v (;o!,i:.i.l:;s"!.oiVir'!! i>.L'i" '.;:.?, r. toW
;..r. (;:-;.;n £.',i.i;. til.? f.lC t;.Mit;!tl i,o Uiiuw i.o;'a/ :.!)■.! i.':i.^;:- l.i--.:/ <;o!:.!.t! .f. r. in l;-.i
our >'..-;-j.->. to l.ii'.; '.•;• :.it-;i i!olK3a. 'j.'iici l/hi.t.j i!oi;J : i ."..s-.^Lvl tV:': rr.iL-! ■i-.. I i!o-r.
"..:•, C.H.-ifi -vid to t..yL.'..V.i.i yj.r to =;o .•■;v'.->.il ?.:\:i \-jL.-y.\3-i o".r :V;'i'o:T.v..tl"iri .
:vr-d :>cy emit! r:i;o.ty ih:vt it c;:tic.! fvo:^ r;;;; n?.:;i. /
401
Exhibit 65
10 February. 1?5?
IlS-JDRAirnUK FOR: Th3 Honorable Kenry A. Kissinger
Tho Ar,siatcr.t to. the President.
for national Security Affairs
Tho V/hito Kcasa
SUBJECT: Stucbnt Unrest
?.. }kro:-rlth i3 e. syr/ay' of studsnfc disslcianco vorld-
vico p.;-. requested, by tl'.o President.
.2. In on effort to rcund-oMt our dlsousnion of this
subject, vo hsvo inclM-.iecl a section on Arrjricsn studsruta.
.This Ik m area not within tl.o' charter' of this Agency, so I
noc-ri r.nt crch-viizo hr.r o:ctrer:sly scr.ait.ivo this riskss fchf!
p-sj::i.r. Should Anyc>.id learn of .its exlctencn it Would prova
rccsfc e:il-arr£03i«:2 for all. concerned.
3« Also par the President's request,' T a.-i prsrarad to
glvo p. thirty : .-:ir.ut«j briefing based on this study "nhsncvcr
it i;cetD Ms convenience.
\ ' • ' " • '
Richard "-fa Las
Director
Att-chrwnt - 1
"Rastlc;:.- Icuth", Copy ?. ; o. 1
No. 05;.'-5/u?.
OCI/PCorsc dc!'.;n:da - 11/2/69 ..
Rfivritt'.-n: MHo'. , .r.i-/oc-.i - 13/2/6?
D5.ntri.buti n: Oris & 1 -'addressee
1 - DCI .
1 - K3/I
1 - O/HCI rils
.0;:.b ; -:../
402
- 2 -
3. I *■*"* thought Ion- and ):;;rd etoui. th:> latter aspect
of thi-3 problem. An t!io conr-jq^ncc, I or. cnbclu::^:! to r.i-:o n
cur.-estio-i -..-hlch lias outsit;.-: tho ra'.r-;c of ~.y raspor.LrLbilitlcs:
Kvcccnlsins that, the Federal Bureau of Invcsti cation oparr.tca
et present on a. rectrictr.d baala in collsct.lr^ information on
United States radicals, you m-ay -wish to connl.-ior having tho Furss'.'.
ouvhoris^d to use -ore advanced invL;i ; ;Ur,aUve tocJinlquso in deal-
ing vith tlsi.i problr ; .u.
).io Yo'-x .and Mr. Rc-nto*.* r.cr.r ha 1 , o tho only two copies of tiiia
report -.,-hich sra outsit tho custody of this Agency.
^...■■--/ »■ ■■-
Richard rclrno
Director
Att.^tacr.t - 3.
Copy !io. 1 - ?,'o. C513/6B - 523TII-S3 lOUTH.
cci V : r* Krlt Hostc-.i -;/.?. tt.v.chn'. out (Cory ? : 'o. 2)
RHelr.s/ecd - 3/9/63
Distribution: OriE^-i • addressee
1 ■- Kr. Corscr*ddcn
1 - F.H .
403
U ScpteHbsr 1?£3 • ,
..KEI-O.TAJ.'DWM FO.-i.i Tha President. •
1. 5o~3 tir;<j 0-2° y° u requested that I r,"ko occaalcml round-
vp reports on youth rr.d atudcnt movements vorldv/ldo, Soapor.dLn-j to
this roqusc-ti, and f-uicod by consents and suggest t.oiis i'roa V:'abt
Rostov,-. '.i2 hay-3 prepared ths attached study. Tou i.J.Uj cf couro3>,
bo aware cf the peculiar ccnrsltlvity which atta.o!-.-?.o to tho f?.ct
that CIA has prepared a report on student cctdvitic;; both hero nnd
cbroad.
2. T fesil th-at thin is -a -Rood imi cfirsfnl report, probably
tho bscit that car J be; do: o r/o thi-j tir.a, I Jin disappointed, however.
r.3 porhaps you i&ll bs f . by our inr.bllL'.y to bo nora precise about
tbo r.otivnt.ion end dtvction'of this v>rldwidc Eoycr^nt. Sc:.-;d of
this rj.bl^iity d-rivc:.. Proa tho sor.evhat unfocused nature o.C tho
novcz-.cnt itself. Ueyjrtd that, ::;y fe;r-lo- that v:o ray ho lacking h;-.t
— precision- of, inCo.rnc-ii on -v.h.ich viou-ld- n-'.:3 -n no-re -positive* report —
' possible.
o
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